New York Law Review

Tag: Rosario Rule

  • People v. Martinez, 22 N.Y.3d 551 (2014): Adverse Inference Charge for Lost Evidence

    People v. Martinez, 22 N.Y.3d 551 (2014)

    When Rosario material is lost or destroyed, a sanction is not mandated unless the defendant establishes prejudice; if prejudice is shown, the choice of the proper sanction is left to the trial judge’s discretion.

    Summary

    Defendants Selbin and Christopher Martinez were convicted of attempted robbery. The key issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in declining to give an adverse inference charge to the jury after a police officer’s handwritten complaint report (scratch 61) was lost. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion because the defendants failed to demonstrate they were prejudiced by the missing document. The court emphasized that the defense must establish prejudice before a sanction is required for lost Rosario material, and the choice of sanction lies within the trial court’s discretion.

    Facts

    Armando Irizarry, Sr., a resident of a public housing building, was accosted in the hallway outside his apartment by two men dressed in black, one with a baseball bat (Selbin) and one with a gun (Christopher). Irizarry recognized Selbin by his walk and Christopher by his movements, which were similar to how he reacted to Irizarry’s dog. Irizarry fought them off, and he and his son fled. Police Officer Franco responded to the scene and interviewed Irizarry. Franco prepared a handwritten complaint report (scratch 61). Selbin was found hiding in a closet in his apartment with a head injury consistent with Irizarry’s account that he struck Selbin with a billiard ball. Christopher was arrested the next day.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were jointly tried and convicted of attempted robbery. During trial, it was revealed that the police officer’s handwritten complaint report (scratch 61) was missing. The defense requested an adverse inference charge, which the trial court denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by declining to give an adverse inference charge to the jury after a police officer’s handwritten complaint report, considered Rosario material, was lost, when the defense failed to demonstrate prejudice from the loss.

    Holding

    No, because the defendants failed to establish that they were prejudiced by the loss of the scratch 61. The choice of a proper sanction lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed its prior case law regarding the loss or destruction of Rosario material (statements of a witness that the prosecution must disclose to the defense). The Court emphasized that the per se reversal rule (requiring automatic reversal of a conviction if Rosario material was not disclosed) does not apply when Rosario material is lost or destroyed; rather, a showing of prejudice is required. The Court cited People v. Martinez, 71 N.Y.2d 937 (1988), stating that if the People fail to preserve Rosario material and the defendant is prejudiced, the court must impose an appropriate sanction, focusing primarily on eliminating prejudice. The Court distinguished cases such as People v. Wallace, 76 N.Y.2d 953 (1990) and People v. Joseph, 86 N.Y.2d 565 (1995), where sanctions were called for due to deliberate destruction of Rosario material and demonstrated prejudice.

    In this case, the Court found that the defendants failed to establish prejudice. The defense attorneys requested an adverse inference charge simply because the scratch 61 could not be produced, without articulating any specific potential prejudice. The Court noted the speculative nature of the defendants’ arguments, such as suggesting the scratch 61 might have contained an inconsistent statement from Irizarry. The Court highlighted the legislative intent behind CPL § 240.75, which signals an aversion to per se rules leading to reversal of convictions for Rosario violations.

    The Court concluded that because the defendants did not meet their burden of demonstrating prejudice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to issue an adverse inference charge. The Court also rejected the defendants’ other claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and the propriety of the identification charge.

  • People v. Machado, 90 N.Y.2d 187 (1997): Standard for Rosario Violations in CPL 440.10 Motions

    People v. Machado, 90 N.Y.2d 187 (1997)

    A defendant seeking to vacate a judgment of conviction on Rosario grounds via a CPL 440.10 motion, whether made before or after direct appeal, must demonstrate prejudice resulting from the Rosario violation.

    Summary

    Machado was convicted of kidnapping and felony assault. Prior to the exhaustion of his direct appeal, he brought a CPL 440.10 motion alleging a Rosario violation based on the prosecution’s failure to disclose a police report. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding that because the CPL 440.10 motion was filed before the direct appeal was exhausted, the violation itself required reversal (per se error). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prejudice standard of CPL 440.10(1)(f) applies uniformly to Rosario claims raised in CPL 440.10 motions, regardless of whether the motion is made before or after direct appeal.

    Facts

    Machado seized his estranged wife, Lydia Machado, and forced her into his van. As he drove away, her brother, Edwin Morales, was dragged and fatally injured. Machado drove around with his wife, assaulting her. He was apprehended and charged with murder, kidnapping, and assault. At trial, Detective Russell, who investigated Morales’s death, testified for the People. The People did not disclose a report authored by Detective Russell, which contained a summary stating that Mrs. Machado sustained minor injuries and refused medical aid.

    Procedural History

    The jury acquitted Machado of murder and assault with a dangerous instrument but convicted him of kidnapping and felony assault. Machado appealed, arguing a Rosario violation based on the withheld Russell Report. The Appellate Division denied his motion to enlarge the record to include the report. While the appeal was pending, Machado filed a CPL 440.10 motion arguing that a “per se error” standard applied because the motion was made before his direct appeal was exhausted. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction, suggesting the Rosario claim be raised in a CPL 440.10 motion. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. Supreme Court denied Machado’s CPL 440.10 motion, finding the report wasn’t Rosario material and that Machado hadn’t demonstrated prejudice. The Appellate Division reversed, finding Rosario material and applying a per se error standard, vacating the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted the People’s leave application.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the per se error rule or the prejudice standard applies to Rosario violations raised by CPL 440.10 motions made before a defendant’s direct appeal has been exhausted.

    Holding

    No, because the unambiguous terms of CPL 440.10 (1)(f) require that a defendant making a CPL 440.10 motion seeking to vacate a judgment of conviction on Rosario grounds demonstrate prejudice resulting from the violation, regardless of when the motion is made relative to the direct appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 440.10(1)(f) explicitly requires a showing of prejudice for vacating a judgment based on improper conduct. The court emphasized the importance of statutory interpretation, stating that courts cannot broaden the scope of the remedy beyond what the Legislature specified. To apply a per se rule for pre-appeal 440.10 motions while requiring prejudice for post-appeal motions would give the word “prejudicial” two different meanings in the same statute. The Court acknowledged society’s interest in the finality of judgments, which is a key consideration in CPL 440.10 motions. The Court found that a uniform standard for CPL 440.10 motions, requiring a showing of prejudice (a “reasonable possibility” that the nondisclosure materially contributed to the verdict), adequately balances fairness to defendants and the need for the People to fulfill their disclosure obligations.

  • People v. Kelly, 88 N.Y.2d 242 (1996): Defining “Control” for Rosario Material Disclosure

    People v. Kelly, 88 N.Y.2d 242 (1996)

    Prosecutors are only required to disclose witness statements under People v. Rosario that are in their actual possession or control, and records held by independent state agencies like the Division of Parole are not generally considered to be under prosecutorial control.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether prosecutors must provide defense counsel with interview notes and reports from the State Division of Parole under CPL 240.45(1)(a) and People v. Rosario. The Court held that such records are not generally under the control of prosecutors because the Division of Parole is an independent state agency. The Court emphasized that the prosecutorial duty to disclose Rosario material extends only to documents within the actual possession or control of the prosecutor’s office, clarifying that agencies like Parole, while part of the Executive branch, operate outside the law enforcement chain for Rosario purposes. This decision overturned lower court rulings that had vacated convictions based on the non-disclosure of parole records.

    Facts

    Defendants Kelly, Brown, and White were convicted in separate jury trials for drug-related offenses and rape, respectively. In each case, the arresting police officer had been interviewed by the defendant’s parole officer, and records of these interviews were maintained by the New York State Division of Parole. These records were not disclosed to the defense during the trials. The defendants subsequently sought to vacate their convictions, arguing that these parole records constituted Rosario material that should have been disclosed.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court vacated the judgments in CPL 440.10 proceedings, holding that the parole officers’ interview notes were Rosario material that the prosecution should have provided to the defense. The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the Supreme Court’s orders, reasoning that the Division of Parole was a distinct state agency, and its records were not in the possession or control of the prosecutors. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether interview notes and reports of the State Division of Parole constitute material that prosecutors are required to provide to defense counsel under CPL 240.45 (1)(a) and People v Rosario.

    Holding

    No, because Parole Division records are not generally in the possession or control of prosecutors.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the obligation to disclose Rosario material is limited to items in the actual possession or control of the prosecution. The Court emphasized that the Division of Parole functions as an independent state administrative agency, separate from local law enforcement. The Court distinguished the Division of Parole from agencies directly involved in law enforcement, stating that while parole officers have some law enforcement functions, their primary role is the supervision of parolees. The Court relied on People v. Howard, noting that the Department of Correctional Services is “at the end of the State’s law enforcement chain,” and the Division of Parole is generally beyond that chain. The Court highlighted the importance of prosecutorial control as the legally dispositive issue. The Court stated, “We are persuaded and satisfied that records of the State Division of Parole should not generally be deemed to be in the control of 62 county prosecutors, nor of any other prosecutorial office subject to the Rosario rule.” The Court explicitly rejected the First Department’s decision in People v. Fields to the extent it conflicted with this holding.

  • People v. Smith, 89 N.Y.2d 941 (1997): Prosecution’s Duty to Disclose Witness Statements Held by Corrections

    People v. Smith, 89 N.Y.2d 941 (1997)

    The prosecution is not obligated to locate and turn over witness statements made during a prison disciplinary proceeding when those statements are held by the Department of Correctional Services, as that agency is primarily administrative rather than law enforcement.

    Summary

    Smith, a prison inmate, was convicted of assault. He argued that the prosecution failed to disclose statements of witnesses made during his prison disciplinary proceeding, violating the Rosario rule. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the prosecution had no duty to obtain and disclose these statements because they were held by the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), an administrative agency. The court reasoned that DOCS is not a law enforcement agency with a duty to share such material with the District Attorney, distinguishing it from entities directly involved in criminal investigations.

    Facts

    The defendant, Smith, was an inmate. He was involved in an incident within the correctional facility that led to criminal charges of assault. During the prison’s internal disciplinary proceedings regarding the incident, witness statements were taken. These statements were recorded in transcripts held by the State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS).

    Procedural History

    Smith was convicted of assault. He appealed, arguing that the prosecution violated the Rosario rule by failing to disclose the witness statements from the prison disciplinary proceeding. The Appellate Division upheld the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the statements of witnesses made during the defendant’s prison disciplinary proceeding constituted Rosario material that the prosecution was required to disclose.

    2. Whether the inmate-eyewitness’s in-court identification had an independent source.

    3. Whether the admission of testimony by a correction officer regarding a pretrial identification procedure was permissible bolstering requiring reversal.

    4. Whether the circumstantial evidence offered at trial was legally sufficient to establish defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statements were not within the People’s control as they were generated and held by the State Department of Correctional Services, an administrative rather than a law enforcement agency.

    2. Yes, because there was support in the Wade hearing record for the Appellate Division’s finding that the inmate-eyewitness’s in-court identification had an independent source.

    3. No, because the admission of testimony by a correction officer regarding that pretrial identification procedure was impermissible bolstering; however, the error was harmless in light of the clear and strong evidence of defendant’s guilt.

    4. Yes, because the circumstantial evidence offered at trial was, when viewed in a light most favorable to the People, legally sufficient to establish defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Rosario rule, requiring the prosecution to disclose prior statements of its witnesses, only applies to materials within the People’s control. The witness statements in question were held by DOCS, which the court characterized as primarily an administrative agency, not a law enforcement agency with a duty to share information with the District Attorney. The Court distinguished the Correction Department from agencies at the end of the State’s law enforcement chain, emphasizing its administrative function. The court cited People v. Washington, 86 NY2d 189, 192-193 and People v. Flynn, 79 NY2d 779, 882, indicating that the People had no obligation to attempt to locate and gain possession of the material.

    Regarding the in-court identification, the Court deferred to the Appellate Division’s finding of an independent source. As to the bolstering claim, the Court acknowledged the error but deemed it harmless due to the strength of the other evidence against the defendant. Finally, the court found the circumstantial evidence legally sufficient, viewing it in the light most favorable to the prosecution, citing People v Norman, 85 NY2d 609, 620-622 and People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620.

    The Court stated: “The statements in question were embodied in transcripts that were generated and held by the State Department of Correctional Services. That agency has no duty to share such material with the District Attorney for the county in which the underlying conduct occurred.”

  • People v. Joseph, 86 N.Y.2d 565 (1995): Destruction of Rosario Material and the Duplicative Equivalent Exception

    86 N.Y.2d 565 (1995)

    A destroyed document can never be deemed the “duplicative equivalent” of disclosed Rosario material because its unavailability prevents a detailed comparison to assess discrepancies that could be useful for cross-examination.

    Summary

    Lesly Joseph was convicted of drug sale and possession. The prosecution failed to disclose envelopes used by an officer to hold drugs seized from Joseph and another individual, Gerzbach, arguing the information was duplicated in disclosed reports. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that destroyed evidence cannot be considered the “duplicative equivalent” of disclosed material under Rosario. The court emphasized that the inability to inspect the original document prevents a determination of exact equivalence, potentially prejudicing the defendant’s ability to cross-examine witnesses effectively. An adverse inference instruction was warranted given the circumstances.

    Facts

    Officer Wasson, from a rooftop, observed Joseph engage in transactions appearing to be drug sales. He radioed Officer Wynne, who arrested Joseph and Gerzbach. Wynne seized cocaine vials from both, placing them in separate envelopes, noting names, times, and locations on the envelopes. Upon returning to the precinct, Wynne transferred the information from the envelopes to an on-line booking sheet and complaint report, then destroyed the envelopes. The prosecution disclosed the complaint report but not the envelopes. At trial, Joseph argued he was misidentified as the seller and that he was the buyer of the drugs. The defense requested an adverse-inference charge due to the destruction of the envelopes, which was denied.

    Procedural History

    Joseph was convicted of criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the envelope information was the “duplicative equivalent” of disclosed reports and irrelevant to Joseph’s identification. Joseph appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a destroyed document can be considered the “duplicative equivalent” of disclosed material under the Rosario rule, such that the failure to disclose the original document does not constitute a Rosario violation.

    Holding

    No, because a destroyed document, unavailable for inspection, cannot be deemed the “duplicative equivalent” of disclosed material, and the trial court erred in declining to give an adverse-inference instruction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the necessity of precise correlation between disclosed and undisclosed material to qualify for the duplicative-equivalent exception. The court stated, “a document that has been lost or destroyed and is therefore no longer available for judicial inspection cannot be deemed the ‘duplicative equivalent’ of Rosario material that has previously been disclosed.” The court reasoned that even if the contents of a destroyed document are purportedly transcribed verbatim, there can be inadvertent errors that are helpful for cross-examination. “Even where a document has purportedly been transcribed verbatim, inadvertent errors, omissions and deletions can occur, giving rise to precisely the kind of discrepancies that are most useful in cross-examination.” Testimony about the destroyed document’s contents is not an acceptable substitute. Since the destroyed envelopes could have supported Joseph’s defense of mistaken identity, the trial court abused its discretion by not giving an adverse-inference instruction. The court distinguished cases where relevance was marginal or the destruction was accidental, stating, “Given the articulable showing of prejudice that the defendant made, the unavailability of the documents from which a less conjectural showing might have been made and, finally, the circumstances of the documents’ loss, the trial court’s refusal to impose the limited sanction counsel requested constituted an abuse of discretion as a matter of law”.

  • People v. Baghai-Kermani, 84 N.Y.2d 525 (1994): Scope of Rosario Violation Reversal for Multiple Counts

    People v. Baghai-Kermani, 84 N.Y.2d 525 (1994)

    A Rosario violation (failure to disclose a witness’s pretrial statements) requires reversal of convictions only on counts for which the witness gave testimony, unless the tainted counts had a prejudicial spillover effect on other counts due to the nature of the evidence and arguments presented.

    Summary

    Defendant, a psychiatrist, was convicted on ten counts of illegally selling prescriptions. A Rosario violation occurred when the prosecution failed to disclose pretrial statements of a witness (Karp) who testified about two of the counts. The Court of Appeals addressed whether this violation required reversal of all ten convictions. The Court held that the Rosario violation only mandated reversal of the two counts related to Karp’s testimony because the other counts involved separate sales to different individuals, and the evidence on the tainted counts did not significantly influence the guilty verdicts on the remaining counts.

    Facts

    Defendant, a psychiatrist, was charged with ten counts of criminal sale of a prescription for a controlled substance. The charges stemmed from visits by four individuals posing as patients: three “shoppers” employed by the Special Prosecutor for Medicaid Fraud Control (Dawson, Kirton, and Williams), and an investigator from the New York State Bureau of Controlled Substances (Karp). Each “patient” paid a fee for a brief “session” with defendant, during which they requested specific controlled substances. Defendant then provided prescriptions without a legitimate medical purpose. Karp testified at trial regarding two sales he made with the doctor.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was convicted on all ten counts after a bench trial. After sentencing, defendant learned of undisclosed tape recordings of pretrial statements made by investigator Karp. Defendant moved to set aside the judgment under CPL 440.10, arguing a Rosario violation. The trial court vacated all ten convictions. The Appellate Division modified, reinstating the convictions on the eight counts unrelated to Karp’s testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecution’s failure to disclose investigator Karp’s taped pretrial statements requires reversal of all ten convictions, including the eight counts for which Karp did not testify?

    Holding

    1. No, because the Rosario violation only taints the two convictions directly related to Karp’s testimony, and there was no significant spillover effect on the other counts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Rosario rule is one of fundamental fairness, and the per se reversal rule is based on the difficulty of assessing the potential impeachment value of withheld material. However, extending the per se reversal rule to unrelated charges would be an unwarranted expansion of the policy. The court stated, “Indeed, in those situations, the handicap visited on the defense as a result of the nondisclosure cannot reasonably or logically be said to have had any impact at all on the manner in which the unrelated charges were litigated.”

    The Court acknowledged the possibility of a “spillover” effect where the tainted counts may have influenced the other counts. However, the Court found no reasonable possibility that the evidence supporting the two tainted counts influenced the guilty verdicts on the other eight. Each count involved a discrete sale to a single buyer-witness, and each buyer-witness’s evidence directly related only to the sales made to him or her. The court noted the large number of counts, the uniformity of the evidence, and the strength of independent proof regarding the defendant’s culpable mental state. The court noted that the prosecutor focused on the sales to James Dawson, and not the sales to investigator Karp in summation. Therefore, reversal of the eight counts on which Karp did not testify was not warranted.

    Regarding the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court stated that the defendant, having chosen to represent himself, must bear the consequences of his decisions.

  • People v. Flores, 84 N.Y.2d 184 (1994): Effective Assistance of Counsel and Tactical Decisions

    People v. Flores, 84 N.Y.2d 184 (1994)

    An attorney’s strategic decisions, even if those decisions later appear questionable, do not automatically constitute ineffective assistance of counsel unless the representation, viewed in its totality, was not meaningful and the defendant was deprived of a fair trial.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of sodomy. He appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, focusing on his attorney’s decision not to pursue a new trial based on potentially exculpatory Rosario material that was disclosed after the jury verdict. Defense counsel reviewed the material and stated it would not have changed his trial strategy. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant received meaningful representation. The court emphasized that strategic decisions, even those later questioned, do not equate to ineffective assistance unless the totality of representation was not meaningful and the defendant was deprived of a fair trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of four counts of sodomy in the first degree related to acts with a six-year-old boy. During the trial, defense counsel requested all Rosario material. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, a police officer’s memo book, potentially containing statements from the complainant and his mother (both trial witnesses), was given to defense counsel. Counsel reviewed the memo book and stated on the record that it contained nothing that would have altered his trial strategy.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to consider the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not pursue a new trial based on Rosario material disclosed after the jury verdict.

    Holding

    No, because the totality of the representation was meaningful, and the attorney’s decision was a strategic one based on his assessment that the Rosario material was not useful to the defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the standard set forth in People v. Baldi, which requires courts to evaluate whether the attorney provided meaningful representation based on the evidence, law, and circumstances of the case, viewed in totality and as of the time of representation. The court emphasized that effective assistance does not guarantee a perfect trial, but a fair one. Disagreement with strategies or tactics, weighed long after the trial, does not suffice to prove ineffectiveness. The court noted that defense counsel was able to secure the dismissal of several counts of the indictment, exhaustively cross-examined witnesses and delivered opening and closing statements consistent with the defense. Further, Rosario dictates that it is defense counsel’s responsibility to determine whether a document is helpful for cross-examination. The court quoted the Appellate Division: “When counsel candidly denies having any use for the material when it is finally disclosed, it cannot be said that the defendant has any substantive right to be vindicated, and there is no basis in law or logic to order a new trial when there is no new issue to be tried.” The Court of Appeals also rejected the dissent’s proposal that an “unexplained error” by counsel is sufficient to deprive the defendant of effective assistance. They stated that an isolated error can constitute ineffective assistance, but only if it is “sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”

  • People v. Spivey, 81 N.Y.2d 356 (1993): Establishing Intent in Felony Assault and Verdict Sheet Restrictions

    People v. Spivey, 81 N.Y.2d 356 (1993)

    The intent necessary for a felony assault conviction is inferred from the intent to commit the underlying felony, and the defendant need not be physically present at the scene of the assault, as long as the assault occurs during the immediate flight from the predicate felony; furthermore, verdict sheets listing statutory elements are reversible error unless agreed upon by both parties.

    Summary

    Defendant Spivey was convicted of second-degree assault (felony assault) after his accomplices assaulted a police officer during their flight from a robbery. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the assault count and ordering a new trial, also directing the trial court to sanction the prosecution for a Rosario violation (failure to produce a police officer’s memo book). The Court of Appeals reinstated the assault count, holding that the intent for felony assault can be inferred from the underlying felony, even if the defendant wasn’t physically present during the assault. The Court also affirmed the new trial order due to an improper verdict sheet but removed the mandate to fashion a Rosario sanction because the defendant received the relief requested at trial.

    Facts

    Transit Police Officer Schumacher witnessed Spivey and three others robbing a man. Schumacher apprehended Spivey but pursued the other three into a subway. The three suspects assaulted Schumacher. After a chase, two were caught. Spivey was tried jointly with the other defendants. Officer Schumacher’s memo book, containing entries about the case, was lost before trial. At a reconstruction hearing, Schumacher testified about the incident. The defense moved for a mistrial or to preclude Schumacher’s testimony, but the court denied the mistrial and stated there was no reconstruction testimony before the jury.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Spivey of second-degree assault and other crimes. The Appellate Division reversed the assault conviction, dismissed that count, and remanded for a new trial on the remaining counts. The Appellate Division also directed the trial court to fashion a sanction for the Rosario violation. The People appealed the dismissal of the assault count and the Rosario sanction direction. Spivey appealed the new trial order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the intent necessary for a felony assault conviction can be inferred from the intent to commit the underlying felony, similar to felony murder doctrine.
    2. Whether a defendant must be physically present at the scene of the assault for a felony assault conviction.
    3. Whether the defendant was entitled to an additional sanction for the Rosario violation.
    4. Whether the verdict sheet containing additional explanatory language was proper.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the intent necessary to sustain a conviction for felony assault is inferred from the intent to commit the underlying felony, and whether the assault occurred during the immediate flight from a predicate felony is a question of fact for the jury.
    2. No, because it is sufficient that the assault is made on a nonparticipant of a predicate felony “in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of [the] felony, * * * or of immediate flight therefrom” (Penal Law § 120.05 [6]).
    3. No, because the trial court granted the alternative relief requested by the defense (preclusion of reconstruction testimony), no additional sanction is required.
    4. No, because giving the jury a verdict sheet that lists some of the statutory elements of the counts is reversible error unless the parties agree.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analogized felony assault (Penal Law § 120.05 [6]) to felony murder (Penal Law § 125.25), noting their similar language. It cited People v. Gladman, 41 NY2d 123, stating that in felony murder, intent is inferred from the intent to commit the underlying felony. The Court applied the same logic to felony assault, referencing People v. Snow, 74 NY2d 671, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s reasoning that the intent for felony murder or assault is inferred from the underlying felony. The Court held that the assault occurring during immediate flight is a factual question for the jury.

    The Court further held that physical presence isn’t required, emphasizing the statute’s language about assaults made “in furtherance” of the felony or flight. Regarding the Rosario violation, the Court noted that the defense requested, and received, preclusion of reconstruction testimony, thus satisfying the need for a sanction.

    Finally, the Court reaffirmed the rule against verdict sheets listing statutory elements without agreement from both parties, citing People v. Kelly, 76 NY2d 1013, and other cases. This necessitates a new trial despite the reinstatement of the assault charge.

  • People v. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d 610 (1992): Mandating Disclosure of Rosario Material

    People v. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d 610 (1992)

    The Rosario rule mandates that the prosecution disclose any prior statements of its witnesses, and a per se reversal is required when such material is improperly withheld, unless the withheld material is the duplicative equivalent of material already disclosed.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the prosecution’s failure to disclose an “unusual occurrence report addendum” constituted a Rosario violation, requiring reversal of the defendant’s murder conviction. The court held that a per se reversal is required if the report contained statements of a trial witness and was not the duplicative equivalent of previously disclosed material. The court rejected the Appellate Division’s attempt to create a “commonsense” exception based on the perceived insubstantiality of the undisclosed material, reaffirming the strict application of the Rosario rule to ensure procedural fairness.

    Facts

    Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder based largely on the testimony of his girlfriend, Marie Somie, who claimed he described killing the victim to her. The prosecution presented testimony from police officers, including Officer Serra and Detective Daniel, who investigated the crime scene. During the appeal process, the prosecution discovered an undisclosed “unusual occurrence report addendum” authored by Sergeant Maisano. This report contained observations by the “investigating officer” regarding possible rope burns on the victim’s body, information not explicitly mentioned in other disclosed documents. The defense argued that Somie fabricated the story, and the undisclosed report could have aided in their cross-examination of the police officers.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to a 25-year-to-life term. While his appeal was pending, the undisclosed document was discovered. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding the report was duplicative and did not affect the credibility of the police officers or the defendant’s guilt. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the undisclosed “unusual occurrence report addendum” constituted Rosario material because it contained statements of a trial witness.
    2. Whether the Appellate Division erred in applying a “commonsense” exception to the Rosario rule based on the perceived insubstantiality of the undisclosed material.
    3. Whether the withheld report was the “duplicative equivalent” of other materials already disclosed to the defense.

    Holding

    1. The Court of Appeals did not definitively decide if the document constituted Rosario material, but remitted the case for a determination of whether the report contained statements made by a witness who testified at trial.

    2. Yes, because the Appellate Division’s approach substituted a harmless error analysis for the per se reversal rule mandated in Rosario violations on direct appeal.

    3. No, because the report contained details, specifically about possible rope burns, that were not explicitly mentioned in the disclosed statements of testifying officers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred in both its “duplicative equivalent” analysis and its creation of a “commonsense” exception to the Rosario rule. The court emphasized that documents are not duplicative if there are variations or inconsistencies, or if they omit details that could be valuable for cross-examination. Here, the report mentioned rope burns, which were not in the disclosed police statements.

    The court also reaffirmed its commitment to the per se reversal rule in Rosario violations on direct appeal, stating that harmless error analysis is inappropriate. The court explicitly rejected the suggestion that reversal should not be required where the withheld Rosario information was “of only ‘de minimis’ or ‘minimal’ value.” The court stated that “a judge’s impartial determination as to what portions may be useful to the defense, is no substitute for the single-minded devotion of counsel for the accused.”

    Because it was unclear whether the “investigating officer” referred to in the report was a testifying witness, the court remitted the case to the trial court for a determination on that issue. If the report contained statements from a testifying witness, a new trial would be ordered; otherwise, the judgment would be amended to reflect that determination.

  • People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56 (1986): Consequences of Failing to Disclose Rosario Material

    People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56 (1986)

    The prosecution has an absolute duty to provide the defense with Rosario material (prior statements of prosecution witnesses) and the failure to do so requires a new trial, regardless of good faith efforts to locate the material.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the prosecution’s failure to disclose Rosario material (prior statements of a prosecution witness) required a new trial. The Court held that the prosecution’s duty to provide such material is absolute, and the failure to do so necessitates a new trial, irrespective of the prosecution’s good faith efforts to locate the material. The Court emphasized that the defense has no obligation to request the material or object to its non-production to preserve the issue for appeal. The decision reinforces the importance of the Rosario rule in ensuring fair trials in New York.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of criminal charges. During the trial, a prosecution witness testified. Prior to the conclusion of evidence, the defense requested Rosario material related to the witness (prior statements). The prosecution failed to provide certain Rosario material, despite claiming to have made efforts to locate it.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after the lower courts upheld the conviction. The Court of Appeals considered whether the failure to disclose Rosario material warranted a reversal of the conviction and a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution’s failure to provide Rosario material to the defense, despite good faith efforts to locate it, requires a new trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecution has an absolute duty to turn over Rosario material, and the failure to do so requires a new trial, irrespective of their efforts to locate such material.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that CPL 240.45 requires the prosecution to make Rosario material available to the defendant. The duty to produce is absolute. The Court cited People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547; People v. Perez, 65 N.Y.2d 154 to support the rule. The Court emphasized that this obligation cannot be avoided even by good-faith, but unsuccessful efforts, to locate the material. The Court noted that the defense is not required to request the material or object to its non-production to preserve the issue for appeal. "[W]e have made it clear that the People’s failure to turn over Rosario material may not be excused on the ground that they were unaware of its existence or were unable to locate it." The dissent argued that the majority’s ruling was incongruous. It noted that attorneys who request covered material are penalized unless they take affirmative steps to clearly preserve the Rosario objection, but attorneys who say nothing are fully protected and automatically entitled to a new trial.