Rodriguez v. City of New York, 66 N.Y.2d 825 (1985)

An attorney’s charging lien under Judiciary Law § 475 is available only to the attorney of record in a case, meaning the attorney whose name appears on the pleadings and other formal court documents.

Summary

This case addresses whether an attorney who referred a case to another attorney “of counsel” and shared fees is entitled to an attorney’s lien under Judiciary Law § 475, even though his name did not appear on any court documents. The Court of Appeals held that the statutory charging lien is available only to the attorney of record—the attorney whose name appears on the pleadings, motions, and other papers filed with the court. Since the referring attorney was not the attorney of record, he could not assert a lien under § 475 and instead would have to pursue a plenary action to enforce any rights he may have.

Facts

The plaintiff retained an attorney (movant) to represent her in a wrongful death action. Due to his age and limited practice, the movant then retained another attorney (respondent) to act “of counsel” and agreed to split the legal fee evenly. The respondent handled the case, and the plaintiff ultimately obtained a judgment in her favor. The movant then filed a notice of attorney’s lien, claiming entitlement to a portion of the fees.

Procedural History

The Supreme Court initially denied the movant’s claim for attorney’s fees. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the movant was entitled to a lien. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Supreme Court’s original order, denying the lien.

Issue(s)

Whether an attorney who is not the attorney of record in a case, but who referred the case to another attorney and shared fees, is entitled to assert an attorney’s charging lien under Judiciary Law § 475.

Holding

No, because Section 475 grants a lien only to the attorney of record, meaning the attorney who appears for a party and whose name appears on the pleadings and other papers filed with the court.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals based its decision on the language of Judiciary Law § 475, which states that “the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client’s cause of action.” The court emphasized that this language has consistently been interpreted to grant a lien only to the attorney of record. The court noted that it was undisputed that the movant’s name never appeared on any of the pleadings, motion papers, affidavits, briefs, or records in the plaintiff’s action. The court dismissed the argument that the movant’s inclusion on a retainer statement filed with the Judicial Conference was sufficient to establish him as the attorney of record, clarifying that such statements are regulatory in nature and do not determine an attorney’s status as the attorney of record. The court stated, “[t]hey are designed for the supervision of attorneys rather than to determine their status as the attorney of record.” Finally, the court rejected the argument that the respondent should be estopped from denying the movant’s status, noting evidence that the movant had reviewed and approved the pleadings without requesting that his name be added. Therefore, the movant was not entitled to a lien under Judiciary Law § 475, but could pursue his claim for fees in a separate plenary action. As the Court stated, section 475 “provides that ‘[f]rom the commencement of an action * * * the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client’s cause of action * * * which attaches to a verdict * * * judgment or final order in his client’s favor, and the proceeds thereof in whatever hands they may come * * * The court upon the petition of the client or attorney may determine and enforce the lien.’ (Emphasis added.) The emphasized language has consistently been held to grant a lien to the attorney of record”.