New York Law Review

Tag: Rockefeller Drug Laws

  • People v. Paulin, 17 N.Y.3d 240 (2011): Parole Violators and Drug Law Resentencing

    17 N.Y.3d 240 (2011)

    Prisoners who have been paroled and then reincarcerated for violating parole are not barred from seeking resentencing relief under the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA).

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) allows prisoners sentenced under the Rockefeller Drug Laws to be resentenced, even if they were paroled and subsequently reincarcerated for violating their parole. The Court held that reincarcerated parole violators are not automatically barred from seeking relief under the DLRA. The Court reasoned that the statute’s plain text and purpose of addressing inordinately harsh punishments for low-level drug offenders applied equally to parole violators. The Court emphasized that lower courts retain discretion to deny resentencing if “substantial justice dictates.”

    Facts

    David Lance Paulin, Jesus Pratts, and James Phillips were convicted of class B felonies involving narcotics and sentenced to indeterminate prison terms under the Rockefeller Drug Laws. Paulin received a sentence of 2 to 6 years, Pratts received 2 to 6 years, and Phillips 5 to 10 years. All three were paroled, violated their parole, and were reincarcerated. Following the enactment of the 2009 DLRA, they applied for resentencing.

    Procedural History

    Supreme Court denied the applications, holding that relief under the statute was not available to reincarcerated parole violators. The Appellate Division affirmed in Paulin and Pratts, but reversed in Phillips, holding that the DLRA did not render parole violators ineligible to apply for resentencing. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal in all three cases.

    Issue(s)

    Whether prisoners who have been paroled and then reincarcerated for violating their parole are barred from seeking resentencing relief under the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA).

    Holding

    No, because the 2009 DLRA’s plain text and purpose of addressing inordinately harsh punishments applies equally to parole violators, and courts retain discretion to deny resentencing if substantial justice dictates.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the 2009 DLRA, codified in part at CPL 440.46, permits individuals imprisoned for class B drug felonies committed before January 13, 2005, to apply for resentencing under the current, less severe sentencing regime. Paulin and Pratts fit squarely within the statute’s text, as they were in the custody of the Department of Correctional Services, convicted of qualifying felonies, and serving indeterminate sentences exceeding three years. The Court rejected the People’s argument that the DLRA should not apply to parole violators, finding no absurdity in granting relief from harsh sentences to individuals who violated parole. The Court emphasized that the purpose of the DLRA, like its predecessors, was to address the “inordinately harsh punishment for low level non-violent drug offenders” required by the Rockefeller Drug Laws. The Court cited the Assembly Sponsor’s Memorandum. The Court also emphasized that CPL 440.46(3) allows courts to deny resentencing applications where “substantial justice dictates that the application should be denied.” The court distinguished People v. Mills, explaining that it interpreted a provision of the 2005 DLRA, which has no counterpart in the 2009 act. The Court stated it would not “write into a statute an exception that simply is not there.”

  • People v. Stephens, 55 N.Y.2d 778 (1981): Appealability of Resentencing Denials

    55 N.Y.2d 778 (1981)

    The Court of Appeals held that an appeal from an order denying resentencing under Penal Law § 60.09 requires permission from a judge of the intermediate appellate court, and failure to obtain such permission warrants dismissal of the appeal.

    Summary

    Defendant Stephens, convicted under the Rockefeller Drug Laws, sought resentencing under Penal Law § 60.09. After his motion was denied without counsel or his presence, he appealed to the Appellate Division, which ruled on the merits without granting permission for the appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed Stephens’s appeal, finding that failure to obtain leave to appeal from the Appellate Division as required by CPL 450.15 and 460.15 was fatal. The dissent argued that the Appellate Division’s determination on the merits was functionally equivalent to granting permission, and that due process concerns warranted review.

    Facts

    Stephens was originally sentenced under the severe Rockefeller Drug Laws.

    He later moved for resentencing pursuant to Penal Law § 60.09, arguing he was a model prisoner who had addressed his drug issues.

    Stephens requested counsel for the resentencing proceedings, but counsel was never assigned.

    The District Attorney initially indicated no opposition to Stephens’s resentencing.

    Stephens’s motion was denied without his presence or representation by counsel, and without any specific findings by the court.

    Procedural History

    Stephens filed a motion under CPL 440.20 to set aside his sentence, which was denied by the County Court.

    He appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department, which considered the appeal on its merits without granting permission for the appeal as required by statute.

    The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that the Appellate Division lacked jurisdiction because Stephens had not obtained leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division’s consideration of the merits of an appeal from the denial of a resentencing motion under Penal Law § 60.09, without granting permission to appeal as required by CPL 450.15 and 460.15, is a procedural defect that deprives the appellate court of subject matter jurisdiction.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 450.15 and 460.15 require permission for an appeal from the denial of a CPL 440.20 motion; failure to obtain that permission means the Appellate Division lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the statutory requirements of CPL 450.15 and 460.15, which mandate that permission be granted by a judge of the intermediate appellate court before an appeal can be taken from an order denying a motion to set aside a sentence under CPL 440.20. The court found that the appellant’s failure to obtain such permission was a fatal defect, depriving the Appellate Division of the power to hear the appeal. The court distinguished this case from situations where the Appellate Division lacked the power to consider an appeal by permission or otherwise. The majority opinion relied on precedent established in People v. De Jesus, 54 N.Y.2d 447, to support its holding. The dissenting judge argued that the Appellate Division’s decision to consider the merits of the case was functionally equivalent to granting permission for the appeal. The dissent also highlighted the importance of ensuring due process in resentencing proceedings, particularly when significant liberty interests are at stake. The dissent suggested that the court should fill the apparent gap in the statutory scheme to harmonize it with legislative intent, especially when constitutional matters are concerned. The dissent further pointed out that Stephens was denied counsel and the right to be present during the resentencing proceedings, which raised concerns about fairness and due process: “Believing these contentions are not without merit, it follows that I would reverse and remand the case to the County Court for proceedings on appellant’s motion under *782 section 60.09 of the Penal Law in accordance with constitutional notions of due process.”