New York Law Review

Tag: Robbery

  • People v. Couser, 37 N.Y.3d 370 (2021): Consecutive Sentences for Robbery and Attempted Robbery; Concurrent Sentencing for Felony Murder

    People v. Couser, 37 N.Y.3d 370 (2021)

    Under New York law, consecutive sentences for robbery and attempted robbery are only permissible if the acts constituting the crimes are separate and distinct; sentencing for felony murder must run concurrently with the underlying felony.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed two consolidated appeals concerning sentencing for robbery and attempted robbery, and for attempted felony murder. In the first appeal, the court considered whether consecutive sentences were permissible where a defendant committed both a completed robbery and several attempted robberies. The court held that because the taking of the victim’s purse was not a separate and distinct act of force, the sentences for robbery and attempted robbery must run concurrently. In the second appeal, the court addressed whether the sentence for attempted first-degree felony murder could run consecutively to the sentences imposed on the underlying felonies. The court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that a concurrent sentence was required. The court rejected the People’s argument that the attempted felony murder sentence could run consecutively to the sentences imposed on the underlying felony.

    Facts

    In the first appeal, the defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and three counts of attempted robbery in the first degree. During the commission of the crimes, the defendant displayed what appeared to be a firearm and demanded money from the victims. One victim, complying with the defendant’s demands, placed her purse on the ground, which the defendant then directed his accomplice to take. The People sought consecutive sentences for the robbery and the attempted robberies, arguing that the taking of the purse constituted a separate act. In the second appeal, the defendant was also convicted of attempted first-degree felony murder. The People did not specify which underlying felony supported this charge.

    Procedural History

    The trial court sentenced the defendant to consecutive sentences for the robbery and attempted robberies. The Appellate Division modified the sentence, ruling that concurrent sentences were required. In the second appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s act of taking a victim’s purse authorized consecutive sentences for robbery and attempted robbery.
    2. Whether the sentence for attempted first-degree felony murder should run concurrently with the sentence imposed on the underlying felony.

    Holding

    1. No, because the taking of the purse was not a separate and distinct act, the sentences must run concurrently.
    2. Yes, a sentence for attempted first-degree felony murder must run concurrently with the sentence imposed on the underlying felony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the first issue, the court relied on the New York Penal Law § 70.25 (2) which states that sentences imposed for multiple offenses committed through a single act or omission must run concurrently. The court also discussed the two-part test established in People v. Laureano, 87 N.Y.2d 640 (1996), determining whether consecutive sentences are permissible. The court found that the statutory elements of attempted robbery and robbery overlapped, and there was no separate and distinct act of force to warrant consecutive sentences. The taking of the purse was part of the same act of displaying a firearm to commit the robbery, and thus not a separate act. The court cited the case People v. Ramirez, 89 N.Y.2d 444 (1996) to support its conclusion that the mere taking of property, even through separate movements, did not justify consecutive sentences in this scenario. Regarding the second issue, the court held that, as a matter of law, a sentence imposed for attempted first-degree felony murder must run concurrently with the sentence imposed on the underlying felony. The court cited previous case law and statutory interpretation to support this. As the People could have corrected their failure to specify the underlying felony, the defendant’s plea was deemed rational and valid. The court emphasized that “it is the acts of the defendant, and not the intent with which he or she acted, that control for consecutive sentencing purposes.”

    Practical Implications

    This case provides guidance for practitioners on when consecutive sentences are permissible in New York. It clarifies the requirements for separate and distinct acts in robbery and attempted robbery cases. Lawyers should be mindful that a single act of force or threat of force that accomplishes the taking of multiple items of property from different individuals, or multiple attempts to rob multiple individuals, does not permit consecutive sentences. This case also affirms the long-standing rule that sentences for felony murder and the underlying felony should run concurrently. It also underscores the importance of properly charging and specifying underlying felonies in indictments, particularly in the context of plea bargains. The failure to specify the underlying felony will result in concurrent sentences for the felony murder and underlying felony charges.

  • People v. Chery, No. 159 (N.Y. 2016): Impeachment Using Omissions in a Spontaneous Statement

    People v. Chery, No. 159 (N.Y. 2016)

    A defendant’s credibility can be impeached with omissions from a spontaneous statement to police when the omitted information would naturally have been included, and when the defendant has provided a different version of events at trial.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant’s trial testimony could be impeached using omissions from a spontaneous statement made to police at the scene of the crime. The defendant, Chery, was arrested for robbery after a physical altercation with a store employee. At the scene, Chery made a spontaneous statement to the police. During trial, Chery provided a different version of the events, including exculpatory details not present in his initial statement. The court held that the prosecutor was permitted to impeach Chery’s testimony by questioning the omissions from his initial statement to challenge his credibility because the omitted information was significant and would have been naturally included in the initial account. This exception to the rule against using silence to impeach a defendant’s testimony underscores the importance of consistency in statements when credibility is at issue.

    Facts

    On April 20, 2012, Chery and another man attacked a grocery store employee, robbing him of $215. Two witnesses observed the altercation. When police arrived, they found Chery with a metal object and observed that the employee was injured. Chery was arrested after the officer recovered an envelope containing $215 from his pocket. Prior to trial, the court allowed the responding officer to testify that Chery stated, "why isn’t [complainant] going to jail, he kicked my bike, he should be going to jail too." At trial, Chery testified that the complainant had initiated the altercation by kicking his bike and hitting him with a wooden board. He claimed he told the police that the complainant kicked his bike and that they had gotten into a fight.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Chery’s motion to suppress the spontaneous statement and allowed the responding officer’s testimony. The jury convicted Chery of robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that omissions from Chery’s spontaneous statement were proper subjects for impeachment. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether it was error to allow the prosecution to use the defendant’s omissions from a spontaneous statement to impeach his trial testimony.

    Holding

    1. No, because it was permissible to use Chery’s omissions from his spontaneous statement to impeach his trial testimony under the specific circumstances of the case, where the omitted information was significant and would naturally have been included if true, especially since Chery provided a different version of events at trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals began by differentiating the case from those concerning the constitutional right to remain silent, as Chery’s statement was spontaneous and pre-Miranda. The court then restated the general rule that pre-trial silence is inadmissible, with limited exceptions. The court referenced People v. Savage, which established an exception where omissions from a statement are admissible for impeachment. The court reasoned that, unlike in Savage, Chery’s statement was spontaneous and made before any Miranda warnings. Additionally, the nature of Chery’s statement, which described the complainant’s conduct, and its timing supported the impeachment because the context suggested that the omitted information would have naturally been included in the original statement. Because Chery provided a different version of events at trial, the credibility of his initial statement was properly questioned. The court emphasized that "when given circumstances make it most unnatural to omit certain information from a statement, the fact of the omission is itself admissible for purposes of impeachment." The Court found that because Chery chose to give an account, it was reasonable to question why he omitted key facts from the original version.

    Practical Implications

    This case has implications for how prosecutors and defense attorneys approach cases involving pre-trial statements, particularly those made spontaneously. Prosecutors can use omissions from a defendant’s prior statements to challenge their credibility, provided the circumstances make the omission significant and unnatural. Defense attorneys must advise clients of the risks associated with making any statements, even spontaneous ones, and the potential for impeachment based on those statements. The case highlights the importance of providing a consistent account of events to law enforcement and at trial. This case should inform legal practice in situations where a defendant’s story changes between an initial statement and trial testimony. Courts will likely focus on whether omitted facts are significant and whether their omission is inconsistent with the statement actually given.

  • People v. Gordon, 23 N.Y.3d 643 (2014): Sufficiency of Evidence for Robbery Absent Recovery of Stolen Property

    23 N.Y.3d 643 (2014)

    A conviction for robbery can be sustained even if the stolen property is not recovered from the defendant, provided there is sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that the defendant used force with the conscious objective of retaining stolen property.

    Summary

    Hazel Gordon was convicted of robbery and assault after a department store incident where security personnel suspected her of stealing earrings. Although no merchandise was recovered, witnesses testified that Gordon concealed earrings and later threatened security guards with pens when confronted outside the store. The Appellate Division reduced the robbery convictions to petit larceny, citing the lack of recovered property. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the absence of recovered property does not preclude a robbery conviction if other evidence supports the inference that the defendant used force to retain stolen property. The court emphasized that intent is a factual question for the jury.

    Facts

    Rayon James, a loss prevention officer, observed Gordon selecting two sets of earrings, concealing them, and dropping the backings on the floor. Gordon made multiple layaway stops without visibly purchasing merchandise. Upon exiting the store, Gordon was stopped by security guard Michael Lisky, who suspected her of shoplifting. Gordon became aggressive, pounding Lisky’s chest and later brandishing pens, threatening the guards. Gordon’s son allegedly displayed a knife and discarded items in a nearby cemetery, but neither stolen merchandise nor the knife were recovered. Gordon then hit another employee, Lance Pappas, with her car while fleeing the scene.

    Procedural History

    Gordon was convicted in Supreme Court of robbery in the first degree, two counts of robbery in the second degree, and assault in the second degree. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing the robbery convictions to petit larceny, finding insufficient evidence to infer that Gordon used force to retain stolen property since no property was recovered. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s decision regarding the robbery convictions, reinstating the original convictions.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a conviction for robbery in the first and second degrees can be sustained when the allegedly stolen property is not recovered from the defendant or her accomplices.

    2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant acted with the conscious objective to cause physical injury to Lance Pappas for the assault conviction.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the failure to recover stolen property from a defendant does not preclude a jury from inferring that the defendant used force with the conscious objective of preventing resistance to the retention of that stolen property when there is other evidence supporting that inference.

    2. Yes, because the testimony from the victim and several eyewitnesses that the defendant swerved into Pappas, and his testimony as to the physical injuries he incurred were more than enough to sustain the jury’s guilty verdict.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a jury can infer intent to forcibly steal property from a defendant’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances. The court rejected the notion that recovery of the stolen property is a prerequisite for a robbery conviction. “The applicable culpability standard — intent—require[s] evidence that, in using or threatening physical force, [the] defendant’s ‘conscious objective’ was either to compel [the] victim to deliver up property or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking” or retention thereof (quoting People v. Smith, 79 NY2d 309, 315 [1992]). The court emphasized that intent is a question for the jury, which may consider the defendant’s actions inside and outside the store. The court noted that requiring recovery of stolen property would allow defendants to escape prosecution by disposing of the evidence. The court found sufficient evidence, including the defendant’s suspicious behavior in the store, the removal of earring backings, and the violent reaction to security guards, to support the jury’s conclusion that the defendant used force to retain stolen property. As to the assault charge, the court found sufficient evidence existed to sustain the conviction.

  • People v. Smith, 22 N.Y.3d 1093 (2014): Establishing “Forcible Stealing” Through Threats and Physical Contact in Robbery

    People v. Smith, 22 N.Y.3d 1093 (2014)

    A larceny becomes robbery when property is forcibly stolen, and “force” includes the use or threatened use of immediate physical force to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking of property.

    Summary

    Defendant Smith, impersonating a police officer, stole money from the victim. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction for second-degree robbery, holding that the element of “forcible stealing” was satisfied. The Court reasoned that the defendant’s impersonation of a police officer, combined with physical contact during the frisk and theft, constituted sufficient force to elevate the crime from larceny by trick to robbery. This case clarifies how threats and physical actions, even without explicit violence, can establish the “force” element in a robbery charge.

    Facts

    Defendant Smith and his brother, posing as plainclothes police officers, approached the victim in his apartment building’s stairwell. Smith identified himself as a police officer, displayed a fake badge, and demanded the victim’s identification. After the victim complied, Smith ordered him to place his hands on the wall and frisked him, removing items from his pockets. The assailants then stated they had the wrong person and allowed the victim to leave. Upon discovering that $200 was missing, the victim called 911 and pursued the suspects, leading police to apprehend Smith, who was found with fake badges, a starter pistol, and a loaded handgun.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of second-degree robbery in the Supreme Court. The defendant moved to dismiss the count of second-degree robbery, claiming the evidence was insufficient to support the forcible theft element of robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish the “forcible stealing” element necessary to sustain a conviction for second-degree robbery, or whether the crime was merely larceny by trick.

    Holding

    Yes, because viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the People, there was a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences that allowed the jury to rationally conclude that defendant forcibly stole the victim’s property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to establish forcible stealing. The court emphasized that threats alone can satisfy the statutory definition of “force”. The Court reasoned that by impersonating police officers, the defendant and his brother restrained the victim and conveyed the impression that disobeying their directives could result in imminent physical repercussions, causing the victim to submit to their false authority. Furthermore, the defendant engaged in physical contact with the victim by frisking him and removing items from his pockets. The Court distinguished this case from mere larceny by trick, stating, “The People therefore adequately established that defendant committed forcible robbery, not merely larceny by trick.” The court cited People v. Woods, 41 NY2d 279, 282-283 (1977), to support the point that threats alone can satisfy the statutory definition of “force”.

  • People v. Pagan, 19 N.Y.3d 91 (2012): Claim of Right and Mistake of Fact Defenses in Robbery

    People v. Pagan, 19 N.Y.3d 91 (2012)

    In a robbery case, a defendant’s claim that they mistakenly believed the property they were taking was theirs is equivalent to a claim of right defense, and neither defense is permissible where the defendant used force to take fungible currency.

    Summary

    Debra Pagan was convicted of attempted robbery in the second degree after an altercation with a cab driver over change. Pagan argued that she mistakenly believed the money she was trying to take from the cab driver was rightfully hers. The New York Court of Appeals held that, in this context, Pagan’s “mistake of fact” defense was indistinguishable from a “claim of right” defense, which is not a valid defense when force is used to take money, especially fungible currency, even if the defendant honestly believes they are entitled to it. The court emphasized the risk of violence inherent in such situations.

    Facts

    Debra Pagan hailed a cab, stating she only had $4, though the minimum fare was $6. The driver agreed to the lower amount. Upon arrival, Pagan gave the driver a $1 bill and a $20 bill, later claiming she was owed $17 in change, despite the driver returning the $1 bill. Pagan then demanded the $20 back and offered $4 from the $16 in change to the driver, who refused, stating she was paying him with his own money. The cab’s security locks were activated, preventing Pagan from leaving. When the driver said he would take her to the police, she put the $16 on the console. As the driver headed to the police precinct, Pagan tried to grab the $16, scratching and biting his hand. She then brandished a knife and demanded the money. Police officers intervened, arresting Pagan.

    Procedural History

    Pagan was indicted on charges including attempted robbery. At trial, she requested a jury instruction on mistake of fact, arguing she believed the money was hers. The trial court denied this, giving instead a negative claim of right instruction. Pagan was convicted of attempted robbery in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request for a mistake of fact jury instruction.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in giving a negative claim of right instruction to the jury.
    3. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support the conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because under these facts, the mistake of fact defense is equivalent to a claim of right defense, which is not permitted in robbery cases involving the use of force.
    2. No, because the negative claim of right instruction was proper under the circumstances, as the money at issue was fungible currency.
    3. Yes, because the jury could have rationally concluded that the defendant did not have a good faith belief that the bills she tried to take were hers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that robbery involves “forcible stealing,” and while a claim of right is a defense to larceny, it is limited in robbery cases due to the risk of injury. The court stated, “Forcibly taking the property of another, even when one honestly believes it to be one’s own property ‘entails the risk of physical or mental injury to individuals’”. In Pagan’s case, her claim that she mistakenly believed the money was hers was equivalent to a claim of right. The court emphasized that a mistake of fact defense, like a claim of right defense, does not apply when force is used to take money to satisfy a preexisting debt. Regarding the negative claim of right instruction, the court noted that currency is generally considered fungible, and therefore, a defendant cannot have a true claim to specific bills unless they have unique characteristics. The court distinguished this from taking a specific chattel, like a painting, where a good faith belief of ownership might negate larcenous intent. The Court found that the evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that Pagan knew the money was not hers and was attempting to take it by force. The court reasoned that the People disproved the defense by presenting evidence that Pagan negotiated a $4 fare, tried to pay with the driver’s change, scratched and bit the driver, and produced a knife.

  • People v. Hall, 19 N.Y.3d 126 (2012): Establishing ‘Dangerous Instrument’ Status in Robbery Cases

    People v. Hall, 19 N.Y.3d 126 (2012)

    To prove that an object is a “dangerous instrument” under New York Penal Law, the prosecution must demonstrate that, under the circumstances of its use, the object is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury, and mere speculation about potential harm is insufficient.

    Summary

    Michael Hall and John Freeman were convicted of robbery after Hall used a stun gun on a store manager during a robbery. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the stun gun qualified as a “dangerous instrument” to support convictions for first-degree robbery and weapon possession. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the stun gun was a “dangerous instrument” because they presented insufficient evidence of its potential to cause serious physical injury. The Court affirmed the vacating of the first-degree robbery and weapon possession charges, while upholding the second-degree robbery convictions, and addressed the missing witness jury instruction.

    Facts

    Saidou Sow, a store manager, was robbed by four men, including Michael Hall and John Freeman. Hall used an object Sow described as a “toy gun” against Sow’s chest, causing a burning sensation and temporary incapacitation. Freeman directed Hall to use the device. A security camera recorded parts of the incident, showing Freeman grabbing and holding Sow while another man hit him.

    Procedural History

    Hall and Freeman were convicted of first-degree robbery, two counts of second-degree robbery, and fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by vacating the convictions for first-degree robbery and weapon possession and affirmed the remaining convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove that the stun gun used in the robbery was a “dangerous instrument” under New York Penal Law § 10.00(13), thus justifying convictions for first-degree robbery and fourth-degree weapon possession.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give a missing witness instruction regarding witnesses who were present during the robbery but not called by the prosecution.

    Holding

    1. No, because the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence demonstrating that the stun gun was readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury as defined by Penal Law § 10.00(10).

    2. Yes, the trial court erred in refusing to give a missing witness instruction, but the error was harmless as to Freeman and unpreserved as to Hall.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that to classify the stun gun as a “dangerous instrument,” the prosecution needed to prove it was “readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injury.” The Court emphasized that the only evidence presented about the stun gun’s potential for harm was Sow’s testimony, which described pain, a burning sensation, and temporary incapacitation. This, the Court stated, did not meet the statutory definition of “serious physical injury,” which requires a substantial risk of death, protracted disfigurement, or impairment of health. The Court rejected the prosecution’s argument that the jury could infer that further use of the stun gun could have caused more severe injuries, labeling it “speculation” and stating that “[m]ore proof than that is required to show that an instrument is ‘readily capable’ of causing such consequences.”

    Regarding the missing witness instruction, the Court found that the preconditions for the charge were met for Sow’s cousin, Muflhi, and Bossman, as they were eyewitnesses friendly to Sow and available to the prosecution. The Court clarified that the witnesses’ availability to the defense did not negate the validity of a missing witness instruction. However, the Court deemed the error harmless as to Freeman, given the overwhelming evidence of his participation in the robbery captured on video and his implausible defense. Hall, however, did not preserve the issue. The court said “A missing witness instruction permits the jury to draw the common-sense inference that a failure to call a seemingly friendly witness suggests some weakness in a party’s case.”

  • People v. Pena, 50 N.Y.2d 400 (1980): Establishing Possession of a Dangerous Instrument in Robbery Cases

    50 N.Y.2d 400 (1980)

    In New York, a defendant’s admission of possessing a weapon during a robbery, coupled with a threat to use it, can constitute legally sufficient evidence of actual possession to support a charge of first-degree robbery, although the weapon is not explicitly displayed or recovered.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a defendant’s verbal claim of possessing a gun during a bank robbery, combined with a threat to use it, provides sufficient evidence of actual possession to sustain a charge of first-degree robbery under New York Penal Law § 160.15(3). The Court of Appeals held that such a statement, without additional corroborating evidence like the display or recovery of a weapon, is insufficient to prove actual possession. The dissent argued that the defendant’s admission should be considered direct evidence of possession.

    Facts

    The defendant handed a bank teller a note stating, “I have A Gun Fill bag, Dont say anything, or I’ll shoot.” The defendant was not apprehended at the scene. He was arrested months later. No weapon was recovered in connection with the defendant.

    Procedural History

    The case originated with an indictment for first-degree robbery. The defendant challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury. The lower court dismissed the first-degree robbery charge. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s statement during a robbery, claiming possession of a gun and threatening its use, is legally sufficient evidence of actual possession of a dangerous instrument to support a charge of first-degree robbery under Penal Law § 160.15(3), even without the weapon’s display or recovery.

    Holding

    No, because a defendant’s statement alone, without corroborating evidence, is insufficient to establish actual possession of a dangerous instrument for the purposes of first-degree robbery.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while admissions are generally competent evidence, the specific requirement of “actual possession” under Penal Law § 160.15(3) necessitates more than a mere verbal claim. The Court distinguished this case from situations where the weapon is displayed or recovered, providing tangible evidence of its existence and the defendant’s control over it. The Court emphasized the importance of preventing convictions based solely on unsubstantiated claims, especially when a significant period has passed, allowing the defendant ample opportunity to dispose of the alleged weapon. The dissent argued that the defendant’s admission should be treated as direct proof of possession, consistent with established evidentiary principles. The dissent also pointed out the practical implication of the ruling which essentially rewards those who conceal their weapons and avoid immediate apprehension, as they can only be charged with a lesser offense. The dissent stated, “Admissions by a party of any fact material to the issue are always competent evidence against him, wherever, whenever, or to whomsoever made” (People v Chico, 90 NY2d 585, 589 [1997]).

  • People v. Wallace, 7 N.Y.3d 886 (2006): Jury Instruction on Lesser Included Offense

    7 N.Y.3d 886 (2006)

    A court is not required to submit a charge to the jury on a lesser included offense unless there is a reasonable view of the evidence to support a conviction for the lesser offense but not the greater offense.

    Summary

    Wallace was convicted of robbery in the first and second degrees. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred by not submitting a charge to the jury on the lesser included offense of robbery in the third degree. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that there was no reasonable view of the evidence to support a conviction for robbery in the third degree. The victim’s testimony indicated the defendant had a gun, and no other evidence reasonably contradicted this testimony. The court emphasized that even though a witness claimed not to see a gun, he overheard a statement indicating the defendant possessed one. Thus, the court properly declined to charge the jury on the lesser included offense.

    Facts

    The victim was approached by Wallace and three companions as he left school. Two companions acted as lookouts while Wallace and another individual surrounded the victim. Wallace pressed his hip into the victim’s waist, revealing what appeared to be a gun. The victim testified he saw the barrel and handle of a black gun. Wallace and his accomplice then took the victim’s money and iPod.

    Procedural History

    Wallace was tried jointly with his accomplices. He requested the trial court to charge the jury on robbery in the third degree as a lesser included offense of robbery in the first degree. The trial court denied the request. Wallace was convicted of robbery in the first and second degrees. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in declining to submit a charge to the jury on the lesser included offense of robbery in the third degree.

    Holding

    No, because there was no reasonable view of the evidence to support a conviction of robbery in the third degree and not robbery in the first degree.

    Court’s Reasoning

    To establish entitlement to a charge on a lesser included offense, a defendant must show that the greater crime cannot be committed without also committing the lesser crime, and that a reasonable view of the evidence would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense. The court stated, “Although robbery in the third degree is a lesser included crime of robbery in the first degree, here there is no reasonable view of the evidence to support a jury finding that defendant committed robbery in the third degree and not robbery in the first degree.” The victim testified that the defendant had a gun. While a witness claimed not to have seen the gun, he overheard another accomplice tell the victim that the defendant had a gun. The court concluded that based on the evidence presented, no reasonable jury could find the defendant committed robbery in the third degree but not robbery in the first degree, and therefore, the trial court did not err in declining to submit the charge to the jury. The decision emphasizes the importance of the trial court’s assessment of the evidence in determining whether a lesser included offense instruction is warranted.

  • People v. Green, 5 N.Y.3d 540 (2005): Claim of Right Defense Not Applicable in Robbery Cases

    5 N.Y.3d 540 (2005)

    A defendant in a robbery prosecution is not entitled to a claim-of-right jury instruction, even if they believed in good faith that the property taken was theirs, because the statutory claim-of-right defense is limited to larceny by trespass or embezzlement, and public policy discourages forcible self-help.

    Summary

    Green was convicted of robbery for forcibly taking a disc player from Pabon, believing it was his stolen property. At trial, Green requested a jury instruction on the claim-of-right defense, arguing he lacked the intent to steal. The trial court denied the request, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the claim-of-right defense is unavailable in robbery prosecutions. The Court reasoned that the Legislature limited the defense to larceny by trespass or embezzlement, and allowing it in robbery cases would encourage the use of force to recover property. While a defendant can argue lack of intent, they are not entitled to a specific claim-of-right jury instruction.

    Facts

    Defendant Green forcibly took a disc player from Pabon, believing Pabon was among a group who had previously stolen Green’s own disc player. Green approached Pabon, snatched the disc player, and walked away. Pabon followed, asking for it back, at which point one of Green’s associates punched Pabon. Green testified that he believed Pabon was one of the individuals who had stolen his disc player because Pabon resembled one of them and was holding a similar disc player.

    Procedural History

    Green and an associate were charged with second-degree robbery and criminal possession of stolen property. The trial court denied Green’s request for a jury instruction on the claim-of-right defense. Green was convicted on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant, prosecuted for robbery of a specific chattel, who in good faith believed that the property was his, is entitled to a “claim-of-right” jury instruction?

    Holding

    1. No, because the Legislature has limited the availability of the statutory claim-of-right defense to prosecutions for larceny by trespass or embezzlement, and public policy considerations militate against encouraging the use of forcible self-help to recover property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Penal Law § 155.15(1) provides a claim-of-right defense only for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement. While a good-faith claim of right negates larcenous intent, this does not automatically extend the defense to robbery cases. The Court acknowledged that robbery is essentially larceny accomplished through force, but the Legislature’s explicit limitation of the claim-of-right defense to specific larceny offenses indicates a deliberate choice not to extend it to crimes involving force. Citing People v. Reid, 69 N.Y.2d 469 (1987), the Court emphasized that if the Legislature intended to excuse forcible taking, it would have explicitly stated so. The court highlighted the policy concerns associated with encouraging self-help through force. A specific jury instruction on claim-of-right defense would give the defendant an unfair advantage by emphasizing one aspect of the proof. The court noted that a defendant can still argue lack of intent based on a claim of right, but is not entitled to a special jury instruction on the defense: “However, simply because a jury might be convinced by a claim-of-right argument, it does not follow that a claim-of-right charge, derived from a statutory defense limited to certain types of larceny, is also available to defendants in robbery prosecutions.”

  • People v. Hanley, 5 N.Y.3d 108 (2005): Admissibility of Witness Reputation for Truthfulness

    5 N.Y.3d 108 (2005)

    A defendant has the right to present evidence that a key prosecution witness has a bad reputation in the community for truth and veracity, provided a proper foundation is laid.

    Summary

    Thomas Hanley was convicted of robbery based on the testimony of two bartenders who claimed he robbed them, implying the presence of a gun. Hanley sought to introduce a witness who would testify that the bartenders had a reputation in the community for dishonesty. The trial court disallowed this testimony. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the exclusion of this reputation evidence was reversible error because the credibility of the bartenders was crucial, and the defendant had a right to present evidence challenging their truthfulness. The court also addressed that the witness worked with the bartenders. The Court of Appeals determined that the case rested largely on the bartender’s testimony and by not allowing the fellow bartender’s testimony, the jury was not able to properly assess the key witnesses’ credibility.

    Facts

    James McEnroe and Brendan Sean Byrne, bartenders at Wilson’s Bar, testified that Hanley robbed them on separate occasions. McEnroe stated that Hanley implied he had a gun. Byrne testified that Hanley demanded money and pointed at him, leading Byrne to believe he had a weapon. No gun was ever recovered. Hanley was charged with robbery. A third bartender was willing to testify that McEnroe and Byrne had a bad reputation in the community for truthfulness.

    Procedural History

    Hanley was convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, vacating one robbery count and reducing the sentence for menacing, but otherwise affirmed. Two dissenting justices believed the exclusion of the reputation evidence was a denial of a fair trial. A Justice of the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defendant to present a witness who would testify that two key prosecution witnesses had a bad reputation in the community for truth and veracity.

    Holding

    Yes, because a party has a right to call a witness to testify that a key opposing witness has a bad reputation in the community for truth and veracity, provided a proper foundation has been established, and in this case, the credibility of the witnesses was essential to proving the crime charged.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the precedent set in People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282 (1983), stating that a party has the right to call a witness to testify about the bad reputation for truthfulness of a key opposing witness. The Court emphasized that the element of displaying what appeared to be a weapon was essential to proving first-degree robbery, making the bartenders’ credibility critical. The Court also stated that the proposed witness’ testimony was not discretionary and the failure to allow the fellow bartender to testify was highly prejudicial as it deprived the jury of properly assessing the credibility of the prosecution’s key witnesses. The court stated, “[a]s we made clear in Pavao, a party may introduce reputation testimony as a matter of right if a proper foundation has been established.” The court stated that even though the trial court stated that such evidence was too “nebulous,” the defendant had a right to present a witness with personal knowledge of the bartenders’ bad reputation. A witness’ reputation among coworkers can be considered. The Court found that the exclusion of the reputation evidence could have altered the jury’s decision, warranting reversal.