New York Law Review

Tag: riparian rights

  • Town of Oyster Bay v. Commander Oil Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 566 (2001): Riparian Owner’s Right to Dredge

    96 N.Y.2d 566 (2001)

    A riparian owner has the right to conduct maintenance dredging of public underwater lands if it is necessary to preserve reasonable access to navigable water and does not unreasonably interfere with the rights of the underwater owner.

    Summary

    This case addresses the conflict between a riparian owner’s right to access navigable waters and a town’s ownership of underwater lands. Commander Oil, a riparian owner, sought to dredge the area near its pier to maintain barge access. The Town of Oyster Bay, the underwater landowner, sought to prevent the dredging. The Court of Appeals held that a riparian owner may dredge if it is necessary to preserve reasonable access and does not unreasonably interfere with the town’s rights. The court reversed the lower court’s injunction and remitted the case for further proceedings applying this standard.

    Facts

    Commander Oil has operated a petroleum storage facility adjacent to Oyster Bay Harbor since 1929. A pier extends from Commander’s land into the harbor, where barges dock to unload oil. The Town of Oyster Bay owns the underwater land in the harbor. Silt accumulation made the basins near the pier shallower. Commander had previously dredged the basins with the Town’s permission under a lease that expired in 1985. In 1995, Commander sought to dredge again, obtaining permits from state agencies but not seeking the Town’s permission. The Town then sought to enjoin Commander from dredging.

    Procedural History

    The Town initially challenged the state permits in Article 78 proceedings, which were dismissed. The Town then sued Commander to enjoin the dredging. Supreme Court initially denied a preliminary injunction, but the Appellate Division reversed. Supreme Court then denied a permanent injunction after finding dredging was necessary to restore the basins. The Appellate Division again reversed, granting a permanent injunction, holding that the upland owner has no riparian right to dredge public underwater lands without the public owner’s permission. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a riparian owner has the right to conduct maintenance dredging of public underwater lands.

    Holding

    Yes, because a riparian owner may dredge if dredging is necessary to preserve reasonable access to navigable water and does not unreasonably interfere with the rights of the underwater owner.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged Commander’s rights as a riparian owner, including the right of access to navigable water. It also recognized the Town’s ownership of the underwater land held in trust for the public good. The court emphasized that neither party’s rights are absolute and must be balanced. The court distinguished this case from Hedges v. West Shore R. R. Co., 150 N.Y. 150 (1896), clarifying that Hedges does not prohibit dredging altogether, but prevents riparian owners from expanding access in a way that seriously impairs the rights of the underwater landowner. The court also noted that the Town’s own stormwater runoff contributed to the silt accumulation. The Court stated, “[N]either the riparian owner nor the underwater landowner has an unfettered veto over reasonable land uses necessary to the other’s acknowledged rights, and where the rights conflict the courts must strike the correct balance.” The court concluded that the riparian owner’s right is to enjoy reasonable access to navigable water, not to maintain the foreshore in any fixed condition. The Court emphasized the importance of balancing the riparian owner’s right to reasonable access with the public owner’s duty to consider the diverse interests of users of the foreshore. The court remanded the case to the Supreme Court to strike the appropriate balance between the parties’ rights, instructing the lower court to consider whether the dredging was necessary for reasonable access and whether it would unreasonably interfere with the Town’s rights.

  • Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 92 N.Y.2d 591 (1998): Defining Navigability to Include Recreational Use

    92 N.Y.2d 591 (1998)

    A river is navigable-in-fact if it has a practical utility for trade or travel, and evidence of recreational use can be considered in determining navigability.

    Summary

    Adirondack League Club (ALC) sued the Sierra Club for trespass after members canoed down a portion of the South Branch of the Moose River running through ALC property. ALC claimed the river was private property, while the Sierra Club argued the river was navigable-in-fact, granting public easement. The Court of Appeals considered whether recreational use can be part of the navigability analysis and whether factual questions existed about the South Branch’s navigability. The Court held that recreational use is a valid factor in determining navigability but found unresolved factual issues preventing summary judgment.

    Facts

    1. ALC, a private club, owns 50,000 acres including a 12-mile stretch of the South Branch of the Moose River.
    2. In June 1991, Sierra Club members canoed down this section of the river, requiring several portages around obstacles.
    3. ALC sued for trespass, claiming the river was private property.
    4. Defendants argued the river’s navigability granted public easement.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially ruled in favor of ALC. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the Sierra Club, the State, and the Adirondack Mountain Club, finding the South Branch navigable-in-fact. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether evidence of recreational use can be considered in determining if a river is navigable-in-fact.
    2. Whether factual questions exist regarding the South Branch’s navigability, precluding summary judgment.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because evidence of a river’s practical utility for transport need not be limited to evidence of its capacity for the movement of commercial goods; practical utility for travel or transport remains the standard.
    2. Yes, because conflicting evidence exists regarding the river’s capacity for use without artificial augmentation and its ability to sustain commercial boating or canoeing operations. The court stated it could not conclude, as a matter of law, that the historical log drives on the South Branch were not accomplished by use of dams and other artificial augmentation of the river flow.

    Court’s Reasoning

    1. The court reviewed the common-law standard of navigability-in-fact established in Morgan v. King, emphasizing the river’s “practical usefulness to the public as a highway for transportation.”
    2. The court reasoned that while historically, practical utility was measured by a river’s capacity to move goods to market, evolving circumstances warrant considering recreational use as a form of practical utility for travel.
    3. The court emphasized that it was not broadening the standard for navigability-in-fact, but merely recognizing that recreational use fits within it, clarifying that boaters can make use of the common-law easement.
    4. Addressing property rights concerns, the court noted that riparian owners retain their rights, subject only to the long-recognized navigational servitude, and they cannot claim a taking because they never owned the easement.
    5. The court found that conflicting evidence regarding historical log drives and recreational use prevented summary judgment. It noted that ALC presented evidence suggesting artificial augmentation was necessary for logging, while the Sierra Club presented evidence of recreational use.
    6. The court concluded that the record presented issues of material fact that must be determined in a plenary trial.
    7. The dissenting judge argued that summary judgment was appropriate based on the undisputed evidence of the river’s historic use for logging and recent use by recreational canoeists.

  • Rose v. State, 24 N.Y.2d 82 (1969): Compensation for Fixtures in Eminent Domain

    Rose v. State, 24 N.Y.2d 82 (1969)

    In eminent domain cases, when the state takes property, just compensation for fixtures requires considering whether the fixtures were removed or could have been removed, and the measure of damages is the higher of either the fixture’s removal costs or the difference between the fixture’s salvage value and its present value in place (reproduction cost less depreciation).

    Summary

    This case concerns the compensation due to a property owner, Rose, whose riparian rights were destroyed by the State’s diversion of a riverbed for highway construction. This diversion forced Rose’s tenants, Binghamton Sand & Crushed Stone and McIntosh Ready Mix Concrete, to relocate their businesses. The Court of Appeals addressed the method for valuing fixtures when a business is forced to relocate due to eminent domain. The court held that compensation should be the higher of either the cost of removing the fixture or the difference between its salvage value and its present value, ensuring fair compensation without unjustly enriching the claimant at the state’s expense. The case emphasizes that the goal of just compensation is to put the owner in the same position as if the taking had not occurred.

    Facts

    Rose owned land adjacent to the Chenango River, which was leased to Binghamton and McIntosh. Binghamton used large quantities of river water for its sand and gravel business. In 1962, the State filed a taking map for the riverbed, and in 1964, Rose learned of the State’s plans to divert the river, which would cut off Binghamton’s water supply. Binghamton could not find an alternative water source and had to relocate its operations in 1965. McIntosh also relocated. Rose, Binghamton, and McIntosh filed claims for compensation, asserting that the buildings and fixtures on the property lost their utility due to the loss of riparian rights.

    Procedural History

    The Court of Claims denied Rose’s claim for land value depreciation but awarded $208,615 to Binghamton and McIntosh for the loss of utility of their buildings and fixtures. The Appellate Division affirmed the Court of Claims’ judgment. The State appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the proper measure of damages for fixtures, when a business is forced to relocate due to the State’s taking of property through eminent domain, is the difference between salvage value and present value, or whether moving expenses should also be considered.

    Holding

    Yes, because in compensating for the taking of fixtures in eminent domain proceedings, the claimant is entitled to the higher of either (1) the cost of removing the fixture, including disassembly, trucking, and reassembly at a new location, or (2) the difference between the fixture’s salvage value and its present value in place (reproduction cost less depreciation), ensuring just compensation without unjustly enriching the claimant at the state’s expense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the destruction of riparian rights is compensable under Section 30 of the Highway Law and existing case law. The court emphasized that just compensation aims to indemnify the property owner, placing them in the same position as if the taking had not occurred, and should be measured by what the owner has lost. In determining the value of fixtures, the court highlighted New York’s broad view, considering improvements that are either physically annexed, adapted to the premises, or intended to be permanently affixed. The court reasoned that valuing fixtures solely based on salvage value is insufficient because it fails to account for the cost of removal and reinstallation at a new location. It established that the claimant is entitled to the higher of either the cost of removing the fixture, including disassembly, trucking, and reassembly at a new location, or the difference between the fixture’s salvage value and its present value in place. This ensures fair compensation without allowing the claimant to profit from the state’s taking. The court modified the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Court of Claims for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, directing the Court of Claims to adjust the award based on the reasonable moving fees for specific items that were moved to the new plant site.

  • Little v. Town of Hempstead, 29 N.Y.2d 435 (1972): Accretion Rights After Condemnation of Upland

    Little v. Town of Hempstead, 29 N.Y.2d 435 (1972)

    When a municipality condemns upland property to the high-water line, it acquires littoral rights, including the right to accretion, even if the adjacent submerged land remains in private ownership.

    Summary

    This case addresses riparian rights, specifically the right to accretion, when a town previously condemned upland property to the high-water line. The central issue is whether the town, by condemning the upland, became a littoral owner entitled to the benefit of land that subsequently accreted to the shoreline, or whether the previous owners of the submerged land retained title despite the accretion. The Court of Appeals held that the town, by virtue of the prior condemnation, acquired littoral rights, including the right to accretion. This decision broke the unity of title between the upland and submerged land, establishing a new relationship where the town gained littoral rights while the original owners retained the fee to the submerged lands, but without the benefit of the accreted land.

    Facts

    In 1952, the Town of Hempstead condemned upland property along the Atlantic Ocean to the high-water line for shoreline protection and a public park. The condemnation did not include land under water, which was owned by Little and Scolaro. After the 1952 condemnation, further accretion extended the shoreline over the submerged land. In 1959, the town initiated a second condemnation proceeding to acquire the claimants’ submerged land. The town argued that it had become the owner of the accreted land due to its littoral ownership acquired in 1952, and the claimants were not entitled to damages for the accreted land. The claimants argued the town’s ownership terminated at the 1952 high water mark.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term initially held that the Town did not acquire any riparian rights in the 1952 condemnation and the town’s ownership terminated at the high water line. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the town acquired littoral rights in the initial condemnation, including the right to accretion. Following the Appellate Division’s reversal and new findings of fact, further proceedings were held at Special Term to determine damages. The case then returned to the Court of Appeals, after a final judgment was entered, to review the prior non-final order of the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Town of Hempstead, by condemning upland property to the high-water line in 1952, became a littoral owner entitled to the benefit of land that subsequently accreted to the shoreline, thereby extinguishing the rights of the prior owners of the submerged land to the accreted portion.

    Holding

    Yes, because when a municipality acquires upland to the high-water line through condemnation, it obtains the rights of a littoral owner, including the right to accretion, which alters the relationship between the upland and submerged land.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle established in Matter of City of Buffalo, which defines the rights of littoral or riparian ownership, noting that when land is increased by accretion, the new land belongs to the owner of the upland to which it attaches. The court reasoned that the 1952 condemnation broke the unity of title between the upland and the land under water, creating a new relationship. By acquiring the upland to the high-water line, the Town acquired littoral rights, including the right to accretion. The court stated that “a new relationship was created between the upland and the submerged land…In that new relationship, although the individual owners retained the fee to their respective submerged lands, the town acquired littoral rights.” The court emphasized that if a condemnor acquires upland to a water line, it gains the rights of the upland owner, including the right to accretion. The court distinguished the situation from one where the original upland owner’s access to the water is destroyed by accretion, stating that the Town stands in a different position as the littoral owner after the condemnation. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s view that the town’s prior condemnation conferred littoral rights, leading to the town’s ownership of the accreted land. Ultimately the court decided the town became a littoral or riparian owner with the usual rights of such an owner from accretion.

  • Rumsey v. New York and New England Railroad Co., 133 N.Y. 423 (1892): Upland Owners’ Rights to Water Access

    Rumsey v. New York and New England Railroad Co., 133 N.Y. 423 (1892)

    An upland owner whose land borders a navigable waterway retains the right to access the water, and a grant of land under water to the upland owner is valid, even if a railroad lies between the upland and the channel, provided it doesn’t interfere with the railroad’s rights.

    Summary

    The plaintiffs, owning uplands bordering the Hudson River, received a grant from the state for land under water. The defendant railroad, operating on an embankment between the plaintiffs’ land and the river channel, argued that the grant to the plaintiffs was invalid because the railroad, not the plaintiffs, was the “adjacent landowner.” The court held that the plaintiffs, as upland owners, retained the right to access the water, and the grant to them was valid as long as it did not interfere with the railroad’s rights, thus affirming the importance of riparian rights and access to waterways for upland owners.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs owned land bordering the Hudson River.
    In 1881, the defendant railroad constructed a portion of its tracks in the river, between the plaintiff’s uplands and the river channel.
    In 1885, the Commissioners of the Land Office granted the plaintiffs land under the water, extending along their waterfront and beyond the railroad’s line.
    The railroad argued that because its embankment was between the plaintiff’s land and the river, the railroad was the “adjacent landowner,” and the grant to the plaintiff was invalid.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the railroad company was the adjacent proprietor and the grant to the plaintiffs was void.
    The General Term affirmed the trial court’s decision.
    The plaintiffs appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiffs, as upland owners whose land borders a navigable waterway, retain the right to access the water, even when a railroad embankment lies between their land and the main channel.
    Whether the grant of land under water to the plaintiffs is valid, given the presence of the railroad, or if the railroad itself should be considered the “adjacent landowner” eligible for the grant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plaintiffs, as upland owners, maintain their riparian rights, including access to the water, even with the railroad’s presence.
    Yes, because the grant to the plaintiffs is valid as long as it doesn’t interfere with the railroad’s operations or rights. The railroad’s limited purpose does not make it an ‘adjacent owner’ within the meaning of the water grant statutes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the state’s policy of granting lands under water to promote commerce, traditionally favoring upland owners with waterfront access. The court stated, “From the earliest history of the state its policy has been to grant the lands under water along the shores of the navigable rivers and lakes, for the purpose of promoting the commerce of the state.”
    The court reasoned that the railroad, being a corporation with specific and limited purposes, couldn’t be considered an “adjacent owner” in the same way as an upland owner who could utilize the waterfront for commerce. The court noted, “A railroad corporation has no capacity to acquire lands for any purpose except such as is defined in its charter…Being a creature of law, it possesses those properties only which its charter confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its existence.”
    The court distinguished the case from previous rulings, clarifying that the key issue was the validity of the water grant itself and the interpretation of statutes relating to such grants.
    The court noted that the grant to the plaintiffs expressly reserved the rights of the Hudson River Railroad Company, thus complying with the statute intended to protect the railroad’s interests.
    The court held that the legislature recognized the power of the commissioners of the land office to grant land under water lying outside of the railroad to the upland proprietor, solidifying the rights of upland owners to retain access to the waterway. The court emphasized the legislative intent to “protect the upland owners along the east shore of the river in their access to the water and maintain their rights in the river unimpaired by the construction of the railroad.”

  • People v. Canal Appraisers, 33 N.Y. 461 (1865): State Ownership of Navigable Riverbeds

    33 N.Y. 461 (1865)

    In New York, the State owns the beds of navigable rivers, allowing the State to use the waters for public purposes like canal construction without compensating riparian owners.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the State of New York must compensate a riparian landowner for diverting water from the Mohawk River for use in the Erie Canal. The court held that the Mohawk River is a navigable river owned by the State, allowing the State to use its waters for public projects without compensating adjacent landowners. The court reasoned that the common law rule granting riparian owners ownership to the center of a non-navigable stream did not apply to large, navigable rivers in New York, and historical legislative actions supported the state’s claim of ownership.

    Facts

    The relator (landowner) owned land adjoining the Mohawk River. In 1841, the State constructed a feeder canal that diverted a significant amount of water from the Mohawk River to supply the Erie Canal. This diversion diminished the water power available to the relator’s mill, which had been operating since 1801. The relator’s title derived from a land patent describing the boundary as “down the stream thereof as it runs.” The landowner sought damages from the canal appraisers, who denied the claim because the State asserted ownership of the Mohawk River.

    Procedural History

    The relator sought a writ of mandamus from the Special Term to compel the canal appraisers to assess damages. The Special Term granted the writ. The General Term reversed the judgment, leading the relator to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State of New York must compensate a riparian owner for diverting water from the Mohawk River for use in the Erie Canal, based on the landowner’s claim to ownership of the riverbed.

    Holding

    No, because the Mohawk River is a navigable river, and the State owns the bed of navigable rivers in New York, giving it the right to use the water for public purposes without compensating riparian owners.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court rejected the common law rule that riparian owners possess title to the center of a non-navigable stream. The court emphasized the unique physical and economic conditions of New York, arguing that this common law principle was ill-suited for large, navigable rivers. The court noted that New York’s legislature had consistently asserted ownership over the beds of navigable rivers, demonstrated by granting portions of the Mohawk River bed to the Western Inland Lock Navigation Company in 1792. This act was seen as an explicit assertion of state ownership and control. The court reviewed past decisions and legislative actions, concluding that New York had established a policy of owning and controlling its navigable waterways for public benefit, regardless of whether the tide ebbed and flowed. The court stated that attempting to apply English common law would be futile when considering the “great fresh water rivers of this continent.” The court relied on *The Canal Appraisers v. The People*, 17 Wend. 571, noting it was universally regarded to have settled the law. While the case of *Commissioner of Canal Fund v. Kempshall*, 26 Wend 404, had caused doubts as to the continuing precedential value of that case, the court found that it would not impact the decision in this case. The court quoted *Furman v. City of New York*, 5 Sandf. 33 as an authority on the idea that the king and, by extension, the state had ownership *tam aquae quam soli* or both water and soil. The court ultimately concluded that the State, as sovereign, possessed the right to use navigable rivers for public purposes without compensating riparian owners for any incidental losses. This right was deemed essential for the State’s ability to develop and maintain its canal system.