Riley v. County of Broome, 95 N.Y.2d 407 (2000)

Vehicles engaged in work on a highway are exempt from the rules of the road, and their operators are liable only for conduct that demonstrates a reckless disregard for the safety of others.

Summary

This case addresses the standard of care applicable to vehicles engaged in highway work under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). Two separate cases were consolidated. In the first, a street sweeper caused a dust cloud leading to a collision. In the second, a snowplow turned unexpectedly, colliding with a car. The New York Court of Appeals held that § 1103(b) exempts vehicles “actually engaged in work on a highway” from the rules of the road, limiting liability to reckless disregard for the safety of others. The Court reasoned that the legislative history supported this interpretation and that the standard of care should be consistent with that applied to emergency vehicles.

Facts

In Riley v. County of Broome, Betty Riley collided with a street sweeper operated by Garwood Young, a Broome County employee. The sweeper was moving slowly, creating a cloud of dust. In Wilson v. State of New York, John Wilson’s car collided with a snowplow operated by William Hunt. The snowplow made a sudden turn across Wilson’s lane during a snowstorm with poor visibility.

Procedural History

In Riley, the trial court instructed the jury that the recklessness standard applied under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), and the jury found for the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed. In Wilson, the Court of Claims dismissed the claim after trial, holding that the recklessness standard applied and the evidence was insufficient to meet that standard. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) exempts “hazard vehicles” engaged in highway work from all rules of the road, or only from the stopping, standing, and parking regulations of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1202(a)?

Whether the applicable standard of care for vehicles engaged in highway work is ordinary negligence or reckless disregard for the safety of others?

Holding

1. Yes, because the statute’s plain language exempts all vehicles “actually engaged in work on a highway” from the rules of the road.

2. Reckless disregard, because the 1974 amendment to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) explicitly references reckless disregard, and the legislative history indicates an intent to align the standard of care with that of emergency vehicles.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that the language of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) is clear: all vehicles “actually engaged in work on a highway” are exempt from the rules of the road. The Court rejected the argument that designated “hazard vehicles” are only exempt from stopping, standing, and parking regulations. The Court stated, “the statute nowhere states that ‘hazard vehicles’ are a distinct class from ‘work vehicles,’ nor does it deny ‘hazard vehicles’ the special protection given to all vehicles actually engaged in road work.”

Regarding the standard of care, the Court relied on its prior holding in Saarinen v. Kerr, which interpreted identical language in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) (regarding emergency vehicles) as imposing a recklessness standard. The Court reasoned that the Legislature’s specific reference to “reckless disregard” would be unnecessary if the intended standard was ordinary negligence. The Court stated, “the only way to apply the statute is to read its general admonition to exercise ‘due care’ in light of its more specific reference to ‘recklessness’.” The Court also referenced the Attorney General’s memorandum, which explicitly stated that the amendment “extends the standard of care presently applicable to drivers of authorized emergency vehicles under § 1104 * * * to persons engaged in maintenance and hazardous operations”. Despite acknowledging concerns that extending this lesser standard of care was unjustified, the court deferred to the Legislature and made it clear that “Any change in that standard, therefore, must come from the Legislature, not the courts.”