New York Law Review

Tag: Right to Silence

  • People v. Sirno, 76 N.Y.2d 967 (1990): Admissibility of Oral Statements After Refusal to Provide Written Statements

    People v. Sirno, 76 N.Y.2d 967 (1990)

    A defendant’s willingness to make an oral statement after refusing to provide a written one, following a valid Miranda waiver, does not constitute an invocation of the right to silence, making the oral statement admissible.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a defendant’s oral statement is admissible when made after the defendant waived his Miranda rights but refused to provide a written statement. The Court of Appeals held that the oral statement was admissible because the defendant’s refusal to sign a written statement, in this context, did not amount to an invocation of his right to silence. The court distinguished this situation from cases where a defendant refuses to speak further, which would invoke the right to remain silent. The key is whether the defendant clearly indicated a desire to cut off further questioning.

    Facts

    During the People’s direct case, the prosecutor presented police testimony indicating that:

    • The defendant received Miranda warnings.
    • The defendant acknowledged the warnings and signed a written waiver of his rights.
    • After the waiver, the officer asked for a written statement.
    • The defendant responded, “I’ll talk to you but I am not signing anything else.”
    • The defendant then provided an oral statement.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after an intermediate appellate court reviewed the trial court’s decision regarding the admissibility of the defendant’s oral statement.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the officer’s testimony regarding the defendant’s oral statement, given after refusing to provide a written statement, constituted an impermissible comment on the defendant’s invocation of his right to silence.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant waived his right to silence and his preference for an oral statement over a written one did not indicate a desire to cut off further inquiry.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the defendant did not invoke his right to silence but, rather, waived it after receiving Miranda warnings. The court emphasized that the defendant’s statement, “I’ll talk to you but I am not signing anything else,” indicated a preference for the form of the statement (oral vs. written) rather than a desire to terminate the interrogation altogether. The court distinguished this case from People v. Von Werne, where the defendant refused to talk further, which was interpreted as an invocation of the right to remain silent.

    The court also distinguished the case from Connecticut v. Barrett, noting that Barrett involved the right to counsel, specifically the refusal to make a written statement without counsel present. In Sirno, the defendant’s refusal to provide a written statement did not implicate his right to counsel. As the court stated, “Defendant’s reliance on Connecticut v Barrett (479 US 523) is misplaced as defendant’s refusal to give a written statement did not implicate his right to counsel.”

    The court concluded that, since the defendant had been properly Mirandized and waived his rights, the officer’s testimony regarding the circumstances in which the defendant made the oral statement was admissible.

  • People v. De George, 87 N.Y.2d 824 (1995): Preserving Objections for Appellate Review

    People v. De George, 87 N.Y.2d 824 (1995)

    To preserve an issue for appellate review in New York, a defendant must raise the specific legal theory at trial; a general objection is insufficient.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery. At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that, after waiving his Miranda rights and providing two alibis, the defendant remained silent when confronted with information contradicting those alibis. The defendant only objected to the evidence refuting the second alibi on hearsay grounds. On appeal, the defendant argued that the admission of testimony regarding his silence violated his constitutional right to remain silent and state evidentiary principles. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant failed to preserve these specific arguments for appellate review because he did not raise them before the trial court.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with robbery and, after being advised of his Miranda rights, provided two different alibis to the investigating officer. When confronted with information contradicting each alibi, the defendant remained silent. At trial, the prosecution introduced testimony regarding the defendant’s silence after the first alibi was contradicted without objection. When the prosecution sought to introduce testimony refuting the second alibi, the defendant objected on hearsay grounds, arguing that the individual who provided information to the police officer should be the one to testify. The trial court provided a curative instruction, stating the testimony was admitted to show the defendant’s state of mind, not for its truth. The prosecutor then elicited testimony, without objection, that the defendant did not respond when confronted with information contradicting his second alibi.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of robbery at trial. He appealed, arguing that the admission of testimony regarding his silence violated his constitutional right to remain silent and state evidentiary principles. The lower courts rejected the defendant’s claims. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant preserved for appellate review the argument that the admission of testimony regarding his silence violated his constitutional right to remain silent and state evidentiary principles, when his only objection at trial was on hearsay grounds.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to raise the specific legal theories regarding his right to silence and state evidentiary principles before the trial court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s claims regarding the violation of his right to silence and state evidentiary principles were not preserved for appellate review because he did not raise these specific arguments before the trial court. The Court emphasized the importance of CPL 470.05 [2], which requires a party to specifically raise an issue at trial in order to preserve it for appeal. The court cited People v. Gonzalez, 55 NY2d 720, 722. The Court reasoned that a general objection, such as the hearsay objection raised in this case, is insufficient to preserve a different legal theory for appeal. By failing to specifically argue that the testimony violated his constitutional right to silence or state evidentiary principles, the defendant deprived the trial court of the opportunity to address those specific issues and potentially avoid the alleged error. The court emphasized the need for specific objections to allow the trial court to make informed decisions and correct any potential errors in a timely manner. The Court’s decision highlights the importance of raising specific legal arguments at trial to preserve them for appellate review, ensuring that the trial court has the opportunity to address and rule on those issues in the first instance.

  • People v. Autry, 75 N.Y.2d 836 (1990): Preserving Objections to Jury Instructions on Defendant’s Right to Silence

    People v. Autry, 75 N.Y.2d 836 (1990)

    A defendant must object to a trial court’s jury instructions regarding the defendant’s failure to testify in order to preserve the issue for appellate review, unless the instruction expressly or unambiguously suggests the defendant should have testified.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a defendant must object to a trial court’s jury instructions regarding the defendant’s right not to testify in order to preserve the issue for appeal. The New York Court of Appeals held that absent a timely objection, the alleged error is unpreserved for review, unless the charge expressly or unambiguously conveys to the jury that the defendant should have testified. The Court reasoned that without a specific objection, it’s unclear whether the defense counsel strategically chose not to object, believing an extended instruction might benefit the defendant.

    Facts

    The defendants in these consolidated cases (Autry, Lara, Brown, and Fehr) claimed the trial courts’ jury instructions regarding their decision not to testify were overly expansive and violated their Fifth Amendment rights. They argued that the instructions should have been limited to the bare statutory language, and that the courts unduly emphasized their silence.

    Procedural History

    In *People v. Autry, People v. Lara,* and *People v. Brown*, the Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. In *People v. Fehr*, the Appellate Division reversed the defendant’s conviction on the law. The People appealed the *Fehr* decision. In all four cases, the defendants appealed, arguing the jury instructions were improper. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the cases to resolve the common legal issue.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant must object to a trial court’s jury instructions concerning the defendant’s decision not to testify in order to preserve a claim of error for appellate review.

    Holding

    Yes, because an objection is required to preserve a point of law for appellate review except in a very small class of cases where the error results in a trial “at basic variance with the mandate of law prescribed by Constitution or statute.” In the context of a charge error implicating a defendant’s right against self-incrimination, this exception applies only where the instruction expressly or unambiguously conveys to the jury that the defendant should have testified.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the alleged errors were not preserved for review because the defendants did not object to the instructions at trial. The Court applied the general rule that objections to jury charges must be made at trial to preserve the issue for appeal, citing *People v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 167 (1965)* and *People v. Thomas, 50 N.Y.2d 467 (1980)*. The Court clarified that an exception exists for errors that result in a trial fundamentally at odds with constitutional or statutory mandates, but this exception only applies where the jury instruction explicitly or unambiguously implies the defendant should have testified. The court stated, “An objection is required to preserve a point of law for appellate review except in a very small class of cases where the error results in a trial ‘at basic variance with the mandate of law prescribed by Constitution or statute.’” The Court distinguished the case from *People v. McLucas*, noting that the instructions in these cases were facially correct and the defendants only complained about possible nuances and inferences. The Court also suggested that the lack of objection might have been a strategic decision by defense counsel. In *People v. Fehr*, the Court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the Appellate Division erred in reviewing the unpreserved claim. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to exercise its fact review and interest of justice jurisdiction.

  • People v. Miller, 54 N.Y.2d 692 (1981): Admissibility of Confession After Invocation of Right to Silence

    54 N.Y.2d 692 (1981)

    A suspect’s invocation of the right to remain silent must be scrupulously honored; however, a confession is admissible if police conduct did not induce or actively aid a third party’s urging of the suspect to speak after the right was invoked.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the defendant’s confession was admissible. The defendant argued that his confession should have been suppressed because his brother-in-law, a police officer, urged him to speak with authorities after he had invoked his right to remain silent. The Court of Appeals found that the police did not induce or actively aid the brother-in-law’s conduct, and therefore, the defendant’s right to remain silent was “scrupulously honored.” The court also held that cross-examination of the defendant concerning uncharged crimes was permissible because the prosecutor had a good faith basis for the inquiry.

    Facts

    The defendant, Miller, was arrested and invoked his right to remain silent. Subsequently, Miller’s brother-in-law, Turner, who was also a New York City police officer but in a different precinct, urged Miller to speak with the authorities. Miller then confessed. At trial, the prosecution cross-examined Miller about uncharged crimes based on information provided by the victim’s brother.

    Procedural History

    The trial court admitted Miller’s confession and permitted cross-examination about uncharged crimes. Miller was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Miller appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that his confession should have been suppressed and that the cross-examination was improper. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s confession should have been suppressed because his brother-in-law urged him to speak with the authorities after he had invoked his right to remain silent, thus violating his Fifth Amendment rights.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in permitting cross-examination of the defendant concerning uncharged crimes based on information provided by the victim’s brother.

    Holding

    1. No, because the police did not induce or actively aid Turner’s conduct; thus, the defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent was “scrupulously honored.”

    2. No, because questioning about uncharged crimes is permissible in the exercise of the court’s discretion so long as there is a good faith basis in fact for the inquiry.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the affirmed findings indicated the police did not induce or actively aid Turner in urging Miller to speak. The court cited Michigan v. Mosley, stating that Miller’s invocation of his right to remain silent was “scrupulously honored.” The court emphasized that the key consideration is whether the police actions undermined the defendant’s decision to remain silent. Here, the brother-in-law acted independently. As for the cross-examination about uncharged crimes, the court referenced People v. Sorge, noting that such questioning is permissible if there is a good faith basis in fact for the inquiry. The trial court was satisfied with the foundation provided for the prosecutor’s questions, and the Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion. The court found no reason to overturn the trial court’s judgment.

  • People v. Wright, 38 N.Y.2d 114 (1975): Failure to Give “No Inference” Charge is Reversible Error

    People v. Wright, 38 N.Y.2d 114 (1975)

    When a defendant requests a jury instruction that no unfavorable inference can be drawn from the defendant’s failure to testify, the trial court’s failure to provide that instruction is reversible error, regardless of the strength of the evidence against the defendant.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a trial court’s failure to instruct the jury, as requested by the defendant, that no unfavorable inference could be drawn from the defendant’s decision not to testify was reversible error. The defendant was convicted of robbery and chose not to testify. His counsel requested a specific jury instruction that the defendant’s silence could not be used against him. The trial court did not provide the requested instruction. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the statutory requirement to provide the instruction upon request is mandatory and not subject to harmless error analysis. The court emphasized the importance of protecting the defendant’s right against self-incrimination and the presumption of innocence.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with robbing the same individual on four separate occasions.
    The defendant chose not to testify at trial.
    Defense counsel requested the trial judge to instruct the jury that the defendant’s failure to testify could not be used against him in any way.
    The trial court failed to provide the requested instruction.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of robbery at trial.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court’s failure to give the requested instruction was harmless error due to the clear and convincing evidence of the defendant’s guilt.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury, as requested by the defendant, that no unfavorable inference could be drawn from the defendant’s decision not to testify constitutes reversible error.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statutory direction to charge this specific language, where a proper request is made, is mandatory and, except in circumstances not now contemplable, immune to harmless error analysis.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that CPL 300.10 (subd 2) explicitly requires the trial court to instruct the jury, upon the defendant’s request, that no unfavorable inference may be drawn from the defendant’s failure to testify. The Court stated, “Upon request of a defendant who did not testify in his own behalf, but not otherwise, the court must state that the fact that he did not testify is not a factor from which any inference unfavorable to the defendant may be drawn.” The use of the word “must” indicates a mandatory requirement. The court reasoned that this requirement is just as obligatory as the requirement to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

    The court cited Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, where the Supreme Court held that a similar federal statute implicitly required a “no inference” charge when requested. The Court of Appeals found the Supreme Court’s reasoning even more applicable to the New York statute, which explicitly mandates the charge.

    The court also noted that ignoring the statutory command would undermine the presumption of innocence and shift the burden of proof to the defendant. “How diluted the exercise of this right would become, if the jury were permitted to presume guilt on the basis of a defendant’s refusal to testify.”

    By emphasizing the mandatory nature of the instruction and the importance of protecting the defendant’s constitutional rights, the court concluded that the failure to provide the instruction was reversible error per se, regardless of the strength of the evidence against the defendant.

  • People v. Von Werne, 41 N.Y.2d 584 (1977): Defendant’s Silence Cannot Be Used Against Him

    People v. Von Werne, 41 N.Y.2d 584 (1977)

    A defendant’s exercise of their constitutional right to remain silent cannot be used against them at trial to infer guilt.

    Summary

    Herbert Von Werne was convicted of possessing stolen property and related charges. The prosecution presented evidence that Von Werne possessed two stolen Cadillacs with altered VIN plates. At trial, a police officer testified that Von Werne invoked his right to remain silent during questioning. The trial court also gave an improper jury instruction regarding circumstantial evidence and the defendant’s knowledge. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the officer’s testimony about Von Werne’s silence was prejudicial error and that the jury instruction on circumstantial evidence was also flawed. This case emphasizes the importance of protecting a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights and properly instructing the jury on the use of circumstantial evidence.

    Facts

    Officer Gleason, trained in detecting stolen cars, found a Cadillac with a VIN plate attached with non-standard rivets. The license plate did not match the car, and the registered owner’s address was incorrect. A hidden VIN plate matched a stolen vehicle reported by Herman Sundelson. When Von Werne claimed ownership, Gleason interviewed him after administering Miranda warnings. Von Werne stated he bought the car without an engine or transmission, and he had worked on it. When asked who helped install the engine and transmission, Von Werne stated, “I don’t wish to answer any more questions without my lawyer present.” Gleason later found another Cadillac near Von Werne’s residence with similar VIN plate irregularities. This car was also determined to be stolen.

    Procedural History

    Von Werne was convicted at trial on multiple counts related to possessing stolen property. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Von Werne appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the police officer to testify that the defendant invoked his right to remain silent during questioning.

    2. Whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the use of circumstantial evidence to prove the defendant’s knowledge of the illegal nature of the property.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a defendant’s exercise of their constitutional right to remain silent cannot be used against them.

    2. Yes, because the court’s instruction regarding the statutory presumption of knowledge was inapplicable, and the jury should have been properly instructed on the use of circumstantial evidence to prove knowledge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that allowing the officer to testify about Von Werne’s silence was a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The court emphasized that the only purpose of such testimony is to allow the jury to infer consciousness of guilt, which is impermissible. As the court stated, “The point of the cases is that a defendant’s exercise of his constitutional right may not be used against him by the prosecution. (Griffin v California, 380 US 609, 615.)” The court found that this error was not harmless, especially considering the less-than-overwhelming evidence of Von Werne’s knowledge. Furthermore, the court found that the trial court erred in its jury instructions regarding circumstantial evidence and the element of knowledge. The court stated “Knowledge, of course, may be shown circumstantially by conduct or directly by admission, or indirectly by contradictory statements from which guilt may be inferred”. The trial court improperly applied a statutory presumption of knowledge applicable to those “in the business of buying, selling or otherwise dealing in property,” as there was no evidence Von Werne engaged in such business. The jury should have been instructed on how to properly evaluate circumstantial evidence to determine if the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Von Werne knew the property was stolen. Because of these errors, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.

  • People v. Moro, 23 N.Y.2d 496 (1969): Inference of Guilt from Possession of Stolen Property

    People v. Moro, 23 N.Y.2d 496 (1969)

    The recent and exclusive possession of stolen property, if unexplained or falsely explained, allows a jury to infer that the possessor is a criminal, but the jury must determine whether the possessor is the thief or merely a receiver of stolen goods; the defendant cannot be convicted of both crimes.

    Summary

    Charles Moro was convicted of criminally concealing and withholding stolen property and possessing burglar’s tools, but acquitted of grand larceny. The key evidence involved a stolen car found near Moro, a known “street mechanic,” with alterations suggesting he was dismantling it. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the jury could infer guilt from Moro’s unexplained possession of the stolen car, even though he was acquitted of stealing it. The court clarified that the inference of guilt arises from unexplained possession and does not violate the defendant’s right to remain silent.

    Facts

    Rene Cartayas reported his 1960 Oldsmobile stolen. Three days later, police officers familiar with Charles Moro, a local “street mechanic,” spotted him driving a similar car. The next day, the officers found the car, with the same license plate, near Moro. It had been partially dismantled and altered. Moro could not produce a driver’s license or registration for the car. The police confirmed the car was stolen from Cartayas. Moro possessed a key that fit the car. The car was inoperable when recovered.

    Procedural History

    Moro was indicted on five counts, but only three were submitted to the jury: grand larceny, criminally concealing and withholding stolen property, and unlawfully possessing burglar’s tools. The jury acquitted Moro of grand larceny but convicted him of the other two charges. Moro appealed, arguing it was improper to convict him of receiving stolen property and that the judge prejudiced him by remarking on his unexplained possession of the stolen car. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a jury can convict a defendant of criminally receiving stolen property when there is evidence that someone else may have stolen the property, and the defendant was in recent and exclusive possession of it.
    2. Whether a judge’s remark about the defendant’s unexplained possession of a stolen car violates the defendant’s right to remain silent.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the recent and exclusive possession of the fruits of a crime, if unexplained, justifies the inference that the possessor is a criminal, and the jury determines whether the possessor is the thief or merely a receiver of stolen goods.
    2. No, because the inference of guilt arises from the unexplained possession of the stolen property, and the judge properly instructed the jury not to draw any inferences from the defendant’s failure to testify.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the established principle that “recent and exclusive possession of the fruits of crime, if unexplained or falsely explained, will justify the inference that the possessor is the criminal.” The court distinguished between the act of stealing and the act of receiving stolen property, noting that a defendant cannot be convicted of both crimes, but can be indicted for both, allowing the jury to determine the appropriate charge based on the evidence. In Moro’s case, the evidence suggested he may not have been the original thief but was instead dismantling the car, justifying the conviction for receiving stolen property. The court noted that the alterations to the car were not such that an experienced mechanic could not have performed them quickly.

    Regarding the defendant’s right to remain silent, the court clarified that the inference of guilt arises from the unexplained possession of the stolen property, not from the defendant’s failure to testify. The court emphasized that the inference can be overcome by evidence presented to explain the possession, even without the defendant’s testimony. The court also highlighted that the trial judge instructed the jury that no adverse inferences should be drawn from the defendant’s decision not to testify, mitigating any potential prejudice. The court cited Wangrow v. United States, 399 F. 2d 106, 118, supporting this view.

  • People v. Kress, 29 N.Y.2d 429 (1972): Silence After Arrest Cannot Be Used Against Defendant

    People v. Kress, 29 N.Y.2d 429 (1972)

    A defendant’s silence after arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings cannot be used against them at trial as evidence of guilt, nor can the prosecutor comment on their failure to provide an alibi to the police.

    Summary

    Defendants Kress and Christman were convicted of attempted rape, sodomy, and assault. At trial, neither defendant testified, but both presented alibi defenses. The prosecutor, during summation, highlighted the fact that the defendants didn’t tell the police about their alibis upon arrest. The trial court deemed this “fair comment.” The New York Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the prosecutor’s comments violated the defendants’ right to remain silent. The court also addressed other evidentiary issues that arose during the trial, including the improper admission of a photographic identification and a co-defendant’s statement.

    Facts

    Kress and Christman were arrested and charged with attempted rape, sodomy, and assault. Kress refused to make any statement to the police except to identify himself. Christman denied the acts but admitted he and Kress were together at the time of the crime. Both defendants presented alibi defenses at trial, but neither testified. The complaining witness identified Kress through a photograph at the police station. A blanket found in Christman’s car was received in evidence but was not connected to the crime.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted at trial. They appealed, arguing that the prosecutor’s comments on their silence after arrest, the admission of the photographic identification, and the co-defendant’s statement were prejudicial errors. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the judgments and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecutor’s comments on the defendants’ failure to provide their alibi to the police after arrest violated their right to remain silent and constituted reversible error.
    2. Whether the admission of the complaining witness’s photographic identification of Kress at the police station was improper.
    3. Whether the admission of Christman’s statement to the police, implicating Kress, was improper against Kress.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because defendants are under no obligation to offer an alibi to police after arrest, and it is impermissible for the prosecution to comment on their silence.
    2. Yes, because admitting testimony of a photographic identification is improper.
    3. Yes, because the statement made by a co-defendant to police is inadmissible against another defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor’s comments on the defendants’ silence after arrest were a substantial error. The Court reasoned that defendants are under no obligation to say anything or provide an alibi to the police after arrest, citing People v. Travato, 309 N.Y. 382 and Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609. The Court stated that it could have been counted against the defendants that there was no police testimony that appellants told them about alibi witnesses; or, alternatively, that they failed to explain on the trial where they were at the time. The court found this to be prejudicial. Additionally, the court found the photographic identification of Kress by the complaining witness at the police station was improperly admitted, citing People v. Cioffi, 1 N.Y.2d 70, as was Christman’s statement to police that he and Kress were together around the time of the crime. While the seizure and inspection of Christman’s car were deemed improper, the evidence found was not prejudicial. Finally, the Court addressed the imposition of consecutive sentences, holding that separate consecutive sentences for attempted rape and assault with intent to commit rape were impermissible under the circumstances, referencing former Penal Law § 1938.