New York Law Review

Tag: right to remain silent

  • People v. Gary, 31 N.Y.2d 68 (1972): Admissibility of Statements After Initial Refusal to Speak

    People v. Gary, 31 N.Y.2d 68 (1972)

    A suspect’s initial invocation of the right to remain silent does not permanently bar subsequent questioning, provided the suspect is re-advised of their Miranda rights and voluntarily chooses to speak.

    Summary

    Gary was convicted of manslaughter after initially pleading not guilty. Prior to the plea, a Huntley hearing was conducted regarding the admissibility of his statements. Gary initially told a patrolman he stabbed a man, and later, after being taken to a precinct and read his Miranda rights, he indicated he wished to remain silent. About an hour later, an Assistant District Attorney re-advised Gary of his Miranda rights, and Gary then agreed to speak, giving a statement. The court addressed whether the initial invocation of the right to silence precluded any subsequent questioning. The court held that re-advising the suspect of his rights and obtaining a voluntary waiver allows for subsequent questioning.

    Facts

    1. Gary approached a police officer and admitted to stabbing a man.
    2. The officer took Gary to a police station.
    3. At a different precinct, a detective advised Gary of his Miranda rights.
    4. Gary signed a form indicating he understood his rights and wished to remain silent.
    5. Questioning ceased, and Gary was transported to another precinct.
    6. Approximately one hour later, an Assistant District Attorney (ADA) advised Gary of his Miranda rights again.
    7. Gary indicated he was willing to talk and gave a statement, which was recorded.

    Procedural History

    1. Gary was indicted for murder.
    2. A Huntley hearing was held to determine the admissibility of Gary’s statements.
    3. The trial court found the statement admissible.
    4. Gary pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree.
    5. Gary appealed the trial court’s decision to admit the statement, arguing that his initial invocation of the right to remain silent should have barred any subsequent questioning.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, after a suspect invokes their right to remain silent, can law enforcement officials initiate a subsequent interrogation after re-advising the suspect of their Miranda rights?

    Holding

    1. No, because neither Miranda nor any broader constitutional mandate prohibits a subsequent request for a statement, made otherwise than in the course of continued importunity or coercive interrogation in the guise of a request for reconsideration, after the suspect has been readvised of their rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished between a continuous interrogation and a subsequent request for reconsideration after a break in time and a reiteration of Miranda warnings. The court emphasized that Miranda prohibits the continuation of an interrogation after a suspect invokes their right to silence, but it does not create a permanent bar to any future questioning. The court noted that the key is whether the subsequent request is made in the course of continued importunity or coercion. The court reasoned that, in this case, the hour-long gap between the initial refusal to speak and the subsequent questioning by the ADA, coupled with the re-administration of Miranda warnings, indicated that Gary’s decision to speak was voluntary. The court cited United States v. Brady, United States v. Collins, and People v. Rice to support its conclusion. The court stated, “that what Miranda requires is that ‘interrogation must cease’ until new and adequate warnings have been given and there is a reasonable basis for inferring that the suspect has voluntarily changed his mind”.

  • People v. Schanberger, 24 N.Y.2d 288 (1969): When Refusal to Answer Police Questions Does Not Justify Loitering Conviction

    People v. Schanberger, 24 N.Y.2d 288 (1969)

    A conviction for loitering requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each conjunctive element of the statute, including circumstances justifying suspicion that the individual may be engaged or about to engage in crime; mere refusal to answer a police officer’s questions is insufficient to establish such suspicion.

    Summary

    Donald Schanberger was convicted of violating New York’s loitering statute after refusing to answer a state trooper’s questions about his identity, destination, and purpose. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the statute requires proof of circumstances justifying suspicion that the individual is engaged in or about to engage in criminal activity. The court found that the trooper’s observation of Schanberger walking along a highway, even in an area with frequent burglaries, was insufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion of criminal intent. The court emphasized that an individual’s refusal to answer questions cannot, by itself, constitute a criminal act under the loitering statute.

    Facts

    State Trooper Kellogg observed Schanberger walking along a highway late at night in a residential area. Approximately thirty minutes later, the trooper saw Schanberger walking along the same highway near a shopping center, an area known for frequent burglaries. Aroused by suspicion, the trooper stopped Schanberger and asked him to identify himself, state his destination, and explain his purpose. Schanberger refused to answer these questions, asserting that he was not obligated to do so. The trooper then warned Schanberger that his refusal could lead to an arrest for loitering. When Schanberger persisted in his refusal, the trooper arrested him. A subsequent search revealed Schanberger’s identity.

    Procedural History

    Schanberger was charged with violating Section 240.35(6) of the New York Penal Law (loitering). At trial, the trooper testified to the facts of the encounter. Schanberger was convicted and fined $10. Schanberger appealed the conviction pro se, challenging the constitutionality of the statute.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a conviction under New York Penal Law § 240.35(6) can be sustained when the information and evidence fail to establish circumstances justifying a reasonable suspicion that the individual was engaged or about to engage in crime, and the conviction is based solely on the individual’s refusal to answer a police officer’s questions.

    Holding

    No, because the statute requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each conjunctive element, including circumstances that justify suspicion of criminal activity; mere refusal to answer questions does not satisfy this requirement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court focused on the conjunctive nature of the loitering statute. To secure a conviction under Section 240.35(6), the prosecution must prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. A critical element, missing from both the information and the trooper’s testimony, was that the circumstances justified a reasonable suspicion that Schanberger was engaged or about to engage in criminal activity. The information failed to allege this element. The trooper’s testimony—that he observed Schanberger walking in an area with frequent burglaries—was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion directed specifically at Schanberger. The court emphasized that the conviction appeared to be based on Schanberger’s refusal to answer the trooper’s questions, stating, “While it may be true that there was no reason why the defendant should not have answered the trooper’s questions, it equally is true that his failure to answer cannot constitute a criminal act and, particularly, a violation of subdivision 6 of section 240.35.” The court implicitly rejected the argument that refusal to answer police questions, without more, provides a basis for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court stated that the information “nowhere states that the circumstances were such that the trooper was justified in suspecting that the defendant might be engaged or was about to engage in crime.”