New York Law Review

Tag: Right to Privacy

  • Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115 (1993): Limits on Emotional Distress and Privacy Claims in Newsgathering

    Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115 (1993)

    The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress cannot be used to circumvent the limitations on right to privacy claims, especially when the publication involves a newsworthy event and the photograph has a real relationship to the article.

    Summary

    Pamela Howell, a patient at a psychiatric facility, sued the New York Post for publishing a photograph of her taken without her consent while she was walking with Hedda Nussbaum, a figure of public interest due to her involvement in the Lisa Steinberg case. Howell claimed the publication revealed her hospitalization, causing her emotional distress. The Court of Appeals held that while the conduct of newsgathering could be tortious, the publication was related to a matter of public interest, and the photograph bore a real relationship to the article about Nussbaum’s recovery. Therefore, neither the privacy claim nor the emotional distress claim could succeed because the publication was qualifiedly privileged.

    Facts

    Pamela Howell was a patient at Four Winds Hospital, a psychiatric facility, and desired to keep her hospitalization private. Hedda Nussbaum, known for her involvement in the Lisa Steinberg case, was also a patient. A New York Post photographer trespassed onto the hospital grounds and took pictures of Nussbaum and Howell. The Post published a front-page photograph of Nussbaum and Howell walking together, contrasting Nussbaum’s healed appearance with a previous photo of her bruised face after Lisa Steinberg’s death. Howell’s name was not mentioned, but her face was visible.

    Procedural History

    Howell sued the New York Post for violating Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, trespass, harassment, and prima facie tort. The Supreme Court dismissed all claims except for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the derivative claim. The Appellate Division modified, dismissing the entire complaint. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to consider the dismissal of the privacy and emotional distress claims.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the publication of Howell’s photograph violated her statutory right to privacy under Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51.
    2. Whether the New York Post’s actions constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress.

    Holding

    1. No, because the photograph was related to a newsworthy article about Hedda Nussbaum and bore a real relationship to the article.
    2. No, because the publication of the photograph was qualifiedly privileged as a newsworthy event, and the newsgathering methods, while involving a trespass, did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that to succeed on a privacy claim under Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51, Howell needed to show that the photograph was used for trade or advertising purposes and bore no real relationship to a matter of public interest. Since the article concerned Hedda Nussbaum, a figure of public interest, and the article was not an advertisement, the court focused on whether the photograph had a real relationship to the article. The court found that the photograph did have a real relationship because it contrasted Nussbaum’s improved appearance with her prior disfigured state, illustrating her recovery. Quoting Murray v New York Mag. Co., the court reiterated that ” ‘a picture illustrating an article on a matter of public interest is not considered used for the purpose of trade or advertising within the prohibition of the statute * * * unless it has no real relationship to the article * * * or unless the article is an advertisement in disguise.’ “

    Regarding the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the court acknowledged that while newsgathering methods could be tortious, the conduct alleged did not meet the stringent requirements for the tort. The court emphasized the “privileged-conduct” exception, stating that “[a] newspaper’s publication of a newsworthy photograph is an act within the contemplation of the ‘privileged-conduct’ exception.” The court further explained that for conduct to be considered outrageous, it must be “ ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community’ ” (quoting Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp.). Trespassing to take the photograph, while unlawful, did not meet this high standard, especially because the photograph was taken outdoors and from a distance.

  • Welch v. Mr. Christmas Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 143 (1982): Scope of Consent in Privacy Rights

    Welch v. Mr. Christmas Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 143 (1982)

    A defendant’s immunity from a claim for invasion of privacy is limited to the scope of the consent provided, and any use exceeding that consent constitutes a violation of New York Civil Rights Law § 51.

    Summary

    Welch sued Mr. Christmas Inc. for violating his right to privacy under New York Civil Rights Law § 51 by using his photographs beyond the scope of his consent. Welch had placed a limitation on the consent form after the photographs were taken. The court held that because the statute requires written consent, Welch had the right to limit his consent in any way he chose, even after the photos were taken, and any use beyond that limited consent constituted a violation. The court reinstated Welch’s claims, emphasizing that the consent defined the boundaries of permissible use.

    Facts

    Welch’s photographs were taken by Mr. Christmas Inc. Subsequently, Welch signed a consent form but added a limitation regarding the use of the photographs. Mr. Christmas Inc. used the photographs in a manner that exceeded the limitations Welch placed on the consent form.

    Procedural History

    The lower court dismissed Welch’s first, third, and fourth causes of action. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision regarding the dismissal of the first, third, and fourth causes of action, reinstating those claims.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a limitation placed on a consent form after photographs are taken, but before the use of those photographs, is effective to limit the scope of consent under Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law.

    Holding

    Yes, because Section 51 of the Civil Rights Law requires written consent, and absent estoppel, the timing of the consent does not limit the plaintiff’s right to define the scope of that consent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the defendant’s immunity from a privacy claim is “no broader than the consent executed to him.” The court emphasized the plaintiff’s statutory right to limit his consent in any way he deemed proper. The court stated, “Section 51 of the Civil Rights Law requires ‘the written consent’ of such person and, absent facts, not here pleaded, upon which an estoppel could be grounded, the fact that the consent was signed after, rather than before, the photographic session, imposed no limitation upon the absolute right granted plaintiff by the statute to limit his consent in any way he deemed proper or desirable.” Any use of the photographs beyond the granted consent gives rise to a cause of action under Section 51, and the plaintiff is not limited to a contract action. The court relied on its prior holding in Shields v. Gross, emphasizing that consent defines the boundaries of permissible use.

  • Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433 (1982): Limits on Right to Privacy for Matters of Public Interest

    Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433 (1982)

    New York’s statutory right to privacy under Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51 does not extend to the publication of a person’s photograph in connection with a matter of public interest unless the photograph has no real relationship to the article or the article is an advertisement in disguise.

    Summary

    Clarence Arrington sued The New York Times Company and others after his photograph was used on the cover of the New York Times Magazine to illustrate an article about the Black middle class. Arrington claimed the article presented views he did not share and subjected him to public scorn. The Court of Appeals held that the use of Arrington’s photograph was not a violation of New York’s Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51 because the article concerned a matter of public interest, and the photograph bore a reasonable relationship to the article. However, the Court found that the photographer and photo agency could be liable for commercializing Arrington’s photograph without his consent.

    Facts

    The New York Times Magazine published an article entitled “The Black Middle Class: Making It,” featuring a photograph of Clarence Arrington on its cover. Arrington had no knowledge that the photograph had been taken or that it would be used in connection with the article. The article discussed the role and perceptions of the Black middle class, including the idea that this group was becoming removed from less fortunate members of their race. Arrington, a financial analyst, felt the article’s views were insulting and subjected him to ridicule, either because people thought he shared those views or because they assumed he had become a professional model.

    Procedural History

    Arrington sued the New York Times Company, the photographer Gianfranco Gorgoni, Contact Press Images, Inc. (the photographic agency), and Robert Pledge (Contact’s president). The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Special Term dismissed the complaint against all defendants, but granted Arrington leave to amend the complaint against the Times based on a constitutional right to privacy. The Appellate Division modified the Special Term’s order by deleting the leave to amend, finding no common-law or constitutional right to privacy applied. Arrington appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the publication of Arrington’s photograph in connection with an article of public interest violates New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51.

    2. Whether the photographer and photographic agency could be held liable for violating New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51 by selling Arrington’s photograph to the New York Times.

    3. Whether Arrington’s constitutional right to privacy was violated.

    Holding

    1. No, because a picture illustrating an article on a matter of public interest is not considered used for the purposes of trade or advertising within the prohibition of the statute unless it has no real relationship to the article or unless the article is an advertisement in disguise.

    2. Yes, because the photographer and photographic agency may have commercialized the photograph independently from the publisher’s immunity for publishing matters of public interest.

    3. No, because there was no state action involved.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed the history and scope of New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51, noting that these statutes were enacted in response to Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., which denied the existence of a common-law right to privacy in New York. The statutes were narrowly drafted to encompass only the commercial use of an individual’s name or likeness. The Court emphasized that it has consistently adhered to the position that “there exists no so-called common-law right to privacy” in New York (Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 493, 497, n. 2). The Court balanced the protection against invasion of privacy for purposes of “advertising” or “trade” with the constitutional values of free speech and free press. The Court cited Murray v. New York Mag. Co., stating that “ ‘[a] picture illustrating an article on a matter of public interest is not considered used for the purposes of trade or advertising within the prohibition of the statute * * * unless it has no real relationship to the article * * * or unless the article is an advertisement in disguise.’ ” The court found that the article concerned a matter of public interest, and the photograph bore a reasonable relationship to the article. However, the Court found that the photographer and photo agency could be liable for commercializing Arrington’s photograph without his consent. The Court rejected Arrington’s “false light” claim, expressing concern that it could compromise the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press. Finally, the Court rejected Arrington’s claim based on an alleged constitutional right to privacy, because no state action was involved.

  • Matter of Linda F. M., 52 N.Y.2d 236 (1981): Establishing ‘Good Cause’ to Unseal Adoption Records

    Matter of Linda F. M., 52 N.Y.2d 236 (1981)

    Under Section 114 of the Domestic Relations Law, an adopted person seeking to unseal adoption records must demonstrate “good cause,” which requires more than a mere desire to learn the identity of their biological parents; concrete psychological problems specifically linked to the lack of knowledge about ancestry may constitute good cause.

    Summary

    Linda F. M., an adopted person, sought to unseal her adoption records, claiming psychological problems stemming from her ignorance of her biological parentage. The New York Court of Appeals held that a mere desire to learn about one’s ancestry does not, by itself, constitute “good cause” to unseal adoption records under Section 114 of the Domestic Relations Law. The court emphasized the importance of protecting the privacy interests of biological parents and the need for a concrete and compelling reason beyond general curiosity.

    Facts

    Linda F. M. was born in 1940 and adopted in 1941. She learned of her adoption in 1971. In 1977, after other attempts failed, she sought access to her sealed adoption records, alleging psychological problems related to her lack of knowledge about her biological parents.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court found that Linda F. M. failed to establish good cause for unsealing the records. The Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate’s decision, agreeing that the petitioner had not demonstrated sufficient cause.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a general desire to learn about one’s ancestry constitutes “good cause” under Section 114 of the Domestic Relations Law to unseal adoption records.

    Holding

    No, because a mere desire to learn the identity of one’s natural parents does not, alone, constitute good cause, or the requirement of section 114 would become a nullity. However, concrete psychological problems, if specifically connected to the lack of knowledge about ancestry, could constitute good cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the confidential nature of adoption records under Section 114, which serves to protect the adopted child, adoptive parents, and biological parents. This confidentiality shields the child from disturbing facts, allows adoptive parents to develop a close relationship, and provides anonymity for the biological parents.

    The court acknowledged the petitioner’s desire to learn about her ancestry but found that her alleged psychological problems were not credibly connected to her lack of knowledge. The court stated, “When balanced against the interests of other parties to the adoption process, however, it cannot alone constitute good cause under section 114.”

    The court clarified that “concrete psychological problems, if found by the court to be specifically connected to the lack of knowledge about ancestry, would never constitute good cause.” It emphasized that “good cause admits of no universal, black-letter definition” and must be decided on a case-by-case basis.

    The court also addressed the issue of notice to biological parents, stating that such notice should be given if the petitioner makes a showing of entitlement and the biological parents can be located with reasonable effort without revealing their identities to the adoptive parents. This notice allows biological parents to intervene and defend their interest in retaining anonymity.

    Finally, the court rejected the petitioner’s claim that Section 114 is unconstitutional, citing Alma Soc. v Mellon.

  • People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476 (1980): Consensual Sodomy Statute Violates Right to Privacy and Equal Protection

    People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476 (1980)

    A state law criminalizing consensual sodomy between adults in private violates the constitutional right to privacy and equal protection.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that Penal Law § 130.38, which criminalized consensual sodomy, was unconstitutional. The defendants were convicted under this statute for engaging in deviate sexual intercourse. The Court reasoned that the statute infringed upon the right to privacy by regulating private, consensual sexual conduct between adults. Furthermore, it violated the equal protection clause because it discriminated between married and unmarried individuals, criminalizing the same conduct for the latter while permitting it for the former without any rational basis.

    Facts

    Defendant Onofre admitted to committing acts of deviate sexual intercourse with a 17-year-old male in his home.

    Defendants Peoples and Goss were convicted after evidence showed they engaged in oral sodomy in a parked car.

    Defendant Sweat was convicted after evidence showed she committed a similar act with a male in a parked truck in a residential area.

    Procedural History

    In Onondaga County Court, Onofre’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on constitutional grounds was denied, leading to his conviction.

    In Buffalo City Court, motions to dismiss by Peoples, Goss, and Sweat, arguing the statute’s unconstitutionality, were also denied, resulting in their convictions.

    The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reversed Onofre’s conviction, declaring the statute unconstitutional, while the Erie County Court affirmed the convictions of Peoples, Goss, and Sweat.

    The cases were consolidated before the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Penal Law § 130.38, criminalizing consensual sodomy, violates the constitutional right to privacy of adults engaging in such conduct in private?

    2. Whether Penal Law § 130.38 violates the equal protection clause by discriminating between married and unmarried persons without a rational basis?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statute infringes on the right of independence in making important personal decisions and engaging in conduct accordingly, absent a valid basis for state intrusion.

    2. Yes, because the statute discriminates between married and unmarried persons without any rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court grounded its decision on the right to privacy, which encompasses the freedom of conduct and personal decision-making. Citing Stanley v. Georgia, the Court highlighted the right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters fundamentally affecting a person.

    The Court distinguished the case from People v. Shepard, which upheld the prohibition of marijuana possession, because there was no evidence presented to suggest that consensual sodomy was harmful to the participants or society.

    The Court emphasized that the right to privacy protects individual decisions about sexual intimacy by unmarried persons and the satisfaction of sexual desires in a cloistered setting. The People failed to demonstrate how banning consensual sodomy promotes public morality or protects the institution of marriage. The court noted, “Personal feelings of distaste for the conduct sought to be proscribed by section 130.38 of the Penal Law and even disapproval by a majority of the populace…may not substitute for the required demonstration of a valid basis for intrusion by the State in an area of important personal decision protected under the right of privacy drawn from the United States Constitution.”

    Regarding equal protection, the Court found no rational basis for the law’s discrimination between married and unmarried individuals. Citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, the court reiterated that differential treatment must be rationally explained. The prosecution’s justifications—protecting marriage and the rights of married persons—lacked any demonstrable connection to the statute’s proscription of consensual sodomy. The Court stated, “no showing has been made as to how, or even that, the statute banning consensual sodomy between persons not married to each other preserves or fosters marriage.”

  • People v. Shepard, 50 N.Y.2d 640 (1980): State Power to Criminalize Marijuana Possession

    People v. Shepard, 50 N.Y.2d 640 (1980)

    A state may constitutionally criminalize the possession of marijuana for personal use within the home, as this does not violate an individual’s right to privacy because the legislature has the right to make such judgements.

    Summary

    Martin Shepard was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance after police found nine marijuana plants at his home. He argued that the law criminalizing possession violated his right to privacy, as marijuana was harmless and the state had no legitimate interest in prohibiting its use. Shepard presented expert testimony supporting his claim. The prosecution countered with evidence suggesting marijuana’s harmful effects. The trial court upheld the law’s constitutionality, and the Appellate Term affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the judiciary should not substitute its judgment for the legislature’s regarding the dangers of marijuana.

    Facts

    Martin Shepard was found to be in possession of nine marijuana plants at his home in Sagaponack, New York.

    Shepard conceded possession but argued the criminal possession statute violated his right to privacy.

    Shepard presented evidence and expert testimony suggesting marijuana’s harmlessness, arguing no significant harm or health danger existed for users.

    The District Attorney countered with evidence asserting marijuana’s harmful effects, including brain damage, genetic damage, and impaired lung function.

    Procedural History

    Shepard was initially charged in the Justice Court of the Town of Southampton with felony possession, later reduced to a misdemeanor.

    The trial court denied Shepard’s motion to dismiss, finding he failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality.

    Shepard was convicted and fined $100.

    The Appellate Term affirmed the trial court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State can constitutionally criminalize the possession and cultivation of personal use quantities of marijuana within the privacy of the home without violating the right to privacy.

    Holding

    No, because the Court of Appeals deferred to the legislature’s judgment regarding the potential harms of marijuana use, stating that it is the legislature’s role to make laws and the court’s role to apply them; therefore, the judiciary should not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the individual’s right to privacy in matters such as marriage, education, procreation, contraception, and family relationships, as established in cases like Loving v. Virginia, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, Skinner v. Oklahoma, Eisenstadt v. Baird, Prince v. Massachusetts and Griswold v. Connecticut. However, the court distinguished these cases from the possession of controlled substances, citing the Supreme Court’s footnote in Stanley v. Georgia, which stated that the decision protecting the private possession of obscenity did not infringe upon the power of the State to criminalize the possession of narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods.

    The court emphasized the role of the legislature in enacting laws, particularly in areas of legitimate controversy. While acknowledging disagreement regarding the effects of marijuana, the court stated that the statute represented the current judgment of the elected Legislature acting on behalf of the people of the State. Empirical data concerning the vices and virtues of marijuana for general use is far from conclusive.

    The court deferred to the legislature’s judgment, stating, “It is the business of the court to apply the law, and while we have the power, we clearly lack the right to substitute our own sense of what is a dangerous substance for the considered judgment of the Legislature. Nothing would be more inappropriate than for us to prematurely remove marihuana from the Legislature’s consideration by classifying its personal possession as a constitutionally protected right.” The court emphasized the limited scope within which it could declare a legislative act unconstitutional. Quoting Cardozo, the court noted that “The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness”.

  • Evans v. Carey, 40 N.Y.2d 1008 (1976): Financial Disclosure by Public Employees and the Balancing of Interests

    Evans v. Carey, 40 N.Y.2d 1008 (1976)

    When the rights and interests of government employees as citizens are balanced against the rights and interests of the government as an employer, a financial disclosure requirement designed to eliminate inefficiency and deter official corruption, which are significant public interests, does not infringe upon individual employees’ constitutional rights.

    Summary

    This case concerns the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 10, which required financial disclosure by certain New York state employees. The plaintiffs challenged the order, arguing it violated their right to privacy. The Court of Appeals upheld the order, distinguishing it from cases involving broader privacy rights and relying on precedents that balance the rights of government employees against the interests of the government as an employer. The court found that the executive order served significant public interests by aiming to eliminate inefficiency and deter corruption, and that it did not unconstitutionally infringe upon employees’ rights.

    Facts

    Executive Order No. 10 mandated financial disclosure by certain public employees in New York. The aim of the order was to deter corruption and eliminate inefficiency within the government. Several employees subject to the order challenged its constitutionality, asserting that it violated their right to privacy.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division upheld the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 10. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Executive Order No. 10, requiring financial disclosure by public employees, unconstitutionally infringes upon the employees’ right to privacy, considering the government’s interest in eliminating inefficiency and deterring official corruption.

    Holding

    No, because the rights and interests of government employees, as citizens, were balanced against the rights and interests of the government, as employer, and the financial disclosure requirement was designed to eliminate inefficiency and deter official corruption, which are significant public interests.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding the Executive Order constitutional. The court distinguished the case from Griswold v. Connecticut, which recognized a broad right to privacy, noting the vastly different context. Instead, the court relied on precedent such as United Public Workers v. Mitchell and Civil Serv. Comm. v. Letter Carriers, which involved balancing the rights of government employees against the interests of the government as an employer. The court emphasized that the Executive Order was designed to eliminate inefficiency and deter official corruption, which are significant public interests. The court stated that the order “does not infringe upon individual employees’ constitutional rights.” The court acknowledged the cogent justification presented by the Presiding Justice at the Appellate Division, supporting the constitutionality of financial disclosures by public employees. The concurring judges highlighted the importance of the public interest in deterring corruption and promoting efficiency within government. The court implicitly found the Executive Order was a reasonable means to achieve these ends.

  • Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234 (1975): Balancing Privacy Rights and Public Health Reporting Requirements for Abortions

    Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234 (1975)

    A mandatory reporting requirement that includes the patient’s name on a certificate of termination of pregnancy does not violate a woman’s qualified right to an abortion if the requirement is narrowly tailored and reasonably related to a compelling governmental interest, such as maternal health, and ensures confidentiality.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether requiring the inclusion of a patient’s name and address on a certificate of termination of pregnancy, as mandated by the New York City Health Code, violates a woman’s right to privacy and abortion. The Court of Appeals held that the requirement was constitutional because it served a compelling state interest in maternal health, was narrowly tailored, and included confidentiality safeguards. The court emphasized the importance of collecting statistical data for public health purposes and ensuring accountability in abortion procedures, especially for indigent women who may not have regular access to medical care.

    Facts

    Dr. Harold Schulman, director of obstetrics at Bronx Municipal Hospital, challenged the requirement of including a patient’s name and address on a certificate of termination of pregnancy. He refused to file a certificate for a patient, Jane Doe, who requested anonymity. The New York City Health Code mandated this reporting requirement to the Department of Health within 24 hours of the termination, enabling the city to monitor the safety and effectiveness of legal abortions and ensure proper medical care.

    Procedural History

    Dr. Schulman and Jane Doe initiated legal action against the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, challenging the constitutionality of the name and address requirement. The lower courts upheld the requirement. This appeal followed, bringing the issue before the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the New York City Health Code requirement that a certificate of termination of pregnancy include the patient’s name and address violates a woman’s constitutional right to privacy and abortion, as established in Roe v. Wade?

    Holding

    No, because the inclusion of the patient’s name is precisely tailored and reasonably related to the compelling governmental interest in maternal health, particularly during the second trimester of pregnancy, and because the code provides adequate confidentiality safeguards.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the reporting requirement served a compelling state interest in protecting maternal health. The court cited several public health objectives that the certificate program aimed to achieve, including facilitating follow-up care, monitoring abortion procedures, and collecting statistical data for public health programs. The court emphasized that the city’s program was designed to ensure safe conditions, especially for indigent women who might not receive adequate after-care medical advice. The court found that the name requirement was necessary to ensure accountability for proper abortion procedures and to retrieve patient records for detailed information. The court stated: “governmental regulations limiting fundamental rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling state interest’ and that legislation or regulations affecting these rights must be ‘narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.’” The court distinguished this case from others where regulations were overly broad and infringed on protected conduct, noting that the challenged regulation did not affect whether and in what manner an abortion would take place. The court also addressed the concern about privacy by noting the confidentiality provision in the Health Code that shielded the information from unauthorized disclosure. The court emphasized that the right to privacy is not absolute and does not extend to situations where the government gathers personal information for legitimate purposes. The court noted, “the regulation is designed to provide information for narrow, well-defined and laudable governmental ends. Protection is afforded to the individual by the confidentiality provision of section 204.07 of the New York City Health Code.”

  • People v. McCall, 17 N.Y.2d 152 (1966): Sufficiency of Eavesdropping Warrant Affidavits

    People v. McCall, 17 N.Y.2d 152 (1966)

    An affidavit supporting an eavesdropping warrant must contain specific facts, not just conclusory statements, to establish reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of a crime will be obtained.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendants’ convictions for conspiracy and narcotics possession, holding that the affidavits supporting the eavesdropping warrants were insufficient because they contained only conclusory statements and lacked specific facts to justify the warrants’ issuance. The court emphasized the need for judicial safeguards to protect privacy rights and held that a trial court must assess the factual basis for an eavesdropping order, even if issued by another judge, when the order’s validity is challenged and the evidence obtained is central to the prosecution’s case.

    Facts

    The People obtained judicial orders permitting eavesdropping on telephones based on affidavits. The defendants were subsequently convicted of conspiracy to violate narcotics laws. A substantial part of the overt acts supporting the conspiracy charge consisted of telephone conversations intercepted via the eavesdropping orders. Two of the defendants were also convicted of narcotics possession, with the intercepted phone calls playing an important role in those convictions as well.

    Procedural History

    After the indictment, the defendants moved to inspect the eavesdropping orders and supporting affidavits. The County Court denied the motion, deeming the orders not public records. At trial, the People offered the orders into evidence. Defense counsel, examining the orders and affidavits for the first time, objected to their reception and the admission of evidence obtained through eavesdropping. The trial court declined to rule on the affidavits’ sufficiency, deferring to the issuing judge’s discretion. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affidavits supporting the eavesdropping orders were sufficient to establish reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of a crime would be obtained through eavesdropping.

    Holding

    No, because the affidavits were barren of tangible facts upon which a judge could exercise discretion, containing only conclusory statements.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found the affidavits supporting the telephone interception orders insufficient. The affidavits stated only the District Attorney’s conclusion that “information received from persons of known reliability” revealed that the telephone was being used for illicit drug trafficking. The court noted that the affidavits failed to state what was “revealed” as a fact or even in substance. The court stated that even if the name of the informant is not disclosed, “some factual statement of the affiant’s experience with his reliability and some factual showing of what he ‘revealed’ are basic requirements.” The court emphasized that the District Attorney’s affidavits presented only indefinite assertions from an undisclosed person to another equally indefinite person, providing no factual basis for the judge to assess. Moreover, the District Attorney did not appear personally before the Justice in Westchester on either application, so the Justice had no opportunity to “examine on oath the applicant and any other witness he may produce” as authorized by Section 813-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court drew an analogy to search warrants, stating that just as with search warrants, “there is a significant need for an adequate factual basis on which the Judge will be able to decide whether or not the order or warrant will issue.” The expressions “oath or affirmation” and “reasonable ground to believe” in the eavesdropping statute (Code Grim. Pro., § 813-a) could have no other meaning. The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of protecting privacy rights and ensuring that judges have a sufficient factual basis before issuing eavesdropping warrants. A refusal to permit a defendant to examine the facts upon which his privacy has been broken into amounts to saying that any search warrant or order for interception is all right if a Judge has seen fit to sign it.