New York Law Review

Tag: Right to Presence

  • People v. Fabricio, 3 N.Y.3d 402 (2004): Defendant’s Right to Be Present at Trial

    3 N.Y.3d 402 (2004)

    A defendant’s right to be present at trial extends only to material stages where their presence would have a substantial effect on their ability to defend against the charges.

    Summary

    Fabricio was convicted of murder, attempted murder, and robbery. After the trial court interviewed the surviving victim and jurors in chambers with all counsel present, regarding potential bias, Fabricio appealed, claiming he had a right to be present during these interviews. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Fabricio’s presence during the interviews would not have had a substantial effect on his ability to defend against the charges and, therefore, his presence was not required. The court emphasized the importance of preserving such claims and determined that the interviews did not constitute material stages of the trial.

    Facts

    The defendant, Fabricio, was convicted on multiple counts including murder, attempted murder, and robbery after a jury trial. Following some developments during the trial, the trial court interviewed the surviving victim in chambers, with all counsel present, regarding his identification testimony related to the defendant’s motion for a mistrial. After denying the mistrial, the court, at defense counsel’s request, conducted inquiries of each juror to ensure they were not disqualified by the preceding developments. The defendant was not present at either of these interviews.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Fabricio of murder, attempted murder, and robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted Fabricio leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant was entitled to be present when the trial court interviewed the surviving victim in chambers regarding identification testimony, in connection with the defendant’s motion for a mistrial.

    Whether the defendant had a right to be present when the court conducted inquiries of each individual juror to ensure they were not disqualified after denying the mistrial and agreeing to defense counsel’s request for cautionary instructions.

    Holding

    No, because the judicial precautions taken in this case did not constitute material stages of the trial, and the defendant’s presence would not have had a substantial effect on his ability to defend against the charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the defendant failed to preserve the issues he raised on appeal regarding his absence during the interviews. The court reasoned that the interviews conducted by the trial court, both with the surviving victim and the jurors, did not constitute material stages of the trial. The court relied on precedent, citing People v. Spotford, People v. Torres, and People v. Ferguson, to support the principle that a defendant’s presence is only required at proceedings where their presence would have a substantial effect on their ability to defend against the charges. The court implicitly found that the defendant’s presence at these interviews would not have significantly contributed to his defense. Therefore, his absence did not violate his rights. The Court did not find that the defendant’s presence was necessary or would have altered the course of the proceedings, given that his counsel was present at both interviews and able to represent his interests.

  • People v. Sloan, 79 N.Y.2d 396 (1992): Right to Presence During Jury Selection and Meaningful Contribution

    People v. Sloan, 79 N.Y.2d 396 (1992)

    A defendant has a right to be present during all material stages of the trial, including questioning of prospective jurors about their ability to weigh evidence objectively, and reversal is required unless the defendant’s presence could not have afforded any meaningful opportunity to affect the outcome.

    Summary

    Defendant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing he was wrongly excluded from voir dire questioning of prospective jurors. The trial court did not record substantial portions of the voir dire, leading the Appellate Division to order a reconstruction hearing. The reconstruction court found the defendant absent during bench conferences with jurors about their impartiality. Two of these jurors were peremptorily challenged by the defense, and one was excused by consent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal, holding that the defendant’s exclusion violated his right to be present at a material stage of the trial because he could have meaningfully contributed to decisions about excusing these jurors.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of first and second-degree robbery. During jury selection (voir dire), the trial court held unrecorded bench conferences with prospective jurors. The defendant was not present during these conferences, where jurors were questioned about their ability to be fair and impartial. Two of the prospective jurors discussed during these off-the-record conferences were later excused via defense peremptory challenges, and a third was excused by consent.

    Procedural History

    The defendant appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division, arguing that his exclusion from the voir dire violated his right to be present at trial. The Appellate Division remanded the case for a reconstruction hearing because the trial court failed to record substantial portions of the voir dire. Following the reconstruction hearing, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s exclusion from bench conferences with prospective jurors during voir dire, where two jurors were later peremptorily challenged by the defense and one was excused by consent, violated the defendant’s right to be present during a material stage of the trial, requiring reversal.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant might have provided valuable input regarding his attorney’s discretionary decisions to excuse these venire members, the record does not negate the possibility that the defendant might have made a meaningful contribution to the proceeding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a defendant has the right to be present during the questioning of prospective jurors concerning their ability to weigh the evidence objectively. The Court emphasized that a defendant’s exclusion requires reversal unless their presence “could not have afforded any meaningful opportunity to affect the outcome.” The court reasoned that because three of the prospective jurors were ultimately excused either through defense peremptory challenges or with defense counsel’s consent, the defendant’s input could have influenced the decisions to excuse those jurors. The court rejected the People’s argument to analyze whether each dismissed juror appeared favorable or unfavorable, deeming it speculative and reiterating that a case-specific prejudice analysis is inapplicable to violations of a defendant’s fundamental right to be present. The court quoted People v. Roman, stating that the record must ” ‘do[es] not negate the possibility that defendant might have made a meaningful contribution to the [proceeding]’ “. This highlights that the *possibility* of meaningful contribution is sufficient to warrant reversal, reinforcing the importance of the defendant’s presence during jury selection. The decision underscores the significance of the defendant’s right to participate in discretionary decisions regarding jury selection, emphasizing that the potential for input, not just proof of actual prejudice, is the determining factor.

  • People v. Odiat, 82 N.Y.2d 872 (1993): Defendant’s Right to Be Present at Sandoval Hearing

    People v. Odiat, 82 N.Y.2d 872 (1993)

    A defendant has a right to be present at a Sandoval hearing unless their presence would be superfluous because the nature of their criminal history and the issues to be resolved render their presence unnecessary.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of assault but acquitted of robbery charges. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction, holding that his absence from the Sandoval hearing was permissible because it would have been superfluous. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that neither the prosecutor nor the defense attorney was fully able to apprise the Sandoval court of the underlying acts of defendant’s prior convictions, and the outcome of the Sandoval hearing was not wholly favorable to the defendant. The Court remitted the case for a reconstruction hearing to determine if the defendant was present at the Sandoval hearing, ordering a new trial if he was not.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted for robbery and assault. Prior to trial, a Sandoval hearing was held to determine the permissible scope of cross-examination regarding the defendant’s prior convictions. The prosecutor expressed unfamiliarity with the facts underlying the defendant’s prior convictions. At trial, the defendant testified about his prior drug dealings, claiming the victim was his supplier and that he acted in self-defense. The jury acquitted him of robbery but convicted him of assault.

    Procedural History

    The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing he was deprived of his right to be present at the Sandoval hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding the defendant’s presence would have been superfluous. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and remitted the case for a reconstruction hearing to determine whether the defendant was present at the Sandoval hearing.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s presence at the Sandoval hearing was “superfluous,” such that his absence violated his rights, given the prosecutor’s unfamiliarity with the underlying facts of the defendant’s prior convictions and the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of those convictions.

    Holding

    No, because neither the prosecutor nor the defense attorney was fully able to apprise the Sandoval court of the underlying acts of defendant’s prior convictions, and the outcome of the Sandoval hearing was not wholly favorable to the defendant, the defendant’s presence was not superfluous.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on People v. Dokes, stating that a defendant should be present at a Sandoval hearing unless their presence would be superfluous. The Court disagreed with the Appellate Division that the superfluous presence exception applied here. The Court emphasized that the prosecutor’s unfamiliarity with the underlying facts of the defendant’s prior convictions, combined with the fact that the Sandoval ruling was not wholly favorable to the defendant, meant that the defendant could have made a meaningful contribution to the colloquy. The Court stated, “the surrounding circumstances do not negate the possibility that defendant might have made a meaningful contribution to the colloquy.”

    The Court also rejected the argument that the defendant’s trial testimony about drug transactions rendered his presence at the Sandoval hearing superfluous. The Court noted that the superfluousness inquiry focuses on the nature of the defendant’s record and the issues to be resolved at the Sandoval hearing itself. Additionally, the Court noted that the Appellate Division’s holding that admission of misdemeanor convictions must have been insignificant to the jury, was a test of prejudice rather than superfluousness.

    The Court ordered a reconstruction hearing to determine whether the defendant was present at the Sandoval hearing. If the defendant was not present, a new trial must be ordered.

  • People v. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d 450 (1992): Defendant’s Right to Presence at Child Witness Competency Hearing

    People v. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d 450 (1992)

    A defendant does not have a constitutional or statutory right to be present at a preliminary competency hearing to determine whether a child witness understands the nature of an oath, as such a hearing is ancillary to the main trial and the defendant’s presence is unlikely to contribute to a more reliable determination of competency.

    Summary

    Edwin Morales was convicted of rape and sodomy against a nine-year-old child, R.H. Prior to R.H.’s testimony, the trial court conducted a competency hearing outside the defendant’s presence to determine if R.H. understood the nature of an oath, as required by CPL 60.20(2). The court allowed defense counsel and the prosecutor to attend, but not the defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that excluding the defendant from the competency hearing did not violate his constitutional or statutory rights, as the hearing was unrelated to the substantive issues at trial, and the defendant’s presence would not have materially contributed to the competency determination. The court reasoned that the core purpose of CPL 60.20 hearing is to assess testimonial capacity, making it distinct from the trial’s central concerns.

    Facts

    Edwin Morales was indicted for rape, sodomy, and other crimes against R.H. and E.T., children he lived with. As R.H. was nine years old, the trial court was required to determine if she understood the nature of an oath before allowing her to give sworn testimony. The trial court conducted a competency inquiry after the trial had commenced, but outside the presence of the jury. The judge excluded Morales from the hearing, stating that the proceeding was “not something that your client has a right to be present at.”

    Procedural History

    The jury convicted Morales of rape and sodomy. Morales appealed, arguing that his constitutional and statutory rights to be present at trial were violated when he was barred from the competency hearing. The Appellate Division unanimously rejected Morales’ claims. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant has a constitutional or statutory right to be present when the trial court preliminarily examines a child witness to determine whether she understands the nature of an oath?

    Holding

    No, because the competency hearing’s purpose is to determine a witness’ testimonial capacity, making it unrelated to the basic issues at trial, and the defendant failed to show that his presence would have ensured a more reliable competency determination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s exclusion from the CPL 60.20 hearing did not violate his federal due process rights. Citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, the Court noted that a defendant’s presence is required only to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence. The Court relied on Kentucky v. Stincer, which held that a competency hearing is not related to the witnesses’ substantive testimony, and the defendant had not demonstrated that his presence would have been useful in ensuring a more reliable determination of competency. The court dismissed the defendant’s argument that the hearing involved substantive testimony, finding that R.H.’s brief statement about the abuse did not create a substantial relationship to the opportunity to defend at trial. The Court also rejected the argument that the defendant’s relationship with R.H. could have made his presence useful, as the defendant presented no evidence that his knowledge of the child’s background could have resulted in a more assured determination of competency.

    The Court further held that the defendant was not deprived of his right to be present under New York State law (CPL 260.20). The Court acknowledged that the statute guarantees the defendant’s right to be present at all important stages of the trial. However, the Court clarified that while a defendant has an unfettered right to attend trial, they only have a qualified right to attend ancillary proceedings. Analyzing prior decisions, the Court reasoned that a CPL 60.20 hearing is not a core part of the trial and could have been conducted pretrial. Since it related to a witness’ testimonial capacity, it was a legal determination unrelated to trial issues.

    The court distinguished the case from those where the defendant’s presence was required because they had something valuable to contribute, such as knowledge of errors in a rap sheet (People v. Dokes) or inconsistencies in a witness’ testimony (People v. Anderson). Here, the hearing concerned a witness’s testimonial capacity, a legal determination unrelated to trial issues. Quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, the Court concluded that the defendant’s presence at the competency hearing would have been “useless, or the benefit but a shadow.”

  • People v. Ford, 78 N.Y.2d 878 (1991): Permissible Scope of Court Officer Communication with Deliberating Jury

    People v. Ford, 78 N.Y.2d 878 (1991)

    A court officer’s instruction to jurors to cease deliberations and resume the following day constitutes a permissible administerial duty, not a violation of the defendant’s right to be present at a material stage of the trial.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a court officer’s instruction to a deliberating jury to cease deliberations for the night and resume the next day was a violation of the defendant’s right to be present at a material stage of the trial. The Court held that such an instruction fell within the scope of the court officer’s administerial duties, similar to informing jurors of sequestration for dinner as established in People v. Bonaparte. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Supreme Court’s judgment, while also reiterating that the better practice is for the court itself, in the presence of the defendant and counsel, to instruct the jury on their duties during sequestration.

    Facts

    During jury deliberations, a court officer, acting under the court’s direction, instructed the jurors to stop deliberating for the evening and that they could resume deliberations the following morning.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Queens County, rendered a judgment. The Appellate Division reversed this judgment. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case, reversing the Appellate Division’s order and reinstating the Supreme Court’s original judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a court officer’s instruction to deliberating jurors to stop deliberating for the night and resume the next day constitutes a violation of the defendant’s right to be present at a material stage of the trial.

    Holding

    No, because instructing jurors to cease deliberations for the night and resume the next day falls within the scope of a court officer’s permissible administerial duties.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals drew a parallel to its prior decision in People v. Bonaparte, which held that informing jurors they were to be taken to dinner and sequestered was within a court officer’s administerial duties. The Court reasoned that similarly, directing jurors to stop deliberating for the night and resume the next day also constitutes a routine administerial task. The court emphasized that this did not violate the defendant’s right to be present at a material stage of the trial. However, the Court reiterated its stance from Bonaparte, stating, “the better practice, and the one that should be followed in the future, would be for the court, in the presence of the defendant and his counsel, to notify the jurors that they are going to be sequestered for the evening and to instruct them as to their duties and obligations during this period, including their duty to refrain from discussing the case among themselves or with others.” The absence of protest from defense counsel regarding the trial court’s instruction was also noted. The court signaled that while the action was permissible, direct instruction from the judge in the presence of the defendant and counsel is preferable to avoid any perception of impropriety.

  • People v. Turaine, 78 N.Y.2d 871 (1991): Defendant’s Right to Be Present at Material Stages of Trial

    People v. Turaine, 78 N.Y.2d 871 (1991)

    A defendant has the right to be present at any material stage of the trial, including preliminary hearings where adverse testimony is received, to confront witnesses and advise counsel.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and mandated a new trial. The court held that the defendant’s exclusion from a pretrial hearing, where a witness testified about alleged intimidation by the defendant, constituted reversible error. The Court of Appeals reasoned that such a hearing is a material stage of the trial, as the defendant’s presence is essential for confronting adverse witnesses and assisting counsel in identifying inconsistencies or falsehoods in their testimony, impacting the defendant’s ability to defend himself effectively.

    Facts

    The defendant was on trial. A witness against him, detained on separate charges, was mistakenly placed in the courthouse holding pen with the defendant. The prosecutor sought to introduce testimony that the defendant threatened or intimidated the witness in the holding pen to prevent him from testifying.

    Procedural History

    During the trial, the court held a hearing outside the jury’s presence to determine the admissibility of the witness’s testimony regarding the alleged intimidation. The defendant was excluded from this hearing over objection. The Appellate Division upheld the original trial court decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s exclusion from a pretrial hearing, where a witness testifies about alleged intimidation by the defendant, constitutes a violation of the defendant’s right to be present at all material stages of the trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because proceedings where testimony is received are material stages of the trial, and the defendant’s presence is necessary to confront adverse witnesses and advise counsel of any inconsistencies, errors, or falsehoods in their testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a defendant has a fundamental right to be present at any material stage of the trial. It cited precedent, including People v. Velasco and People v. Mullen, to support this principle. The court reasoned that a hearing where testimony is received qualifies as a material stage because it directly impacts the defendant’s ability to defend themselves. The court noted, “Proceedings where testimony is received are material stages of the trial because defendant’s presence is necessary so that he or she may confront adverse witnesses and advise counsel of any inconsistencies, errors or falsehoods in their testimony.”

    The court distinguished the hearing from the witness’s subsequent testimony before the jury, stating, “At that stage of the trial, the court had already decided the evidence had probative value and would be received for the jury’s consideration.” Thus, the defendant’s presence at the later stage did not cure the error of their exclusion from the earlier hearing, where the admissibility of the evidence was being determined. The Court relied on the principle that a defendant’s absence from such hearings could have a substantial effect on their ability to defend, referencing Snyder v. Massachusetts.