Tag: Right to Information

  • People v. Weinberg, 34 N.Y.2d 429 (1974): Waiver of Right to Prosecution by Information

    People v. Weinberg, 34 N.Y.2d 429 (1974)

    A defendant’s right to be prosecuted by information, rather than a misdemeanor complaint, is a substantial right that must be knowingly and intelligently waived, and such waiver cannot be presumed in the absence of the court advising the defendant of this right.

    Summary

    Weinberg was convicted of shoplifting based on a hearsay misdemeanor complaint. He was never advised of his right to be prosecuted by information. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether Weinberg waived his right to a trial by information by pleading and proceeding to trial on the misdemeanor complaint. The Court of Appeals held that a defendant must be informed of their right to be prosecuted by information before a waiver of that right can be considered knowing and intelligent. Because Weinberg was not informed of this right, his waiver could not be presumed, and his conviction was reversed.

    Facts

    A store detective observed Weinberg leaving Gimbel’s Department Store with two shirts without paying. He was apprehended in a vestibule. Weinberg claimed it was a mistake and asked to return the shirts. He was arrested and issued an appearance ticket.

    Procedural History

    A misdemeanor complaint was filed by a police detective based on information from the store’s security officer. Weinberg pleaded not guilty, was tried, and convicted of petit larceny in the Criminal Court of the City of New York. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, by pleading and proceeding to trial on a misdemeanor complaint, waives their statutory right to a trial by information when the court has not advised them of this right.

    Holding

    No, because the right to be prosecuted by information is a substantial right that must be knowingly and intelligently waived, and such a waiver cannot be presumed when the court has not advised the defendant of this right.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a misdemeanor complaint, based on hearsay, is insufficient for prosecution purposes unless the defendant consents to be tried on it. The right to be prosecuted by information is a substantial right because an information requires non-hearsay allegations. The court emphasized that a waiver of a substantial right must be knowing and intelligent. CPL 170.10(4) requires the court to advise a defendant of the right to trial by information. The court stated: “But in the absence of an effective admonition of the right to be prosecuted by information, and here there was none, a waiver or consent to prosecution by misdemeanor complaint cannot be presumed.” The court suggested that a defendant, aware of the witnesses and the case against them, would likely waive the right if informed. Because Weinberg was not informed of his right to be prosecuted by information, his waiver to that right could not be presumed. Therefore, the order of the Appellate Term was reversed and the misdemeanor complaint was dismissed.

  • City of New York v. Public Serv. Comm., 19 N.Y.2d 242 (1967): Right to Examine Data in Rate Increase Cases

    City of New York v. Public Serv. Comm., 19 N.Y.2d 242 (1967)

    Parties in rate increase proceedings have the right to access factual material that played a part in the rate decision, ensuring a plenary inquiry into the basis for proposed tariff increases.

    Summary

    The City of New York and the Housing Authority challenged a 5% increase in electric tariffs granted to Consolidated Edison by the Public Service Commission (PSC). The Court of Appeals found that while the PSC’s initial justification for the increase was supported by evidence, the PSC erred in denying the City and the Housing Authority access to the underlying data supporting the rate decision. The Court emphasized the right of adverse parties to fully examine the basis of proposed tariff increases and remitted the case to the PSC to allow for these inquiries, with the approved tariffs remaining in effect pending further review.

    Facts

    Consolidated Edison Company sought and received a 5% increase in its electric tariffs from the Public Service Commission. The City of New York, representing its citizens, and the Housing Authority, a major consumer of electricity, were parties in the rate proceeding. Both the City and the Housing Authority requested access to the factual data used to support the company’s exhibits and the basis for fixing the company’s required bank balance, which impacted the rate base. The PSC denied these requests.

    Procedural History

    The Public Service Commission approved the 5% increase in electric tariffs. The City of New York and the Housing Authority appealed this decision. The Appellate Division affirmed the PSC’s decision. The City and Housing Authority then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Public Service Commission erred in denying the City of New York, as a party in the interest of its citizens, access to the underlying data supporting Consolidated Edison’s exhibits in evidence during the rate increase proceeding.
    2. Whether the Public Service Commission erred in denying the Housing Authority, as a large consumer of electricity, access to the bank’s basis for fixing Consolidated Edison’s required balance, which was reflected in part of the rate base.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the City, as an adverse party, has the right to a plenary inquiry into the facts on which the proposed tariff increase was based.
    2. Yes, because the Housing Authority, as an adverse party, has the right to a plenary inquiry into the facts on which the proposed tariff increase was based; specifically, the bank’s basis for fixing the company’s required balance was a proper subject of inquiry.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Public Service Commission was unduly restrictive in denying the City of New York and the Housing Authority access to factual material that played a part in the rate decision. The Court emphasized that as adverse parties to Consolidated Edison, both the City and the Housing Authority were entitled to a plenary inquiry into the facts underlying the proposed tariff increase. The Court rejected the PSC’s justifications for denying access, stating that the commission’s staff checking the data or the company complying with record-keeping procedures was insufficient to deny the parties their right to examine the underlying data. Regarding the Housing Authority’s request, the Court found that the bank’s basis for fixing the company’s required balance was a proper subject of inquiry because it directly affected the rate base. The Court stated: “These parties were adversaries to the company before the commission and the right of plenary inquiry ought to have been afforded them into the facts on which the proposed increase in tariffs was to be based.” The Court remitted the case to the PSC to allow for these inquiries, but stipulated that the approved tariffs should remain in effect, subject to adjustment if the additional proof warranted a different rate.