New York Law Review

Tag: Right to Defense

  • People v. DeGina, 72 N.Y.2d 768 (1988): Improper Entrapment Charge When Defendant Denies the Crime

    People v. DeGina, 72 N.Y.2d 768 (1988)

    A trial court commits reversible error by instructing the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment when the defendant explicitly denies raising that defense and instead asserts a defense inconsistent with entrapment.

    Summary

    DeGina was convicted of drug sales. At trial, he argued he sold talcum powder, not drugs, to an undercover officer. The prosecution requested an entrapment instruction, which the court gave over DeGina’s objection. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that giving the entrapment instruction was error because DeGina did not raise that defense. Entrapment requires admitting the crime and claiming inducement, which DeGina didn’t do. This error prejudiced DeGina by undermining his chosen defense and imposing an unassumed burden of proof. The court emphasized that a defendant has the right to chart his own defense, and the entrapment charge contradicted DeGina’s claim that he did not sell drugs.

    Facts

    John DiDomenico, an undercover agent, met DeGina seeking to buy cocaine. After several unsuccessful attempts, DeGina sold DiDomenico an envelope of talcum powder for $125. DiDomenico insisted on restitution, after which DeGina and a friend, Sanzo, sold him opium and amphetamines. At trial, DeGina’s mother testified about numerous calls from “Frank” (DiDomenico) and a meeting between Frank and Sanzo.

    Procedural History

    DeGina was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the entrapment charge harmless error due to “overwhelming evidence” of intent. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether it is reversible error for a trial court to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment over the defendant’s objection, when the defendant maintains a defense inconsistent with entrapment.

    Holding

    Yes, because imposing the burden of proving entrapment on DeGina, who had not raised it, constituted an abuse of the affirmative defense that violated his right to have the State bear the entire burden of proof. Furthermore, the instruction undermined the defense chosen by DeGina.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the entrapment defense was improperly applied. DeGina’s defense was that he did not commit the crime charged (selling drugs), but rather sold talcum powder. He claimed the officer fabricated the drug sales story. The court emphasized that a defendant has the right to chart his own defense. “[A] defendant unquestionably has the right to chart his own defense.” The court highlighted the prejudice to DeGina: the entrapment charge undermined his chosen defense, placed him in the midst of contradictory defenses (admitting and denying the sale of drugs), and imposed an affirmative burden of proof he had not undertaken. The court stated, “[T]he court’s charge imposed upon defendant an affirmative burden that the jury was bound to conclude he had failed to sustain.” The Court rejected the argument that the error was harmless, noting that overwhelming evidence of intent was irrelevant when the defense was that the sales never occurred. “Overwhelming evidence of intent would be relevant to the question whether the defense of entrapment had been made out, but was not proof whether the sales took place at all.”

  • Matter of Anthony M., 63 N.Y.2d 270 (1984): Discretion to Allow Surrebuttal Testimony

    Matter of Anthony M., 63 N.Y.2d 270 (1984)

    A trial court has discretion to permit surrebuttal testimony when the prosecution’s rebuttal evidence goes beyond the scope of proper rebuttal; however, the denial of a reasonable request for a continuance to secure such testimony can constitute an abuse of discretion, especially when a fundamental right of the accused is abridged.

    Summary

    This case concerns the trial court’s denial of a continuance requested by the defendant to secure surrebuttal testimony after the prosecution presented rebuttal evidence that went beyond the scope of proper rebuttal. The Court of Appeals held that while the trial court has discretion in such matters, denying a reasonable continuance to allow the defendant to counter unexpected testimony can be an abuse of discretion, infringing upon the defendant’s right to present a defense. The dissent argued the denial was prejudicial, warranting a new trial, because the rebuttal testimony differed substantially from prior expert testimony, and the defense had no prior notice.

    Facts

    During the trial, after the People’s rebuttal witness, Dr. Hyland, testified in a manner inconsistent with previous expert testimony, defendant Godbee’s attorney requested a brief recess, which was followed by a request for a continuance to secure additional testimony to counter Dr. Hyland’s statements.

    The defense attorney argued that Dr. Hyland’s testimony presented new information not previously disclosed and differed significantly from the other expert witnesses, thus necessitating an opportunity to secure surrebuttal testimony.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s request for a continuance and a subsequent motion for a mistrial. The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed. This appeal followed, focusing on the propriety of denying the continuance for surrebuttal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s request for a continuance to secure surrebuttal testimony after the prosecution presented rebuttal evidence that arguably exceeded the scope of proper rebuttal?

    Holding

    No, the order was affirmed because, in the companion case, the court held the error harmless. However, the dissent argued that the denial was an abuse of discretion because the rebuttal testimony introduced new and unexpected information, and the defense was not given a fair opportunity to respond.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority, while not explicitly addressing the surrebuttal issue in *Matter of Anthony M.*, implied that the trial court has discretion to manage the order of proof and determine the admissibility of evidence. However, the dissenting opinion (applied to *People v. Cable and Godbee*) emphasized the importance of allowing a defendant to present a complete defense, especially when confronted with unexpected testimony during rebuttal. The dissent argued that denying the continuance, especially when the rebuttal testimony deviated substantially from previous expert testimony and when the defense had no prior notice of the new information, constituted an abuse of discretion. The dissent cited Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, underscoring that “Few rights are more fundamental than that Of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense”. The dissent also quoted People v Foy, 32 NY2d 473, 477, stating “mere inconvenience is not sufficient ground for denying an adjournment when to do so would abridge a basic right”. Judge Meyer, in dissent, concluded that the denial of a brief adjournment was “an ‘abuse of discretion, in a legal sense * * * [and] a plain error of law’ (Meyer v Cullen, 54 NY 392, 397).”