New York Law Review

Tag: Right to Counsel

  • People v. Ortega, 78 N.Y.2d 1101 (1991): The Consequences of Ex Parte Communication with Witnesses

    People v. Ortega, 78 N.Y.2d 1101 (1991)

    A trial court’s private, off-the-record communication with a witness regarding a material issue in a criminal trial violates the defendant’s rights, even if the precise impact of the communication on the court’s ultimate decision is unclear.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance after an undercover officer, introduced by a confidential informant, purchased cocaine from him. During cross-examination, the officer refused to reveal the informant’s identity. The trial judge then held a private, unrecorded meeting with the officer to discuss the potential disclosure issue under People v. Goggins. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the private conference violated the defendant’s rights because it was a material part of the trial, and the record did not definitively show that the conference did not influence the court’s decision regarding disclosure of the informant’s identity. The court emphasized that the lack of a record made it impossible to determine whether the officer’s statements in chambers influenced the judge.

    Facts

    A confidential informant introduced an undercover police officer to the defendant.

    The undercover officer purchased cocaine from the defendant.

    During the defendant’s trial for criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance, the undercover officer refused to disclose the identity of the confidential informant during cross-examination.

    The trial judge held an ex parte conference with the officer without the presence or knowledge of either party or counsel.

    The stated purpose of the conference was to advise the witness about a potential Goggins problem (regarding the need to disclose the informant’s identity) and to persuade him to voluntarily disclose the informant’s identity.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of two counts of criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance in the trial court.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and overturned the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court’s ex parte communication with a witness during a criminal trial, concerning a material issue, violates the defendant’s rights when the content of the communication is unrecorded and its impact on the court’s decision is unclear.

    Holding

    Yes, because the inquiry was a material part of the trial, and there was no record to definitively show that the conference did not influence the court’s decision regarding disclosure of the informant’s identity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the ex parte conference was a material part of the trial, invoking precedent such as People v. Turaine and People v. Darby which established a defendant’s right to be present during material stages of a trial. The Court emphasized the lack of a record of the conversation, stating, “There is no record, however, to show what was said in chambers or whether it contributed to the court’s decision that disclosure was not required.”

    The court reasoned that it was possible the officer presented an unrebutted view of the facts that influenced the trial court’s subsequent decision regarding disclosure. The court highlighted the potential prejudice to the defendant, noting, “At least, the conference must be viewed in that light on the present state of the record.”

    The court rejected the People’s argument that no Goggins issue was raised during the conference because the judge only intended to persuade the officer to disclose voluntarily. The court’s decision underscores the importance of transparency and the defendant’s right to be present and represented during all material stages of a trial to ensure a fair adversarial process.

  • People v. Smith, 79 N.Y.2d 434 (1992): Immediate Flight Rule in Felony Murder

    People v. Smith, 79 N.Y.2d 434 (1992)

    A homicide occurring during a high-speed chase 15-20 minutes and 1 1/2 to 2 miles away from an attempted robbery can constitute “immediate flight” for felony murder purposes, and the determination of whether the defendant reached a place of temporary safety is a factual question for the jury.

    Summary

    Smith was convicted of felony murder after a high-speed chase following an attempted robbery resulted in a fatal car crash. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the homicide occurred during the “immediate flight” from the attempted robbery and whether the trial court adequately ensured the defendant understood the risks of proceeding *pro se*. The Court held that the immediate flight issue was properly submitted to the jury but reversed the conviction due to the trial court’s inadequate inquiry regarding the defendant’s decision to represent himself during a suppression hearing.

    Facts

    Smith and accomplices attempted to rob a warehouse. An employee alerted the police, and the perpetrators fled in a van. Approximately 15 minutes later and 1 1/2 to 2 miles from the warehouse, police spotted the van based on a radio description. A high-speed chase ensued, culminating in a collision that killed a passenger in another vehicle. Smith was immediately apprehended.

    Procedural History

    Smith was indicted and a suppression hearing commenced. He expressed dissatisfaction with his court-appointed attorney, which the court initially denied replacement. Later, Smith requested to represent himself during the hearing. The court allowed this without adequate inquiry. After trial with new counsel, Smith was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed, deeming the *pro se* error harmless. The Court of Appeals granted leave and reversed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for felony murder, specifically whether the homicide occurred during the immediate flight from the attempted robbery.

    2. Whether the suppression hearing court conducted a sufficiently searching inquiry to ensure that the defendant understood the risks of proceeding *pro se*.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because given the proximity in time and distance between the robbery and the homicide, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was still in the course of “immediate flight.”

    2. No, because the hearing court failed to make the required searching inquiry of the defendant to ensure that he was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the felony murder conviction, the Court of Appeals relied on Penal Law § 125.25(3) and *People v. Gladman*, 41 NY2d 123. The Court reiterated that whether a homicide occurred in “immediate flight” is generally a factual question for the jury, unless the record compels the inference that the actor was not in immediate flight. Relevant factors include the distance between the felony and the homicide, the time interval, possession of the fruits of the crime, police pursuit, and whether the criminals reached a place of temporary safety. The Court found the jury could reasonably conclude the defendant was still fleeing, given the short distance and time frame, and the active police pursuit. “Given the circumstances and particularly the proximity in time and distance between the robbery and the homicide, we cannot say that the brief interruption in the flight from the crime scene and the van’s direction toward the scene when first observed by police were sufficient, as a matter of law, to preclude a conclusion that when the homicide occurred defendant and his accomplice were still in the course of ‘immediate flight’.”

    Regarding the *pro se* issue, the Court cited *People v. McIntyre*, 36 NY2d 10, and *Faretta v. California*, 422 US 806, emphasizing that a waiver of the right to counsel must be unequivocal, voluntary, and intelligent. The court must conduct a sufficiently searching inquiry to ensure the defendant understands the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel. “the ‘court should undertake a sufficiently ‘searching inquiry’ of the defendant to be reasonably certain that the ‘dangers and disadvantages’ of giving up the fundamental right to counsel have been impressed on the defendant”. Here, the court failed to make *any* inquiry, rendering the waiver ineffective. The Court also rejected the argument that the new counsel’s failure to seek reopening of the suppression hearing constituted abandonment of the claim or that the error was harmless, as the defendant was forced to proceed *pro se* at a critical stage of the hearing without understanding the implications.

  • People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434 (1991): State Constitution Affords Greater Protection Against Payton Violations

    77 N.Y.2d 434 (1991)

    Under the New York State Constitution, statements obtained following a Payton violation (warrantless arrest in a home) are inadmissible unless the taint from the illegal arrest is attenuated, offering greater protection than the Fourth Amendment.

    Summary

    Following a remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals considered whether the station house statement obtained after an illegal warrantless arrest in the defendant’s home was admissible under the New York State Constitution. The Court held that the statement was inadmissible because the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the statement was not sufficiently attenuated. New York’s strong right to counsel rule provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment, thus requiring suppression of statements obtained after a Payton violation unless attenuated.

    Facts

    Police had probable cause to arrest Harris for murdering his girlfriend. However, instead of obtaining a warrant, they arrested him in his apartment, violating Payton v. New York. After his arrest, Harris made three statements: one in his apartment, one at the police station an hour later, and a third on videotape. The first and third statements were suppressed. The admissibility of the second statement, made at the station house, was at issue.

    Procedural History

    The trial court suppressed the first and third statements but admitted the second. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals initially reversed, suppressing the station house statement on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the statement admissible under the Fourth Amendment. The case was remanded to the New York Court of Appeals to consider the state constitutional claim.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the New York State Constitution requires suppression of a statement obtained at a police station following a warrantless arrest in the defendant’s home, in violation of Payton v. New York, even if the statement is admissible under the Fourth Amendment?

    Holding

    Yes, because the New York State Constitution provides greater protection regarding the right to counsel than the Fourth Amendment, and statements obtained following a Payton violation are inadmissible unless the taint of the illegal arrest is attenuated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court recognized that while the Fourth Amendment and the New York State Constitution’s search and seizure clause contain similar language, the State Constitution can provide greater protection. The court employed a noninterpretive analysis, focusing on matters peculiar to New York, including the history and traditions of the state in protecting individual rights. The court emphasized New York’s unique and strong right to counsel rule, noting it is “far more expansive than the Federal counterpart.” The Court stated: “Manifestly, protection of the right to counsel has become a matter of singular concern in New York and it is appropriate that we consider the effect of Payton violations upon it.” Because New York’s criminal procedure law requires an accusatory instrument be filed before an arrest warrant can be issued, the right to counsel attaches upon issuance of the warrant. Thus, police have an incentive to violate Payton to circumvent the accused’s indelible right to counsel. The Court concluded that the connection between the illegal arrest and the station house statement was not sufficiently attenuated, considering the temporal proximity, absence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct. Therefore, the statement was suppressed under the New York Constitution. The Court stated, “We adhere to our earlier decision, therefore, and hold that statements obtained from an accused following an arrest made in violation of Payton are not admissible under the State Constitution if they are a product of the illegality.”

  • People v. LaClere, 76 N.Y.2d 670 (1990): Right to Counsel at Lineup After Attorney’s Explicit Entry and Judicial Notice

    People v. LaClere, 76 N.Y.2d 670 (1990)

    When an attorney explicitly informs the court and requests that the police be notified that they represent a defendant on a specific charge, the defendant’s right to counsel attaches, requiring that the attorney be notified of any impending investigatory lineup unless exigent circumstances exist.

    Summary

    LaClere was convicted of attempted murder after being identified in a lineup conducted without his attorney present. His attorney had informed the court that they represented LaClere on the charge for which he was being arrested and asked the judge to inform the arresting officers that no statements should be taken without counsel present. The judge complied, but the police conducted a lineup without notifying the attorney. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the attorney’s explicit entry into the case and the judicial notification to the police triggered LaClere’s right to counsel at the lineup, requiring notification to the attorney absent exigent circumstances.

    Facts

    LaClere was arrested after a court appearance on an unrelated matter. His attorney informed the presiding judge that they also represented LaClere on the matter for which he was then being arrested and requested the judge to advise the arresting officers not to take any statements from him without counsel present. The judge complied. The police then conducted a lineup without notifying LaClere’s attorney, where he was identified.

    Procedural History

    The initial court denied the motion to suppress the lineup identification. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, citing precedent that the police were not obliged to inform defense counsel of the investigatory lineup. A dissenting Justice at the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, when an attorney has explicitly entered a case, sought judicial protective relief, and secured a court’s alert to the arresting officers that the defendant is represented on the charge for which an imminent lineup is to be conducted, the police are required to notify the attorney of the lineup.

    Holding

    Yes, because counsel’s announced entry into the case and explicit solicitation of formal judicial admonitory relief attached the defendant’s right to counsel, requiring notification of the lineup absent some legally recognized excuse.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the formal point of counsel’s entry into the case, their representational activity, and the solicitation of judicial intervention were sufficient to trigger the entitlement to counsel at the investigatory lineup. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Coates, where the defendant had requested counsel’s presence, but the attorney had not formally entered the case. Here, the attorney had explicitly informed the court and requested that the police be notified of their representation. The Court quoted People v. Blake stating, “When an accused, at any stage, before or after arraignment, to the knowledge of the law enforcement agencies, already has counsel, his right or access to counsel may not be denied”. The court found that prompt notification to counsel would have been a feasible and reasonable accommodation of defendant’s right and that there was no indication that notifying counsel would have significantly inconvenienced the witnesses or undermined the advantages of a prompt identification.

  • People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d 935 (1982): Admissibility of Spontaneous Statements After Right to Counsel Attaches

    People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d 935 (1982)

    A defendant’s spontaneously volunteered statement, not the result of inducement, provocation, encouragement, or acquiescence, is admissible even after the right to counsel has attached.

    Summary

    Harris was arrested for fatally stabbing an inmate. At arraignment, with a Spanish interpreter present due to Harris’s limited English, he spontaneously confessed his guilt after the Town Justice spoke. The translator, believing Harris had a question about the Justice’s statement, allowed him to speak. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision to admit the statement. The Court reasoned that because the statement was spontaneous and not solicited, it was admissible despite Harris’s right to counsel having attached. The translator’s action of allowing Harris to speak, reasonably believing he sought clarification, did not constitute inducement.

    Facts

    Defendant Harris was arrested for fatally stabbing a fellow inmate at the Watertown Correctional Facility.
    Before arraignment, a Spanish teacher was appointed as an interpreter for Harris due to his limited English proficiency.
    The interpreter translated the Miranda warnings, which Harris indicated he understood.
    Harris was not questioned by anyone.
    During arraignment, after the Town Justice spoke, Harris inquired in Spanish if he could ask the interpreter something.
    The translator, believing Harris had a question about the Justice’s last statement, said yes without consulting the court.
    Harris then stated in Spanish that he had a nervous condition, didn’t realize he killed the man, and was guilty.
    The translator immediately informed the court of Harris’s statement.

    Procedural History

    The trial court admitted Harris’s statement into evidence.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.
    Harris appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s unsolicited confession, made in court after arraignment and attachment of the right to counsel, is admissible if the statement was spontaneous and not the product of inducement, provocation, encouragement, or acquiescence.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s statement was spontaneously volunteered and not the result of “inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that Harris’s statement was admissible because it was spontaneous and not the result of any inducement. The Court relied on the established principle that while the right to counsel attaches at arraignment, barring statements made without counsel present or a valid waiver (People v. Samuels, 49 NY2d 218), an exception exists for spontaneous statements (People v. Maerling, 46 NY2d 289, 302-303).
    The Court emphasized that Harris initiated the exchange, and the translator’s response, based on a reasonable belief that Harris merely wanted clarification, did not amount to inducement. The Court cited People v. Anderson, 42 NY2d 35, 38-39, to support the finding that the statement was wholly self-generated. Further, the court noted it found spontaneity in instances where a police officer engaged in a more extensive dialogue with the defendant, referencing People v. Lynes, 49 NY2d 286. The court stated, “Defendant initiated the exchange, and the translator’s response, based on the reasonable belief that defendant merely wanted clarification of what she had just said, was neither intended nor objectively likely to elicit an inculpatory statement from defendant, who had been fully advised of his Miranda rights.”
    The Court rejected the argument that an affirmative act to prevent the statement was required, stating, “We have not previously established a requirement that a defendant affirmatively be stopped from making an inculpatory statement, and we see no reason to depart from our precedents to do so on these unusual facts.” The Court affirmed that it was not retreating from the rights accorded to a defendant upon the filing of formal criminal charges, but declined to create a new rule that would ignore admissions made spontaneously in court.

  • People v. Davis, 67 N.Y.2d 514 (1986): Waiver of Counsel After Non-Custodial Request

    People v. Davis, 67 N.Y.2d 514 (1986)

    An individual who requests counsel during a non-custodial interrogation can later waive that right, even outside the presence of counsel, provided the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

    Summary

    Brenda Davis was convicted of felony murder. Prior to her guilty plea, she moved to suppress statements made to police, arguing that they were obtained in violation of her right to counsel. She initially requested counsel during a non-custodial interview, but later waived her rights during a custodial interrogation the following day. The County Court suppressed the first statement, but admitted the second. The Appellate Division reversed, suppressing the second statement as well. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a suspect who requested counsel while not in custody may later waive that right before formal proceedings begin, and remitted the case to the Appellate Division to determine the validity of the waiver.

    Facts

    Brenda Davis lived on a farm with her daughter, James Davis, and Jessie White. Elizabeth Schlitt, James Davis’s girlfriend, died on the farm. Initially, Davis and the codefendant claimed Schlitt died from a fall in the barn. An autopsy revealed she died from multiple injuries, including sexual assault. During a non-custodial interview at the farm, after being read her Miranda rights, Davis requested a lawyer after being confronted with James Davis’s confession. The deputies ceased questioning at that time but told her they would return the next day. The next day, deputies found a note from Davis and met her at her sister’s house, asking her to come to the Sheriff’s office for questioning. She voluntarily accompanied them. She was given Miranda warnings, waived her rights, and gave incriminating statements.

    Procedural History

    The County Court suppressed statements Davis made after requesting counsel on August 25 but denied suppression of those made on August 26, finding a valid waiver. The Appellate Division reversed, suppressing the August 26 statements. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a suspect who has requested counsel during a non-custodial interrogation may subsequently waive that right, without counsel present, during a later custodial interrogation?

    Holding

    Yes, because the protections afforded to suspects who request counsel are different in custodial versus non-custodial settings. The coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation necessitates stricter protections.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the robust right to counsel in New York, extending beyond the federal constitutional right. It identified two scenarios where the right to counsel attaches indelibly, requiring counsel’s presence for a valid waiver: (1) after formal proceedings commence, and (2) when a suspect in custody has retained or requested an attorney. However, this case did not fall within either of these rules. The court distinguished People v. Cunningham, noting that Davis was not in custody when she initially requested counsel. The court reasoned that during a non-custodial interview, the coercive power of the state is limited because the suspect can refuse to answer questions or leave. The court stated: “In a noncustodial interview, however, a witness or suspect is not constrained by police influence and does not suffer ‘the disadvantage’ of being ‘directly confronted with the awesome law enforcement machinery possessed by the State.’” The court emphasized that the ultimate question is whether the People met their burden of proving a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. Factors relevant to this determination include whether the defendant was fully advised of their rights, whether the defendant initiated further communication with police, and whether there was a break in interrogation providing a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney. The court remitted the case to the Appellate Division to consider the unreviewed factual question of whether Davis’s waiver was indeed knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The Court noted that it is always desirable to remind the defendant of the earlier request and obtain an express withdrawal.

  • People v. Wicks, 76 N.Y.2d 128 (1990): Harmless Error Analysis and Denial of Counsel at Preliminary Hearing

    People v. Wicks, 76 N.Y.2d 128 (1990)

    Harmless error analysis may apply to the denial of counsel at a pre-indictment preliminary hearing (CPL 180.10) if the error did not contribute to the defendant’s conviction.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether harmless error analysis applies when a defendant is denied counsel at a preliminary hearing. Wicks was convicted of attempted rape, burglary, and sexual abuse. He argued his right to counsel was violated at his preliminary hearing. The Court held that while denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing is a constitutional and statutory violation, it is not per se reversible. The Court reasoned that because the purpose of the hearing is to determine if the defendant should be held for grand jury action, and because the grand jury can indict regardless of the hearing’s outcome, the error can be harmless if it did not contribute to the conviction. Finding overwhelming evidence of guilt, the Court affirmed the conviction, concluding the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Facts

    Wicks, a student at SUNY Cobleskill, was accused of attacking several women in dormitories. On October 3, 1986, he unlawfully entered four dormitory rooms occupied by female students, touched and fondled them, and attempted to rape one. One of the victims identified Wicks from a photo array later that morning. He was arrested and arraigned.

    Procedural History

    A preliminary hearing was held on October 9, 1986, to determine whether Wicks could be held for Grand Jury action. Despite Wicks’s request for counsel at his arraignment, no attorney was appointed, and the hearing proceeded. The hearing court ruled that Wicks was to be held for action by the Grand Jury. He was subsequently indicted, tried, and convicted. On appeal, Wicks argued that the preliminary hearing without counsel was reversible error. The Appellate Division deemed the issue unpreserved but held the error was harmless. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the denial of counsel at a pre-indictment preliminary hearing pursuant to CPL 180.10 is per se reversible error, or whether it is subject to harmless error analysis.

    Holding

    No, harmless error analysis is applicable because the purpose of the preliminary hearing is limited to determining whether the defendant should be held for action by the Grand Jury, and the Grand Jury is free to indict regardless of the outcome of the hearing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that the denial of counsel at the preliminary hearing violated Wicks’s constitutional and statutory rights. However, the Court distinguished this violation from a denial of effective assistance of counsel at trial, which is per se reversible error. The Court reasoned that a preliminary hearing’s purpose is to determine whether the defendant should be held for Grand Jury action. Even if the defendant prevails at the hearing, the Grand Jury can still indict based on its independent determination. Therefore, the trial is unaffected by the hearing’s outcome.

    The Court noted that while defense counsel may gain some discovery benefits at a preliminary hearing, any prejudice resulting from the denial of counsel in this regard would lead to a determination that the error was not harmless, but it does not automatically invalidate the subsequent trial. The Court relied on Coleman v. Alabama, where the Supreme Court determined that deprivation of counsel at a preliminary hearing could be harmless error.

    The Court then applied harmless error analysis, asking whether there was a reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to Wicks’s conviction. The Court found that Wicks did not argue that the hearing’s outcome affected the trial, nor did he argue that the absence of counsel deprived him of discovery benefits. His argument that he was unable to effectively cross-examine witnesses was deemed speculative. The Court highlighted the overwhelming evidence of Wicks’s guilt, including the victim’s consistent testimony and the corroborating evidence. The court stated that the hearing identification was not admitted at trial, and thus did not contribute to the conviction.

    Ultimately, the Court concluded that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, affirming the Appellate Division’s order. The court stated that “in light of this overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, there is no reasonable possibility that the absence of defense counsel at the preindictment preliminary hearing contributed to defendant’s conviction.”

  • People v. Sides, 75 N.Y.2d 822 (1990): Right to Counsel Requires Inquiry into Potential Conflict

    People v. Sides, 75 N.Y.2d 822 (1990)

    When a defendant requests new counsel, alleging an irreconcilable conflict with their current attorney, the trial court must conduct a minimal inquiry to determine if good cause for substitution exists; failure to do so violates the defendant’s right to counsel.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, vacated the guilty plea and judgment, and remitted the case for further proceedings. The defendant, initially assigned counsel, expressed dissatisfaction and a breakdown in communication with his lawyer. The attorney confirmed the communication breakdown and lack of trust. The trial court, without inquiry, denied the request and essentially forced the defendant to either proceed pro se or accept the plea with the existing attorney. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s failure to inquire into the defendant’s reasons for requesting new counsel violated his right to counsel, as the request suggested a potential irreconcilable conflict.

    Facts

    Defendant was arraigned on multiple charges, including sodomy and sexual abuse, and assigned counsel, John Gilbert, at his request. He pleaded not guilty. Later, a plea bargain was offered. At a subsequent hearing, the defendant requested to dismiss Gilbert and be assigned new counsel, citing dissatisfaction. Gilbert stated, “[defendant] also indicated to me * * * that he is not satisfied with my representation of him…any type of meaningful communication between us is probably dissolved at this point. I don’t think he trusts me. I am not sure I do the same with respect to him…because of the breakdown and inability to communicate with each other.” The trial court refused to assign new counsel, stating the defendant could not “pick and choose” lawyers and would have to either hire counsel or represent himself. Defendant stated he had no money for a lawyer. After the judge stated that the plea offer would be revoked if he did not plead guilty, and after conferring with Gilbert, the defendant pleaded guilty.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted based on his guilty plea. He appealed, arguing that the County Court’s failure to inquire about his issues with counsel violated his constitutional right to counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court violated the defendant’s right to counsel by failing to conduct any inquiry after the defendant complained about the adequacy of his assigned counsel and requested new counsel due to a breakdown in communication and trust.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s statements, coupled with his counsel’s acknowledgement of a breakdown in communication and trust, suggested a serious possibility of an irreconcilable conflict. The trial court had a duty to make at least a minimal inquiry to ascertain whether good cause for substitution existed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that while an indigent defendant does not have the right to choose successive lawyers, they may be entitled to new counsel if they show “good cause for a substitution,” such as a conflict of interest or an irreconcilable conflict. The court emphasized that while such requests should not be granted lightly, a trial court must carefully evaluate requests for substitution to determine if good cause exists. The Court found that the defendant’s request, coupled with the attorney’s statements, suggested a serious possibility of irreconcilable conflict. “That being so, the trial court was obliged to make some minimal inquiry and it erred by failing to ask even a single question about the nature of the disagreement or its potential for resolution.” The court emphasized the importance of protecting the right to counsel and ensuring that a defendant’s concerns are adequately addressed, even if a limited inquiry might have revealed the request to be without genuine basis. The court distinguished this case from cases where the request for substitution was clearly a delay tactic. By failing to make any inquiry, the trial court failed to adequately protect the defendant’s right to counsel. The Court cited People v Medina, 44 NY2d 199, 205-207 as a comparison point.

  • People v. Smalls, 74 N.Y.2d 746 (1989): Right to Counsel at Lineup and Independent Source for Identification

    74 N.Y.2d 746 (1989)

    A defendant has a right to counsel at a lineup when a removal order has been issued to secure the defendant’s attendance, and in the absence of a hearing to determine independent source, in-court identification testimony from witnesses exposed to an uncounseled lineup is inadmissible.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial because the defendant’s right to counsel was violated during pretrial lineups. The lineups occurred without counsel present despite a removal order securing the defendant’s attendance. The Court of Appeals held that the admission of the lineup evidence was not harmless error because the key issue at trial was identification, and the in-court identifications of the witnesses who attended the lineup were tainted. The court also addressed errors related to the testimony of an informant witness.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of robbery and other charges. The People’s case rested significantly on eyewitness identifications. Two witnesses identified the defendant at lineups conducted without the presence of counsel, despite a removal order in place to ensure the defendant’s attendance. Another witness was a police informant who testified in exchange for a reduced sentence on an unrelated charge.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and then reversed the Appellate Division’s order, remanding the case for a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the lineup testimony of the two witnesses should have been suppressed due to the absence of counsel during the lineups, given that a removal order was issued to secure the defendant’s attendance.

    2. Whether the erroneous admission of the lineup evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

    3. Whether the in-court identification testimony of the witnesses who attended the uncounseled lineups was admissible without a hearing to determine if the testimony had an independent source.

    4. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the informant-witness’s testimony.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a removal order had been issued to secure defendant’s attendance at the pretrial identification procedures, defendant had a right to the presence of counsel during the lineups.

    2. No, because the only significant issue at defendant’s trial was identification, and the People’s strongest evidence came from the two eyewitnesses who had been exposed to the uncounseled lineups.

    3. No, because in the absence of a hearing to determine whether that testimony had an independent source, it cannot be assumed that that testimony was not also tainted and subject to exclusion.

    4. Yes, because the court should have instructed the jury to scrutinize the informant’s testimony carefully and determine whether any benefit he received affected the truthfulness of that testimony, and the court’s erroneous instruction created an imbalance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that because a removal order was issued to secure the defendant’s attendance at the lineups, the defendant had a right to counsel under People v. Coleman, 43 NY2d 222. Since the defendant did not waive that right, the lineups conducted without counsel violated the defendant’s constitutional rights.

    The court found that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237, because identification was the only significant issue at trial. Two of the four witnesses connecting the defendant to the crime were subject to serious impeachment, and the other two eyewitnesses had been exposed to the uncounseled lineups.

    The court emphasized that the in-court identification testimony of the witnesses who viewed the lineup was inadmissible without a hearing to determine whether the testimony had an independent source, citing United States v. Wade, 388 US 218, 240-241; People v. Coates, 74 NY2d 244; and People v. Dodt, 61 NY2d 408. The court noted, “in the absence of a hearing to determine whether that testimony had an independent source, it cannot be assumed that that testimony was not also tainted and subject to exclusion.” This underscored the importance of establishing that the in-court identification was based on the witness’s independent recollection of the crime and not influenced by the tainted lineup.

    Regarding the informant-witness, the court found that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury to carefully scrutinize the informant’s testimony for truthfulness, given the benefits he received. The court stated that “the informant’s testimony should be scrutinized carefully and a determination made as to whether any benefit he received affected the truthfulness of that testimony.” The court also noted the error in instructing the jury that the informant’s criminal past could be considered only insofar as it implicated his general credibility, thereby ruling out consideration of the more specific possibilities of bias and motive to falsify, citing People v. Bell, 38 NY2d 116, 123.

  • People v. Hatterson, 63 N.Y.2d 586 (1984): Deprivation of Counsel at Arraignment Requires Dismissal

    People v. Hatterson, 63 N.Y.2d 586 (1984)

    An unjustified court order barring a defendant’s attorney from contacting him for 30 days after arraignment constitutes a per se violation of the right to counsel, requiring dismissal of the indictment.

    Summary

    Defendant Hatterson, an inmate, was charged with assault. At his arraignment, the Town Justice, due to Hatterson’s disruptive behavior, found him in contempt and ordered his counsel not to contact him for 30 days. The Court of Appeals held that this order violated Hatterson’s right to counsel, which attached at arraignment, and was not subject to harmless error analysis. Because the deprivation of counsel occurred at a critical stage and its effects could not be remedied by a new trial, the indictment was dismissed.

    Facts

    Hatterson, an inmate at Eastern Correctional Facility, was arrested on August 7, 1985, and arraigned the same day on assault charges stemming from an altercation with a correction officer. During the arraignment, Hatterson repeatedly disobeyed the Town Justice’s orders to be quiet. As a result, the judge held Hatterson in contempt and issued an order prohibiting his counsel from contacting him for 30 days.

    Procedural History

    Hatterson moved to dismiss the indictment before trial, arguing he was denied the opportunity to appear before the Grand Jury and received ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion was denied, and Hatterson was convicted after trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding no merit in his claims. Hatterson then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a court order prohibiting a defendant’s attorney from contacting him for 30 days after arraignment, due to the defendant’s contemptuous behavior during the arraignment, constitutes a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel requiring reversal.

    Holding

    Yes, because the court’s punitive order denying defendant his constitutional right to counsel after such right had attached was without justification and constituted a per se violation not subject to harmless error analysis, requiring dismissal of the indictment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that Hatterson’s right to counsel attached at arraignment, citing Powell v. Alabama, Coleman v. Alabama, Kirby v. Illinois, and People v. Meyer. While acknowledging the court’s right to impose reasonable rules, it deemed the order prohibiting contact with counsel for 30 days as “purely punitive and without justification.” The Court relied on People v. Crimmins, stating that some errors deny a defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial, requiring reversal without evaluating the error’s impact on the conviction. The Court also referenced People v. Felder, where denial of the constitutional right to counsel mandated reversal and a new trial. The Court reasoned that the denial of counsel at arraignment was a critical error that could not be remedied by a new trial. The court stated: “the court’s ruling, entered at the time of arraignment, affected defendant’s representation in such a way that the error cannot be corrected by a new trial”. Therefore, the Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the indictment, emphasizing the fundamental nature of the right to counsel at arraignment.