New York Law Review

Tag: Right to Counsel

  • People v. Glover, 87 N.Y.2d 838 (1995): Unequivocal Invocation of Right to Counsel

    People v. Glover, 87 N.Y.2d 838 (1995)

    A suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel must be unequivocal to trigger the protections of the New York Constitution, and a statement that simultaneously requests and negates the need for counsel is not considered unequivocal.

    Summary

    Glover was taken to the police station for questioning about a murder. After initially speaking freely, he mentioned wanting to call a friend to get a lawyer upon being confronted with incriminating evidence. However, almost immediately thereafter, he retracted this statement, saying he did not want a lawyer and would talk to the police. The New York Court of Appeals held that Glover’s initial request for counsel was not unequivocal because he immediately negated it. Therefore, his subsequent statements were admissible, and his constitutional rights were not violated.

    Facts

    Police brought Glover to the station for questioning regarding a murder investigation. He initially spoke freely with the police. When officers confronted him with a bloodstained T-shirt found outside his apartment, Glover stated he wanted to call a friend to get a lawyer. He then suggested calling his mother instead. Before the officer dialed, Glover stated, “Hang up the telephone. I do not want a lawyer. I’ll talk to you.” Between 30 and 60 seconds elapsed between Glover’s initial request and retraction. Glover then made incriminating statements, some spontaneously and others in response to questioning.

    Procedural History

    The lower courts found Glover’s statements admissible. Glover appealed, arguing his statements were obtained in violation of his right to counsel under the New York Constitution because he had invoked his right to counsel before making the incriminating statements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, upholding the admissibility of Glover’s statements.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements made by a suspect after an initial request for counsel, which is immediately retracted, are admissible in court, or whether that initial request, even if retracted, triggers the constitutional right to counsel, thus barring subsequent questioning without an attorney present.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s request for counsel was not unequivocal. Glover’s statement expressing a desire for counsel was immediately negated, therefore his subsequent statements were admissible in court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on established New York precedent holding that when a defendant unequivocally requests counsel, any subsequent waiver of that right without counsel is ineffective, citing People v. Esposito, 68 NY2d 961 and People v. Cunningham, 49 NY2d 203. However, the court emphasized that this protection only applies when the request for counsel is clear and unambiguous, citing People v. Hicks, 69 NY2d 969, 970 and People v. Rowell, 59 NY2d 727, 730. The court determined that whether a request is unequivocal depends on the circumstances, including the defendant’s demeanor, manner of expression, and specific words used, citing People v. Johnson, 79 AD2d 201, 204. The court found that Glover’s statement wanting to call a friend for a lawyer was immediately negated, therefore the lower court’s finding that the request was not unequivocal was supported by evidence and not reviewable. As such, Glover’s constitutional rights were not violated, and his statements were deemed admissible. The court highlighted the importance of clear communication from the defendant regarding their desire for counsel. A simultaneous request and retraction creates ambiguity, preventing the right to counsel from attaching.

  • People v. Ferrara, 80 N.Y.2d 672 (1993): Appearance of Impropriety and Right to Counsel

    People v. Ferrara, 80 N.Y.2d 672 (1993)

    The appearance of impropriety, standing alone, is not grounds for disqualification of counsel unless it creates a substantial risk of an abuse of confidence or actual prejudice to the defendant.

    Summary

    Ferrara was convicted of sex offenses. He argued his conviction should be vacated because his attorney was a part-time Village Prosecutor, creating an appearance of impropriety and compromising his right to effective assistance of counsel. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the attorney’s limited role as Village Prosecutor, with no connection to the District Attorney’s office prosecuting Ferrara’s case, did not create a substantial risk of abuse of confidence or actual prejudice, and therefore did not violate Ferrara’s right to counsel.

    Facts

    Ferrara was prosecuted by the Erie County District Attorney’s office for sex offenses.
    Ferrara was represented by Daniel J. Henry, Jr.
    Henry was a part-time Village Prosecutor for the Village of Blasdell.
    Henry’s authority as Village Prosecutor was limited to traffic violations (except misdemeanors), village ordinance violations, and Penal Law violations (excluding felonies and misdemeanors).
    Henry was not an employee of the Erie County District Attorney’s office and had no access to its files or resources.
    Henry was not empowered to prosecute the crimes Ferrara was charged with.

    Procedural History

    Ferrara was convicted on all counts in the trial court.
    Ferrara moved to vacate his judgment of conviction under CPL 440.10, arguing his right to counsel was violated.
    Supreme Court denied the motion.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision.
    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a criminal defendant’s right to counsel is violated when their attorney is a part-time Village Prosecutor with no direct connection to the District Attorney’s office prosecuting the case, based on the appearance of impropriety.

    Holding

    No, because the attorney’s role as a part-time Village Prosecutor, with no connection to the District Attorney’s office prosecuting the defendant, did not create a substantial risk of abuse of confidence or actual prejudice to the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Shinkle, where an attorney who had actively participated in the defendant’s defense later became employed by the District Attorney’s office prosecuting the same defendant. In Shinkle, the court found an unacceptable appearance of impropriety and a risk of abuse of confidence.

    The court emphasized that disqualification is required only when there is a “risk of prejudice attendant on the abuse of confidence.” Shinkle, 51 N.Y.2d at 421. The appearance of impropriety alone is insufficient.

    The court quoted Matter of Schumer v. Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46, 55, stating that “The objector should demonstrate actual prejudice or so substantial a risk thereof as could not be ignored”.

    In Ferrara’s case, the court found no opportunity for abuse of confidences. Henry, the defense attorney, could not prosecute the crimes Ferrara was charged with, did not try cases in the same court, did not work with the same law enforcement personnel, and was not supervised by or in communication with the District Attorney’s office. The connection between Henry’s role as Village Prosecutor and the District Attorney’s office was “so tenuous that it did not signal a risk of prejudice to defendant.”

    The court also addressed the New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion No. 544 (1982), noting that ethical opinions do not have the effect of law. Instead, disciplinary rules are guidelines to be applied with due regard for the broad range of interests at stake.

    Thus, the court reiterated that the test remained whether there was actual prejudice or a substantial risk of prejudice, which was not established in this case.

  • People v. Mejia, 82 N.Y.2d 930 (1994): Defendant’s Right to Participate in Jury Instruction Decisions

    People v. Mejia, 82 N.Y.2d 930 (1994)

    A trial court’s denial of a defendant’s opportunity to participate in formulating a response to a note from a deliberating juror is inherently prejudicial and requires reversal of the conviction.

    Summary

    Following a jury trial, Mejia was convicted of assault. During deliberations, a juror sent a note indicating an “emotional impasse.” The trial court read the note aloud but refused defense counsel’s request to suggest a response or even make a record of objections. Citing People v. O’Rama, the Appellate Division acknowledged the error but deemed it harmless. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that denying the defendant input into the response to the juror’s note was inherently prejudicial, warranting a new trial. Additionally, the court found that property recovered from the defendant prior to arrest should have been suppressed.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with robbery and assault. During jury deliberations, the jury sent several notes to the court. One note indicated the jury was at an “emotional impasse”. Defense counsel asked to approach the bench to discuss the note, but the judge refused, read the note aloud, and instructed the jury to decide the case on the evidence without letting emotions influence them. The judge also refused to allow the defense counsel to make a record of his objections.

    Procedural History

    Following a jury trial, the defendant was acquitted of robbery but convicted of assault in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding the trial court’s error in denying defense counsel input on the jury note response harmless. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a trial court’s refusal to allow defense counsel to provide input on the court’s response to a note from a deliberating juror constitutes reversible error.
    2. Whether property recovered from the defendant prior to arrest, identification, or connection to the crime should have been suppressed.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the court entirely deprived the defendant of his right to have specific input into the court’s response to the single juror’s note, which was inherently prejudicial.
    2. Yes, because the search was illegal as it was not conducted pursuant to a warrant, by consent, or incident to arrest, and there was no probable cause to search the clothing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on People v. O’Rama, which established that defense counsel must have the opportunity to be heard before the court responds to a jury’s request. The court reasoned that denying the defendant the opportunity to participate meaningfully in this critical stage of the trial was inherently prejudicial. The court stated, “[T]he court’s response to the juror’s note ‘was, unquestionably, intended to have an effect on the deliberative process’.” Therefore, the denial of the defendant’s opportunity to participate in the charging decision was inherently prejudicial.

    Furthermore, the court found the search of the defendant’s clothing illegal because it was not conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or incident to arrest, and there was no probable cause. The court emphasized that “[t]here is nothing in the record to support the trial court’s finding that the officer who searched the clothing found on the hospital floor in the same room with defendant ‘was directed to a room where the other individual was who was involved in the shooting in the robbery.’”

  • People v. Joseph, 84 N.Y.2d 995 (1994): Right to Counsel During Trial Recesses

    People v. Joseph, 84 N.Y.2d 995 (1994)

    A trial court violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it prohibits the defendant from consulting with their attorney about their testimony during a weekend recess.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal of the defendant’s conviction, holding that the trial court violated the defendant’s right to counsel by preventing him from discussing his trial testimony with his attorney during a weekend recess. The defendant was accused of burning his former wife with acid, and his direct testimony occurred on a Friday afternoon. The trial court’s order prohibiting consultation about the testimony until Monday was deemed a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel because it impeded necessary trial preparation and strategy discussions.

    Facts

    Defendant and his former wife were arrested after an incident where both were burned with acid. Each accused the other of initiating the attack. The charges against the former wife were dismissed. At the defendant’s trial, his direct testimony occurred on a Friday afternoon. The trial court recessed for the weekend and instructed the defendant not to discuss his testimony with his attorney, although they could discuss other aspects of the case. The defendant was subsequently convicted.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division reversed, finding a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and ordering a new trial. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s limitation on the defendant’s ability to consult with his attorney regarding his ongoing testimony during a weekend recess violated the defendant’s state and federal constitutional right to counsel.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court’s order infringed on the defendant’s right to unrestricted access to counsel for advice on trial-related matters during a significant recess, thereby hindering the defendant’s ability to prepare and strategize effectively.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 6 of the New York Constitution, both of which guarantee the right to counsel. Citing Powell v. Alabama, the court emphasized that the right to counsel requires the “guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings.” The court drew upon Geders v. United States, where the Supreme Court found a violation of the right to counsel when a defendant was prohibited from consulting with their attorney during a 17-hour overnight recess. The Court in Geders highlighted the importance of overnight discussions for trial preparation, tactical decisions, and reviewing strategies. The court distinguished the case from Perry v. Leeke, which allows for a temporary ban on discussions during brief recesses between direct and cross-examination. The court emphasized that the length of the recess is the critical factor. As the Court in Perry v. Leeke stated, “It is the defendant’s right to unrestricted access to his lawyer for advice on a variety of trial-related matters that is controlling in the context of a long recess… The fact that such discussions will inevitably include some consideration of the defendant’s ongoing testimony does not compromise that basic right”. The court noted that the defendant’s testimony concerned the discord between himself and his wife, testimony which went “to the heart of his defense”, meaning he was unable to discuss this crucial information with his counsel during the recess.

  • People v. Sawyer, 83 N.Y.2d 913 (1994): Duty to Inquire into Indigent Defendant’s Need for Counsel

    People v. Sawyer, 83 N.Y.2d 913 (1994)

    When a defendant expresses a desire to represent himself but also indicates an inability to afford counsel, the court has an affirmative duty to inquire further into the defendant’s eligibility for and desire for the appointment of counsel.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s order affirming the defendant’s conviction for driving-related offenses. The Court held that the trial court failed to adequately inquire into the defendant’s eligibility for and desire for appointed counsel. Despite the defendant’s expressed intention to represent himself, his indication that he could only hire a lawyer if he could afford one triggered the court’s obligation to conduct a more thorough inquiry. The failure to do so warranted a new trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested and charged with driving without insurance, failing to display rear lamps, and driving while intoxicated. At his arraignment on July 20, 1990, the defendant agreed to be represented by Legal Aid. On August 20, 1990, the defendant disputed the court’s assertion that he had failed to provide verification of his eligibility for free legal representation and stated he wanted to represent himself. At trial in May 1991, he stated he would hire a lawyer if he could afford one.

    Procedural History

    Following a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of the charged offenses. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court adequately inquired into the defendant’s eligibility for and desire for the appointment of counsel, given his expressed intention to represent himself and his statement that he would hire a lawyer if he could afford one.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s statement about affording counsel triggered the court’s duty to conduct a further inquiry, which the court failed to do adequately.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that when a defendant expresses a desire to represent himself but also indicates an inability to afford counsel, the court must inquire further into the defendant’s eligibility for and desire for appointed counsel. The court emphasized that the defendant’s stated intention to exercise his right to self-representation, as established in Faretta v. California, did not eliminate the court’s duty to ensure the defendant’s understanding of the right to counsel, especially given his potential indigence. The court reasoned that the trial court did not make a sufficient inquiry into the defendant’s ability to engage a lawyer. This duty arises from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and ensures that indigent defendants are not forced to proceed without adequate legal representation due to financial constraints, even if they initially express a desire to represent themselves. The court referenced Faretta v California, 422 US 806 and People v Davis, 49 NY2d 114 to support the importance of inquiry into the defendant’s understanding of his rights. By failing to adequately inquire, the trial court violated the defendant’s constitutional rights, necessitating a new trial.

  • People v. Carmona, 82 N.Y.2d 603 (1993): Clergy-Congregant Privilege and Ineffective Waiver After Right to Counsel Attaches

    82 N.Y.2d 603 (1993)

    A defendant’s statement to clergy is privileged, but a waiver of that privilege obtained after the defendant’s right to counsel has attached is ineffective and cannot be used to admit the clergy’s testimony at trial.

    Summary

    Elias Carmona was convicted of second-degree murder. Prior to trial, he sought to suppress statements he made to two clergymen in Florida, arguing they were privileged under CPLR 4505. Carmona had fled to Florida after the murder, confessed to the clergymen, and then confessed to police after they contacted him. The trial court found the clergy communications privileged but ruled Carmona waived the privilege by repeating the substance of those communications to the police. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that any waiver obtained after the indelible right to counsel attached was ineffective, but deemed the error harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt.

    Facts

    Olga Estremera was killed in Carmona’s apartment. Carmona fled to Miami, Florida. In Miami, Carmona spoke with William Jaramillo, a church member, about his crime and his estrangement from the church. Jaramillo referred Carmona to Reverend Hernandez. Carmona confessed to Hernandez and Reverend Mimoso. The ministers convinced Carmona to surrender. Carmona surrendered to Miami police and confessed to Detective Torres after receiving Miranda warnings. Carmona told Detective Torres he had told the same thing to the reverends.

    Procedural History

    Prior to trial, Carmona moved to suppress his statements. The trial court suppressed Carmona’s statements to Detective Torres because they were obtained without counsel after his right to counsel had attached due to an outstanding arrest warrant. However, the trial court admitted the testimony of Reverends Hernandez and Mimoso, finding Carmona had waived the clergy-congregant privilege by repeating his confession to Detective Torres. Carmona was convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the finding of waiver but affirmed the conviction, deeming the error harmless.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the communications between Carmona and the two ministers were privileged under CPLR 4505.
    2. Whether Carmona waived the clergy-congregant privilege by repeating the substance of his communications to the police after his right to counsel had attached.
    3. If the admission of the ministers’ testimony was error, whether it was harmless.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the communications were made in confidence and for the purpose of obtaining spiritual guidance.
    2. No, because any waiver obtained after the indelible right to counsel attached is ineffective.
    3. Yes, because the remaining evidence of guilt was overwhelming.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed CPLR 4505, which protects confidential communications made to clergy for spiritual guidance. The court emphasized that the privilege applies broadly to ministers of all religions and is not limited to formal confessions. The Court found that the evidence supported the finding that Carmona sought spiritual guidance from the ministers. The court then addressed the issue of waiver. Although an express waiver is not required, the Court held that any implied waiver based on statements made to police after the right to counsel attached was ineffective. “Since the purported waiver flowed from the same wrong and is conceptually inseparable from the statements that were suppressed as a result of that wrong, it should be denied legal effect to the same extent that the underlying statements are denied recognition as admissible evidence in chief.” Permitting the waiver would allow the People to indirectly use illegally obtained evidence. Despite the error, the court found it harmless due to the overwhelming circumstantial evidence of Carmona’s guilt, including eyewitness testimony, blood evidence, and his flight from the state. The court reasoned that the improperly admitted evidence did not contribute to the guilty verdict.

  • People v. West, 81 N.Y.2d 370 (1993): Indelible Right to Counsel and Covert Interrogation

    People v. West, 81 N.Y.2d 370 (1993)

    Once a defendant is actually represented by counsel in a criminal matter, the State constitutional right to counsel indelibly attaches, prohibiting police from engaging in covert interrogation regarding that matter without first determining whether the attorney-client relationship continues.

    Summary

    Defendant was implicated in a shooting. He appeared in a lineup represented by counsel, who instructed the police not to question him. Three years later, without inquiring whether defendant was still represented, police used a wired informant to elicit incriminating statements. The New York Court of Appeals held that these statements were obtained in violation of defendant’s indelible right to counsel because the police knew of the prior representation and failed to determine if it was ongoing before initiating the covert interrogation. The conviction was reversed, and the statements were suppressed.

    Facts

    Defendant was involved in a drug operation. In 1982, a shooting occurred. Defendant was placed in a lineup, represented by counsel who instructed police not to question him in his absence. The lineup results were inconclusive, and defendant was not charged. Three years later, an accomplice, seeking leniency, implicated defendant and, acting as an informant, surreptitiously recorded conversations with defendant at the direction of law enforcement. The police made no attempt to contact defendant’s attorney before arranging these conversations.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was indicted for murder based on the taped conversations. His attorney (the same one from the lineup) moved to suppress the taped statements, arguing a violation of defendant’s right to counsel. The trial court denied suppression. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, reasoning the initial investigation had ended and the taped statements were part of a new investigation, also emphasizing the noncustodial nature of the taped conversations. The New York Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s indelible right to counsel, which attached when he was represented by counsel at a lineup, was violated when police, without determining if the representation continued, used a wired informant to elicit incriminating statements from him about the same matter three years later.

    Holding

    Yes, because when the police know that a defendant has an attorney in the matter under investigation, they have a duty to inquire whether the attorney-client relationship continues before engaging in further interrogation, even if non-custodial and covert. They cannot sidestep a defendant’s constitutional rights by failing to inquire whether the attorney-client relationship continued with respect to the very matter under investigation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the strength of New York’s right to counsel protections. It noted the right attaches indelibly upon actual representation in a criminal matter. The Court distinguished this situation from cases involving representation on unrelated charges, where the right to counsel is derivative. The Court stated that in the present case, the police knew of the prior representation and were therefore obligated to determine whether it continued before questioning the defendant. The Court reasoned that the police cannot simply assume the representation has ceased, even after a significant period of time has passed. The court cited People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24 (1980), and People v. Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 161 (1982) as precedent. The Court explicitly rejected the dissent’s argument that the defendant must prove the attorney-client relationship existed at the precise moment of questioning. The Court stated, “A suspect whose right has indelibly attached has no obligation to keep the police informed as to the status of the attorney-client relationship. Should the police wish to question defendant without counsel on the same matter after the right has attached, it is as a rule their burden to determine whether representation continues (People v Marrero, 51 NY2d 56, 59).” The Court concluded by noting that this rule does not create an interminable right to counsel but rather ensures that the police respect existing attorney-client relationships. The Court stated, “Absent some indication that the representation had ceased, the police could not question defendant concerning the very matter as to which they knew he had a lawyer”.

  • People v. Ruff, 81 N.Y.2d 330 (1993): Limits on Questioning Suspects with Pending Charges

    People v. Ruff, 81 N.Y.2d 330 (1993)

    When a suspect has pending criminal charges but is not represented by counsel on those charges, police questioning about those charges does not automatically require the suppression of statements made regarding unrelated matters.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant’s statements to police about a murder should be suppressed because they were obtained while the defendant was being questioned about pending sexual abuse charges for which he did not have counsel. The Court held that because the defendant was not represented by counsel on the pending sexual abuse charges, the questioning on those charges did not require the suppression of the statements made about the unrelated murder. The Court distinguished this case from situations where an attorney-client relationship exists on the pending charges, emphasizing that the mere attachment of the right to counsel due to pending charges is insufficient to bar questioning on unrelated matters.

    Facts

    In 1987, a warrant was issued for Ruff’s arrest in Rensselaer County for sexual abuse. In 1988, police learned Ruff might be involved in a 1957 murder in Albany County. Police located Ruff in Florida and, after advising him of his Miranda rights, questioned him about the sexual abuse allegations. Ruff admitted to committing acts constituting sex crimes. He was then questioned about the 1957 murder, initially denying any knowledge. After a polygraph examination, Ruff admitted to the murder and wrote a confession. He was arrested as a fugitive and transported back to New York.

    Procedural History

    Ruff was indicted in Albany County for murder. At a pretrial Huntley hearing, Ruff moved to suppress his statements about the murder, arguing they violated his right to counsel due to the pending Rensselaer County sexual abuse charges. The trial court denied the motion. Ruff was convicted of first-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements about an unrelated crime must be suppressed when they are obtained during questioning of a suspect who has pending charges for which the suspect has not retained counsel.

    Holding

    No, because questioning on pending charges, in the absence of actual representation by counsel on those charges, does not require suppression of statements on unrelated matters.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished this case from People v. Rogers, which held that once an attorney has entered proceedings on prior pending charges, police may not question a suspect in custody on those charges, even on unrelated matters, in the absence of counsel. The Court emphasized that the Rogers holding applies only when an attorney-client relationship has been established on the pending charges. Citing People v. Kazmarick, the Court noted that pending criminal charges do not bar police from questioning a suspect on an unrelated matter when the suspect is not represented by counsel on the pending charges.

    The Court stated: “Defendant in an overly simplistic lumping of the two lines of cases argues from Samuels that the arrest warrant and accusatory instrument * * * created a nonwaivable right to counsel and from Rogers that attachment of that right prevented interrogation on any other criminal matter. While the filing of an accusatory instrument triggers a right to counsel with respect to the charge made by the accusatory instrument, the right to counsel and representation by counsel are not the same thing * * * Simply put, the legal fiction of representation indulged by the Samuels line of cases is not tantamount to the actual or requested representation protected by the Rogers-Cunningham line.”

    In People v. Ermo, the Court suppressed statements because police exploited impermissible questioning on a matter for which the defendant was represented by counsel to elicit statements on an unrelated matter. Here, because Ruff was not represented by counsel on the sexual abuse charges, there was no attorney-client relationship for the police to interfere with. The court explicitly declined to address whether particularly egregious police questioning on unrelated matters could be deemed an intolerable exploitation, as this situation was not present in the instant case.

  • People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 509 (1995): Upholding Defendant’s Right to Counsel During Jury Deliberations

    People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 509 (1995)

    CPL 310.30 requires that counsel be given meaningful notice of jury inquiries and an opportunity to be heard before the response is given, especially when the inquiries are substantive and deviate from the original written questions.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery, drug possession, and weapons possession. During jury deliberations, the trial judge held oral colloquies with the jury beyond their initial written inquiries, discussing reasonable doubt and possession without allowing defense counsel meaningful participation. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the lack of meaningful participation by defense counsel in formulating responses to the jury’s substantive follow-up questions violated CPL 310.30. The court emphasized that counsel must have the opportunity to be heard before the response is given, ensuring a fair trial.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested during a narcotics buy-and-bust operation where an undercover officer was held at gunpoint. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of multiple charges, including robbery in the first degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance, criminal sale of a controlled substance, and criminal possession of a weapon. During jury deliberations, the trial court engaged in several oral exchanges with the jury, addressing questions beyond the scope of the jury’s initial written inquiries.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial, finding a violation of CPL 310.30 regarding communication with the jury.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court violated CPL 310.30 by engaging in substantive oral exchanges with the jury during deliberations, concerning matters not included in the original written inquiries, without allowing defense counsel meaningful participation in formulating the responses?

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 310.30 requires that counsel be given meaningful notice of jury inquiries and an opportunity to be heard before the response is given, and this opportunity was not provided with respect to the substantive follow-up questions posed by the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 310.30, as interpreted by People v. O’Rama, mandates that counsel receive meaningful notice of jury inquiries and have the opportunity to be heard before the court responds. The court emphasized that the oral exchanges between the judge and the jury included substantive discussions regarding reasonable doubt and constructive and actual possession, which were not part of the original written queries. Since the defense counsel was not given a meaningful opportunity to participate in formulating the responses to these follow-up questions, the statute was violated.

    The court distinguished this case from People v. Lykes, where the jury was given mere clarifying inquiries. In this case, the jury received additional instructions on crucial, distinct, substantive issues. The court stated that “an important purpose of the statute ‘is to ensure that counsel has the opportunity to be heard before the response is given’” (quoting People v O’Rama, 78 NY2d 270, 277). The court found that the initial opportunity to participate in responses to written notes did not satisfy the statute regarding the subsequent oral exchanges, as the follow-up questions changed the substantive scope of the inquiries. The court also noted that the identification by the undercover officer was merely confirmatory, and a Wade hearing was not required, citing People v. Polanco, 80 NY2d 1012 and People v. Wharton, 74 NY2d 921.

  • People v. Colon, 76 N.Y.2d 903 (1990): Right to Counsel at Execution of Sentence After Sentencing In Absentia

    People v. Colon, 76 N.Y.2d 903 (1990)

    When a defendant is sentenced in absentia while represented by counsel, the subsequent execution of the sentence is not a critical stage of the criminal proceeding, and the defendant is not entitled to counsel at that time.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant sentenced in absentia while represented by counsel is not entitled to counsel at the subsequent execution of that sentence. Colon pleaded guilty to attempted burglary and was warned that failure to appear for sentencing could result in a harsher prison sentence imposed in his absence. After failing to appear twice, he was sentenced in absentia. Several months later, Colon was arrested and the sentence was summarily executed without his counsel present, and without providing him an opportunity to explain his absence. The court reasoned that the critical stage of sentencing concluded when the sentence was imposed in absentia, thus negating any right to counsel at the later execution of that sentence.

    Facts

    The defendant, Colon, pleaded guilty to attempted burglary in the second degree. This plea satisfied an indictment charging him with second-degree burglary and criminal mischief. At the plea allocution, while represented by counsel, Colon was promised a conditional probationary sentence. He was explicitly warned that if he failed to appear for sentencing, he could be sentenced in absentia to a prison term of 2 1/2 to 7 years. Colon failed to appear for the scheduled sentencing, which was then adjourned. He again failed to appear at the rescheduled sentencing. The sentencing court, after a hearing, determined that Colon’s absence was voluntary and sentenced him to 2 to 6 years in prison.

    Procedural History

    Several months after being sentenced in absentia, Colon was arrested on a bench warrant and returned to court. The sentence was summarily executed. Colon’s counsel was not present during the execution of the sentence. Colon was not given an opportunity to explain his absence at the original sentencing hearing, nor did he request one. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision. Colon then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant who was sentenced in absentia while represented by counsel is entitled to counsel at the subsequent execution of that sentence.

    Holding

    No, because where a defendant is sentenced in absentia while represented by counsel, the critical stage of the sentencing process terminates upon the imposition of sentence, and the subsequent execution of the sentence is not a critical stage entitling the defendant to counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding that implicates the right to counsel, citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 and People v. Perry, 36 N.Y.2d 114. However, the court distinguished the present case by emphasizing that Colon was sentenced in absentia while represented by counsel. According to the court, this fact was crucial, since “the critical stage of the sentencing process and, hence, the criminal proceeding itself for all nisi prius court purposes, terminates upon the imposition of sentence.” The court explicitly stated that “[s]ubsequent execution of the sentence is not a critical stage of the defendant’s criminal proceeding.” The court cited People v. Scott, 158 A.D.2d 725, 726, and People v. Villegas, 146 A.D.2d 228, 232, in support of this proposition. The court reasoned that because the critical stage had already passed, Colon was not entitled to counsel at the execution of his sentence. The court also stated that Colon’s remaining argument was not properly preserved for appellate review, thus declining to address it.