New York Law Review

Tag: Right to Counsel

  • People v. Garcia, 93 N.Y.2d 42 (1999): Right to Counsel on Appeal

    93 N.Y.2d 42 (1999)

    A defendant has a right to counsel on a People’s appeal, and the Appellate Division must ensure the defendant is represented or has waived counsel as a matter of record before proceeding.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a defendant was denied his constitutional right to counsel during the People’s appeal to the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred in deciding the appeal without ensuring the defendant was represented by counsel or had knowingly waived that right. The defendant had retained counsel for trial, but was unrepresented on appeal after his conviction was set aside and the People appealed. The Court emphasized that the State has the ultimate duty to inform a defendant of their right to appellate counsel and to provide counsel if the defendant is indigent. The case was remitted for a new appeal with representation.

    Facts

    Defendant Garcia was convicted of first-degree burglary and robbery after a jury trial. The trial court granted Garcia’s motion to set aside the verdict, finding the evidence insufficient as a matter of law. The court informed Garcia that the People had a right to appeal and urged his trial counsel to discuss the implications of a People’s appeal with him. The People filed a notice of appeal. Garcia’s trial counsel informed the People that Garcia had not retained them for the appeal and sent letters to Garcia’s last known address referencing a conversation informing him of the consequences of the People’s appeal.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially set aside the jury verdict. The People appealed this decision to the Appellate Division, First Department. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s order, reinstated the jury verdict, and remanded the case for sentencing, noting that there was “no appearance for respondent.” Subsequently, the case was remanded to the Supreme Court for sentencing, at which point Garcia obtained assigned counsel. Garcia then appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing he was denied his right to counsel on the People’s appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred by proceeding with the People’s appeal without ensuring that the defendant was represented by counsel or had waived his right to counsel.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Appellate Division had the obligation to ensure that the defendant was represented or had waived counsel on the record. The absence of representation, without a valid waiver, violated the defendant’s right to counsel on appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a defendant has a right to counsel on a People’s appeal, especially where imprisonment is a potential outcome. The Court stated, “ ‘where imprisonment threatens, constitutional guarantees as to counsel must apply’ ” (quoting People v. White, 56 N.Y.2d 110, 116). The court reasoned that the ultimate duty of informing the defendant of this right rests with the State, not just delegated to a member of the bar, quoting People v. Montgomery, 24 N.Y.2d 130, 133: “we do not believe that an indigent defendant can lose his right to appeal simply because the State delegates its responsibility to a member of the Bar to pass along the requisite information.” The Appellate Division had the responsibility to ensure representation or a valid waiver on the record. By proceeding without counsel and without ascertaining a waiver, the Appellate Division failed in its duty. The court also noted that meaningful appellate advocacy requires “the single-minded advocacy of an appellate counsel” (citing People v. Emmett, 25 N.Y.2d 354, 356), which a bare record cannot replace. The Court of Appeals also advised the Appellate Divisions to implement uniform rules to ensure defendants are informed of their right to counsel on appeal.

  • People v. Garcia, 93 N.Y.2d 42 (1999): Right to Counsel at TASC Program Appearances

    People v. Garcia, 93 N.Y.2d 42 (1999)

    A defendant does not have the right to counsel at court appearances related to participation in a Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC) program when those appearances are primarily administrative and do not involve accusatory proceedings or factual determinations affecting the defendant’s liberty.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s right to counsel was not violated when he appeared in court without counsel for TASC-related proceedings. Garcia pleaded guilty to a drug offense with the understanding that he would enter a TASC program. He was later ejected from the program for a rules violation. At a subsequent court appearance to discuss his status, the TASC representative suggested the court proceed to sentencing. The court agreed and discharged TASC from the case. The Court of Appeals reasoned that this appearance was not a “critical stage” requiring counsel because it was an administrative matter, not an accusatory proceeding involving new factual or legal determinations.

    Facts

    In 1994, Garcia sold heroin and crack cocaine to an undercover officer and was indicted. In 1995, he pleaded guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance, the top count of the indictment, with the understanding that he would be admitted into a TASC program. The court warned him that if he failed to complete the program or committed another crime, he could face a sentence of 4½ to 9 years. After participating in the program for 18 months, Garcia was ejected for violating rules and remained at large for three months. He was brought back to court on a bench warrant.

    Procedural History

    After being ejected from the TASC program, Garcia appeared in court several times without counsel. At one such appearance, the TASC representative suggested that the court sentence Garcia. The court discharged TASC from the case and scheduled sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, with counsel present, Garcia was sentenced to 4½ to 9 years. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction, and Garcia appealed, arguing a violation of his right to counsel.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the February 20th court appearance, where the court determined Garcia would be sentenced to jail after his ejection from the TASC program, constituted a “critical stage” of the proceedings requiring the presence of counsel.

    Holding

    No, because the February 20th appearance was an administrative proceeding and not an accusatory one requiring factual or legal determinations affecting Garcia’s liberty.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished TASC appearances from parole or probation revocation hearings, where the right to counsel is required because the outcome (liberty or imprisonment) depends on factual determinations of misconduct. In revocation hearings, counsel is needed to marshal facts, introduce mitigating evidence, and assist the defendant. In contrast, Garcia’s February 20th appearance was not accusatory. The court emphasized that it was undisputed that Garcia had violated the TASC program rules. The court stated that “No factual or legal questions were at issue, and defendant’s views were not relevant to TASC’s decision to readmit him or its ability — given the circumstances created by defendant’s conduct — to find a new program for him.” The court’s decision was driven by administrative concerns and TASC’s assessment, not by any new allegations or factual disputes requiring legal representation. The Court concluded that the presence of counsel was not required to protect Garcia’s due process rights in this context. The court noted, “At the core of that right, which we have long recognized as inviolable and fundamental to our form of justice, is the recognition that defendants, confronted with both the intricacies of the criminal law and the experienced advocacy of the public prosecutor, require the ‘guiding hand of counsel’ to aid their defense.”

  • People v. Smith, 92 N.Y.2d 518 (1998): Adequacy of Waiver of Right to Counsel

    People v. Smith, 92 N.Y.2d 518 (1998)

    A defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel must be unequivocal, voluntary, and intelligent, and the trial court must conduct a sufficiently searching inquiry to ensure the defendant appreciates the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order for a new trial because the trial court improperly relieved the defendant’s assigned counsel during trial, and the defendant proceeded pro se without a valid waiver of his right to counsel. The court emphasized the necessity of a ‘searching inquiry’ to ensure a defendant understands the risks of self-representation. The defendant’s expression of dissatisfaction with counsel and a threat made against him did not automatically constitute forfeiture of the right to counsel, but rather triggered the need for a waiver analysis which was not properly conducted here.

    Facts

    The defendant, Smith, was found guilty of criminal sale of a controlled substance. Before and during the trial, Smith repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with his assigned counsel and requested new counsel, while simultaneously stating he could not represent himself. During the trial, defense counsel requested to be relieved, claiming Smith threatened him. The trial court then relieved the attorney, allowing him to act as a legal advisor while Smith proceeded pro se.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Smith. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, ordering a new trial, concluding the trial court did not adequately warn Smith about the risks of proceeding pro se, thus rendering his implied waiver ineffective. Two dissenting justices argued the trial court did not err because Smith’s threat constituted a forfeiture of his right to counsel. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court conducted a sufficient inquiry to ensure the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel before proceeding pro se.

    Holding

    No, because the record does not reflect that the trial court fulfilled the requisite probativeness to particularize defendant’s understanding of the “dangers and disadvantages” of proceeding pro se before discharging assigned counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the waiver of the right to counsel must be unequivocal, voluntary, and intelligent. This requires the trial court to undertake a “searching inquiry” to be reasonably certain that the defendant appreciates the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. The inquiry should delve into the defendant’s age, education, occupation, previous exposure to legal procedures, and other relevant factors. The court noted, “Governing principles demand that appropriate record exploration between the trial court and defendant be conducted, both to test an accused’s understanding of the waiver and to provide a reliable basis for appellate review.” The court found the trial court’s colloquy insufficient. While the judge offered Smith the choice to apologize to his attorney or proceed pro se, this triggered the need for a “searching inquiry” that was not met. The court pointed out that the trial judge failed to explore the potential pitfalls and responsibilities of pro se representation. Even though Smith stated he was unwilling or unable to represent himself, the court stated this highlighted the need for a plain examination of the defendant’s understanding. The court explicitly declined to address the concept of forfeiture of counsel, as the trial court’s actions suggested a waiver analysis was appropriate and the appeal did not proceed on a forfeiture theory.

  • People v. Grant, 91 N.Y.2d 989 (1998): Right to Counsel and Interrogation on Related Charges

    91 N.Y.2d 989 (1998)

    When a suspect is represented by counsel on one charge, questioning on a separate charge is impermissible if it is purposely exploitative and designed to elicit incriminating responses on the represented charge to pressure the suspect to confess to the unrepresented crime.

    Summary

    Jonathan Grant was arrested and interrogated about a homicide and assault in Schenectady, NY, while already represented by counsel on a gun possession charge in Brooklyn. He made incriminating statements that he later sought to suppress. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the two charges were not so interwoven as to automatically taint the interrogation, the trial court needed to determine if the questioning about the Brooklyn charge was purposely exploitative, designed to pressure Grant into confessing to the Schenectady crimes. The case was remitted for that determination.

    Facts

    Grant was arrested for a homicide and assault in Schenectady related to a May 9, 1993 incident. Prior to this, he had been arrested in Brooklyn for possessing a 9mm Glock pistol and was represented by counsel on that charge. Schenectady police knew of the Brooklyn charge and his representation. During interrogation for the Schenectady crimes, police questioned him about the Brooklyn gun charge, eventually eliciting admissions about possessing the Glock. He then gave two statements implicating himself in the Schenectady shooting.

    Procedural History

    Grant’s motion to suppress the statements was denied by the trial court, and he was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. A dissenting Justice granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals based on the “relatedness” of the charges. While the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals decided People v. Cohen. Grant then argued that the questioning about the Brooklyn charge was purposely exploitive. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division decision and remitted the case to the trial court to determine if the questioning was, in fact, purposely exploitive.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the questioning by Schenectady police about the Brooklyn gun possession charge, while Grant was represented by counsel on that charge, was discrete or fairly separable from the Schenectady crimes and was “purposely exploitive” and “designed to add pressure on defendant to confess” to the unrepresented crime.

    Holding

    No, the Court of Appeals did not make a determination if the questioning was purposely exploitive, because that issue had not been properly preserved at trial. The case was remitted to the trial court to determine whether the questioning by Schenectady police was purposely exploitive and designed to add pressure on defendant to confess to the unrepresented crime, based on the record.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged its holding in People v. Cohen, which addressed the issue of questioning a represented suspect on a new matter. The Court stated that suppression is required where the represented and unrepresented crimes are so thoroughly interrelated that questioning on one will almost necessarily elicit incriminating responses on the other. It further stated that a statement may be subject to suppression where impermissible questioning on a represented charge was, when viewed as an integrated whole, not fairly separable from otherwise permissible questioning on the unrepresented matter and was, in fact, purposely exploited to aid in securing inculpatory admissions on the latter.

    The court found that the Appellate Division erred in ruling the issue waived because it was not raised at trial. Instead, the Court remitted the case back to the trial court to determine if the questioning was purposely exploitative and designed to add pressure on Grant to confess to the unrepresented crime, applying the law as articulated in People v. Cohen. Judge Titone dissented in part, arguing that the record clearly showed the questioning was exploitative and a new trial should be ordered.

    Judge Titone noted, “the only inferable purpose for engaging in the impermissible line of questioning was to use it as leverage to obtain admissions regarding the Schenectady murder.” Further, “By asking defendant about his possession of the murder weapon, Sims pressured him into either giving incriminating responses regarding his own use of that weapon in the Schenectady shooting or giving false exculpatory answers regarding his possession that could later be exploited in further interrogation.”

  • People v. Burdo, 91 N.Y.2d 146 (1997): Limits on Interrogation When Defendant Has Counsel on Unrelated Charge

    91 N.Y.2d 146 (1997)

    Once a defendant in custody is represented by counsel, even on an unrelated charge, police cannot interrogate the defendant about any matter without counsel present, absent a counseled waiver.

    Summary

    Burdo was incarcerated on rape charges and an unrelated probation violation. Police questioned him about a murder, after advising him of his Miranda rights and confirming he understood them and was willing to speak without a lawyer present. Burdo admitted to involvement in the murder. The trial court suppressed the confession, citing People v. Rogers. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under Rogers, because Burdo was in custody and represented by counsel on another charge, questioning on any matter was prohibited without counsel present, protecting the attorney-client relationship and mitigating state coercion.

    Facts

    Francis Burdo was jailed on rape and probation violation charges and was represented by counsel on the rape charges.

    Police investigators questioned Burdo about the murder of Leo Gebo.

    Burdo was given Miranda warnings and waived his rights, agreeing to speak to the officers without counsel.

    He confessed to the Gebo murder. Burdo stated that he was high on pot and booze when the murder occurred.

    Burdo then signed a written statement detailing his involvement in the murder.

    Procedural History

    The County Court suppressed Burdo’s confession, citing People v. Rogers, as Burdo was in custody on unrelated charges for which he had counsel.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the County Court’s order.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements made during a custodial interrogation, without counsel present, are admissible when the defendant is represented by counsel on a pending, unrelated charge.

    Holding

    No, because once a defendant in custody on a particular matter is represented by counsel, custodial interrogation about any subject, related or unrelated to the charge upon which representation is sought or obtained, must cease, unless there is a counseled waiver.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the precedent set in People v. Rogers, which held that once an attorney has entered the proceeding, police must cease questioning the defendant in custody without counsel present. This protects the attorney-client relationship from being undermined by police interrogation. The Court reaffirmed its commitment to Rogers. The Court emphasized the principle that it is the attorney, not the police, who determines which matters are related and unrelated to the subject of the representation. The Court rejected the argument that Rogers only applies when an attorney actively interjects to stop questioning, clarifying that representation alone triggers the protection. Dissent argued Burdo failed to establish a clear attorney-client relationship or invoke his right to counsel, citing a distinction between the Sixth Amendment right and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Dissent claimed extending the Rogers rule this far could impede law enforcement’s ability to investigate crimes. The majority stated the decision neither expands nor narrows Rogers, which established the principle that a defendant represented by counsel on the charge on which he is held in custody cannot be interrogated in the absence of counsel “on any matter.” The Court noted that the Rogers rule ensures that it is the defendant’s attorney, not the police, who determines which matters are related and unrelated to the subject of the representation.

  • People v. Cohen, 90 N.Y.2d 632 (1997): Interrogation Tactics & Right to Counsel

    People v. Cohen, 90 N.Y.2d 632 (1997)

    When police question a suspect about a crime for which they know the suspect has retained counsel, any confession obtained, even regarding an unrelated crime, is inadmissible if the questioning on the represented crime was not discrete or fairly separable from the questioning on the unrepresented crime and was purposely exploited to elicit statements on the unrelated matter.

    Summary

    Cohen was a suspect in a garage burglary. He had retained counsel regarding the burglary. Later, Cohen was arrested and interrogated about a robbery-murder at a Citgo station. Police knew Cohen was represented on the burglary charge but questioned him about it anyway, intermingling questions about the burglary with questions about the robbery-murder. Cohen confessed to the robbery-murder. The New York Court of Appeals held that Cohen’s confession should have been suppressed because the police violated his right to counsel by questioning him about the burglary after he had retained counsel for that charge, and they exploited that violation to obtain the confession to the robbery-murder.

    Facts

    A Citgo station mini-mart was robbed, and the store clerk was murdered. Police recovered a bullet from the scene, determined to be from a .22 caliber older model gun. An informant, Mackrodt, told police that Cohen, along with codefendants McCulloch and Anderson, had shown him an older .22 caliber revolver, a .357 caliber revolver, and a third unidentified gun at McCulloch’s residence. Mackrodt further stated that Cohen, McCulloch, and Anderson had admitted to stealing these guns from Thompson’s Garage and were planning to rob the Citgo station.

    Procedural History

    Cohen was indicted for intentional and felony murder and robbery. He moved to suppress physical evidence and his confession, arguing the search warrant was invalid due to the informant’s arrest and that his confession violated his right to counsel. The County Court denied the motion. Cohen pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the informant’s arrest did not invalidate the warrant and that the two crimes were unrelated. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the search warrant was invalid based on the subsequent arrest of the informant, Mackrodt, for the Thompson’s Garage crimes.
    2. Whether Cohen’s confession should be suppressed because police questioned him about the Thompson’s Garage crimes after he had retained counsel for those crimes.

    Holding

    1. No, because the record lacks evidence that the investigator knowingly or recklessly disregarded evidence that Mackrodt participated in the Thompson’s Garage burglary and weapons theft when applying for the search warrant.
    2. Yes, because the police exploited their questioning regarding the Thompson’s Garage crimes, for which Cohen had retained counsel, to obtain his confession for the Citgo robbery-homicide.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the search warrant, the Court of Appeals held that the warrant was valid because there was no evidence that the investigator knew or recklessly disregarded evidence that Mackrodt was involved in the Thompson’s Garage burglary when applying for the warrant. The court emphasized that suppression is designed to deter deliberate falsity by law enforcement, not to impeach their sources.

    Regarding the confession, the Court of Appeals distinguished its prior cases involving police interrogation after the right to counsel had attached. The Court stated, “Our case law involving police interrogation of a suspect on the subject of one crime after the right to counsel had indelibly attached by the actual appearance of an attorney representing that suspect in another crime falls into two relevant categories.” First, the Court discussed cases where the two crimes are so closely related that questioning on one inevitably elicits incriminating responses on the other. Second, the Court discussed cases where the police are aware that the defendant is represented by counsel in one of the matters, and the interrogation entails questioning on the represented crime.

    The Court found this case fell into the second category. The Court emphasized that the Appellate Division used the wrong legal standard by focusing on whether the questions regarding the Thompson’s Garage crimes were the crucial element in securing Cohen’s confession, stating that the proper inquiry is whether the impermissible questioning was “discrete or fairly separable.” The Court also stated it was critical whether the police purposely “exploited concededly impermissible questioning” to get a confession in the unrepresented matter.

    The Court found that the police intentionally interfered with Cohen’s right to counsel, as they acknowledged knowing they had been instructed not to question him about the Thompson’s Garage crimes. Moreover, the questioning was completely interrelated. Therefore, the court concluded that the police exploited the questioning regarding the Thompson’s Garage crimes to add pressure on Cohen to confess to the Citgo robbery-homicide, and the confession should have been suppressed.

  • People v. Wilson, 89 N.Y.2d 754 (1997): Right to Counsel at Investigatory Lineup

    People v. Wilson, 89 N.Y.2d 754 (1997)

    Once a suspect is represented by counsel, even on an unrelated charge, police cannot conduct an investigatory lineup without making reasonable efforts to notify and secure the attorney’s presence, absent exigent circumstances.

    Summary

    Eric Wilson, arrested on Brooklyn charges, was identified in a lineup as the perpetrator of a Queens homicide. Wilson’s attorney on the Brooklyn charges informed Queens detectives that he also represented Wilson on the Queens matter and that no questioning or lineups should occur without him. Despite this, police conducted a lineup without notifying the attorney, and Wilson was identified. The New York Court of Appeals held that because Wilson was represented by counsel, the lineup conducted without notifying counsel violated his right to counsel, requiring suppression of the identification. The Court emphasized the importance of affording a defendant’s attorney the opportunity to be present at critical stages of the investigation.

    Facts

    Defendant Eric Wilson was arrested on Brooklyn charges of criminal possession of a stolen vehicle and a weapon. The weapon was linked to a Queens homicide. An eyewitness identified Wilson’s photo as being involved in the Queens shooting. Wilson’s attorney, Norman Berle, representing him on the Brooklyn charges, informed Queens detectives that he also represented Wilson regarding the Queens matter and that no questioning or lineups should occur without his presence. The Brooklyn charges were dismissed, and Queens detectives took Wilson into custody. Advised of his Miranda rights, Wilson waived them and denied knowledge of the homicide. A lineup was conducted without notifying Berle, and Wilson was identified as the shooter.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Queens County, denied Wilson’s motion to suppress the lineup identification, finding that the attorney-client relationship terminated with the dismissal of the Brooklyn charges. Wilson was convicted of murder and other charges. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the motion to suppress and ordering a new trial, allowing the People to establish an independent source for the in-court identification. The Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an investigatory lineup conducted without notifying a suspect’s attorney, after the attorney informed police of their representation and requested their presence at any questioning or lineups, violates the suspect’s right to counsel.

    Holding

    Yes, because once a suspect is actually represented by counsel, a waiver of the right to counsel without the attorney present is ineffective, and the police are obligated to make reasonable efforts to notify counsel of an impending lineup, absent exigent circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle that while a suspect has no constitutional right to counsel at a pre-indictment lineup, if a suspect already has counsel, that attorney may not be excluded from the lineup proceedings. The Court found that attorney Berle’s notification to the Queens detectives that he represented Wilson on the Queens matter created a duty for the police to notify Berle of the lineup. The Court cited People v. LaClere, 76 N.Y.2d 670 (1990), emphasizing that the police took the risk that the evidence would be suppressed by conducting the lineup without notice to counsel. The Court also noted that no exigent circumstances justified proceeding without counsel. The Court reasoned that once an attorney-client relationship is established and communicated to law enforcement, the police cannot disregard the attorney’s request to be present. Allowing a lineup without notifying known counsel undermines the protections afforded by the right to counsel. The court emphasized, “In conducting the lineup in these circumstances, without some notice or other legally recognized excusal of counsel’s presence, the police took the risk that the adduced evidence would not be allowed” (People v. LaClere, supra, at 672).

  • People v. Hinds, 78 N.Y.2d 75 (1991): Addressing Racial Bias in Courtroom Counsel Exclusion

    People v. Hinds, 78 N.Y.2d 75 (1991)

    A trial court’s decision to exclude an attorney from participating in a case based solely on the attorney’s race violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions and undermines public policy favoring justice without racial bias.

    Summary

    In People v. Hinds, the New York Court of Appeals addressed a situation where a trial judge excluded an African-American attorney from participating in a trial because of her race. The judge explicitly stated that the attorney’s presence was an attempt to gain undue sympathy from the jury. Justice Smith’s concurring opinion argues that this exclusion violated the Equal Protection Clauses of both the Federal and State Constitutions and ran contrary to the state’s public policy. While the majority and dissenting opinions condemned the trial judge’s ruling, they differed on whether the issue was properly preserved for appellate review. Justice Smith contended that the constitutional issue was sufficiently raised and briefed at the Appellate Division, making it appropriate for the Court of Appeals to review the decision. This case highlights the importance of addressing racial bias within the judicial system and ensuring fair representation for all defendants.

    Facts

    During a criminal trial, the lead defense attorney requested that a second attorney, who was African-American, assist with the cross-examination of a witness.

    The trial judge denied the request, stating that he believed the defense was attempting to garner sympathy from the jury by having an African-American attorney present, given that the defendant was black.

    The judge explicitly stated that his decision was influenced by the attorney’s race.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defense’s request to have the second attorney participate.

    On appeal to the Appellate Division, the defendant argued that the trial court’s ruling violated his right to counsel and the Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. and New York State Constitutions.

    The Appellate Division disapproved of the trial court’s reasoning but concluded that the defendant’s constitutional rights were not impaired.

    The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s exclusion of an attorney based on race violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions, and whether this issue was properly preserved for appellate review.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court’s explicit reliance on race in excluding the attorney constituted a clear violation of equal protection principles, and the issue was adequately addressed at the appellate division, despite not being initially and explicitly raised at trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Justice Smith, in concurrence, emphasized that the trial court’s statement alone demonstrated an abuse of discretion. The judge’s explicit consideration of race in his ruling was a violation of equal protection. Although a constitutional argument should generally be raised at the earliest opportunity, the parties fully briefed the constitutional issue at the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division addressed and decided the constitutional issue. The concern that the issue was not raised at the trial level should not prevent review by the Court of Appeals, especially where all facts pertaining to the constitutional issue are in the record.

    Justice Smith cited People ex rel. Roides v Smith, 67 NY2d 899, 901, arguing that legal arguments may be reviewed even if raised for the first time on appeal if the opposing party has no factual or legal counterstep that could have been made below. The trial court’s statements were dispositive of the defendant’s constitutional appeal.

    Furthermore, issues impacting public policy can be reviewed even if raised for the first time on appeal. Justice Smith cited Matter of Niagara Wheatfield Adm’rs Assn. [Niagara Wheatfield Cent. School Dist.], 44 NY2d 68, 72. Racial discrimination within the judicial system is a matter of significant public policy.

    Citing Powers v Ohio, 499 US 400, 415, Justice Smith stated, “The Fourteenth Amendment’s mandate that race discrimination be eliminated from all official acts and proceedings of the State is most compelling in the judicial system”. Refusing to consider the constitutional claims would immunize the Appellate Division’s determination from review, even though the error is of constitutional magnitude. Racial discrimination is never a valid basis for exercising discretion. The judge issued a procedural ruling based solely on the skin color of the defendant and his counsel, which is unacceptable and “improperly infects our entire judicial process.”

  • People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331 (1990): Limits on Derivative Right to Counsel

    People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331 (1990)

    A suspect who has counsel assigned in a prior, unrelated case can waive the right to counsel in the absence of counsel during a subsequent interrogation regarding a new, unrelated charge.

    Summary

    Bing addresses the scope of a defendant’s right to counsel in New York, particularly when the defendant has prior representation in an unrelated case. The Court of Appeals held that the derivative right to counsel established in People v. Bartolomeo was no longer good law. Thus, a defendant can waive their right to counsel, even without counsel present, when being questioned on a new charge that is unrelated to a previous case where they were assigned counsel. This decision overruled the broader protections previously afforded to defendants under Bartolomeo, emphasizing the need for a clearer, more practical standard.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested for criminal possession of a controlled substance and resisting arrest. While in custody, he volunteered information about an unrelated homicide. He was assigned counsel for the misdemeanor charges under an alias. Later, police learned his true identity and arrested him for a parole violation. After receiving Miranda warnings, the defendant waived his right to counsel and discussed the homicide again, making inculpatory statements. He was then charged with murder.

    Procedural History

    The Onondaga County Court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress his statements, finding a violation of his right to counsel. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reversed, denying suppression. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether inculpatory statements made by a defendant, after waiving the right to counsel in the absence of counsel, should be suppressed when the defendant had previously been assigned counsel in a pending, unrelated misdemeanor case.

    Holding

    No, because the derivative right to counsel established in People v. Bartolomeo does not extend to subsequent interrogations on unrelated charges after a valid waiver of Miranda rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed the interplay between People v. Rogers and People v. Bartolomeo, and ultimately overruled Bartolomeo to limit the scope of derivative right to counsel. The Court explained that the Bartolomeo rule, which imputed a duty to inquire about prior representation, lacked a “principled basis which justifies its social cost.” The Court emphasized that “there is little to be said for a [derivative] rule which is not firmly grounded on prior case law, cannot be applied uniformly, favors recidivists over first-time arrestees, and exacts such a heavy cost from the public.”

    The Court clarified that Rogers still stands for the principle that once a defendant in custody requests or is represented by counsel, interrogation must cease on any subject. However, Bing makes it clear that this protection does not extend to subsequent interrogations on unrelated charges when the defendant validly waives their Miranda rights. The Court distinguished Bing from Rogers noting, “In People v. Bartolomeo (supra), however, defendant was taken into custody for questioning on a new, unrelated charge. He was not represented on that charge and freely waived his right to counsel”.

    Thus, the Court held that a suspect is competent to waive the right to counsel in the absence of counsel regarding matters unrelated to a charge where counsel was previously assigned. This decision aimed to strike a balance between protecting defendants’ rights and ensuring effective law enforcement.

  • People v. Petrovich, 87 N.Y.2d 961 (1996): Defendant’s Right to Decide Jury Instructions Over Counsel’s Objection

    People v. Petrovich, 87 N.Y.2d 961 (1996)

    A defendant, represented by counsel, has the ultimate authority to make fundamental decisions regarding the case, including whether to request submission of an affirmative defense to the jury, even over the objections of counsel.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of murdering his parents. At trial, he asserted an insanity defense. The trial court inquired whether the defendant wanted an instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, which would reduce the charges to manslaughter. Initially, the defendant agreed, but later changed his mind, against his counsel’s advice, fearing it would preclude a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court, after a colloquy with the defendant, honored the defendant’s wishes. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the decision to submit the affirmative defense rested with the defendant, not counsel, as it was a fundamental decision about the case’s presentation.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with murdering his parents. His defense was that he lacked the mental capacity to appreciate the criminal consequences of his actions due to a mental disease or defect.
    After both sides rested, the court inquired whether the defendant wanted an instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to reduce the murder charges to manslaughter. Initially, the defendant agreed to the instruction. The next day, the defendant changed his mind and informed the court that he only wanted three possible verdicts submitted to the jury: guilty of murder, not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect, or not guilty. The defendant believed that submitting the extreme emotional disturbance defense would preclude a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of murder after a jury trial. He appealed, arguing that the trial judge violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by allowing him to override his counsel’s advice regarding the extreme emotional disturbance defense without conducting a “searching inquiry.” The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, represented by counsel, has the right to decide whether to request submission of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to the jury, even when counsel advises against it.

    Holding

    Yes, because the decision of whether to request submission of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance rests with the defendant, as it concerns a fundamental decision regarding the case that impacts the potential verdict and the defendant’s fate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a defendant retains the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding their case, even when represented by counsel. These decisions include whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify on their own behalf, or take an appeal. The court analogized the decision of whether to submit the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to these fundamental decisions, emphasizing its potential impact on the verdict.
    The court noted that the defendant’s decision was not simply a matter of trial strategy or tactics. Rather, the defendant perceived that charging the jury on both murder and manslaughter provided two opportunities for the jury to convict, and he calculated that eliminating consideration of manslaughter increased his chance for an acquittal. The court found that the trial court was under no obligation to conduct a “searching inquiry” because the defendant was not forfeiting his Sixth Amendment right. The trial court’s inquiry was sufficient to establish that the defendant understood the nature of his request to limit the charges submitted to the jury. The court stated, “Manifestly, a verdict is dispositive of a defendant’s fate and, as this defendant recognized, the submission of the extreme emotional disturbance defense to the jury could indeed be determinative of the verdict.”
    The court cited Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, noting that a defendant retains ultimate authority over certain fundamental decisions. The court concluded that the defendant could not later complain that his miscalculation translated into a forced relinquishment of his right to counsel, especially since counsel repeatedly voiced disagreement and continued to actively represent the defendant throughout the trial. The court referenced People v. Cabassa, 79 N.Y.2d 722, 730-731, highlighting that no “searching inquiry” was required under these circumstances. Ultimately, because the defendant understood the ramifications of his request, the trial court properly acceded to it.