New York Law Review

Tag: Right to Counsel

  • People v. Monahan, 17 N.Y.2d 310 (1966): Right to Counsel at Coram Nobis Hearing

    People v. Monahan, 17 N.Y.2d 310 (1966)

    An indigent defendant has the right to assigned counsel at a coram nobis hearing when challenging a prior conviction used to enhance a subsequent sentence.

    Summary

    Monahan appealed a decision denying his request for assigned counsel at a coram nobis hearing. He sought to challenge a 1945 misdemeanor conviction, arguing he wasn’t advised of his right to counsel at the time, which was now being used to enhance his current felony sentence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that an indigent defendant is entitled to assigned counsel at a coram nobis hearing when challenging a prior conviction. The court reasoned that denying counsel in such circumstances would invidiously discriminate between the rich and the poor, undermining the integrity of the judicial process.

    Facts

    In 1945, Monahan was convicted of a misdemeanor for fraudulently secreting personal property. Subsequently, he was convicted of two felonies and incarcerated as a second felony offender. In 1963, Monahan petitioned for a writ of error coram nobis, alleging that in 1945, he had not been advised of his right to counsel as required by Section 699 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. His request for assigned counsel at the coram nobis hearing was denied.

    Procedural History

    The City Court of Rome initially denied Monahan’s petition without a hearing. The Oneida County Court reversed and remanded for a hearing. The City Court then dismissed the writ after a hearing where Monahan’s request for counsel was denied. The County Court affirmed, but acknowledged the potential merit of Monahan’s claim. Upon rehearing, Monahan argued pro se, but the County Court adhered to its original decision. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indigent defendant is entitled to have counsel assigned to represent him, upon request, at a coram nobis hearing in a Court of Special Sessions.

    Holding

    Yes, because denying counsel to an indigent defendant at a coram nobis hearing, especially when challenging a prior conviction used to enhance a subsequent sentence, constitutes invidious discrimination and undermines the principle that a state cannot discriminate between the rich and poor in affording remedies to attack criminal convictions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principles established in People v. Witenski (15 N.Y.2d 392), which affirmed the right to counsel for misdemeanor charges, and People v. Hughes (15 N.Y.2d 172), which recognized the right to assigned counsel on a coram nobis appeal. The court emphasized that the power to assign counsel to an indigent defendant is inherent. The court cited People v. Shipman (62 Cal. 2d 226, 231) stating that “it is now settled that whenever a state affords a direct or collateral remedy to attack a criminal conviction, it cannot invidiously discriminate between rich and poor.” The court distinguished cases like People v. Dash, People v. Nicholson and People v. Rogers, where the defendants were represented by counsel at the time pleas were entered, precluding subsequent resort to coram nobis. Here, the core issue was whether Monahan was properly advised of his right to counsel during the initial misdemeanor charge. The court concluded that the City Court Judge of Rome was incorrect in stating that a Judge sitting at a Court of Special Sessions is without power to assign counsel. The right to be represented by counsel extends to Special Sessions courts, as stated in People v. Witenski. Therefore, denying Monahan counsel at the coram nobis hearing was a violation of his rights. The court emphasized the practical impact: if a prior conviction obtained without proper advisement of rights is used to enhance a subsequent sentence, the defendant has a right to challenge the validity of that prior conviction with the assistance of counsel.

  • People v. Kohler, 218 N.E.2d 310 (N.Y. 1966): Right to Counsel in Traffic Infraction Cases

    People v. Kohler, 18 N.Y.2d 310, 218 N.E.2d 310, 274 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1966)

    Neither the New York State nor the Federal Constitution requires a court hearing a traffic infraction case to advise the defendant of the right to counsel.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether defendants charged with traffic infractions must be advised of their right to counsel. The court held that neither statutory nor constitutional law mandates such advisement in traffic cases. The court reasoned that traffic infractions are minor transgressions distinct from crimes, historically subject to summary disposition. Requiring counsel in all traffic cases would be impractical and overwhelm the legal system. The court emphasized that the defendant is entitled to a fair forum but not necessarily the right to assigned counsel. Therefore, the court upheld the conviction of Letterio and reversed the reversal in Kohler, reinstating the original conviction.

    Facts

    Two defendants, Kohler and Letterio, were convicted of traffic violations in the Criminal Court of the City of New York. Both appealed, arguing their convictions should be overturned because the court did not advise them of their right to counsel, only inquiring if they were ready to proceed without counsel.

    Procedural History

    In People v. Kohler, the Appellate Term reversed the conviction, with one Justice dissenting, holding that a defendant in a traffic case must be advised of their right to counsel. In People v. Letterio, the Appellate Term affirmed the conviction but modified the sentence. The People appealed the Kohler decision, and the Letterio decision was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which consolidated the appeals to address the common legal question.

    Issue(s)

    Whether there is a statutory or constitutional requirement that a defendant charged with a traffic infraction be apprised of the right to counsel and to an assignment of counsel.

    Holding

    No, because neither statutory nor constitutional law mandates that a court hearing a traffic infraction case advise the defendant of the right to counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found no statutory requirement to advise defendants of their right to counsel in traffic infraction cases. Section 41 of the New York City Criminal Court Act does not overrule the precedent set in People v. Felberbaum, which held that the Magistrates’ Court was not required to advise individuals charged with traffic infractions of their right to counsel. The court noted that the purpose of the Criminal Court Act was merely to merge existing courts. Furthermore, the legislature expressly excluded those charged with traffic infractions from the provisions of article 18-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides counsel to indigent defendants.

    The court also found no constitutional mandate requiring such advisement. The court acknowledged the right to counsel but distinguished traffic infractions as petty offenses. The court stated, “While some may say that the right to counsel extends to all crimes, we say that neither our State nor the Federal Constitution requires the court having jurisdiction of a petty offense, like a traffic infraction, so to advise the defendant.”

    The court emphasized the historical treatment of traffic infractions as distinct from crimes, citing Penal Law § 2 and Vehicle and Traffic Law § 155. The court reasoned that traffic courts need only ensure a fair forum. The court also highlighted the practical implications of assigning counsel in all traffic cases, which would be overwhelming. As the court noted, assigning counsel in just 1% of traffic cases could require the services of nearly half the attorneys in the state.

    The court concluded that the defendants were not treated unfairly and that the traffic court judge often operates in a “triune function” as prosecutor, defense counsel, and Judge.

  • People v. Bodie, 16 N.Y.2d 275 (1965): Validity of Waiving Counsel After Information Filed

    People v. Bodie, 16 N.Y.2d 275 (1965)

    A defendant in police custody, against whom an information has been filed and an arrest warrant issued, may waive their right to counsel, making subsequent inculpatory statements admissible, provided the waiver is knowing and voluntary.

    Summary

    The case concerns the admissibility of an incriminating statement made by Bodie while in police custody after an information had been filed and an arrest warrant issued, but without counsel present. Bodie was convicted of selling heroin. He argued that the statement should be inadmissible because it was made after formal charges were filed. The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant can waive their right to counsel, even after the filing of an information, provided the waiver is knowing and voluntary. The Court found Bodie’s waiver valid, considering his prior experience with the law and affirmation that he did not want an attorney.

    Facts

    George Bermudez, an undercover officer, purchased heroin from Bodie. Bermudez then signed a criminal information charging Bodie with selling narcotics, and an arrest warrant was issued. Bodie was arrested and taken to a police barracks. Before interrogation, Bodie was asked if he wanted counsel, to which he replied, “No.” Bodie then signed a statement admitting to selling heroin to Bermudez. Bodie had a prior conviction for possession of a hypodermic needle. This previous experience with the law was used to assess his understanding of his rights.

    Procedural History

    Bodie was convicted in the trial court, where his incriminating statement was admitted into evidence after a Huntley hearing determined it was voluntary. Bodie appealed, arguing the statement was inadmissible because it was taken without counsel after an information had been filed. An earlier conviction was reversed on unrelated grounds. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant, who is in police custody after an information has been filed and an arrest warrant issued, may waive their right to counsel.

    2. Whether Bodie validly waived his right to counsel in this case.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the right to counsel includes the right to refuse counsel.

    2. Yes, because considering Bodie’s prior experience with the law, his negative response to being asked if he wanted counsel demonstrated a knowing and voluntary waiver.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while a post-information statement made in the absence of counsel would typically be inadmissible, the right to counsel also includes the right to refuse counsel. The critical issue was whether the police were capable of advising Bodie of his rights, which the court affirmed, dismissing the need for a complex ritual. The Court distinguished its holding from cases requiring police to inform defendants of their rights, noting that New York does not impose such a requirement. The Court emphasized the importance of determining whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary. The Court considered Bodie’s prior conviction as probative of his understanding of his rights when he declined counsel. The court stated, “On the issue of waiver, this court may consider the defendant’s previous experience with the law…as probative of what he understood the question ‘do you care for counsel’ to mean.” Because Bodie understood his rights and affirmatively waived them, the statement was admissible. The court stated that “if the authorities do advise him of said right, it may be waived…and…this defendant did waive that right.”

  • People v. Friedlander, 16 N.Y.2d 242 (1965): Admissibility of Statements Made Outside Counsel’s Presence

    16 N.Y.2d 242 (1965)

    Once a suspect has retained counsel and that counsel has requested arraignment, any statements elicited from the suspect in the absence of counsel are inadmissible, even if the suspect has not been formally arraigned.

    Summary

    Friedlander was arrested, and her attorney requested that she be arraigned. The police did not arraign her but instead interrogated her without her attorney present, eliciting incriminating statements. The New York Court of Appeals held that these statements were inadmissible. The court reasoned that once a suspect is represented by counsel, and the authorities are aware of this representation, they cannot interrogate the suspect in the absence of counsel after counsel has requested arraignment. This rule protects the defendant’s right to counsel, ensuring that any waiver of this right is made knowingly and intelligently.

    Facts

    On January 3, 1962, police searched the business premises of Tele-A-Flash, Inc., and Friedlander’s apartment pursuant to a valid warrant, seizing documentary evidence related to alleged bookmaking activities.

    Friedlander was taken to the District Attorney’s office for questioning.

    Later that evening, Friedlander’s attorney arrived and consulted with her privately for over half an hour.

    After the consultation, the attorney requested the officer to arrest and arraign Friedlander, but the officer did not respond.

    The attorney then left the District Attorney’s office.

    At approximately 1:00 a.m., the same officer interrogated Friedlander in the absence of her counsel, during which she admitted ownership of some of the seized material.

    Friedlander was not warned of her right to counsel or her right to remain silent.

    Procedural History

    The trial court admitted Friedlander’s inculpatory admissions into evidence over her attorney’s objection.

    Friedlander was convicted. She appealed.

    The appellate division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether inculpatory admissions obtained from a defendant after her attorney has requested arraignment, but before the arraignment occurs and in the absence of her attorney, are admissible in evidence.

    Holding

    No, because the authorities, knowing the defendant was represented by counsel who had requested them to arrest and arraign his client, nonetheless, after counsel left, took occasion to elicit damaging admissions from her.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the fundamental right to counsel, citing Escobedo v. Illinois and People v. Donovan.

    The court stated that statements obtained after arraignment not in the presence of counsel are inadmissible, as are statements obtained where access to counsel has been denied, citing People v. Meyer, People v. Failla, and People v. Sanchez.

    The court extended this principle to situations where counsel cannot obtain access due to physical circumstances, as in People v. Gunner.

    The court reasoned that the police, knowing Friedlander was represented by counsel who had requested her arraignment, improperly elicited damaging admissions from her after her counsel had left.

    The court distinguished this situation from permissible investigatory conduct, emphasizing that the focus shifted once counsel was retained and had requested arraignment. The court highlighted the importance of protecting the attorney-client relationship and preventing the state from undermining it through interrogation in the attorney’s absence.

    The court concluded that while the search warrants were properly issued and executed, the admission of Friedlander’s statements was prejudicial error, warranting a new trial.

  • People v. Nicholson, 16 N.Y.2d 414 (1965): Retroactive Application of Right to Counsel

    16 N.Y.2d 414 (1965)

    A decision regarding right to counsel is not to be accorded retroactive effect.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the principles established in *Jackson v. Denno* and *People v. Huntley*, regarding the voluntariness of confessions, and *People v. Howard* regarding the right to counsel, should be applied retroactively. The court held that its prior decision in *People v. Nicholson* remains valid and that defendants are not automatically entitled to a hearing on the voluntariness of their confessions based on *Jackson v. Denno* or *Huntley*. Furthermore, it affirmed its stance that decisions concerning the right to counsel, as articulated in *People v. Howard*, are not to be applied retroactively.

    Facts

    The defendant sought a hearing before the trial court to challenge the voluntariness of his confession, relying on the principles established in *Jackson v. Denno* and *People v. Huntley*. Additionally, he argued for the retroactive application of decisions concerning the right to counsel, based on *People v. Howard*. The defendant also asserted that his guilty plea was induced by coercion, thus presenting a triable issue.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after lower courts denied the defendant’s request for a hearing on the voluntariness of his confession and the retroactive application of right-to-counsel decisions. The Court of Appeals reviewed these decisions to determine if a hearing was warranted and if previous rulings should be overturned or modified.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the principles established in *Jackson v. Denno* and *People v. Huntley* require the court to overrule its decision in *People v. Nicholson*, thus entitling the defendant to a hearing on the voluntariness of his confession.
    2. Whether the decision in *People v. Howard* regarding the right to counsel should be applied retroactively.

    Holding

    1. No, because the court approved the holding and reasoning in *People v. Nicholson*, finding no basis to overrule it based on *Jackson v. Denno* or *People v. Huntley*.
    2. No, because no argument had been presented to warrant any change or modification of the conclusion in *People v. Howard* that retroactive effect is not to be accorded to decisions of the court respecting right to counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reaffirmed its prior holding in *People v. Nicholson*, stating that nothing in *Jackson v. Denno* or *People v. Huntley* required it to overrule that decision. The court emphasized its approval of the holding and reasoning in *Nicholson*. Regarding the retroactive application of right to counsel decisions, the court maintained its position, as stated in *People v. Howard*, that such decisions are not to be applied retroactively. The court found no compelling arguments to justify altering this stance. The court also concluded that the defendant failed to present a triable issue on the question of coercion. The dissenting judges believed the petition raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the guilty plea was induced by coercion, citing *People v. Picciotti*, *People v. Pearson*, *People v. Lake*, and *People v. Zilliner*.

  • People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392 (1965): Duty to Inform Defendant of Right to Assigned Counsel

    People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392 (1965)

    In courts of special sessions, defendants must be informed of their right to assigned counsel if they cannot afford an attorney; a mere statement of the right to counsel and an offer to send a message to an attorney the defendant names is insufficient.

    Summary

    Three underage defendants were arrested for stealing apples and brought before a Justice of the Peace without legal representation. After being informed of their right to counsel but not of the possibility of assigned counsel if they could not afford one, they pleaded guilty and were sentenced to imprisonment. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the defendants did not effectively waive their right to counsel because they were not informed of their right to assigned counsel. The court emphasized that merely informing defendants of their right to counsel and offering to contact an attorney they name does not constitute a sufficient waiver, especially for indigent defendants. This case highlights the necessity of ensuring that defendants understand their right to assigned counsel, especially in minor criminal cases.

    Facts

    Three defendants, all under 21, were caught stealing apples from an orchard around 10:30 p.m.
    The orchard owner filed an information stating the stolen apples were worth about $2.
    Shortly after midnight, the defendants were brought before a Justice of the Peace.
    None of the defendants were represented by an attorney.
    They pleaded guilty after a brief proceeding.
    None of them had prior convictions.
    Each was sentenced to 30 days imprisonment and a $25 fine, resulting in 55 days imprisonment due to inability to pay the fine.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were initially convicted in the Justice of the Peace Court.
    They appealed to the County Court, arguing they were deprived of their right to counsel.
    The County Court rejected their arguments except for the excessiveness of the sentence.
    The County Court modified the judgments, reducing the imprisonment to time already served (about 7 days).
    The defendants then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendants, in the proceedings before the Justice of the Peace, were deprived of their constitutional and statutory right to counsel, particularly given the lack of explicit information about their right to assigned counsel if indigent.

    Holding

    Yes, because the court failed to adequately inform the defendants of their right to assigned counsel if they could not afford an attorney, rendering their waiver of counsel ineffective. The court’s statement about the right to counsel and sending a message to a lawyer they name did not adequately inform them of the possibility of court-assigned counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the fundamental right to counsel, particularly for indigent defendants, referencing Gideon v. Wainwright. It stated that simply informing a defendant of their right to counsel and offering to send a message to an attorney they name does not constitute an effective waiver, especially for young, inexperienced defendants. The court highlighted that the Justice of the Peace did not inform the defendants that the court would assign an attorney if they could not afford one. The court cited People v. Marincic, emphasizing that the opportunity to have counsel must be real and reasonable, not a mere “formulistic recital of ‘law language.’” The court also noted the historical basis for the right to assigned counsel in New York, even before statutory codification. The court approved of the ruling in People v. Brantle, which emphasized that the proffer of aid of counsel “should be made in clear and unequivocal terms.” The court rejected the argument that the applicable statute for Courts of Special Sessions (Code Crim. Pro., § 699) does not require informing a defendant of the right to assigned counsel, stating that there is little real difference between § 699 and § 308 (which explicitly requires asking about and assigning counsel on indictment). The court dismissed concerns about the impracticality of assigning counsel in Special Sessions Courts, noting the large number of attorneys in the state. The decision underscored that a waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, which requires informing defendants of their right to assigned counsel if they cannot afford one. The court reasoned that without informing defendants of the right to assigned counsel, any waiver is likely not intelligent, especially when dealing with young, unexperienced defendants in a stressful situation.

  • People v. Sanchez, 15 N.Y.2d 387 (1965): Right to Counsel After Attorney Contact

    People v. Sanchez, 15 N.Y.2d 387 (1965)

    Once an attorney has contacted the police on behalf of a suspect in custody, any subsequent statements made by the suspect during interrogation in the absence of counsel are inadmissible, regardless of whether the suspect was formally considered an “accused,” “suspect,” or “witness.”

    Summary

    Sanchez was convicted of first-degree murder, and the central issue was the admissibility of his statements to law enforcement. Prior to the interrogation, Sanchez’s attorney contacted the police, requesting to see and speak with his client. The police subsequently interrogated Sanchez without his counsel present, leading to incriminating statements. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the statements should have been excluded because they were obtained after Sanchez’s attorney had contacted the police on his behalf. The court emphasized that the critical factor is the attorney’s contact, not the suspect’s formal status or the voluntariness of the statements. The court ordered a new trial where these statements would be inadmissible.

    Facts

    Sanchez was in police custody. His attorney, who had been previously retained, contacted the police by phone and in person on July 5, 1963, around 5:00 p.m. The attorney informed the police that he wished to see and speak with Sanchez. Despite the attorney’s communication, the police interrogated Sanchez. During this interrogation, conducted without his attorney present, Sanchez made inculpatory statements to both the police and an assistant district attorney.

    Procedural History

    Sanchez was convicted of first-degree murder in the trial court and sentenced to death. He appealed his conviction to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the statements he made to law enforcement officials should have been excluded from evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of conviction and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements obtained from a suspect in police custody are admissible when the suspect’s attorney has contacted the police requesting to see and speak with the suspect, but the interrogation proceeds without the attorney present?

    Holding

    No, because once an attorney has contacted the police on behalf of a suspect, any subsequent statements made during interrogation in the absence of counsel are inadmissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on its prior decisions in People v. Donovan, People v. Failla, and People v. Gunner. The court emphasized that the key fact is that Sanchez incriminated himself while being interrogated by the police without counsel after his attorney had contacted them on his behalf. The court stated, “The significant or operative fact in such cases is that the defendant confessed or otherwise incriminated himself while being interrogated by the police in the absence of counsel after he had requested the aid of an attorney or one retained to represent him had contacted the police in his behalf.” The court rejected the argument that the attorney’s contact was relevant only to the voluntariness of the statements. The trial court’s error in admitting the statements and refusing to instruct the jury to disregard the statements if they found the police denied the attorney access to the defendant was not harmless. The court found no merit in the other arguments raised by the defendant but reversed and ordered a new trial due to the inadmissible statements.

  • People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 226 (1968): Right to Counsel Attaches When Attorney Contacts Police

    People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 293 N.Y.S.2d 155, 239 N.E.2d 895 (1968)

    Once a retained attorney informs the police that they represent a suspect and do not want any statements taken, the police are precluded from questioning the suspect in the absence of counsel, and any statements obtained thereafter are inadmissible.

    Summary

    Arthur was convicted of felony murder. While in custody in California, an attorney retained by Arthur’s parents contacted the Nassau County Police and told them not to take any statements from Arthur. Despite this, the police continued to question Arthur, obtaining several incriminating statements. The New York Court of Appeals held that any statements taken after the attorney contacted the police were inadmissible, even if the attorney was not physically present and did not formally request to see Arthur. The court reasoned that the critical point is whether the police were aware that the suspect had legal representation and that the attorney did not want questioning to proceed.

    Facts

    Arthur was arrested in Los Angeles for a murder committed in Nassau County, New York. The Nassau County police suspected Arthur of shooting a store proprietor with a 12-gauge shotgun on July 16, 1962. Upon arrest, a search of the rented car Arthur used revealed two pistols stolen from the murdered man’s store. Arthur made several incriminating statements to the police both before and after an attorney, Wallace, retained by his parents, contacted the police. Wallace specifically instructed the police not to take any statements from Arthur.

    Procedural History

    Arthur was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding that several pretrial statements were improperly admitted into evidence. The People appealed, arguing that only the statements taken after the attorney was denied access to the defendant should have been excluded. The defendant argued that even more statements should have been excluded.

    Issue(s)

    Whether inculpatory statements made by a suspect to law enforcement officers are admissible when the statements are made after a retained attorney has informed the police that they represent the suspect and do not want any statements taken from him, but before the attorney has had the opportunity to consult with the suspect.

    Holding

    Yes, because once a retained attorney informs the police that they represent a suspect and do not want any statements taken, the police are precluded from questioning the suspect in the absence of counsel, and any statements obtained thereafter are inadmissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that its prior decision in People v. Donovan sought to prohibit the police from questioning a suspect in the absence of counsel after an attorney has been retained to represent them and has informed the police of their retention. The court emphasized that the focus should not be on whether the attorney physically presented themself or requested to consult with the client. Instead, the critical factor is whether the police were aware of the attorney’s representation and their explicit instruction that no statements be taken. The court stated: “As is manifest, our decision in Donovan sought to prohibit the police from questioning a suspect, in the absence of counsel, after an attorney has been retained to represent him and has apprised the police of his retention.”

    The court distinguished the situation from cases where the suspect had not yet retained counsel, even if they were a prime suspect. In those circumstances, the majority held that police were not obligated to advise the suspect of their right to remain silent or their right to a lawyer.

    Chief Judge Fuld and another judge dissented on this point, arguing that the additional statements made after arrest but before the lawyer contacted police should also be excluded.

  • People v. Rozzell, 20 N.Y.2d 712 (1967): Attorney’s Duty When Client Seeks to Withdraw Guilty Plea Based on Disputed Facts

    People v. Rozzell, 20 N.Y.2d 712 (1967)

    An attorney’s representation is compromised when, after a client seeks to withdraw a guilty plea based on claims the attorney disputes, the attorney informs the court that the client understood the proceedings at the time of the plea, thereby taking a position adverse to the client.

    Summary

    Rozzell pleaded guilty to attempted grand larceny, but then sought to withdraw his plea, claiming he was under the influence of narcotics during the original hearing and didn’t understand the proceedings. His attorney informed the court that Rozzell understood the proceedings when he entered the plea. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s judgment, holding that the attorney’s action compromised Rozzell’s right to counsel because the attorney took a position adverse to his client. The dissent argued that the attorney was faced with a difficult ethical choice and acted reasonably in informing the court of his knowledge of the facts.

    Facts

    Defendant Rozzell, represented by counsel, pleaded guilty to attempted grand larceny in the second degree on May 22, 1963. On July 24, 1963, Rozzell, again represented by the same counsel, appeared for sentencing. At sentencing, Rozzell personally sought to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that he had been under the influence of narcotics at the time of the original hearing and did not understand the proceedings. The trial court summarily denied the application.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Rozzell’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and proceeded with sentencing. Rozzell appealed, arguing that his attorney’s conduct deprived him of his right to counsel. The appellate division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an attorney’s representation of a defendant is unconstitutionally compromised when, after the defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea based on a claim the attorney disputes, the attorney informs the court that the defendant understood the nature of the proceedings at the time the plea was entered.

    Holding

    Yes, because the attorney took a position adverse to his client by essentially testifying against him regarding the validity of the guilty plea.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the attorney’s actions compromised Rozzell’s right to counsel. By informing the court that Rozzell understood the proceedings at the time of the guilty plea, the attorney took a position adverse to his client, who was claiming the opposite. The court reasoned that the attorney’s role is to advocate for the client’s interests, and this duty is breached when the attorney actively undermines the client’s position, especially when the client is attempting to withdraw a guilty plea. The dissent argued that the attorney faced a difficult ethical dilemma and acted reasonably in informing the court of his knowledge. The dissent further contended that the attorney’s conduct occurred after the court’s ruling denying the withdrawal of the plea and had no influence on it.

  • People v. Failla, 14 N.Y.2d 178 (1964): Right to Counsel During Interrogation

    People v. Failla, 14 N.Y.2d 178 (1964)

    A confession obtained from a suspect is inadmissible at trial if police denied the suspect’s attorney access to him during questioning, even if the denial occurred after the interrogation had begun.

    Summary

    Failla was convicted of second-degree murder. His conviction was based, in part, on a confession obtained while he was in police custody. An attorney, retained by Failla’s father, attempted to see Failla during the interrogation but was denied access by the police. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the denial of access to counsel rendered the confession inadmissible. The court reasoned that fragmenting a confession into admissible and inadmissible parts based on when counsel was denied access would create confusion and be unworkable. The Court emphasized the importance of allowing counsel access to the accused upon proper identification to ensure fairness and protect the accused’s rights.

    Facts

    On October 7, 1960, Failla was arrested around 1:00 a.m. and taken to a hospital for a gastric lavage based on a report that he had ingested sleeping pills. After the procedure, while in police custody at Westchester County Parkway Police Headquarters, an Assistant District Attorney began taking a statement from Failla at 2:58 a.m., continuing until 4:45 a.m., with a brief interruption. The statement was described as a complete and voluntary confession to the murder of Kathryn Levy. Additional statements were taken at the crime scene at 7:00 a.m. and in a tape-recorded session at 8:00 a.m. Failla was arraigned at 10:00 a.m. the same morning. An attorney, contacted by Failla’s father, arrived at Troop K State Police Barracks (near the Parkway Police Headquarters) around 3:00 a.m. but was initially told he could not see Failla. Upon arriving at the Parkway Police Headquarters between 3:15 and 3:30 a.m., the attorney identified himself and requested to see Failla, but was refused.

    Procedural History

    Failla was convicted of second-degree murder in Westchester County Court. He appealed the conviction, arguing that the confession used against him was inadmissible because his attorney was denied access to him during questioning. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a confession is admissible when police deny an attorney access to the accused during questioning, even if the denial occurs after the interrogation has commenced but before its completion?

    Holding

    No, because interfering with the right to counsel violates the principles established in People v. Donovan, and fragmenting a confession based on the timing of the denial of access is impractical and creates uncertainty.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the case fell under the rule established in People v. Donovan, which held that a confession taken after counsel had been denied access to the accused is inadmissible. The Court rejected the prosecution’s argument that the confession should be admissible because it had substantially progressed before the attorney was denied access. The Court stated, “If there had been an interference with the right to counsel within the Donovan rule, it would be wholly impracticable to dissect a confession into parts to be deemed admissible before counsel arrived and was refused access to the accused, and parts to be deemed inadmissible after he arrived.” This fragmentation would lead to confusion in police investigations and uncertainty in the admissibility of evidence. Instead, the Court proposed a “pragmatic and much simpler test” of invariably admitting the lawyer to see his client upon proper identification. The Court emphasized that denying access to counsel after a confession has begun taints the entire process, rendering the confession inadmissible. The Court noted that a reasonable practice for attorneys would be to request a police blotter entry of their appearance to confer with an accused, and for police officials to make such entries to avoid uncertainty.