New York Law Review

Tag: Right to Counsel

  • People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d 155 (1970): Waiver of Counsel After Indictment

    People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d 155 (1970)

    A defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive their right to counsel after indictment, provided the waiver is voluntary and informed.

    Summary

    The defendant, indicted for murder, was arrested by federal officers and gave a statement after waiving his rights to counsel and to remain silent. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether this waiver was valid given the indictment, considering prior case law that generally prohibited questioning an indicted defendant without counsel. The court held that a defendant can waive their right to counsel post-indictment, provided the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court found that the waiver was valid in this case and affirmed the conviction.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted in New York County for murder. Federal officers arrested him on a warrant. Before questioning, the officers advised the defendant of his rights to counsel and to remain silent, informing him that any statements could be used against him. The defendant signed a written waiver of these rights.

    Procedural History

    The trial court held a hearing and found that the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intelligently understood the warnings and knowingly waived his constitutional rights. The defendant appealed, arguing the waiver was invalid due to the prior indictment. The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, already indicted for a crime, can validly waive their right to counsel and make admissible statements to law enforcement officers in the absence of counsel.

    Holding

    Yes, because the right to counsel can be knowingly and intelligently waived, even after indictment, provided the waiver is voluntary and informed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished this case from precedent (e.g., People v. Waterman) that generally prohibits questioning an indicted defendant without counsel present. The Court emphasized that those cases did not address whether the right to counsel could be knowingly and intelligently waived. The Court relied on People v. Bodie, which held that no valid distinction exists between post-indictment and post-information statements regarding the waiver of counsel. The critical point is that the waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court noted there was no evidence of willful concealment or misrepresentation regarding the indictment to undermine the validity of the waiver. The court reasoned that being indicted does not change the importance of the right to counsel. As stated in the opinion, “no prejudice is shown. Defendant certainly knew he was being prosecuted for the murder because he was taken into custody. Whether the prosecution had started with an arrest on probable cause, or on an information, or on an indictment, it was certain to go forward and the right to counsel was just as important to a defendant thus arrested whether of not he had been indicted as far as waiver on interrogation was concerned.”

  • People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 27 N.Y.2d 376 (1971): Right to Counsel at Parole Revocation Hearings

    People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 27 N.Y.2d 376 (1971)

    Due process under the New York State Constitution requires that a parolee be represented by counsel at parole revocation hearings, as the outcome of the hearing directly impacts the individual’s liberty.

    Summary

    Menechino, imprisoned for murder, had his parole revoked for technical violations: associating with ex-convicts and providing false information to his parole supervisor. He was not represented by counsel at the revocation hearing. The New York Court of Appeals held that parolees are constitutionally entitled to counsel at revocation hearings. The court reasoned that a parole revocation hearing is an accusatory proceeding where the parolee’s liberty is at stake, necessitating the assistance of counsel to ensure a fair determination of the facts. This right is grounded in due process, guaranteeing a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

    Facts

    In 1947, Menechino was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 20 years to life. He was paroled in 1963 after serving 16 years.
    In December 1964, he was declared delinquent for violating parole conditions.
    In March 1965, he was taken into custody.
    In April 1965, a parole revocation hearing was held where he was charged with associating with individuals having a criminal record and giving false information to his parole supervisor.
    Menechino, without counsel, admitted to the charges.
    His parole was revoked, and he was barred from reconsideration for at least two years.

    Procedural History

    Menechino initiated an Article 78 proceeding challenging the denial of his right to counsel and other procedural safeguards at the revocation hearing; it was dismissed as untimely.
    He then filed a habeas corpus proceeding in Dutchess County, arguing deprivation of due process rights at the revocation hearing.
    Special Term dismissed the writ.
    Menechino appealed directly to the New York Court of Appeals on constitutional grounds.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a parolee is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at a parole revocation hearing under the New York State Constitution.

    Holding

    Yes, because a parole revocation hearing involves the right of an individual to continue at liberty or be imprisoned, which falls within the due process provision of the New York State Constitution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found the principle in Mempa v. Rhay sufficiently broad to encompass parole revocation, stating that, “the necessity for the aid of counsel in marshaling the facts, introducing evidence of mitigating circumstances and in general aiding and assisting the defendant to present his case * * * is apparent.”
    The court emphasized that a parole revocation hearing is an accusatory proceeding where the parolee’s liberty is at stake, requiring a factual determination regarding alleged misconduct.
    “When all the legal niceties are laid aside a proceeding to revoke parole involves the right of an individual to continue at liberty or to be imprisoned. It involves a deprivation of liberty just as much as did the original criminal action and * * * falls within the due process provision of section 6 of article I of our State Constitution.”
    The court rejected the argument that parole is a mere privilege, asserting that once a state undertakes proceedings affecting liberty, it must do so consistently with constitutional privileges.
    The court highlighted the importance of counsel in ensuring a fair and accurate factual presentation, particularly in refuting ambiguous charges.
    The court found that the right to be heard would be “of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”
    The court determined that Menechino’s failure to request counsel at the hearing did not constitute a waiver of his right to counsel because he was not advised of that right.
    The court stated that requiring obedience to the demands of due process and granting parolees a hearing at which they will be represented by counsel will further the purpose of the parole system, which is to rehabilitate convicted criminals, by creating a belief in a fair and objective parole procedure.

  • People v. Taylor, 27 N.Y.2d 327 (1971): Admissibility of Statements on Unrelated Charges When Counsel Assigned on Prior Charge

    People v. Taylor, 27 N.Y.2d 327 (1971)

    Incriminating statements about an unrelated crime are admissible, even if the defendant has counsel assigned for a different charge, as long as the defendant waives their Miranda rights and counsel has not entered the proceeding for the specific crime under investigation.

    Summary

    Ronald and Curtis Taylor were convicted of murder based on incriminating statements they made to the police. Prior to making these statements, they had been assigned counsel for an unrelated robbery charge. The trial court initially suppressed the statements, but the Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the statements were admissible because the right to counsel had not attached for the murder charge, as it was unrelated to the robbery charge for which they already had counsel. The court emphasized that the police had advised the Taylors of their Miranda rights, which they waived. The court distinguished this case from situations where the prior charge was a pretext or sham to hold the defendant for questioning on the new charge.

    Facts

    Bernhard West was killed during a street assault and robbery on March 22, 1968. Detective Russo learned on April 10, 1968, that Ronald and Curtis Taylor, along with Gail White, had been arrested for a robbery with a similar modus operandi. On April 11, Russo interviewed White, who implicated herself and the Taylors in the West murder, after advising her of her Miranda rights. On April 16, the Taylors were taken to the District Attorney’s office, advised of their rights, and signed a waiver form. They then gave detailed incriminating statements about the West murder.

    Procedural History

    The Taylors were indicted for the murder of Bernhard West. A pretrial Huntley hearing was held to determine the admissibility of their statements. The trial court suppressed the statements based on People v. Vella, because the Taylors had been assigned counsel on an unrelated robbery charge. The People appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed, relying on People v. Stanley. The case reached the New York Court of Appeals on a certificate issued by an Associate Judge.

    Issue(s)

    Whether incriminating statements made by defendants, who had been assigned counsel on an unrelated charge but waived their Miranda rights before making the statements, are admissible in a trial for a different crime.

    Holding

    Yes, because the assignment of counsel on an unrelated charge does not automatically bar police from questioning the defendants about a different crime, provided the defendants waive their Miranda rights and counsel has not entered the proceedings for the specific charges under investigation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on People v. Stanley, which held that questioning an accused about unrelated crimes is permissible even after arraignment or indictment on another charge. The court distinguished this case from People v. Vella, where the charges in both counties were related, and the first arraignment was essentially a pretext for questioning on the second charge. In this case, the robbery charge was not a sham, and the interrogation about the West murder occurred nearly a week after the arraignment on the robbery charge. The court emphasized that the Taylors had waived their Miranda rights and that no attorney had entered the proceeding specifically for the murder charge. The court stated, “Quite obviously, the fact that the defendant may have been represented in the past by an attorney in some unrelated case is, for present purposes, beside the point.” The critical factor is whether the police knew that an attorney had entered the proceedings for the charges under investigation. The court reasoned that extending the Donovan-Vella-Arthur rule to cover any situation where a defendant has had an attorney in any unrelated proceeding would be overly broad. The court concluded, “Thus, the thrust of our prior decisions is that once the police learn that an attorney has entered the proceeding, it is offensive to our system of justice, in the absence of a waiver, to permit further questioning by representatives of the People. Implicit in this rationale is the concept that the rule does not obtain unless and until the police or prosecutor learn that an attorney has been secured to assist the accused in defending against the specific charges for which he is held.“

  • People v. Fuller, 24 N.Y.2d 244 (1969): Admissibility of Confession and Joinder of Offenses

    People v. Fuller, 24 N.Y.2d 244 (1969)

    A defendant’s confession is admissible if the defendant has not retained counsel, does not desire counsel at the time of questioning, and multiple charges of similar character may be joined in a single indictment and trial.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree for the homicide of Richard Fuller and in the second degree for the homicide of Catherine Herrell. The defendant argued his confession was involuntary because police continued questioning him after he mentioned having an attorney, and that it was improper to charge him with two separate murders in a single indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant had not retained counsel for the current case, and he did not desire counsel during questioning. The court also held that Section 279 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the joinder of similar offenses in a single indictment and trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with two counts of murder for killing Catherine Herrell and Richard Fuller. The defendant made statements to the police and the district attorney. The defendant told a police officer that he “had” a lawyer who had represented him “down South in another case”, but clarified that he did not wish to speak to that lawyer and would seek an attorney if needed when he went to court.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree for Fuller’s homicide and in the second degree for Mrs. Herrell’s homicide. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing his confession was involuntary and the joinder of offenses was improper.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s confession was involuntary and should not have been admitted into evidence because police continued questioning him after he mentioned having an attorney.
    2. Whether the defendant was improperly charged in a single indictment and tried in a single trial for two separate murders.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant had not retained an attorney for the current case, did not express a desire to speak with the attorney he had from a previous case, and indicated he would seek counsel when he went to court.
    2. No, because Section 279 of the Code of Criminal Procedure explicitly provides that a defendant may be indicted for “two or more acts…constituting crimes of the same or a similar character”.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that further questioning of an accused in the absence of counsel is proscribed only after the police learn that an attorney has entered the proceeding in connection with the charges under investigation. Since the defendant did not have an attorney representing him in this case, or desire one at that time, there was no violation of his right to counsel.

    Regarding the joinder of offenses, the Court cited Section 279 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which explicitly allows for the joinder of similar offenses in a single indictment and trial. The Court referenced precedent such as People ex rel. Pincus v. Adams, 274 N.Y. 447 (1937), which upheld the constitutionality of this practice. The court stated, “There is nothing unique about a statute which provides that a person may be tried in a single trial for a number of crimes of a similar nature”.

    The Court found no merit in the defendant’s arguments and affirmed the judgment of conviction.

  • People v. Steuding, 6 N.Y.2d 556 (1959): Defendant’s Grand Jury Testimony and Right to Counsel

    People v. Steuding, 6 N.Y.2d 556 (1959)

    A defendant’s voluntary decision to testify before a grand jury without notifying counsel, while potentially unwise, does not automatically constitute reversible error unless prejudice is demonstrated.

    Summary

    The defendant, after being arraigned and assigned counsel, requested to testify before the grand jury without his counsel’s knowledge. He testified under waiver of immunity and was subsequently indicted. At trial, his grand jury testimony, which was substantially similar to his trial testimony, was used to impeach him on a minor point. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while the District Attorney should have notified the defendant’s counsel about the grand jury appearance, the defendant’s voluntary action and the lack of demonstrated prejudice meant the conviction should stand. The court emphasized that the Grand Jury serves an investigatory, not prosecutorial, function.

    Facts

    After his arraignment and assignment of counsel, Steuding sent a note to the grand jury asking to testify and “tell his story.”
    His counsel was not informed of this request or the subsequent testimony.
    Steuding testified before the grand jury, waiving immunity.
    He provided testimony denying his guilt.
    Steuding was later indicted.
    At trial, his testimony mirrored what he had said before the grand jury.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted after a jury trial.
    The Court of Appeals reviewed the case, considering the defendant’s claim that his grand jury testimony, taken without his counsel’s knowledge, prejudiced his trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a conviction should be reversed when a defendant testifies before a grand jury without informing their counsel, and the prosecutor fails to notify defense counsel of the defendant’s intention to appear.
    Whether the use of the defendant’s grand jury testimony at trial, to impeach him on a minor inconsistency, constitutes prejudicial error requiring reversal.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant acted voluntarily, and the grand jury is an investigatory body. The prosecutor’s failure to notify defense counsel, though a misstep, did not automatically invalidate the conviction.
    No, because the inconsistency was trivial and did not prejudice the defendant’s case before the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the defendant had a personal right under Section 250(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to appear before the grand jury. While counsel could have advised him, the defendant took the initiative. Quoting People v. Ianniello, the court noted that the grand jury is part of the investigatory process, not the prosecution. The court emphasized that the People did not induce Steuding’s appearance. Therefore, this situation wasn’t considered an improper interference by the prosecutor with the attorney-client relationship.
    The Court emphasized that a conviction should not be reversed unless prejudice resulted. The court found that the only use of the grand jury testimony during trial was a question about a “trivial difference” regarding the timeline of the defendant’s acquaintance with the deceased. The court concluded, “This could have had no prejudicial effect.”
    The court distinguished this scenario from one where the prosecutor actively interferes with the attorney-client relationship. Here, the defendant initiated the contact with the grand jury, minimizing the prosecutorial misconduct. The key factor was the lack of demonstrated prejudice to the defendant’s case.

  • People v. Zabrocky, 26 N.Y.2d 530 (1970): Indigent Defendant’s Right to Suppression Hearing Transcript

    People v. Zabrocky, 26 N.Y.2d 530 (1970)

    An indigent defendant has a constitutional right to a free transcript of a pre-trial suppression hearing for use at trial.

    Summary

    Zabrocky and Harle were convicted of grand larceny. They appealed, arguing the trial court erred in limiting their attack on the complainant’s credibility and denying them a free copy of the suppression hearing transcript. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the denial regarding the credibility attack, holding it was a collateral matter. However, the Court reversed the conviction, holding that denying the indigent defendants a copy of the suppression hearing transcript was reversible error, regardless of whether the transcript would have ultimately been useful.

    Facts

    John Hunter reported to police that Zabrocky and Harle robbed him. Hunter identified them to police officers shortly after the robbery. The police apprehended Zabrocky and Harle and found money and a roll of nickels on Harle matching Hunter’s description of the stolen items. Before trial, Zabrocky and Harle moved to suppress evidence (money), Hunter’s identification, and a statement by Harle. They requested a full transcript of the suppression hearing, claiming indigency and arguing the transcript was needed for cross-examination. The trial court denied this request. At trial, Hunter testified to the robbery and identified Zabrocky and Harle. The defense attempted to introduce evidence that Hunter was fired on the day of the robbery due to a mailroom burglary but was precluded from doing so.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were indicted by a New York County Grand Jury for robbery and grand larceny. Prior to trial, the defendants moved to suppress evidence, identification, and statements, and requested a transcript of the suppression hearing; the motion and request were denied. Following a jury trial, the defendants were acquitted of robbery but convicted of grand larceny in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by limiting the defendant’s ability to attack the credibility of the prosecution’s witness by introducing collateral evidence.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the indigent defendants a free copy of the suppression hearing transcript.

    Holding

    1. No, because the attempted impeachment related to a collateral matter.
    2. Yes, because indigent defendants have a constitutional right to a free transcript of a pre-trial suppression hearing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the trial court properly precluded the attempt to introduce collateral issues to impeach Hunter’s credibility. The Court cited the established rule that cross-examination regarding immoral or criminal acts is collateral, and the cross-examiner is bound by the witness’s answer and cannot introduce extrinsic evidence to contradict it. Regarding the transcript, the Court relied on People v. Montgomery, 18 N.Y.2d 993, and People v. Ballott, 20 N.Y.2d 600, which established an indigent defendant’s right to free transcripts of preliminary hearings and prior trials. The Court extended this right to pre-trial suppression hearings, stating that “The Montgomery-Ballott rules must, as a matter of logic and fairness, also extend to the minutes of pretrial suppression hearings.” The Court explicitly rejected the People’s argument that the denial was harmless error if the transcript would have been of limited use, stating that “the use to which a requested transcript might have been put is irrelevant.” Therefore, the denial of the transcript was reversible error.

  • People v. McKinney, 24 N.Y.2d 474 (1969): Admissibility of Psychiatric Testimony After Secret Examination

    People v. McKinney, 24 N.Y.2d 474 (1969)

    A psychiatric examination of a defendant by a prosecution-retained psychiatrist, conducted without notice to the defendant’s counsel or court permission, violates the defendant’s right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination, rendering the psychiatrist’s testimony inadmissible.

    Summary

    McKinney was convicted of murdering his wife after pleading not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. The prosecution, without informing McKinney’s counsel or obtaining court approval, had him examined by a psychiatrist, Dr. Abrahamsen, who testified that McKinney was faking mental illness. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Dr. Abrahamsen’s testimony was inadmissible because the examination violated McKinney’s right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination. The court also found error in admitting testimony that McKinney had invoked his right to counsel when initially questioned.

    Facts

    Following the murder of his wife, McKinney was arrested and informed officers he would not speak without his lawyer present. He pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. While jailed and awaiting a court-ordered competency evaluation, the District Attorney arranged for Dr. Abrahamsen to examine McKinney’s sanity without notifying McKinney’s attorney or seeking court approval. Dr. Abrahamsen concluded McKinney was malingering and testified to this effect at trial. At trial, a police officer testified that McKinney asserted his right to counsel upon arrest.

    Procedural History

    McKinney was convicted of first-degree murder. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that Dr. Abrahamsen’s testimony was inadmissible and that the admission of testimony regarding McKinney’s invocation of his right to counsel was also erroneous. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a psychiatric examination of a defendant by a prosecution-retained psychiatrist, conducted without notice to the defendant’s counsel or court permission, violates the defendant’s right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination.

    2. Whether it is permissible to present evidence that the defendant invoked his right to counsel as evidence of guilt or to rebut an insanity defense.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because such an examination constitutes a secret interrogation that contravenes the defendant’s constitutional rights.

    2. No, because using the defendant’s assertion of his constitutional right as evidence against him is impermissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel at every stage of the proceeding, especially during interrogation. Citing People v. Waterman, the court emphasized that any secret interrogation after indictment, without counsel, violates basic fairness. While acknowledging the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Baird, which allowed court-ordered psychiatric examinations outside the presence of counsel, the court distinguished the present case. The key difference was that Dr. Abrahamsen’s examination was conducted secretly, without court permission or notice to defense counsel. The court reasoned that this secrecy deprived the defendant of the opportunity to seek a protective order to prevent the disclosure of incriminating information. The court highlighted the inherent dangers of secret examinations, where probing questions, hypnosis, or drugs could be used to extract information without proper safeguards. The court further stated, “In the absence of any notice to counsel or of judicial supervision, a ‘medical examination’ may well develop into precisely the sort of ‘secret interrogation’ which this court decried and found objectionable in People v. Waterman.” Furthermore, the court found it was reversible error to admit testimony that McKinney invoked his right to counsel when questioned, as it created an inference of guilt. The court stated: “To sanction the surreptitious examination of such a defendant, or to allow his insistence upon his constitutional rights to be used against him, would seriously impair the value of those protections.”

  • People v. Paulin, 25 N.Y.2d 447 (1969): Admissibility of Statements and Evidence After Request for Counsel

    People v. Paulin, 25 N.Y.2d 447 (1969)

    Once a suspect in custody requests an attorney, police may not question the suspect in the absence of counsel unless there is an affirmative waiver, in the presence of the attorney, of the right to counsel; evidence obtained in violation of this rule is inadmissible.

    Summary

    Janet Paulin was indicted for the second-degree murder of her husband. Prior to trial, she moved to suppress oral statements and physical evidence. The trial court granted the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Paulin was subjected to custodial interrogation without being properly advised of her rights and after requesting counsel. Statements made during this time, and physical evidence derived from those statements (a cooking pot) or seized as a result of an illegal search (a knife), were deemed inadmissible “fruit” of the initial constitutional violation.

    Facts

    On June 12, 1967, police went to Janet Paulin’s home to investigate the death of her husband, Joseph Paulin. Upon arrival, Lt. Kuzia questioned Paulin for 20 minutes without giving her Miranda warnings, during which time she made several admissions. After being warned, Paulin requested her lawyer, who arranged for his associate to come to the house. Before the lawyer arrived, Capt. Chieco arrived and engaged Paulin in conversation despite knowing her lawyer was en route. Paulin then admitted to striking her husband with a cooking pot, which she pointed out to police. Later, after stab wounds were discovered on the body, Capt. Chieco ordered a search of kitchen utensils, and a stained knife was seized. Paulin was then formally arrested.

    Procedural History

    The County Court of Saratoga County granted Paulin’s motion to suppress her oral statements and the physical evidence (cooking pot and knife). The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the oral statements made by Paulin to Lt. Kuzia before receiving Miranda warnings were admissible, given the claim she was undergoing custodial interrogation at the time.
    2. Whether the statements made to Capt. Chieco were admissible, considering that Paulin had requested counsel and Capt. Chieco initiated conversation with her.
    3. Whether the metal cooking pot was admissible, given that it was located as a result of the statements made to Capt. Chieco.
    4. Whether the kitchen knife was admissible, given that it was seized during a search that preceded Paulin’s formal arrest.

    Holding

    1. Yes, the statements to Lt. Kuzia were inadmissible because the lower courts’ affirmed finding of fact, supported by the record, indicated that she was undergoing custodial interrogation before being advised of her rights.
    2. Yes, the statements to Capt. Chieco were inadmissible because the lower courts found that Capt. Chieco’s conversation constituted a disguised interrogation after Paulin requested counsel, and she did not affirmatively waive her rights.
    3. Yes, the metal cooking pot was inadmissible because it was the direct consequence (fruit) of the inadmissible statements made to Capt. Chieco.
    4. Yes, the kitchen knife was inadmissible because it was seized during a search that preceded Paulin’s formal arrest, rendering it an unlawful search.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals deferred to the affirmed findings of fact by the lower courts. The court noted that the questioning of a suspect in her own home does not automatically constitute custodial interrogation. However, the circumstances in this case—the condition of the body, its placement, and Paulin’s behavior—supported the finding that she was in custody.

    Regarding Capt. Chieco’s actions, the court cited Miranda v. Arizona, stating that if a defendant requests an attorney before speaking to police, they must respect that decision. The court also cited People v. Arthur, which held, “Once an attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not question the defendant in the absence of counsel unless there is an affirmative waiver, in the presence of the attorney, of the defendant’s right to counsel.” Since Capt. Chieco knew Paulin’s lawyer was on the way and she had not waived her right to counsel, the interrogation was impermissible.

    Because the cooking pot was discovered as a result of the inadmissible statements to Capt. Chieco, it was deemed inadmissible as “fruit” of the poisonous tree. The knife was inadmissible because the search that yielded it preceded Paulin’s arrest, and was not a valid search incident to arrest.

  • People v. Emmett, 25 N.Y.2d 355 (1969): Right to Counsel on Appeal Includes Opportunity to Submit Brief

    People v. Emmett, 25 N.Y.2d 355 (1969)

    A defendant’s right to counsel on appeal includes the right for that counsel to have an opportunity to prepare and submit a brief on the merits of the case.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of issuing a bad check. On appeal to the Appellate Term, the defendant argued insufficient evidence and lack of intelligent waiver of counsel/jury trial. The Appellate Term remitted the case for a hearing on waiver. After a finding of valid waiver and before defense counsel received the hearing minutes, the Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. Counsel’s motion for reargument and leave to file a brief was denied. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that denying counsel the opportunity to submit a brief negates the effective appeal to which a defendant is entitled. The Court emphasized the importance of single-minded advocacy by appellate counsel.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted in District Court of issuing a worthless check for $51 and sentenced to 10 days in jail (execution suspended). The defendant was not represented by counsel at trial but had Legal Aid counsel for the appeal.

    Procedural History

    The District Court found the defendant guilty. On appeal, the Appellate Term remitted the case for a hearing on whether the defendant knowingly waived his rights. The District Court found that he had. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction before defense counsel received the hearing minutes. The Appellate Term denied the defendant’s motion for reargument and leave to file a brief. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s affirmance and remitted the case to that court for reargument.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant is deprived of the right to appeal when the Appellate Term decides against him without allowing his attorney an opportunity to prepare and submit a brief.

    Holding

    Yes, because implicit in the right to appeal and to have counsel on that appeal is the right for such counsel to be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to submit a brief on the merits of the case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that denying a defendant’s lawyer on appeal any opportunity to see or read the record and present arguments negates the effective appeal to which a defendant is entitled. “Implicit in the right of a defendant to appeal (see People v. Borum, 8 Y 2d 177) and to have counsel on that appeal (see People v. Hughes, 15 Y 2d 172; Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353) is his right that such counsel be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to submit a brief on the merits of the case.” The Court also noted that there is no substitute for the single-minded advocacy of appellate counsel, who may advance contentions that judges of busy appellate courts might otherwise miss. An appellate court must afford a defendant’s lawyer the opportunity to present arguments, point out alleged errors, and call attention to asserted questions of law. “There is no substitute for the single-minded advocacy of appellate counsel. Experience has demonstrated that they not infrequently advance contentions which might otherwise escape the attention of judges of busy appellate courts, no matter how conscientiously and carefully those judges read the records before them.”

  • People v. Kaye, 25 N.Y.2d 139 (1969): Admissibility of Spontaneous Statements When Defendant is Represented

    People v. Kaye, 25 N.Y.2d 139 (1969)

    A spontaneous statement made by a defendant to the police, even when in custody and represented by counsel who is not present, is admissible as evidence if the statement is not the product of interrogation.

    Summary

    Kaye was arrested for homicide. While being transported to the police station, and after being informed of his rights, he spontaneously confessed to the crime. The court addressed whether the confession was admissible, considering that the defendant was in custody and represented by counsel who was not present. The court held that the confession was admissible because it was a volunteered statement, not the product of custodial interrogation, and therefore not barred by the Fifth Amendment or the right to counsel. The court emphasized that the detectives had even reminded the defendant that he did not have to speak to them and that his attorney advised him of that.

    Facts

    Detectives discovered the body of a 13-year-old boy in Kaye’s hotel room, the cause of death was strangulation. Kaye’s attorney and father surrendered Kaye to the police at Bellevue Hospital. The attorney informed Detective McNally that he had advised Kaye of his constitutional rights, and instructed him not to make any statements. The attorney declined to accompany Kaye to the police station, stating he would see the detective in court the next morning. Almost immediately after entering the police car, Kaye spontaneously stated, “It’s all a mistake, but I know he forgave me. He’s in heaven now. It didn’t have to happen. I’m sorry I ever met him in the village.” Detective McNally reminded Kaye of his right to remain silent and that his lawyer had already advised him of that fact. Kaye insisted on talking, stating he wanted to tell his side of the story.

    Procedural History

    A Huntley hearing was held to determine the voluntariness of Kaye’s confessions. The confession obtained at the police station was suppressed because the police knew Kaye was represented by counsel and questioned him without his attorney present. However, the court found the oral confession in the police car was spontaneous and voluntary. Kaye withdrew his not guilty plea and pled guilty to manslaughter in the first degree, receiving a sentence of 10 to 15 years. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding the confession admissible as a voluntary statement, not the product of questioning.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a spontaneous oral confession must be suppressed, as a matter of law, solely because the defendant was under arrest and represented by counsel at the time he volunteered his confession.

    Holding

    No, because the Fifth Amendment does not bar volunteered statements, and the confession was not the product of custodial interrogation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the central issue is whether the defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation. The court cited Miranda v. Arizona, emphasizing that while custodial interrogation is inherently coercive, volunteered statements are admissible. The court quoted Miranda, “Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.” The court distinguished prior cases like People v. Arthur, clarifying that those cases prohibit custodial interrogation of a suspect represented by counsel in the attorney’s absence, when police are aware of the representation. Here, Kaye initiated the conversation and insisted on speaking despite being advised of his rights. The detective’s suggestion that Kaye start from the beginning did not constitute interrogation. The court weighed the trustworthiness of voluntary confessions, noting that no court has required police to prevent a suspect from making a spontaneous incriminating statement. To do so, would stretch the comprehension of the average citizen to the breaking point and would lead to unfair and impractical results. As Justice Cardozo said, “[J]ustice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament.” Chief Judge Fuld and Judge Burke dissented arguing that no statement made in the absence of counsel should have been used against defendant, whether spontaneous or not, once he had been arrested and taken into custody and his lawyer had informed the police that he had advised the defendant not to make any statements.