New York Law Review

Tag: Right to Counsel

  • People v. Reason, 37 N.Y.2d 351 (1975): Competency Standard for Waiving Right to Counsel

    People v. Reason, 37 N.Y.2d 351 (1975)

    The standard for determining whether a defendant can waive their right to counsel and represent themselves is the same as the standard for determining mental capacity to stand trial: whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with their lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against them.

    Summary

    The defendant, indicted for murder and attempted murder, insisted on representing himself at trial, despite the court’s urging to accept counsel. He had a history of mental illness, but psychiatric evaluations determined he was fit to stand trial. The jury convicted him. On appeal, his counsel argued he lacked the competence to act as his own attorney. The New York Court of Appeals held that the mental capacity standard for standing trial is sufficient for waiving the right to counsel. The court emphasized the trial court’s duty to ensure the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived counsel with awareness of the risks involved. The conviction was affirmed, finding the trial court fulfilled this duty.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted for murder and attempted murder after stabbing two men in 1969.
    Prior to trial, he had a history of hospitalizations for mental illness between 1965 and 1967.
    Upon arraignment, the court ordered psychiatric examinations to assess his mental capacity to stand trial.
    The psychiatric reports concluded he was not mentally incapacitated, and the court confirmed these reports.
    At trial, the defendant insisted on representing himself, rejecting the court’s advice to use counsel and declining to present an insanity defense, instead pursuing an alibi.
    Despite being strongly urged to accept counsel, the defendant conducted his own defense with standby counsel. He was found guilty.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found the defendant guilty.
    Before sentencing, the trial court ordered a new psychiatric examination to determine the defendant’s present mental capacity and mental status at the time of trial.
    Psychiatrists reported he had the capacity to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense at the time of trial, which the court confirmed after a hearing.
    On appeal, the defendant’s counsel argued the defendant was denied his constitutional right to proper counsel because he lacked the capacity to represent himself. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the mental capacity standard for standing trial is sufficient for determining if a defendant can waive their right to counsel and represent themselves, or if a higher standard of competency is required.

    Holding

    No, because the mental capacity standard for standing trial is sufficient for determining if a defendant can waive their right to counsel and represent themselves, provided that the trial court conducts a searching inquiry to ensure a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel with awareness of the risks and consequences.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that there are different levels of mental capacity for standing trial versus waiving the right to counsel. The court reasoned that the standard used to determine if a defendant is capable of defending themselves is adequate when they choose to conduct their own defense.
    The court stated, “From a practical viewpoint it would be even more difficult to formulate a workable, and presumably higher, standard of competency which would not infringe on the defendant’s constitutional right ‘to appear and defend in person’ (NY Const, art I, § 6; People v McIntyre, 36 NY2d 10).”
    The right to self-representation is not absolute. Quoting People v. McIntyre, the court reiterated that a defendant may invoke the right to defend pro se if: “(1) the request is unequivocal and timely asserted, (2) there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, and (3) the defendant has not engaged in conduct which would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of the issues”.
    The key inquiry is whether the waiver of counsel was made competently, intelligently, and voluntarily. This determination does not require another psychiatric examination, but a traditional inquiry by the court to demonstrate that the defendant was aware of the dangers of waiving counsel.
    Referencing Westbrook v. Arizona, the court highlighted that even if a competency hearing expands to cover the question of the defendant’s mental capacity to defend themselves, the critical factor is whether the trial court queried the defendant to determine if their waiver of counsel was intelligently made.
    The court found that the trial court in this case fully discharged its responsibility by advising the defendant of the consequences of acting as his own attorney and ensuring he comprehended his predicament. Therefore, the defendant’s decision to waive counsel was made knowingly and intelligently, supported by the finding that he was mentally competent to stand trial. The court found the evidence sufficient to support the court’s determinations.

  • Matter of Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433 (1975): No Constitutional Right to Assigned Counsel in Divorce Cases

    Matter of Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433 (1975)

    Indigent parties in divorce actions do not have a constitutional right to assigned counsel at public expense; the provision of such counsel is a matter for the legislature, not the courts.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether indigent parties in divorce actions are constitutionally entitled to publicly-funded legal representation. Two indigent wives, one a plaintiff and one a defendant in separate divorce actions, sought court orders compelling Tompkins County to provide them with counsel or compensate counsel they retained. The New York Court of Appeals held that no such constitutional right exists. The court emphasized that while counsel is desirable, it is not a legal condition to access the courts in divorce cases. The appropriation of public funds for such purposes is a legislative function.

    Facts

    Two indigent women were involved in separate divorce actions in Tompkins County. One was a plaintiff, and the other was a defendant. Both sought court orders requiring the county to provide them with legal representation at public expense, arguing they could not afford counsel themselves. The trial court granted the relief sought, but the Appellate Division reversed.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the wives’ requests for counsel. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision, holding that absent statutory authority, the courts cannot direct the provision of counsel or compensation of retained counsel for indigent wives using public funds. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indigent plaintiff wife in a divorce action and an indigent defendant wife in a similar action are entitled, as a matter of constitutional right, to have the County of Tompkins provide them with counsel or compensate counsel retained by them.

    Holding

    No, because the appropriation and provision of authority for the expenditure of public funds is a legislative and not a judicial function, both in the Nation and in the State.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between criminal and civil cases, noting that the right to assigned counsel in criminal cases stems from constitutional provisions safeguarding liberty and due process. In contrast, no similar constitutional or statutory provision applies to private litigation like divorce. The court acknowledged the inherent power of courts to assign uncompensated counsel in civil cases under CPLR 1102(a), but emphasized this is discretionary, not an absolute right.

    The court addressed the argument that Boddie v. Connecticut supports a constitutional right to counsel in matrimonial matters. It clarified that Boddie only prohibited states from denying access to courts by imposing fees indigents could not afford. Representation by counsel is not a legal condition to accessing the courts in divorce cases. “On no view of the matter is counsel required in a matrimonial action as a condition to access to the court.”

    The court recognized the practical recourse available to indigent litigants through legal aid societies, federally-funded programs, and discretionary assignments of uncompensated counsel. It also noted the possibility of counsel fees being awarded to the wife against the husband and the availability of conditional fee arrangements. The court concluded that the problem of providing counsel to indigent matrimonial litigants is a matter for the legislature, which has the power to appropriate the necessary funds. The court stated, “The fundamental is that the courts constitute but one branch of government. The absence of appropriated funds and legislation to raise taxes under our State constitutional system, as in the rest of the Union, is not a judicially-fillable gap.”

  • People v. Farinaro, 36 N.Y.2d 284 (1975): Right to Counsel on Appeal for Traffic Infractions

    People v. Farinaro, 36 N.Y.2d 284 (1975)

    There is no constitutional or statutory right to assigned counsel on appeal for traffic infraction convictions where the defendant no longer faces imprisonment.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether indigent defendants have a right to assigned counsel on appeal for traffic infraction convictions. In these consolidated cases, the defendants were convicted of traffic infractions and sought assigned counsel for their appeals. The Court held that neither the U.S. Constitution, the New York Constitution, nor state statutes mandate the assignment of counsel in such cases, especially when the defendant no longer faces imprisonment. The Court reasoned that traffic infractions are qualitatively different from criminal prosecutions where imprisonment is a potential outcome, distinguishing them from cases requiring counsel.

    Facts

    Defendants were convicted of traffic infractions in the trial court. In one case, the defendant pleaded guilty, and in the other two, the convictions followed trials. Each defendant had assigned counsel at the trial level. The defendants then sought to appeal their convictions and requested the assignment of counsel at public expense for the appeal.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendants of traffic infractions. The defendants then appealed to the Appellate Term, arguing they were entitled to assigned counsel for the appeal. The Appellate Term denied their request. The cases then went before the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether indigent defendants have a constitutional or statutory right to assigned counsel on appeal from a conviction for a traffic infraction, where the defendant no longer faces the possibility of imprisonment.

    Holding

    No, because there is no statutory or constitutional right to assigned counsel in traffic infraction prosecutions where the defendant no longer faces imprisonment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Term’s orders, holding that there is no statutory right to assigned counsel in traffic infraction prosecutions under New York’s County Law § 722-a and CPL 170.10, subd. 3, par. (c). The Court relied on its prior holding in People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, which established that the New York State Constitution does not require assigning counsel in such prosecutions. The Court distinguished Argersinger v. Hamlin, which mandated counsel where a conviction could lead to imprisonment, noting that the defendants in these cases no longer faced imprisonment. The court stated, “It is not persuasive to extrapolate ‘equal protection reasoning to such abstract “rights to appeal” from convictions for traffic infractions, without any showing of merit or likelihood of merit. This is especially true where the defendant no longer faces any loss of liberty, but is only exposed to adverse ‘points’ in the event of future traffic infractions.” The Court reasoned that if a defendant had counsel at trial, they or their lawyer should be able to suggest any errors meriting appeal. The Court also noted the situation is “even more ludicrous” when a defendant pleads guilty and then tries to appeal. The court emphasized that the possibility of accumulating points on a driver’s license as a result of the infraction does not create a compelling equal protection argument for assigning counsel on appeal.

  • People ex rel. Combs v. LaVallee, 29 N.Y.2d 23 (1971): Right to Counsel at Parole Revocation Hearings After Criminal Conviction

    People ex rel. Combs v. LaVallee, 29 N.Y.2d 23 (1971)

    A parolee is entitled to the assistance of counsel during a final parole revocation hearing, even if the revocation is based on a new criminal conviction committed while on parole.

    Summary

    Combs, a former state prisoner on parole, had his parole revoked after being convicted of third-degree assault. The Parole Board denied him the right to counsel at his final revocation hearing, citing a regulation that barred counsel for parolees convicted of new crimes. Combs sought habeas corpus relief, which was initially granted by the Wyoming County Court. The Appellate Division reversed, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the parolee was entitled to counsel. The Court of Appeals emphasized that revocation is not automatic and counsel could influence the Board’s decision regarding the length of time before the prisoner is reconsidered for parole.

    Facts

    In 1970, Combs was convicted of felonious sale of a dangerous drug and sentenced to a maximum of five years. He was released on parole in November 1971. In February 1972, a parole violation warrant was issued based on allegations of assault, associating with a criminal, failing to report to his parole officer, and absconding from supervision. He was arrested in Florida and returned to New York where he pleaded guilty to third-degree assault. At the parole revocation hearing, he was denied counsel because of the assault conviction. His parole was revoked based on the conviction and absconding.

    Procedural History

    Combs sought habeas corpus relief in Wyoming County Court, which granted his release and return to parole supervision. The Appellate Division reversed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the County Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a parolee convicted of a new crime committed while on parole is entitled to the assistance of counsel at a final parole revocation hearing.

    Holding

    Yes, because revocation is not automatic and counsel could influence the Parole Board’s discretion regarding the length of time before the prisoner is reconsidered for parole, and other factors related to the sentence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, which established the right to counsel at parole revocation hearings. While the Supreme Court’s decision in Gagnon v. Scarpelli made the right to counsel dependent on the circumstances of each case, the New York Court of Appeals stated it was not required to retreat from its holding in Menechino, which was based, in part, on the State Constitution.
    Even with a new criminal conviction, revocation is not automatic; it rests in the Parole Board’s discretion. “The offense committed or the circumstances, including the facts which may have induced a plea to a lesser offense, surrounding the crime may be such that counsel by offering testimony or effective reasoning might persuade the board not to revoke parole.” Moreover, counsel can assist in determining the period of time before the prisoner is reconsidered for parole. Effective counsel may be able to obtain more favorable treatment for the parolee.
    The Court invalidated a Parole Board regulation (7 NYCRR 1.19 [c]) that barred counsel from final parole revocation hearings for parolees convicted of a crime while on parole, finding it inconsistent with the parolee’s right to counsel under the State Constitution.

  • People v. Cerami, 30 N.Y.2d 245 (1972): Right to Counsel During Psychiatric Examinations

    People v. Cerami, 30 N.Y.2d 245 (1972)

    A criminal defendant has the right to have counsel present during psychiatric examinations conducted by the prosecution’s expert to ensure effective cross-examination regarding the defendant’s sanity.

    Summary

    Michael Cerami was convicted of first-degree manslaughter. His defense was insanity, but a prosecution psychiatrist examined him pre-trial without notifying his counsel. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Cerami was entitled to have counsel present at the psychiatric examination to make the right of cross-examination more effective. The court reasoned that the pretrial psychiatric examination is a critical stage of the criminal prosecution. The failure to exclude the psychiatrist’s testimony due to the lack of notice to counsel regarding the first examination was prejudicial error, warranting a new trial.

    Facts

    Michael Cerami shot and killed Stanley Bohrer, his former supervisor, who had asked for Cerami’s resignation from his teaching position years earlier. Cerami claimed insanity, asserting he was a paranoid schizophrenic who believed Bohrer had wrongfully terminated him and spread rumors about him. The defense presented evidence of Cerami’s prior diagnoses of paranoid schizophrenia from multiple hospitals and a psychologist. The prosecution sought to rebut this defense with the testimony of its own psychiatric expert, Dr. Pollack, who had examined Cerami twice before trial.

    Procedural History

    Cerami was indicted for manslaughter. After a jury trial in the Monroe County Court, he was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s conviction should be set aside because pretrial psychiatric examinations, conducted by the prosecution’s expert regarding the defense of insanity, occurred without notice to or the presence of defendant’s counsel.

    Holding

    Yes, because a defendant is entitled to counsel’s presence at the first psychiatric examination to ensure the effective right of cross-examination, and the failure to exclude the psychiatrist’s testimony due to a lack of notice to counsel was prejudicial error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on Matter of Lee v. County Ct. of Erie County, which established that pretrial psychiatric examinations are a critical stage in a criminal prosecution, entitling the defendant to have counsel present to make more effective the basic right of cross-examination. The court reasoned that the prosecution’s notice of a psychiatric examination must include sufficient details (date, time, and place) to permit defense counsel to attend. The court found that the defense counsel was not given adequate notice regarding Dr. Pollack’s first examination of the defendant. The court rejected the argument that the defense waived the objection by waiting until the suppression hearing, as any prejudice to the prosecution could have been alleviated at that time. The court stated that any expert opinion based even in part upon an improper examination should be excluded. Quoting People v. Keough, the court emphasized that it is irrelevant that the psychiatrist may have properly acquired some part of the foundation for his expert opinion apart from the invalid examination.

  • People v. Townsend, 33 N.Y.2d 37 (1973): Police Deception Regarding Access to Counsel

    People v. Townsend, 33 N.Y.2d 37 (1973)

    It is impermissible for the police to use a confession, even if otherwise voluntary, obtained from a 17-year-old defendant when police have sealed off the most likely avenue by which the assistance of counsel may reach him by deception and trickery.

    Summary

    Steven Townsend, a 17-year-old, was convicted of murder. His confession was admitted at trial, but the police obtained it after misleading Townsend’s mother about his whereabouts when she called the station. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the police’s deception to prevent access to counsel rendered the confession inadmissible, even if it was otherwise voluntary. The court emphasized that police cannot use trickery to prevent a suspect’s parents from obtaining legal assistance for them.

    Facts

    Following a murder, Townsend, a 17-year-old high school student, voluntarily went to the police station. While he was being questioned, his mother repeatedly called the police station to ask if her son was there. Each time, the desk officer told her that he was not. After several hours of interrogation, an assistant district attorney arrived and obtained a written confession from Townsend, preceded by Miranda warnings. Only after the written confession was obtained did the police inform Mrs. Townsend that her son was at the station and under arrest for homicide. Townsend also made inculpatory statements to a friend, Horace Hudson.

    Procedural History

    Townsend was indicted for murder. At a pretrial Huntley hearing, the court held Townsend’s initial oral statements inadmissible because he had not been properly advised of his Miranda rights. However, the court found the written confession to the prosecutor admissible. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Justice Hopkins dissented, arguing that the circumstances surrounding the confession violated due process. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a confession obtained from a 17-year-old is admissible when the police, through deception, prevented the defendant’s parent from contacting him and potentially obtaining counsel.

    Holding

    Yes, because it is impermissible for the police to use a confession, even if it is otherwise voluntary, obtained from a 17-year-old defendant when, in the course of extracting such confession, they have sealed off the most likely avenue by which the assistance of counsel may reach him by means of deception and trickery.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the police’s deceptive tactics to prevent Townsend’s mother from contacting him undermined the fundamental safeguards of due process. The court distinguished this case from People v. Hocking, 15 N.Y.2d 973 (1965) and People v. Taylor, 16 N.Y.2d 1038 (1965), where families knew where the defendant was and took no further steps beyond a request to see him. Here, the police actively concealed Townsend’s presence and deceived his mother when she inquired. The court stated, “What the police did here was indefensible. The courts should not accept a confession obtained by the police through tactics calculated to make certain that the defendant’s parents will not take any steps to get him a lawyer.” The court emphasized that the confession followed inadmissible statements and occurred while Townsend’s mother was desperately trying to reach him. The court concluded that because the police used illegal tactics to ensure counsel would not be obtained, the confession was inadmissible. The court allowed the use of statements made to Townsend’s friend, Hudson, as evidence.

  • People v. Pobliner, 32 N.Y.2d 356 (1973): Consequences of Wiretapping Attorney-Client Communications

    People v. Pobliner, 32 N.Y.2d 356 (1973)

    While intercepting attorney-client communications is improper, dismissal of an indictment is only warranted if the interception undermines the right to counsel and the prosecution directly or indirectly uses illegally obtained evidence to gain an unfair advantage.

    Summary

    Jay Pobliner was convicted of murdering his wife. A key issue on appeal was whether intercepted telephone conversations between Pobliner and his lawyers before the indictment warranted dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that although the wiretapping was improper, the defense was not so prejudiced as to require dismissal. The court found no indication the prosecution unfairly leveraged wiretap information. The defense waived a full hearing on the wiretap’s impact, and other issues raised, such as admitting crime scene photos and testimony about extramarital affairs, did not constitute reversible error. The court found that the drastic remedy of dismissing an indictment is reserved for only the most egregious violations of the right to counsel.

    Facts

    Brenda Pobliner was found murdered in her bed with multiple gunshot wounds. Her husband, Jay, had spent the previous evening with a friend, Iilis Jurisson. Jay later confessed to a friend, Joe Hall, that he shot his wife while she slept in Jurisson’s presence. After the murder, Jay took Jurisson to Manhattan, had breakfast with his parents, and went to work. After arriving at work, he called his wife. Receiving no answer, he called a neighbor, who discovered the body. He told the men where his automobile was parked that his wife was bleeding. The prosecution emphasized Jay’s “guilty knowledge” and his confession to Joe Hall. The murder weapon was never found, but the prosecution showed Pobliner previously purchased an unregistered pistol.

    Procedural History

    Following the murder, the police investigation focused on Jay. Unable to make headway, they obtained judicial eavesdropping orders for telephones in his parents’ apartment, where he was staying. Pobliner was indicted after Joe Hall revealed Pobliner’s confession. At the preliminary hearing, the defense moved for a hearing on the wiretap’s validity. The prosecutor stated that no wiretap evidence would be used directly. The court denied the motion but advised defense counsel to object if wiretap evidence was used indirectly during trial. Pobliner was convicted at the second trial, the first ending in a mistrial, and he appealed, arguing the wiretap warranted dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the interception of attorney-client communications before indictment warrants dismissal of the indictment.
    2. Whether the prosecutor improperly used information from the wiretap during cross-examination of a defense witness.
    3. Whether the trial court properly admitted photographs of the victim’s body.
    4. Whether testimony regarding the defendant’s extramarital affair was properly admitted.

    Holding

    1. No, because dismissal is a drastic remedy reserved for extreme cases where the interception undermines the right to counsel and prejudices the defense.
    2. No, because the defense failed to properly object and waived a full hearing on the issue.
    3. Yes, because the photographs were relevant to material issues in the case and were not solely intended to inflame the jury.
    4. Yes, because the evidence of the affair was relevant to motive.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the wiretapping was improper but stated that dismissing the indictment is a drastic remedy, only appropriate when the interception undermines the right to counsel and the prosecution exploits the illegal evidence to gain an unfair advantage, citing Hoffa v. United States. The court distinguished State v. Cory, where dismissal was warranted because pervasive eavesdropping made a fair retrial impossible. Here, the court found no showing that the wiretap affected the defense’s trial strategy, questioning of witnesses, or evidence introduction. The prosecutor agreed to exclude wiretap conversations and derivatives, and hearings during trial addressed specific objections. The defense waived a full hearing on the wiretap’s legality, fearing further evidence might become admissible. The court found the admission of photographs of the victim relevant to disputed issues. They showed the victim was in a sleeping position when shot, corroborating Hall’s testimony. The photos also illustrated the deliberateness of the killing, supporting the prosecution’s theory. Similarly, the court found the testimony about Pobliner’s affair relevant to establishing a motive for the murder.

  • People v. Lasky, 31 N.Y.2d 146 (1972): Burden of Proof in Challenging Prior Convictions

    People v. Lasky, 31 N.Y.2d 146 (1972)

    When a defendant challenges a prior conviction used for sentencing enhancement, the burden of proving the prior conviction’s unconstitutionality rests on the defendant, especially when the record indicates representation by counsel.

    Summary

    Lasky was convicted of multiple crimes and sentenced as a fourth-felony offender based on prior convictions, including one in Arkansas. Lasky challenged his sentence, arguing that the Arkansas conviction was invalid because he was not represented by counsel. The New York Court of Appeals held that Lasky had the burden of proving the unconstitutionality of the Arkansas conviction and failed to meet that burden because the Arkansas court record indicated he was represented by counsel, and Lasky admitted to discussing his plea with someone from the court.

    Facts

    Lasky was convicted of conspiracy, burglary, and grand larceny in New York in 1966. Based on prior felony convictions, the District Attorney sought to have Lasky sentenced as a fourth-felony offender. One of the prior convictions was from Arkansas in 1960. Lasky claimed he was not represented by counsel in the Arkansas case, rendering that conviction unconstitutional and unusable for sentencing enhancement.

    Procedural History

    The Dutchess County Court initially found that Lasky failed to prove he lacked counsel in the Arkansas conviction and sentenced him as a fourth-felony offender. The Appellate Division affirmed. Lasky’s petition for resentencing was denied, and the Appellate Division affirmed, treating the petition as a motion for a writ of error coram nobis. Lasky filed another petition for a writ of error coram nobis with the Dutchess County Court, which was denied without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. This appeal followed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the burden of proof was correctly placed on the defendant to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of a prior conviction when challenging a fourth-felony offender sentencing.

    Holding

    Yes, because when challenging a prior conviction used for sentencing enhancement, the defendant bears the burden of proving its unconstitutionality, especially when the record suggests representation by counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Lasky failed to prove his Arkansas conviction was unconstitutional. While Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967), prohibits presuming waiver of counsel from a silent record, the Arkansas record here was not silent; it stated that “Harry Robinson [was] appointed to defend.” A Federal District Court also reviewed the Arkansas conviction and found Lasky’s challenge “lacking in any merit.” The court noted Lasky’s admission that he spoke with someone from the court who instructed him to plead guilty. The court emphasized that the defendant had the burden to show good cause for failing to challenge the prior conviction at sentencing and must carry the burden of proof as to the unconstitutionality of any prior conviction.

    The court distinguished the case from situations where the record is silent regarding counsel. Here, the Arkansas docket specifically stated, “Davis and [Lasky] — Plea of not Guilty — Harry Robinson appointed to defend.” This notation, combined with Lasky’s admission of discussing his plea, outweighed the formalistic recitation of “in proper person” on the certified judgment. The court concluded that Lasky failed to carry his burden of proof.

    The court also addressed the argument that CPL 400.20 (subds. 5, 6) placed the burden on the People to prove persistent felony offender status. However, this statute, effective September 1, 1967, was not retroactive and did not apply to Lasky’s post-conviction motion.

  • In re B., 30 N.Y.2d 352 (1972): Right to Counsel for Indigent Parents in Child Neglect Cases

    In re B., 30 N.Y.2d 352 (1972)

    An indigent parent facing the potential loss of a child’s society in a child neglect proceeding is entitled to be advised of the right to assigned counsel if they cannot afford an attorney.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a Family Court is required to advise an indigent parent, charged with child neglect, of their right to assigned counsel. The Westchester County Commissioner of Social Services filed a neglect charge against the appellant, alleging she left her three-year-old daughter unattended. The Family Court advised the appellant she could retain counsel at her own expense but did not inform her of her right to assigned counsel if indigent. The appellant admitted the facts in the petition, and the child was placed in the petitioner’s custody. The New York Court of Appeals held that indigent parents are entitled to be advised of their right to assigned counsel in child neglect proceedings due to the fundamental interest at stake.

    Facts

    In June 1969, the Westchester County Commissioner of Social Services filed a child neglect charge against the appellant. The charge alleged that the appellant left her three-year-old daughter home alone between 1:00 AM and 4:00 AM on June 21. During that time, the child was allegedly kidnapped and raped by a friend of the appellant.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court adjudicated the child neglected and placed her in the petitioner’s custody after the appellant admitted to the allegations in the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s order. The appeal then reached the New York Court of Appeals as a matter of right based on constitutional grounds.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Family Court is required to advise an indigent parent, charged with child neglect, that they are entitled to be represented by assigned counsel.

    Holding

    Yes, because an indigent parent, facing the loss of a child’s society, is entitled to the assistance of counsel and must be informed of that right; to deny legal assistance under such circumstances would constitute a violation of their due process rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a parent’s concern for the liberty, care, and control of their child involves a fundamental interest. The court stated that this interest cannot be relinquished to the State without the opportunity for a hearing with assigned counsel if the parent cannot afford one. The court emphasized that once the right to assigned counsel exists, the individual must be informed of that right. The court highlighted the deficiency in the Family Court’s advice to the appellant, which stated, “you must obtain [an attorney] yourself, and pay for him out of your own funds,” excluding the possibility of assigned counsel. This statement, the Court reasoned, could not lead to a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. The court adopted the reasoning of the Federal District Court in Cleaver v. Wilcox, emphasizing the inherent imbalance between the state as an adversary and an unrepresented indigent parent. The court remitted the proceeding to the Family Court for a rehearing, ensuring the appellant would be represented by counsel, while not reversing or vacating the initial order.

  • In re Anthony R., 29 N.Y.2d 532 (1971): Juvenile Parole Revocation Requires Due Process

    In re Anthony R., 29 N.Y.2d 532 (1971)

    Juvenile parolees, like adult parolees, are entitled to due process protections, including notice, a hearing, and the assistance of counsel, before their parole can be revoked.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether juvenile delinquents have a right to a hearing and the assistance of an attorney before their parole is revoked. Two juveniles, Anthony R. and Roderick R., had their parole revoked without a hearing after new delinquency petitions were filed against them, even though the charges were dismissed. The New York Court of Appeals held that due process requires a fair hearing, including the right to counsel, before a juvenile’s parole can be revoked. The court reasoned that revocation of parole constitutes a deprivation of liberty, triggering due process protections. This ensures a fair and accurate determination of whether parole conditions were violated.

    Facts

    Anthony R. and Roderick R. were adjudged juvenile delinquents in November 1966 and placed on probation.
    In July 1967, their probation was revoked, and they were placed in Highland State Training School for 18 months.
    They were paroled, but neither they nor their parents were informed of the conditions of parole.
    In June 1970, new juvenile delinquency petitions, alleging assault and petit larceny, were filed against them, but the charges were dismissed.
    Their parole was revoked without a hearing based on the dismissed charges, and they were returned to the training school.

    Procedural History

    The boys’ law guardian sued out writs of habeas corpus, arguing that the lack of a hearing violated due process.
    Special Term denied the requested relief.
    The Appellate Division reversed, sustained the writs, and ordered the boys discharged, concluding that due process requires a fair hearing before parole revocation.

    Issue(s)

    Whether juvenile delinquents have a right to a hearing and the assistance of an attorney before their parole can be revoked.

    Holding

    Yes, because due process demands notice, a hearing, and the aid of counsel before a juvenile’s parole can be revoked. “[T]he proceeding involves a deprivation of liberty just as much as did the original criminal action and, by that token, falls within the protective ambit of due process.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the principle established in People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, which granted adult parolees the right to counsel in revocation hearings. The court extended this principle to juveniles, emphasizing that a parolee may not be deprived of liberty without a hearing to determine if parole was violated. The court quoted Powell v. Alabama stating that the right to be heard would be “of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel”. The court stated, “[N]o tribunal, whether board or court, should be allowed to base its determination on a possibly mistaken view of the facts owing to the parolee’s inability, absent counsel, to make a proper factual presentation.”

    The court also cited In re Gault, stating that fundamental fairness and due process require that a juvenile be accorded basic rights, including notice of the charges, right to counsel, right to confrontation and cross-examination, privilege against self-incrimination, right to a transcript of the proceedings, and right to appellate review.

    The court rejected the argument that the hearing should be informal, noting that the appearance and actuality of fairness are essential for juveniles. Citing In re Gault, the court stated, “They suggest that the appearance as well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness—in short, the essentials of due process—may be a more impressive and more therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile is concerned”.

    The court emphasized that a lawyer’s assistance is needed to marshal the facts and introduce evidence of mitigating circumstances to present the juvenile’s case. Quoting from Menechino, “participation by counsel need be no greater than is required to assure, to the court as well as to the parolee, that the court is accurately informed of the facts and the presentation of testimony need be no greater than is necessary for the same purpose.” The court reiterated that a fair and objective parole procedure is essential for rehabilitating offenders.