New York Law Review

Tag: Right to Counsel

  • People v. Felder, 47 N.Y.2d 287 (1979): Right to Counsel Means Licensed Attorney; Representation by Imposter Requires Automatic Reversal

    People v. Felder, 47 N.Y.2d 287 (1979)

    A criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated when unknowingly represented by a person not licensed to practice law, requiring automatic reversal of the conviction regardless of demonstrable prejudice.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed four consolidated cases where criminal defendants were represented by an individual, Albert Silver, who was not a licensed attorney. Silver had been practicing law illegally for approximately 12 years. After Silver’s status was discovered, the defendants sought to vacate their convictions, arguing that representation by an unlicensed individual violated their constitutional right to counsel. The lower courts denied the motions, applying a harmless error analysis. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that representation by an unlicensed person constitutes a per se violation of the right to counsel, requiring automatic reversal without a prejudice inquiry.

    Facts

    Felder was convicted of robbery and grand larceny after a jury trial where Silver appeared as assigned counsel. Tucker and Wright pleaded guilty to drug sale and rape charges, respectively, based on Silver’s advice and plea negotiations. Davis was convicted of arson after a jury trial, with Silver as assigned counsel. Post-trial, it was discovered that Silver was not a licensed attorney in any jurisdiction and had never completed law school. Each defendant moved to vacate his conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Procedural History

    The trial courts denied the defendants’ motions to vacate their convictions, finding that Silver’s representation, though erroneous, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of Felder, Tucker, and Wright’s motions, employing a harmless error analysis. The Appellate Division also affirmed the denial of Davis’s motion without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and consolidated the cases.

    Issue(s)

    Whether representation by a person not licensed to practice law constitutes a per se violation of a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, requiring automatic reversal of the conviction.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel means the right to representation by a licensed attorney, and representation by an unlicensed individual is equivalent to a complete denial of counsel, which cannot be considered harmless error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that “counsel,” as used in the Sixth Amendment, unequivocally means a licensed attorney at law. A layperson, regardless of qualifications, cannot substitute for a member of the Bar. The court emphasized that the right to assistance of counsel is fundamental to a fair trial, stating, “The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial” quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76. It further held that harmless error analysis is inapplicable when there is a denial of counsel, which invalidates the trial. The court distinguished this situation from mere trial errors, where harmless error analysis might be appropriate. The court stated: “this Court has concluded that the assistance of counsel is among those ‘constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.’ Chapman v. California, supra [386 US], at 23.” quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489. Because the defendants were unknowingly represented by a non-attorney, their convictions were reversed, and new trials were ordered.

  • People v. Byrne, 47 N.Y.2d 117 (1979): Admissibility of Confessions Before Right to Counsel Attaches

    People v. Byrne, 47 N.Y.2d 117 (1979)

    When a defendant makes a confession, part of which is obtained before the defendant’s right to counsel attaches and part after, the portion of the confession obtained before the right to counsel attached is admissible, provided it can be clearly separated from the inadmissible portion and was not the result of prior illegality.

    Summary

    Dominick Byrne was convicted of grand larceny for his role in the kidnapping of Samuel Bronfman. Byrne argued that oral statements he made to FBI agents should have been suppressed because they were taken before he was allowed to consult with his attorney. The New York Court of Appeals held that statements made before Byrne’s attorney contacted the FBI were admissible because Byrne had been fully advised of his rights, no coercion was used, the statements made after the attorney’s call were excluded, and the pre-attorney statements were not tainted by any prior illegality or inextricably bound to the later statements. The Court also rejected Byrne’s argument that the agents’ deferment of his request to go to church violated his rights.

    Facts

    Samuel Bronfman was kidnapped at gunpoint. Byrne contacted the New York City police claiming he and Lynch were coerced into participating in the kidnapping. FBI agents questioned Byrne at FBI headquarters after advising him of his constitutional rights. Byrne initially claimed coercion, but later confessed to his role in the crime, detailing the planning and execution of the kidnapping over several hours. Later, Byrne’s attorney contacted the FBI and requested that questioning cease. The government continued questioning Byrne after receiving that call.

    Procedural History

    Byrne was convicted of grand larceny. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction. Byrne appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting his oral statements to the FBI agents because they continued to question him after being contacted by his attorney. The trial court suppressed written and oral statements made after the attorney’s phone call.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether oral statements made by the defendant to FBI agents before his attorney contacted them, but after he had been advised of his Miranda rights, are admissible when statements made after the attorney’s contact were suppressed?
    2. Whether the agents’ deferment of Byrne’s request to attend church during the interrogation was a violation of his constitutional rights?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statements made before the attorney’s contact were distinct from and not tainted by the illegally obtained statements after the attorney’s contact.
    2. No, because there was no indication that Byrne’s church request flowed from an intention to seek the aid of a clergyman rather than that of a lawyer as a primary source of help and advice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from People v. Failla, where the defendant’s lawyer was deliberately kept waiting while police questioned the defendant. In Byrne, the initial interrogation by the FBI agents occurred over many hours before the attorney’s call. The court emphasized that the statements elicited after the attorney’s call were either duplicative or committed to a written form and were excluded by the trial court.

    The court noted the principle that an invalidly obtained prior confession may require exclusion of a subsequent validly taken one (see People v. Valerius, 31 NY2d 51, 55), reasoning that once the police have illegally caused a defendant to “let the cat out of the bag,” statements he makes afterward, no matter the safeguards the police employ as to these, may be found as a matter of fact to stem from the initial illegality (see, e.g., People v. Chapple, 38 NY2d 112, 115; People v. Stephen J. B., 23 NY2d 611, 615). However, the court pointed out that in such cases the taint is prospective only, never retrospective.

    Regarding Byrne’s request to attend church, the court distinguished this from People v. Bevilacqua, where the police engaged in a “seemingly conscious scheme * * * to prevent [an 18-year-old defendant] from establishing contact with anyone who might be able to provide him with assistance or advice”. The court found no similar intent to frustrate Byrne’s access to counsel. The court reasoned that the constitutional right to counsel does not transform into a right to consult with clergymen, physicians, or others.

  • People v. Garofolo, 46 N.Y.2d 592 (1979): Police Duty to Facilitate Attorney Access to Suspects

    People v. Garofolo, 46 N.Y.2d 592 (1979)

    Once police are aware that an attorney has been retained to represent a suspect in custody, they cannot elicit a valid waiver of counsel from the suspect unless the attorney is present; police must also have adequate procedures to ensure attorneys can communicate with their clients without unreasonable delay.

    Summary

    Steven Garofolo confessed to murder after being interrogated by police. An attorney, retained by Garofolo’s father, attempted to contact him but was initially misinformed about his whereabouts due to inadequate police communication. The New York Court of Appeals held that Garofolo’s written confession should have been suppressed because it was obtained after the police were aware he had legal representation, but that the initial oral confession was admissible. The court also found that “casual” questioning by a correction officer violated Garofolo’s right to counsel. The case emphasizes the importance of clear police procedures to ensure attorney access to clients in custody and protects the right to counsel.

    Facts

    Garofolo called the victim’s parents to report seeing her with three men. Police contacted him at his workplace and he agreed to go to the homicide squad office. Detective Rodriguez noted inconsistencies in Garofolo’s story and gave him Miranda warnings. Garofolo confessed to murder. He then provided details about disposing of evidence. During the interrogation, Garofolo’s attorney, Eric Naiburg, retained by Garofolo’s father, tried to locate him. Naiburg called police headquarters but was initially told Garofolo was not in custody, even though he was being interrogated at a nearby location. The police located evidence based on Garofolo’s oral confession.

    Procedural History

    Garofolo was convicted of felony murder and second-degree murder. His pretrial motions to suppress his confessions and related evidence were denied. The Appellate Division upheld the judgment. Garofolo appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that his confessions were obtained in violation of his right to counsel and that evidence was illegally seized.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s right to counsel was violated by the police department’s failure to promptly inform his attorney of his whereabouts while in custody.
    2. Whether statements elicited from the defendant by a correction officer while in jail awaiting trial violated his right to counsel.
    3. Whether a letter written by the defendant to his parents from jail was illegally seized and searched.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because once the police were aware that an attorney had been retained to represent Garofolo, they could not obtain a valid waiver of his right to counsel in the attorney’s absence, and the police procedures were inadequate to ensure timely communication between Garofolo and his attorney.
    2. Yes, because the correction officer’s questions constituted custodial interrogation in the absence of counsel, violating Garofolo’s right to counsel.
    3. No, because Garofolo was aware of the jail’s routine procedure to inspect prisoners’ correspondence before delivering the unsealed letter.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle that, once police are aware that a lawyer has undertaken to represent a defendant in custody, the defendant cannot waive the assistance of counsel except in the lawyer’s presence, citing People v. Hobson and People v. Arthur. The Court emphasized that this rule protects not only the right to effective counsel but also the privilege against self-incrimination and the guarantee of due process. The court found that Naiburg’s call to police headquarters put the police on notice that Garofolo was represented, and any uncounseled statements taken after that point were inadmissible, citing People v. Pinzon. The court stated, “[T]he police should have been on notice that an attorney had appeared on behalf of the defendant then in custody”. The court criticized the police department’s lack of procedures to ensure effective communication between attorneys and clients in custody. The court held that the written confession, obtained after Naiburg’s call, should have been suppressed. The court found that the correction officer’s questioning of Garofolo in jail was a form of custodial interrogation that violated his right to counsel. The court explained, “Queries aimed at the issue of a defendant’s guilt or innocence must be proscribed irrespective of their underlying motivation.” The court found no error in the admission of the jail letter, as Garofolo knew that his mail would be read.

  • People v. Gruttola, 43 N.Y.2d 116 (1977): Appellate Review of Factual Findings with Record Support

    People v. Gruttola, 43 N.Y.2d 116 (1977)

    Appellate courts are bound by factual findings of lower courts when those findings are supported by evidence in the record.

    Summary

    This case addresses the limits of appellate review concerning factual findings made by lower courts. Gruttola sought to overturn his conviction by claiming he was denied the right to counsel. The County Court rejected his version of the facts after a hearing, a decision affirmed by the Appellate Division. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the lower courts’ factual findings were supported by evidence in the record, the Court of Appeals lacked the power to review those findings. This underscores the principle that appellate courts primarily review questions of law, not factual determinations already resolved by trial courts and affirmed on appeal.

    Facts

    Defendant Gruttola was originally sentenced to probation. He later violated his probation, which resulted in a prison term being substituted for his probation. After the substitution of the prison term, Gruttola brought a motion under CPL 440.10, claiming for the first time that he had been denied the right to counsel both when he confessed and when he pleaded guilty.

    Procedural History

    The County Court held a hearing on Gruttola’s motion and rejected his version of the facts. The Appellate Division affirmed the County Court’s decision. Gruttola then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Court of Appeals has the power to review factual findings made by the County Court and affirmed by the Appellate Division when those findings are supported by evidence in the record.

    Holding

    No, because the Court of Appeals is bound by factual findings of lower courts when those findings are supported by evidence in the record.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that the merits of Gruttola’s appeal regarding the denial of counsel rested on a version of the facts that had already been rejected by the County Court after a hearing, and then again by the Appellate Division. The Court highlighted that Gruttola had, on the record, affirmed that he understood the consequences of his plea, that he had committed the acts underlying the crimes, and that he was being advised by competent counsel. Citing People v. Seaton, 19 NY2d 404, 406, the court emphasized the weight given to on-the-record statements made during a plea. The Court emphasized that it lacked the power to review factual determinations made by lower courts when those determinations had support in the record. As the Court stated, “since our own examination of the record reveals factual support for the findings below, they are beyond our power of review”. The court based their reasoning on established principles of appellate review, emphasizing the importance of deferring to the factual findings of lower courts when those findings are reasonably supported by the evidence. This deference promotes judicial efficiency and recognizes the trial court’s superior position to assess witness credibility and weigh evidence.

  • People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307 (1975): Attorney Disqualification Due to Conflict of Interest

    People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307 (1975)

    A trial court may disqualify a defendant’s chosen counsel, even over the defendant’s objection, when an attorney’s continued representation poses a substantial risk of prejudice to either the prosecution or the defendant due to a conflict of interest.

    Summary

    Louis Alperin, the defendant’s assigned counsel, discovered he previously represented a key prosecution witness, James Gonzalez, and possessed potentially damaging information about Gonzalez. Fearing prejudice to either the prosecution or the defendant, Alperin moved to be relieved. The trial court granted the motion over the defendant’s objection. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while a defendant has a right to counsel, this right is not absolute and the court can disqualify counsel if a conflict of interest creates a substantial risk of prejudice. The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the sentencing was improper.

    Facts

    On the eve of trial, defense counsel, Louis Alperin, realized he had previously represented a key prosecution witness, James Gonzalez. Alperin’s prior representation involved intimate knowledge of Gonzalez’s personal history, including potentially embarrassing information. After learning who the defense counsel was, Gonzalez recanted his identification of the defendant. Alperin promptly informed the court and prosecution of the conflict.

    Procedural History

    The prosecution moved to disqualify Alperin. Alperin joined the motion. The trial court granted the motion, relieving Alperin and assigning new counsel, despite the defendant’s objections. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in disqualifying the defendant’s assigned counsel, Louis Alperin, due to a conflict of interest arising from his prior representation of a key prosecution witness, despite the defendant’s desire to retain Alperin.

    Holding

    No, because a court may disqualify a defendant’s counsel when continued representation poses a substantial risk of prejudice to either the prosecution or the defendant due to a conflict of interest, even if the defendant objects.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged a defendant’s right to counsel but emphasized that this right is not absolute. The court distinguished this case from situations where a defendant waives a potential conflict or proceeds pro se. The court stated, “Clearly the lawyer cannot terminate the relationship, ex parte. Nor, on the other hand, may the client preclude termination.” The court found that disqualifying Alperin was appropriate because his continued representation created a very likely risk of unfair prejudice to either the prosecution or the defendant. The court reasoned that denying Alperin’s request to be relieved might have violated the defendant’s constitutional rights. The court distinguished United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, noting that in that case, defense counsel did not join the prosecution’s motion to disqualify. The court also addressed the defendant’s claim of improper sentencing, finding that the sentencing judge’s reference to another crime for which the defendant was indicted but not convicted did not influence the sentences imposed.

  • People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167 (1979): Right to Counsel and Interrogation on Related Charges

    People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167 (1979)

    Once an attorney has been assigned to represent a defendant, the police cannot question the defendant about any crime, even if unrelated, in the absence of counsel.

    Summary

    Rogers was arrested and assigned counsel. The attorney notified the Sheriff that Rogers was not to be questioned without counsel present. Subsequently, the police questioned Rogers about a different crime. The New York Court of Appeals held that questioning Rogers about a different, but related, crime without his lawyer present violated his right to counsel. The Court emphasized that once representation begins, questioning is prohibited even on separate matters. The Court also addressed the defendant’s request to represent himself, stating the trial court must conduct a thorough inquiry to ensure the defendant understands the implications of self-representation.

    Facts

    Rogers was arrested and arraigned on burglary charges. Counsel was assigned to represent him. Rogers’ assigned counsel sent a letter to the Sheriff instructing that Rogers not be questioned without counsel being present. While in jail on those charges, police questioned Rogers about a separate but similar burglary that occurred at the same location (Tanner Building Company) a week earlier. Rogers made incriminating statements during the interrogation about the second burglary.

    Procedural History

    Rogers was indicted on both incidents in the same indictment. Rogers moved to suppress the statements made during the interrogation. The trial court denied the motion and also summarily denied Rogers’ request to represent himself. Rogers pleaded guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Rogers appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the police violated the defendant’s right to counsel by questioning him about a different crime than the one for which he was being held, after counsel had been assigned and had instructed the police not to question him in the absence of counsel?

    2. Whether the trial court erred in summarily denying the defendant’s request to represent himself?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because once a defendant is represented by counsel, the police cannot question the defendant about any crime in the absence of counsel, especially where the charges are related.

    2. Yes, because a defendant has a right to represent himself, and the court must conduct an inquiry to determine if the defendant is aware of the consequences of self-representation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the police violated Rogers’ right to counsel because he was represented by counsel at the time of the interrogation. The fact that the police officers questioned Rogers about a different crime was a “technicality of little significance” because both incidents involved burglaries at the same location and were closely related in time. The Court cited People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, in support of its holding. The Court emphasized the importance of the attorney-client relationship and the need to protect a defendant’s right to counsel once it has been invoked. The court found the charges to be sufficiently related, noting “the Grand Jury considered the charges together, and the defendant was indicted for both incidents in the same indictment.”

    Regarding self-representation, the Court held that the trial court should not have summarily denied Rogers’ request to represent himself, citing People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10. The Court stated that the trial court must make further inquiry to ensure that the defendant is fully aware of the consequences of representing himself. The Court noted the fact that Rogers may intend to present an insanity defense does not preclude him from representing himself, as long as he is competent to proceed, citing People v. Reason, 37 N.Y.2d 351.

  • People v. Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289 (1978): Admissibility of Inculpatory Declarations Against Penal Interest

    People v. Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289 (1978)

    An inculpatory declaration against penal interest is admissible in a criminal trial only if the interest compromised is of sufficient magnitude to all but rule out any motive to falsify, the declarant is conscious of the adversity, and the circumstances under which the declaration was made do not reveal motives to fabricate.

    Summary

    William Maerling was convicted of murder, burglary, and robbery based largely on the out-of-court statements of a deceased informant, Anne Marie Paixao, and his own jailhouse confession. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Paixao’s statements did not qualify as admissible declarations against penal interest because her potential motives to fabricate outweighed the reliability of her statements. The court also found that Maerling’s jailhouse confession was obtained in violation of his right to counsel, as it was the product of deliberate elicitation by a jail officer after Maerling had requested to speak about a deal.

    Facts

    Jerry Lo Basso, a reputed bookmaker, was murdered during a home invasion. Anne Marie Paixao informed police that she overheard Maerling, Robert Ragonese, and Tony Franciotti discussing the crime, implicating themselves. Paixao claimed Franciotti mentioned only wanting to “rob them” and “not to shoot anybody”, but Ragonese stated he shot “the old man” and Maerling said he shot “the old lady.” Paixao also stated that Franciotti gave her $25 the day after the robbery. Maerling, who could not read or write, signed a statement consistent with Paixao’s information after his arrest. Later, while in jail and without counsel, Maerling made another inculpatory statement to a jail officer.

    Procedural History

    Maerling was indicted for murder, burglary, and robbery. His case was severed from his co-defendants. The trial court admitted Paixao’s statements and Maerling’s confessions into evidence. Maerling was convicted on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals then reversed the judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the out-of-court statements of a deceased informant were admissible as declarations against penal interest to incriminate the defendant.

    2. Whether the defendant’s jailhouse confession was admissible, considering his right to counsel.

    Holding

    1. No, because the informant’s statements lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and were potentially motivated by a desire for leniency and to minimize her lover’s culpability.

    2. No, because the confession was the product of deliberate elicitation by a jail officer in the absence of counsel, violating the defendant’s right to counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that for an inculpatory declaration against penal interest to be admissible, the interest compromised must be of sufficient magnitude to rule out any motive to falsify. The declarant must also be conscious of the adversity. Here, Anne Marie Paixao’s receipt of a small amount of money ($25) was deemed too trivial to guarantee the trustworthiness of her statements, especially considering her potential motives to fabricate, including seeking leniency on a kidnapping charge and minimizing her lover’s role in the crime.

    Regarding Maerling’s jailhouse confession, the court emphasized the importance of protecting a defendant’s right to counsel. Quoting People v. Hobson, the court stated, “the rule that once a lawyer has entered the proceedings in connection with the charges under investigation, a person in custody may validly waive the assistance of counsel only in the presence of a lawyer breathes life into the requirement that a waiver of a constitutional right must be competent, intelligent and voluntary.” The court determined that Maerling’s confession was not spontaneous but was the product of deliberate elicitation by the jail officer, Cannatella. Even though Maerling initiated the conversation, Cannatella engaged in a two-way conversation that ultimately led to Maerling confessing to the Lo Basso murder after Cannatella prompted him to reveal what he wanted to discuss with the District Attorney’s office. This violated Maerling’s right to counsel, rendering the confession inadmissible. The court stated, “It is one thing for a police officer unavoidably to hear and thereafter to report a statement which in effect is forced on him. It was quite another for Cannatella to engage in the long, two-way conversation whose direction became apparent almost from the beginning. In doing so, he trespassed on the spirit, if not on the letter, of the principles we have reviewed.”

  • People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154 (1978): Waiver of Counsel After Indictment

    People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154 (1978)

    A defendant who is under indictment and in custody may not waive the right to counsel unless an attorney is present.

    Summary

    Settles was convicted of robbery. The key issue was whether a pre-arraignment lineup identification should have been excluded because Settles waived his right to counsel without counsel present after being indicted. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that once an indictment is filed, a defendant in custody cannot waive the right to counsel unless counsel is present. This rule aims to protect the defendant’s rights during the accusatory phase, ensuring a buffer against the state’s power.

    Facts

    Two men robbed a bar, its manager, and a patron. Police responding to the scene engaged in a shootout with one of the robbers, who escaped. Police later found evidence at the apartment of the co-defendant’s common-law wife, including proceeds from the robbery, clothing worn by the perpetrators, and the gun used in the shooting. Both Boalds and Settles were present in the apartment. Boalds was arrested, and Settles was taken in for questioning and then released.

    A grand jury indicted both Settles and Boalds on murder, robbery, and weapons charges. Settles was apprehended in Atlanta, Georgia, and returned to New York. Upon arrival, he was taken to a precinct for a lineup. He was given Miranda warnings and agreed to appear in the lineup without counsel. Two witnesses identified Settles as one of the robbers.

    Procedural History

    Settles and Boalds were jointly tried, and Settles was convicted of first-degree robbery and sentenced as a predicate felony offender. Settles appealed from the judgment of conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed. Settles then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether identifications made by witnesses at a post-indictment, pre-arraignment corporeal viewing of the then unrepresented defendant should have been excluded where defendant, in the absence of counsel, orally waived his right to have an attorney present at the lineup?

    Holding

    No, because a defendant in a postindictment, prearraignment custodial setting, even though not then represented by an attorney, may not in the absence of counsel waive the right to have counsel appear at a corporeal identification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of the right to counsel in New York, which has developed independently of its federal counterpart. Once an indictment is filed, the police function shifts from investigatory to accusatory. "At that point, there is no longer any inquiry into an unsolved crime and the suspect is now the accused." The court stated: "In a very real sense, the indictment represents a method of commencing formal judicial proceedings against the defendant…and it is at that point at which the assistance of counsel is indispensable." The Court reasoned that any delay in arraignment after indictment serves only to bolster the prosecution’s case. The court explicitly stated: "a criminal defendant under indictment and in custody may not waive his right to counsel unless he does so in the presence of an attorney." The court rejected the argument that the need for counsel is lessened at a corporeal viewing, stating that "assistance of counsel after indictment at a lineup is an indispensable correlative to a fair trial." The court emphasized that it refuses "to predicate a waiver of so valued a right on the recitation of a formula printed on a card." The court also addressed the admissibility of a statement by the co-defendant Boalds, finding that it may be admitted under certain circumstances as a declaration against penal interest if it contains sufficient indicia of reliability and trustworthiness.

  • People v. Tompkins, 45 N.Y.2d 748 (1978): Waiver of Counsel Requires Attorney’s Physical Presence

    People v. Tompkins, 45 N.Y.2d 748 (1978)

    Once an attorney has entered a criminal proceeding, a defendant in custody cannot waive the right to counsel unless the attorney is physically present during the waiver.

    Summary

    Tompkins was arrested for robbery and, after receiving Miranda warnings, learned an accomplice implicated him. After speaking with his attorney by phone, Tompkins told police he would talk despite his attorney’s advice. He then confessed to multiple robberies. The County Courts suppressed these statements, but the Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that a defendant in custody cannot waive the right to counsel without the attorney’s physical presence, solidifying the principle established in People v. Hobson. A phone consultation does not satisfy the requirement of counsel’s presence for a valid waiver.

    Facts

    On December 23, 1974, Tompkins was arrested for a robbery at a Seven-Eleven store.
    After receiving Miranda warnings, he learned an accomplice implicated him.
    Tompkins requested and received permission to call his mother and subsequently received a call from his attorney.
    After the call, Tompkins told the investigating officer his attorney advised him not to speak, but he intended to do so anyway.
    Police then interrogated Tompkins, obtaining confessions to the Fishkill robbery and other robberies in Orange and Dutchess Counties.

    Procedural History

    Tompkins was prosecuted in Orange and Dutchess Counties.
    In both counties, Tompkins moved to suppress his statements. The County Courts granted the motions.
    The Appellate Division reversed each order, holding the confessions admissible.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the County Court orders.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant in custody, who has spoken to an attorney by phone, can validly waive the right to counsel without the attorney being physically present during the waiver.
    Whether Tompkins’s statement can be considered a spontaneous admission, making it admissible despite the right to counsel.

    Holding

    No, because once an attorney enters a criminal proceeding, a defendant in custody cannot waive the right to counsel unless the attorney is physically present. A phone call does not constitute presence.
    No, because Tompkins’s statement was not a spontaneous admission but an attempt to waive his right to counsel, which is invalid without the attorney’s physical presence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on People v. Hobson, which established that once a lawyer enters a criminal proceeding, a defendant in custody may only waive the right to counsel in the lawyer’s presence. The court explicitly rejected the argument that a phone call constitutes the “presence of counsel.” The court stated, “[t]his attenuated interpretation of the meaning of ‘presence of counsel’ is totally unacceptable.”
    The court emphasized that the Hobson rule is meant to ensure that any waiver of a constitutional right is competent, intelligent, and voluntary. A mere phone call from counsel does not provide sufficient protection for this right.
    Regarding spontaneous admissions, the court distinguished this case from People v. Kaye, where the defendant volunteered a statement. Here, Tompkins was attempting to waive his right to counsel, not making a spontaneous admission. The court declined to expand the Kaye rationale to include waivers of counsel. The court emphasized, “[O]nce an attorney has entered a criminal proceeding on behalf of a defendant, the defendant in custody may not waive his right to counsel, spontaneously or otherwise, in the absence of the lawyer.”
    The decision reinforces the protection of the right to counsel under the New York Constitution, ensuring that a defendant’s waiver is truly knowing and voluntary, with the benefit of counsel’s physical presence and guidance.

  • People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203 (1980): Re-Interrogation After Invocation of Right to Counsel

    People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203 (1980)

    Once a suspect in custody invokes their right to counsel, police must scrupulously honor that request, and cannot resume interrogation about the same crime shortly thereafter without counsel present, even if Miranda rights are re-administered.

    Summary

    Cunningham was arrested for attempted burglary with two others. After initially being questioned without Miranda warnings, he invoked his right to counsel. Shortly after, a different officer re-initiated questioning about the same crime, obtained incriminating statements, and a written confession after confronting Cunningham with a co-defendant’s statement. The New York Court of Appeals held that the confession was inadmissible because the police failed to scrupulously honor Cunningham’s prior request for counsel. This case clarifies the obligations of law enforcement following a suspect’s invocation of their right to counsel during custodial interrogation.

    Facts

    Cunningham was arrested with Harvey and Eason for attempted burglary. At the time of his arrest, the police seized evidence from their car and obtained statements from Cunningham without advising him of his Miranda rights. Later, at the police station, after being advised of his rights, Cunningham stated he wanted an attorney and did not wish to answer questions without counsel. The initial questioning ceased, and he was allowed to call his mother and ask her to contact an attorney.

    Procedural History

    Cunningham moved to suppress his statements and the physical evidence. The County Court suppressed statements made before Miranda warnings but denied the rest of the motion. Cunningham pleaded guilty to criminal facilitation. The Appellate Term reversed, set aside the plea, and suppressed the confession. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a confession obtained after a suspect invokes the right to counsel, but is subsequently re-interrogated shortly thereafter about the same crime without counsel present, is admissible, when police briefly complied with the request but then resumed questioning and confronted the suspect with a co-defendant’s statement?

    Holding

    No, because the police did not scrupulously honor Cunningham’s request for counsel before re-initiating interrogation about the same criminal offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that when a defendant invokes their right to counsel, Miranda imposes additional obligations on the police, beyond simply advising the defendant of their rights. While the police briefly complied with Cunningham’s request by terminating the interrogation and allowing him to attempt to contact a lawyer, they almost immediately re-initiated questioning about the same crime before he had an opportunity to consult with counsel and without re-advising him of his rights. Confronting Cunningham with Harvey’s statement was coercive, designed to induce him to change his mind and respond to questioning without an attorney. The court emphasized that “[t]his type of conduct cannot be said to be consistent with the obligation of the police to scrupulously honor the defendant’s request for counsel and his refusal to answer questions about the attempted burglary without an attorney’s assistance.” The court distinguished this situation from a permissible break in questioning. This case underscores the importance of respecting a suspect’s right to counsel once invoked, preventing immediate resumption of interrogation on the same matter.