New York Law Review

Tag: Right to Counsel

  • People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24 (1980): Right to Counsel Attaches When Attorney is Retained, Even in Non-Custodial Interrogation

    52 N.Y.2d 24 (1980)

    Once a suspect retains counsel on a matter under investigation, the police cannot interrogate that suspect about the same matter in a non-custodial setting if the suspect’s attorney has instructed the police not to question the suspect in their absence; any waiver of the right to counsel must occur in the presence of the attorney.

    Summary

    Skinner was a suspect in a murder investigation and had retained an attorney who instructed the police not to question him outside of his presence. Despite this instruction, police served Skinner with an order to appear in a lineup, and then proceeded to question him about the homicide, obtaining incriminating statements. The New York Court of Appeals held that Skinner’s state constitutional rights were violated. Because Skinner had retained counsel specifically for the matter under investigation and his attorney instructed the police not to question him in the attorney’s absence, the police could not elicit statements from Skinner in a non-custodial setting without violating his right to counsel. This decision emphasizes the importance of the attorney-client relationship and the state’s obligation to respect it.

    Facts

    Diane Snell was murdered in June 1975. Police suspected Skinner, who had been seen with her the night before. Skinner was questioned twice and submitted to polygraph examinations, but did not confess. In the early fall of 1975, Skinner retained attorney Leo Fallon due to the repeated police questioning. Fallon informed the police department that he represented Skinner and instructed them not to question Skinner without him. In March 1977, police served Skinner with an order to show cause regarding a lineup. After serving the order, detectives, knowing Skinner was represented, questioned him about the homicide and obtained incriminating statements. Skinner was then taken to the police station, but refused to make a statement until he spoke with his attorney.

    Procedural History

    Skinner moved to suppress the statements made on March 10, 1977. The hearing court denied the motion, finding the questioning was non-custodial. Skinner was convicted of first-degree manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the statements were admissible because the interrogation was non-custodial and unrelated to service of the order. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police violated Skinner’s New York constitutional right to counsel when they interrogated him in a non-custodial setting about a matter for which he had retained counsel, after his attorney instructed the police not to question him in his absence.

    Holding

    Yes, because Skinner retained counsel specifically on the matter under investigation, and the police knew this, they could not question him on the same matter in a non-custodial setting after his attorney had instructed them not to question him in his absence. Any waiver of this right had to occur in the presence of his attorney.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the New York State Constitution’s guarantees of the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, and due process. The court emphasized that the right to counsel includes the right to have an attorney present while considering whether to waive rights. The court stated that “where, as here, a defendant is known to have invoked the right to and obtained the services of counsel on the matter about which the person is questioned, the State may not use statements elicited from that person in the absence of a waiver of counsel made in the presence of the attorney.”

    The court distinguished the case from situations where the non-waiver rule was deemed inapplicable in non-custodial settings. The court cited *People v. Townes* and *People v. Roberson*, cases that suppressed statements made in the absence of counsel even though the defendants were not in custody. Here, Skinner had retained counsel specifically because of the police investigation, indicating he felt unable to deal with the authorities without legal assistance. His attorney had interceded, demanding the police not question him, a demand the police ignored on March 10. The court rejected the argument that absent formal commencement of a criminal action, the defendant could be questioned with impunity after service of an order to show cause simply because he was not in custody.

    The Court also reasoned that allowing the police to question a represented individual in a non-custodial setting renders the right to counsel illusory. The effect of a waiver of counsel is the same regardless of whether the setting is custodial or non-custodial; therefore, the waiver’s validity should be equally scrutinized. The court found the motivations of the police irrelevant, as the impact on the right to counsel remains the same.

    The Court acknowledged the People’s argument that they depend on statements of the “guilty” to further an investigation. However, the Court countered that law enforcement officials must operate within the bounds of our State constitutional guarantees of the privilege against self incrimination and the right to counsel.

  • People v. Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 169 (1982): Police Knowledge of Representation Trumps Attorney’s Limited Role

    People v. Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 169 (1982)

    Once the police are aware that a suspect has retained counsel in connection with the charges under investigation, they cannot question the suspect in the absence of counsel, regardless of the specific terms of the attorney-client relationship known to the police.

    Summary

    The defendant, believing he was a suspect in a homicide, retained an attorney who arranged his surrender to the police. The police, aware of the attorney’s involvement, took the defendant into custody and obtained incriminating statements after a Miranda waiver, but without the attorney present. The New York Court of Appeals held that the statements should have been suppressed because the police knew the defendant had retained counsel, and the exact scope of the attorney’s representation was irrelevant to the police conduct, since they had no specific knowledge of its limitations. The Court emphasized the importance of protecting a defendant’s right to counsel once an attorney has entered the proceeding, preventing police from exploiting ambiguities in the attorney-client relationship.

    Facts

    The defendant believed he was wanted by police for a homicide investigation and consulted an attorney.

    The attorney contacted the police, confirmed they were looking for the defendant, and arranged for his surrender.

    The police took the defendant into custody at the attorney’s office.

    At the police station, the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, waived them, and made incriminating statements without counsel present.

    The attorney had only agreed to arrange the surrender, but the police were unaware of this limitation.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the statements.

    The defendant was convicted at trial.

    The Appellate Division modified the sentence but otherwise affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police could question the defendant in the absence of counsel when they knew the defendant was represented by counsel at the time of arrest, but did not know that the attorney had only agreed to arrange the defendant’s surrender to the police.

    Holding

    Yes, because the police were aware that the defendant had retained counsel, and the scope of the attorney’s representation, as known to the police, did not negate the defendant’s right to have counsel present during questioning.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the principle established in People v. Hobson, which protects a defendant’s right to counsel once an attorney has entered the proceeding. The Court stated that it has “attached little significance to the contractual arrangements between the defendant and his attorney in determining whether the defendant’s right to counsel has been violated during custodial interrogation.” It emphasized that the key factor is the police’s awareness of an attorney’s appearance on the defendant’s behalf.

    The Court noted that the police were aware that the defendant had sought and retained counsel, and that the attorney had arranged the surrender. While the attorney’s representation may have technically terminated prior to questioning, the police were not aware of that limited arrangement. The Court reasoned that consulting a lawyer and surrendering with counsel present manifests the defendant’s view that he is not competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice, quoting Michigan v. Mosley: ” ‘his own view that he is not competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice’ (Michigan v. Mosley, 423 US 96, 110, 2 [White, J., concurring]).”

    The Court extended the protection of Hobson to situations where the police are generally aware of representation, even if the exact scope of that representation is unclear, emphasizing that the police should not exploit ambiguities in the attorney-client relationship to justify questioning without counsel present.

  • People v. Quick, 52 N.Y.2d 1041 (1981): Suppression of Confession on Unrelated Charge

    People v. Quick, 52 N.Y.2d 1041 (1981)

    A confession obtained during questioning of a defendant in custody on one charge must be suppressed in its entirety, even if it concerns an unrelated incident, where the questioning violates the defendant’s right to counsel.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a confession obtained from a defendant, who was in custody on one charge, must be suppressed in its entirety even if it relates to an unrelated crime. The defendant was arrested, arraigned, and held in custody. While in custody, police questioned him about the charge for which he was being held and also about an unrelated incident. The Court reasoned that since the questioning violated the defendant’s right to counsel under People v. Hobson, the entire confession, including the portion related to the unrelated incident, was inadmissible. The Court rejected the argument that the confession was spontaneous due to the defendant’s own remarks.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested, arraigned, and held in custody on one charge. While in custody, police questioned the defendant not only about the charge for which he was being held, but also about a separate, unrelated incident. The questioning occurred while the defendant was in custody and without the presence of counsel.

    Procedural History

    The hearing court initially held that the defendant’s statement should be suppressed only insofar as it related to the charge for which the defendant was being held, citing People v. Hobson. The prosecution sought to admit the portion of the confession related to the unrelated incident. The case reached the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a confession obtained during questioning of a defendant in custody on one charge must be suppressed in its entirety if the questioning violates the defendant’s right to counsel, even if part of the confession concerns an unrelated incident.

    Holding

    Yes, because the questioning violated the defendant’s right to counsel; therefore, the entire confession, including the portion related to the unrelated incident, must be suppressed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on People v. Rogers, which extended the protections established in People v. Hobson. The Court reasoned that once a defendant in custody is represented by counsel, or has invoked the right to counsel, they cannot be questioned in the absence of counsel. This rule applies even if the questioning pertains to an unrelated matter. The Court explicitly stated that the protections of People v. Hobson apply to cases on appeal at the time Hobson was decided. The Court rejected the prosecution’s argument that the confession was spontaneous, stating that the fact that the questioning was prompted by the defendant’s remarks did not render his answers spontaneous, citing People v. Tompkins. The court emphasized the prophylactic nature of the Hobson rule, designed to safeguard the attorney-client relationship and prevent police overreach. The court found no merit to the prosecutor’s argument that People v. Rogers should not be applied retroactively, noting that Rogers was based on People v. Hobson, which has been applied to cases on appeal at the time the case was decided. Judge Jasen concurred on constraint of People v Rogers.

  • People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218 (1980): Waiver of Right to Counsel After Felony Complaint

    People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218 (1980)

    Once a felony complaint is filed and an arrest warrant is issued, a defendant’s right to counsel attaches, and any waiver of that right obtained in the absence of counsel is invalid, rendering any subsequent statements inadmissible.

    Summary

    Samuels was arrested and questioned about a robbery after a felony complaint was filed against him. He waived his Miranda rights outside the presence of counsel and made incriminating statements. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the felony complaint initiated formal adversarial proceedings, Samuels’s right to counsel had indelibly attached. Therefore, his waiver of counsel in the absence of an attorney was invalid, and his statements were inadmissible. The court emphasized that once a formal accusation is made, the matter becomes a legal controversy requiring the presence of counsel to safeguard the defendant’s rights.

    Facts

    On September 4, 1975, a store robbery occurred in Nassau County. Several days later, an investigating officer filed a felony complaint in the District Court, charging Samuels with the crime. An arrest warrant was issued based on the complaint. On October 5, 1975, police arrested Samuels at his mother’s home. Before arraignment, Samuels was taken to the local precinct for “processing.” At the police station, he was advised of his Miranda rights and questioned about the robbery without counsel present. He made oral and written statements admitting involvement, but claimed coercion.

    Procedural History

    Samuels moved to suppress his statements, arguing he wasn’t properly advised of his rights and was coerced. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing. He was subsequently convicted of robbery. On appeal, Samuels argued that the confession should have been suppressed because it was obtained without counsel after the felony complaint was filed. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can validly waive their right to counsel in the absence of an attorney after a felony complaint has been filed in court and an arrest warrant has been issued.

    Holding

    No, because once a felony complaint is filed and an arrest warrant is issued, the right to counsel attaches, and any waiver of that right in the absence of counsel is invalid.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the right to counsel attaches at all critical stages of a criminal prosecution and commences with the filing of an accusatory instrument, including a felony complaint. The court distinguished this case from situations where the police were merely investigating a crime. It stated, “The sole function of a warrant of arrest is to achieve a defendant’s court appearance in a criminal action for the purpose of arraignment upon the accusatory instrument by which such action was commenced.” Once a formal accusation is made, the matter is no longer simply an investigation but a legal controversy. Quoting People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 163-164, the court noted, “Once a matter is the subject of a legal controversy any discussions relating thereto should be conducted by counsel: at that point the parties are in no position to safeguard their rights.” The court emphasized that the defendant has a right to counsel at all preliminary proceedings, including arraignment on a felony complaint. Since “all that stands between the entry of counsel into the proceedings and nonrepresentation is the ministerial act of arraignment, there may be no waiver of the right to counsel unless an attorney is present.” Therefore, Samuels’ statements obtained in the absence of counsel after the felony complaint was filed should have been suppressed.

  • People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203 (1980): Right to Counsel After Request

    People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203 (1980)

    Once a suspect in custody requests the assistance of counsel, they may not be questioned further in the absence of an attorney, and any subsequent uncounseled waiver of constitutional rights will not be deemed voluntary.

    Summary

    Frederick Cunningham was convicted of second-degree murder. A key piece of evidence was a statement he gave to police after invoking his right to counsel. Cunningham initially agreed to speak with police but then requested an attorney. Later, he initiated contact with the police and, after speaking with his wife, waived his rights and made incriminating statements. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that once a suspect in custody requests counsel, any subsequent waiver made outside the presence of an attorney is invalid. The court reasoned that this rule protects the individual’s right against self-incrimination and ensures a knowing and voluntary waiver.

    Facts

    Frederick Cunningham was arrested at his home at 7:00 p.m. on March 7, 1975, and taken to police headquarters. He was given Miranda warnings and initially agreed to speak with the police, but did not provide any incriminating information. Around 10:30 p.m., after being formally arrested and re-Mirandized, Cunningham stated he would not sign a waiver and wanted to consult an attorney. The police ceased questioning and booked him. At 1:30 a.m., Cunningham called the police to his cell stating he wished to make a statement. He was given Miranda warnings again, but again declined to sign a waiver, reiterating his desire for counsel. As police were returning him to his cell, he saw his wife, conferred with her, and then stated he would speak without an attorney. He then signed a waiver and made incriminating statements.

    Procedural History

    Cunningham moved to suppress the statement, arguing it was involuntary. The trial court denied the motion, finding the statement voluntary. Cunningham was convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a suspect in custody, who has invoked the right to counsel, may validly waive that right and make admissible statements to police in the absence of an attorney.

    Holding

    No, because once a suspect in custody requests the assistance of counsel, any subsequent uncounseled waiver of their constitutional rights is not deemed voluntary under New York State’s constitutional and statutory guarantees.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized New York State’s strong protection of the right to counsel, holding that it includes the right to advice of counsel before deciding to waive the privilege against self-incrimination or the right to an attorney. The court distinguished between situations where formal adversary proceedings have commenced (e.g., indictment, arraignment) and where a suspect has retained counsel. The court extended its existing protections, stating that even if a suspect has not yet secured an attorney but requests one, they are “expressing] his own view that he is not competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice.” The court explicitly rejected the idea that the right to counsel should depend on whether a defendant had a prior relationship with an attorney. To hold otherwise would disadvantage those who are not affluent or have not previously required legal assistance. Therefore, once the right to counsel is invoked, all guarantees implicit in that right come into play, and a subsequent waiver outside the presence of counsel is invalid. The court stated: “[W]e reaffirm our position that the right to counsel in this State includes the right of an accused to have the advice of counsel before making the decision to waive either his privilege against self incrimination or his right to the assistance of an attorney, so that once a defendant in custody invokes his right to counsel, all of the guarantees implicit in that right are brought into play, and a subsequent waiver of rights outside the presence of counsel cannot be given legal effect.”

  • People v. Stroh, 48 N.Y.2d 1000 (1979): Clarifying Ambiguous Requests for Counsel During Interrogation

    People v. Stroh, 48 N.Y.2d 1000 (1979)

    When a suspect makes an ambiguous statement regarding the desire for counsel during police interrogation, clarifying questions by the police are permissible, but once the suspect unequivocally requests an attorney, questioning must cease.

    Summary

    John Stroh was arrested and charged with murder. During interrogation, he made three statements to law enforcement officials. Before his first statement, Stroh stated he wanted “either an attorney or a priest to talk to.” After making the first two statements without an attorney present, Stroh told an Assistant District Attorney that he had asked for a lawyer earlier and nobody responded. The Court of Appeals held that the first two statements were admissible because Stroh’s initial request was ambiguous and clarified as a request for a priest. However, the third statement was inadmissible because Stroh explicitly requested counsel before making it.

    Facts

    John Stroh was arrested on July 8, 1975, for second-degree murder.

    During questioning by a senior investigator, Stroh stated, “hold it, I would like to either have an attorney or a priest to talk to, to have present”.

    The officer asked, “who do you want,” and Stroh replied, “contact a priest down in the parish, in Beacon”. The priest was contacted but did not arrive immediately.

    Before the priest arrived, Stroh made an oral statement and then a typewritten statement.

    Later, an Assistant District Attorney obtained a waiver of Stroh’s rights and questioned him. Stroh stated, “Well, I had asked for a lawyer before and nobody said nothing”. The assistant replied “O.K.” and continued to question Stroh, eliciting a third statement.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress all three statements.

    The lower courts ruled on the admissibility of the statements.

    The Court of Appeals reviewed the lower court’s decision regarding the suppression motion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s initial statement requesting “either an attorney or a priest” was an unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel, thus requiring the cessation of questioning.

    Whether the third statement, made after the defendant asserted he had asked for a lawyer previously, should have been suppressed.

    Holding

    1. No, because the officer permissibly clarified Stroh’s ambiguous request, and Stroh then specified that he wanted a priest. Questioning could continue until Stroh clearly invoked his right to counsel.

    2. Yes, because once Stroh stated he had asked for a lawyer before, the authorities were obligated to cease questioning, and the third statement was therefore inadmissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that when a defendant makes an ambiguous request for counsel, it is permissible for the police to clarify the request, as long as they do not dissuade the defendant from exercising their rights. The Court distinguished between the initial ambiguous request for “either a priest or an attorney” and the subsequent statement to the Assistant District Attorney, where Stroh asserted he had previously requested an attorney.

    Regarding the initial request, the court noted, “It was not improper for the officer to clarify the situation by asking ‘who do you want’, so long as this was not accomplished in a manner which would tend to dissuade defendant from exercising his rights.” Since Stroh clarified that he wanted a priest, the police were allowed to continue questioning him until he clearly requested an attorney.

    However, regarding the third statement, the court stated, “when speaking with the assistant, defendant did indicate a desire for an attorney. It was only at this time that defendant’s statement reflected a request for legal counsel. And it was then that the law enforcement authorities became duty bound not to seek a waiver of defendant’s rights or proceed with questioning. Their failure to do so renders the third statement inadmissible.”

    Chief Judge Cooke dissented in part, arguing that only the third statement should be suppressed, as the initial request was ambiguous and the officer properly clarified it. The dissent emphasized that the bright-line rule against questioning after a request for counsel should only apply when the request is unambiguous.

  • People v. Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 169 (1982): Consent to Search After Request for Counsel

    People v. Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 169 (1982)

    Once a suspect in custody requests counsel, any subsequent consent to a warrantless search obtained in the absence of counsel is invalid, even if the consent appears voluntary.

    Summary

    Knapp was arrested for grand larceny, and after being read his Miranda rights, stated he would get a lawyer. The police ceased questioning about the crime but asked Knapp if they could look around his property. Knapp agreed and signed a consent form. The search revealed stolen materials. The New York Court of Appeals held that Knapp’s consent was invalid because it was obtained after he requested counsel but before he had the opportunity to consult with an attorney. The court reasoned that the right to counsel is just as important when police seek a waiver of the right to be secure against unreasonable searches as when they seek a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. The evidence obtained during the search was therefore suppressed.

    Facts

    Deputy Sheriff Price arrested Knapp for grand larceny based on information about ongoing thefts.

    Price advised Knapp of his Miranda rights, and Knapp indicated he understood them.

    Another officer testified that Knapp stated, “You’re damn right, I’m going to have a lawyer.”

    Sergeant Fikar arrived and, after confirming Knapp was advised of his rights, asked about building materials on the property.

    Knapp stated he wanted to speak to his attorney before making any statement.

    Fikar then asked if Knapp minded if he looked around, and Knapp said “no” and signed a consent to search form after being told he had the right to refuse.

    A search of the property revealed stolen building materials.

    After the initial search, Knapp again requested his attorney and was allowed to call him. The attorney arrived but did not object to the search.

    Procedural History

    The County Court denied Knapp’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding the consent was voluntary based on People v. Gonzalez.

    Knapp pleaded guilty to grand larceny in the second degree.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a consent to a warrantless search is valid when obtained after a suspect in custody has requested counsel but before counsel is provided.

    Holding

    No, because once a suspect requests counsel, the police cannot seek a waiver of the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures until the suspect has been permitted access to counsel, and any consent obtained before then is legally ineffectual.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found no basis to distinguish between obtaining a statement and obtaining consent to a search after a defendant’s request for an attorney. Quoting Miranda v. Arizona, the court emphasized that “If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.”

    The court reasoned that the right to counsel is just as important when police seek a relinquishment of the constitutional right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures as when they seek a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination.

    The court found that the police did not “scrupulously honor” Knapp’s request for counsel. Instead, they merely shifted their focus from obtaining oral statements to eliciting consent to search. Because the defendant had requested counsel twice, the police were constitutionally prohibited from seeking his consent to the search before he had access to counsel.

    The court rejected the argument that the attorney’s later arrival and failure to object validated the search, stating the attorney “could not then undo what had already been accomplished”. The court reasoned that there was no evidence to support the claim that the defendant, on advice of counsel, retroactively validated the earlier unconstitutional search.

    The court cited People v. Grant, 45 N.Y.2d 366 and People v. Buxton, 44 N.Y.2d 33 in support of their holding.

  • People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167 (1979): Right to Counsel Extends to Questioning on Unrelated Matters

    People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167 (1979)

    Once an attorney has entered a proceeding representing a defendant, the police may not question the defendant in custody on any matter, even if seemingly unrelated, in the absence of counsel, and any waiver of this right must occur in the presence of the attorney.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that once an attorney represents a defendant in a criminal matter and instructs the police to cease questioning, the police cannot further interrogate the defendant, even about unrelated matters, without the attorney present. Rogers was arrested for robbery and, after initially waiving his Miranda rights, his attorney instructed the police to stop questioning him. The police then questioned Rogers about unrelated activities, after which he made an inculpatory statement about the robbery. The Court of Appeals reversed Rogers’s conviction, ruling the statement inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of his right to counsel.

    Facts

    Rogers was arrested on December 16, 1975, as a suspect in a liquor store robbery. He was given Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest and again at police headquarters. Rogers informed the police that he had an attorney but was willing to speak without him. After two hours of interrogation, Rogers’s attorney instructed the police to cease further questioning. Despite this instruction, the police continued to question Rogers for four hours about unrelated activities, after which Rogers made an inculpatory statement about the robbery. Rogers was handcuffed throughout the entire period.

    Procedural History

    Rogers was convicted of robbery in the first degree after a jury trial and of burglary in the third degree upon a guilty plea. He sought to suppress the inculpatory statement, but the motion was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgments of conviction. Rogers then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police may question a defendant about matters unrelated to the charge for which the defendant is represented by counsel, after the attorney has instructed the police to cease questioning and the defendant has waived his rights outside the presence of his attorney.

    Holding

    No, because once an attorney has entered the proceeding, the police may not elicit any statements from the defendant, except those necessary for processing or physical needs, nor may they seek a waiver of this right, except in the presence of counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of protecting an individual’s privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel, stating that these rights must be accorded the highest degree of respect. The court noted that previous decisions had created an exception to the rule against questioning a represented defendant when the questioning concerned unrelated charges. However, the court found that this exception was inconsistent with the principles enunciated in People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479 (1976), which emphasized the protective role of counsel once representation has begun. The court reasoned that it would “ignore reality to deny the role of counsel when the particular episode of questioning does not concern the pending charge.” The court explicitly stated, “[O]nce a defendant is represented by an attorney, the police may not elicit from him any statements, except those necessary for processing or his physical needs. Nor may they seek a waiver of this right, except in the presence of counsel.” The court also determined that Rogers’s inculpatory statement did not fall within the “spontaneously volunteered statement” exception because it was induced by the coercive atmosphere created by the continuous interrogation and the restriction on Rogers’s freedom of movement. “Given the unique circumstances here, there can be no conclusion other than that defendant’s statement did not fall within the exception.”

  • People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203 (1980): Right to Counsel Must Be Scrupulously Honored After Invocation

    People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203 (1980)

    Once a suspect in custody unequivocally requests the assistance of counsel, both the police and the prosecutor have a duty to scrupulously honor that request and refrain from further questioning until counsel is provided; a subsequent waiver of rights obtained without honoring the initial request is invalid.

    Summary

    Cunningham, while in police custody, explicitly refused to make a statement without an attorney. Instead of assisting him in obtaining counsel, the police returned him to a holding pen. Several hours later, after some cooperation from Cunningham, they obtained a waiver of his rights and proceeded with questioning. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, vacated the plea, and granted the motion to suppress, holding that Cunningham’s initial request for counsel was not scrupulously honored, rendering the subsequent waiver invalid, even if the error wasn’t adequately preserved at trial.

    Facts

    The defendant, Cunningham, was in police custody and being questioned by an Assistant District Attorney. During the questioning, Cunningham explicitly stated that he would not make a statement without the presence of an attorney. Instead of assisting Cunningham in obtaining legal representation, the police returned him to a holding pen. Hours later, after the defendant cooperated to some extent, the police sought and obtained a waiver of his rights, and continued questioning him.

    Procedural History

    The defendant entered a plea, presumably based on evidence obtained during the questioning. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, vacated the plea, and granted the motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the questioning. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court, Bronx County, for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police and prosecutor scrupulously honored the defendant’s right to counsel when, after the defendant refused to make a statement without an attorney, they failed to assist him in obtaining counsel and instead obtained a waiver of his rights hours later.

    Holding

    No, because the police and prosecutor became duty bound not to question defendant without first scrupulously honoring his right to counsel. The police failed to do so by not taking steps to assist defendant in obtaining counsel and instead obtaining a waiver of his rights hours later.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on established precedent holding that when a defendant in custody requests counsel, the police and prosecutor have a duty to scrupulously honor that request. The Court emphasized that this duty requires more than simply ceasing questioning temporarily. It necessitates actively assisting the defendant in obtaining legal representation, or at the very least, refraining from any actions that undermine the defendant’s ability to secure counsel. The court found that merely returning Cunningham to a holding pen after he invoked his right to counsel, and then later obtaining a waiver, did not meet the standard of “scrupulously honoring” his request. The court stated, “In these circumstances, it cannot be said that defendant’s refusal to answer questions without the aid of counsel was scrupulously honored.” The Court also noted that a violation of the right to counsel may be reviewed even in the absence of a formal objection at trial, underscoring the fundamental importance of protecting this right.

  • People v. Ermo, 47 N.Y.2d 863 (1979): Waiver of Counsel in Interrelated Offenses

    People v. Ermo, 47 N.Y.2d 863 (1979)

    When two offenses are so interwoven that questioning about one necessarily involves the other, a suspect represented by counsel on one charge cannot waive counsel on the second charge without counsel being present.

    Summary

    William Ermo was convicted of murder. The Appellate Division overturned the conviction, and the People appealed. Ermo, represented by counsel on an assault charge, was questioned about an unrelated murder. He waived his right to counsel and confessed to the murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that because the questioning about the assault and murder were interwoven, Ermo could not waive his right to counsel on the murder charge without his attorney present. The dissent argued that established precedent allowed questioning on an unrelated charge, and the charges here were sufficiently distinct.

    Facts

    William Ermo was accused of assaulting a young schoolgirl on March 13, 1972. This led police to question him about the murder of Ursula Shiba, which occurred seven months prior. There was no initial suspicion linking Ermo to the murder; only the proximity of his address to the victim’s led to the questioning. Ermo waived his Miranda rights and confessed to the murder during questioning.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Ermo of murder. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, who is represented by counsel on one charge, can waive his right to counsel and be questioned about a separate, but possibly related, charge without his attorney present, and whether a confession obtained during such questioning is admissible.

    Holding

    Yes, because the questioning regarding the assault and the murder were interwoven, the defendant could not waive his right to counsel on the murder charge without his attorney present. The confession was therefore inadmissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding the questioning regarding the assault and the murder were interwoven. Even though the charges were initially considered separate, the sexual nature of the assault charge brought the prior unsolved murder into the discussion. The court emphasized the importance of protecting a defendant’s right to counsel, particularly when the questioning blurs the lines between ostensibly separate offenses.

    The dissenting judge, Gabrielli, argued that the majority opinion disregarded established precedent. He cited cases such as People v. Stanley, People v. Simons, and People v. Coleman, which held that a defendant could waive counsel on an unrelated pending charge without counsel present. Gabrielli argued that the mere fact that the defendant has been arraigned or indicted on one charge does not prevent law-enforcement officials from interrogating him, in the absence of an attorney, about another and different crime. He asserted that the two crimes were not significantly related. He stated, “Representation by counsel in a proceeding unrelated to the investigation is insufficient to invoke” the rule that a person may not be interrogated after a lawyer has entered another proceeding in which he is represented by counsel.