New York Law Review

Tag: Right to Counsel

  • Matter of Jeter v. Poole, 2024 NY Slip Op 05868: Application of New Law to Pending Administrative Appeals in Child Abuse Cases

    2024 NY Slip Op 05868

    When a new law alters the legal standard in a case that is pending on appeal, the appellate court must apply the new law unless the legislature clearly indicated otherwise or applying the new law would create a manifest injustice.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether amendments to the Social Services Law, which changed the standards for removing individuals from the Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment (SCR), applied to a case that was pending appeal when the new law took effect. The court held that the amendments did not apply retroactively because the legislature explicitly set a future effective date for the changes. The court also addressed whether a party has a constitutional right to counsel in SCR proceedings.

    Facts

    Shani Jeter was accused of abusing her daughter, T. The police, a teacher, and a caseworker received reports of the incident. Subsequently, the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) initiated a neglect proceeding in Family Court, and the police made a report to the SCR. After an investigation, ACS indicated that the report against Jeter was substantiated. Family Court ultimately dismissed the neglect proceeding. Jeter challenged the SCR determination administratively, but the New York State Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) upheld it. Jeter then initiated an Article 78 proceeding, arguing that the new legislative amendments to Social Services Law § 422 should apply to her case, entitling her to have the indication of child abuse expunged from the SCR due to the Family Court dismissal, and she had a constitutional right to assigned counsel during the SCR hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed OCFS’s determination, and Jeter appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    ACS commenced a Family Court article 10 neglect proceeding, which was eventually adjourned in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) and then dismissed. An administrative hearing was held before OCFS, which determined that Jeter had maltreated her daughter. Jeter sought judicial review of the OCFS determination via an Article 78 proceeding, which was transferred to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division confirmed OCFS’s determination, and Jeter appealed to the Court of Appeals, which granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the amendments to Social Services Law § 422, which took effect during the pendency of Jeter’s Article 78 proceeding, applied to her case, specifically regarding the presumption to be applied to the SCR determination following the Family Court’s dismissal of the neglect proceeding.

    2. Whether Jeter had a constitutional right to assigned counsel during the SCR administrative hearing.

    Holding

    1. No, because the legislature specifically provided that these amendments would not apply until January 1, 2022.

    2. No, because Jeter’s interest in her reputation and employment prospects were not sufficient to warrant the appointment of counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while a party is typically entitled to the benefit of the law as it exists at the time of appeal, the legislature clearly stated that the 2020 amendments would not take effect until January 1, 2022, months after the administrative hearing and OCFS determination. The court emphasized that the legislature’s intent should be effectuated, and there was no indication that the legislature intended for the new provisions to apply retroactively. Regarding the right to counsel, the Court noted that, unlike Family Court proceedings where a person’s physical liberty or the custody of their children is at stake, SCR proceedings do not implicate such fundamental rights. As a result, due process was satisfied by providing the opportunity for counsel, not requiring its assignment.

    Practical Implications

    The decision reinforces the principle that when a statute’s effective date is delayed, courts must respect the legislature’s intent not to apply the new law to pending matters. It highlights the limited scope of the constitutional right to assigned counsel in administrative proceedings, particularly those affecting reputation or employment. The case clarifies the importance of analyzing legislative intent when considering the application of statutory amendments during appellate review, demonstrating that a delayed effective date is a strong indicator against retroactivity. The ruling also impacts child welfare cases. The outcome of an ACD or a dismissal in Family Court may not automatically result in the expungement of a report from the SCR if the administrative review happened before the amendments took effect. This means that the Family Court’s determination is not binding if OCFS made a decision before January 1, 2022.

  • People v. Garay, 24 N.Y.3d 64 (2014): Preservation of Right to Counsel and Courtroom Closure Procedures

    People v. Garay, 24 N.Y.3d 64 (2014)

    To preserve a claim of deprivation of the right to counsel for appellate review, a defendant must object at the time of the alleged violation, when the trial court has an opportunity to correct the error.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed three claims in this case: a Sixth Amendment right to counsel violation due to the replacement of a sick juror; a Sixth Amendment right to a public trial violation due to courtroom closure during testimony of undercover officers; and denial of a suppression hearing. The court held that the right to counsel claim was not preserved for appellate review due to a lack of timely objection. The court also upheld the courtroom closure, finding that the trial court was not required to explicitly state on the record the alternatives considered, so long as the record established the need for closure. Finally, the court upheld the denial of a suppression hearing, finding that the defendant’s assertions were insufficient to raise a factual issue warranting a hearing under CPL 710.60.

    Facts

    Benny Garay was tried with co-defendant Rivera for drug-related offenses. During the trial, a juror called in sick, prompting the judge to replace the juror with an alternate. Garay’s counsel was not present during the initial discussion of the replacement, but was present when the alternate juror was seated. During trial, the courtroom was partially closed during the testimony of two undercover officers. The court had conducted a Hinton hearing and allowed the defendant’s family members to attend. The police, investigating a drug operation, arrested Garay and found cocaine on his person. Garay moved to suppress the evidence, claiming lack of consent and probable cause. The trial court denied the motion.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Garay of criminal possession of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s right to counsel was violated when a sick juror was replaced with an alternate juror.

    2. Whether the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated by the partial courtroom closure during the testimony of undercover officers.

    3. Whether the trial court erred in summarily denying the defendant’s request for a suppression hearing.

    Holding

    1. No, because the claim was not preserved for appellate review due to the defense counsel’s failure to object.

    2. No, because the trial court considered the alternatives to closure sufficiently.

    3. No, because the defendant’s motion papers did not contain sufficient factual allegations to warrant a hearing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that the defendant’s right to counsel claim was unpreserved because defense counsel was present when the alternate juror was seated, and did not object to the replacement. The court cited CPL 470.05(2), which requires a timely protest to preserve a claim of error. The court distinguished the situation from cases where counsel was absent when the alleged deprivation occurred, and thus could not object. For the courtroom closure issue, the court found the trial court’s closure was proper, as the record supported the need for closure and the court had allowed family members to attend. The court reaffirmed People v. Echevarria, which held that a trial court need not explicitly state the alternatives considered. Finally, regarding the suppression hearing, the court referenced CPL 710.60 and People v. Mendoza. Defendant’s assertion of innocent conduct at the time of arrest, without refuting the allegations of the drug conspiracy, did not establish entitlement to a hearing.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of timely objections to preserve legal arguments for appeal. Attorneys must be vigilant in raising objections when potential errors occur in the presence of the court to ensure their clients’ rights are protected. The case confirms the standard in New York for courtroom closures, holding that a trial court does not need to explicitly enumerate alternatives considered, as long as the record supports the necessity of closure. The case also reinforces the requirements for suppression motions, emphasizing that such motions must contain sworn factual allegations sufficient to raise a legal basis for suppression. This highlights the need for attorneys to present specific factual challenges to establish grounds for a suppression hearing.

  • People v. Johnson, 27 N.Y.3d 190 (2016): Right to Counsel Extends to Intertwined Cases

    27 N.Y.3d 190 (2016)

    When a defendant cooperates with police on a new investigation to gain leniency in a pending case, the right to counsel in the pending case extends to the new investigation, requiring a valid waiver before questioning.

    Summary

    Raul Johnson, represented by counsel on a burglary charge, offered information about a stabbing to gain leniency. He met with police, signed a cooperation agreement, and later, without his attorney present, confessed to the stabbing. The New York Court of Appeals held that Johnson’s right to counsel was violated because the stabbing investigation was intertwined with his burglary case. The court reasoned that his attorney’s duty extended to advising him on the potential implications of his cooperation. Without a valid waiver of counsel, the confession was inadmissible, and the conviction was reversed.

    Facts

    Defendant Raul Johnson was arrested for burglary. He offered information about an earlier, unrelated stabbing in a supermarket parking lot in exchange for leniency in his burglary case. Johnson met with police and his attorney, John Schwarz, and signed a “Queen-for-a-Day” agreement. During the meeting, Johnson implicated Sunny Bajwa in the stabbing, but police found inconsistencies in his story. Later, Johnson was released from jail with the People’s consent. Without his lawyer present, Johnson met with police officers again where his version of events changed multiple times, eventually confessing to the stabbing.

    Procedural History

    Johnson was charged with attempted murder and assault for the stabbing. The Supreme Court denied his motion to suppress his statements. Johnson was convicted of both crimes. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the police were not barred from questioning Johnson about the stabbing because the two charges were unrelated. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the police questioning of Johnson about the stabbing violated his right to counsel, given that he was represented by counsel on a pending burglary charge and was cooperating in the stabbing investigation to obtain leniency in the burglary case.

    2. Whether Johnson validly waived his right to counsel at the April 19 meeting with police.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because under these circumstances, Schwarz’s duty to his client required him to concern himself with both cases.

    2. No, because there was no express waiver of the right to counsel, nor could a waiver be inferred from the circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that because Johnson’s cooperation in the stabbing investigation was directly linked to his hope for a favorable outcome in the burglary case, his attorney’s representation extended to the stabbing investigation. The court stated, “Schwarz’s obligation in defending the burglary case included an obligation to be alert to, and to avert if he could, the possibility that defendant’s cooperation would hurt rather than help him.” Therefore, the police should not have questioned Johnson about the stabbing without a valid waiver of his right to counsel. The Court emphasized the need for an express waiver, preferably in writing, where a defendant seeks leniency through cooperation. It noted that even if a limited waiver existed for interviewing Johnson as a potential witness, that waiver could not extend to the point when police realized Johnson was a suspect. At that point, police should have contacted Schwarz. The dissent argued that the two cases were unrelated and the detectives acted properly by interviewing him about the stabbing. The majority’s opinion states that, “Once an attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not question the defendant in the absence of counsel unless there is an affirmative waiver, in the presence of the attorney, of the defendant’s right to counsel” (People v Arthur, 22 NY2d 325, 329 [1968]).

  • People v. Grubstein, 22 N.Y.3d 501 (2013): Post-Conviction Relief and Right to Counsel Claims

    22 N.Y.3d 501 (2013)

    A defendant alleging deprivation of the right to counsel during a guilty plea is not automatically barred from raising this claim in a post-conviction motion (CPL 440.10), even if the issue wasn’t raised on direct appeal.

    Summary

    Grubstein pleaded guilty to misdemeanor DWI in 2008 without counsel and was not advised of his right to appeal. In 2010, a subsequent DWI charge was elevated to a felony due to the prior conviction. Grubstein moved to withdraw his 2008 plea, arguing an invalid waiver of counsel. The Town Court granted the motion, but the Appellate Term reversed, stating the claim should have been raised on direct appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the failure to raise a right to counsel claim on direct appeal does not automatically bar its assertion in a CPL 440.10 motion, especially when the deprivation of counsel may have prevented a proper appeal.

    Facts

    In 2008, Grubstein pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated (DWI) in Tuxedo Town Court. He was not represented by an attorney during these proceedings. The Town Court did not advise him of his right to appeal the conviction. Grubstein did not file an appeal. In 2010, Grubstein was arrested and charged with another DWI. Due to the 2008 conviction, the 2010 charge was elevated to a felony under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (1) (c) (i). Grubstein then moved in the Town Court to withdraw his 2008 guilty plea.

    Procedural History

    The Tuxedo Town Court granted Grubstein’s motion to withdraw his 2008 guilty plea, finding that his waiver of counsel was not knowing or intelligent. The People appealed this decision. The Appellate Term reversed the Town Court’s order, holding that Grubstein should have raised the issue on direct appeal, as there were sufficient facts in the record to evaluate his claims. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal the Appellate Term’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, who pleaded guilty pro se and was allegedly deprived of the right to counsel, is barred from raising that claim in a motion under CPL 440.10 due to failure to raise it on direct appeal.

    Holding

    No, because a defendant who was allegedly deprived of the right to counsel when pleading guilty pro se is not automatically barred from raising that claim in a CPL 440.10 motion due to the failure to raise it on direct appeal. The failure to appeal must be “unjustifiable,” and a violation of the right to counsel that impaired the defendant’s ability to pursue appellate relief should normally be a sufficient justification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that applying the procedural bar in CPL 440.10(2)(c) could be unfair when the defendant claims deprivation of the right to counsel. The Court stated, “A defendant who has wrongly been deprived of a lawyer can hardly be blamed for failing to follow customary legal procedures.” The Court emphasized that Section 440.10(2)(c) only applies when the failure to appeal is “unjustifiable.” Furthermore, the Town Court failed to advise Grubstein of his right to appeal, which is required by 22 NYCRR 671.5 when a defendant appears pro se. The Court referenced prior cases involving the writ of error coram nobis, the predecessor to CPL Article 440, stating that procedural barriers to post-conviction relief are relaxed when a violation of the right to counsel is claimed. Quoting People v. Hannigan, 7 NY2d 317, 318 (1960), the Court noted that “ ‘Judicial interference with the right to counsel guaranteed to defendant by law may warrant the extraordinary remedy of coram nobis, even though the error appears on the face of the record.’ ” The Court concluded that Grubstein was not barred from raising his right to counsel claim in a CPL article 440 motion and remitted the case to the Appellate Term to consider the remaining issues.

  • People v. McLean, 22 N.Y.3d 127 (2013): Police Can Rely on Attorney’s Statement of Discontinuance

    People v. McLean, 22 N.Y.3d 127 (2013)

    When police are told by a suspect’s lawyer that the lawyer no longer represents him, they may question the suspect without violating his right to counsel.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that police did not violate a defendant’s right to counsel when they questioned him after his attorney stated he no longer represented him. McLean, previously represented by Kouray for a robbery charge, provided information about a murder in exchange for a plea deal. Years later, after Baker implicated McLean in the murder, detectives spoke with Kouray, who stated he no longer represented McLean. Subsequently, the detectives questioned McLean, who provided a new statement implicating himself in the murder. The Court of Appeals found that the police reasonably relied on Kouray’s statement and were not required to take further steps to ascertain the status of the attorney-client relationship.

    Facts

    In 2003, McLean, represented by attorney Kouray, offered information about a murder to get a lighter sentence on a robbery charge. He provided a statement to Detective Sims in Kouray’s presence. In 2006, after Antoan Baker implicated McLean in the murder, Detective Sims contacted Kouray to inquire if he still represented McLean. Kouray stated he did not. Detectives then interviewed McLean in prison, after administering Miranda warnings, about the murder. McLean provided a new, more incriminating statement.

    Procedural History

    McLean was indicted for murder. His motion to suppress the 2006 statement was denied, and he pleaded guilty. His direct appeal, arguing a violation of his right to counsel, was initially rejected due to an insufficient record. McLean then moved to set aside his conviction under CPL 440.10, again arguing a right to counsel violation. The County Court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The dissenting Justice granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police violated McLean’s right to counsel when they questioned him after his attorney told them that he no longer represented him.

    Holding

    Yes, because the police had a reasonable basis to believe that the attorney-client relationship had ceased when McLean’s attorney explicitly stated he no longer represented him.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the principle established in People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325 (1968) and People v. West, 81 N.Y.2d 370 (1993), which generally prohibits questioning a defendant in the absence of counsel once an attorney has entered the proceeding, unless the defendant affirmatively waives his right to counsel in the attorney’s presence. However, the Court distinguished the present case from West, where police failed to make any inquiry regarding the status of the attorney-client relationship. Here, the police specifically asked Kouray if he still represented McLean, and Kouray responded in the negative.

    The Court reasoned that the police are not required to take all imaginable steps to protect a defendant’s right to counsel. The court stated: “Where they follow the rules laid down in our cases — rules that are, in general, highly protective of the attorney-client relationship — they need do no more.” The Court found that by inquiring with Kouray and receiving an unequivocal answer, the police discharged their burden to ascertain the status of the representation. This decision emphasizes the importance of direct inquiry with the attorney of record and provides a clear standard for police conduct in such situations. The Court indicated that its holding does not mean that “the right to counsel is interminable” as stated in West. It clarified that the outcome would be different if police had reason to believe the attorney-client relationship had ended, which in this case, they did.

  • People v. Espinal, 24 N.Y.3d 136 (2014): Limits on Defendant’s Right to Choice of Counsel

    People v. Espinal, 24 N.Y.3d 136 (2014)

    A trial court is not obligated to inquire whether a defendant seeks new counsel when newly retained counsel requests an adjournment for more preparation time, unless the defendant communicates a desire to obtain new counsel.

    Summary

    Espinal was convicted of rape and related charges. He argued the trial court violated his right to counsel of choice by denying adjournment requests made by his newly retained attorney, Bruno, who stepped in for Espinal’s original attorney, Martineau, due to Martineau’s illness. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court had no obligation to inquire if Espinal wanted to retain new counsel because Espinal only requested more time for Bruno to prepare, not to seek a different attorney. The Court emphasized that the right to counsel of choice is not absolute and can be limited by the need for efficient administration of justice.

    Facts

    Espinal was charged with multiple counts of rape, sexual abuse, and endangering the welfare of a child.
    He initially retained attorney Martineau, who suffered a debilitating medical condition.
    Martineau requested and received an adjournment of Espinal’s trial due to his health.
    After another adjournment request, Martineau suggested that Espinal might need to find substitute counsel. Attorney Bruno was identified as a potential replacement.
    Bruno took over the case shortly before trial as Martineau’s health worsened.

    Procedural History

    County Court initially granted adjournments due to Martineau’s health.
    After Bruno took over, the County Court denied further adjournment requests.
    Espinal was convicted on all charges in County Court.
    Espinal moved to set aside the verdict, arguing a violation of his right to counsel of choice; the motion was denied.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the County Court’s judgment.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court violated the defendant’s right to counsel of choice by denying adjournment motions without inquiring whether the defendant sought to retain new counsel.

    Holding

    No, because no communication was made to the County Court that the defendant was asking for the opportunity to retain new counsel. The defendant simply sought an adjournment to give Bruno more time to prepare.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged the fundamental right to counsel of one’s choosing under both the Federal and State Constitutions, citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 US 140, 144 (2006) and People v. Arroyave, 49 NY2d 264, 270 (1980). However, the Court emphasized that this right is qualified and can be subordinate to the efficient administration of justice, referencing People v. Griffin, 20 NY3d 626, 630 (2013).

    The Court reasoned that a defendant cannot use the right to counsel of choice as a delaying tactic, quoting Arroyave: “the efficient administration of the criminal justice system is a critical concern to society as a whole, and unnecessary adjournments for the purpose of permitting a defendant to retain different counsel will disrupt court dockets, interfere with the right of other criminal defendants to a speedy trial, and inconvenience witnesses, jurors and opposing counsel” (Arroyave, 49 NY2d at 271).

    The Court highlighted that Espinal never explicitly requested new counsel. Bruno’s requests for adjournment were framed as needing more time for preparation, not as a desire to find a different attorney. The Court noted that while it is “the better practice” for a court to inquire about a defendant’s intentions when new counsel requests an adjournment, there was no constitutional violation in this case because there was no indication that Espinal wanted to replace Bruno.

  • People v. Washington, 23 N.Y.3d 228 (2014): Duty to Inform DWI Suspect of Attorney’s Contact

    People v. Washington, 23 N.Y.3d 228 (2014)

    When an attorney contacts the police on behalf of a DWI suspect before a chemical test is administered, the police must inform the suspect of the attorney’s communication, unless doing so would unduly interfere with the test’s administration.

    Summary

    Defendant was arrested for DWI after a fatal car accident. While she was being processed, her attorney contacted the police, requesting that they not question or test her. The police, without informing her of the attorney’s call, obtained her consent for a breathalyzer test and administered it. The New York Court of Appeals held that the police violated her limited right to counsel under People v. Gursey. The Court reasoned that because the attorney contacted the police before the breathalyzer was administered, the police were obligated to inform the defendant of the communication so she could decide whether to consult with counsel.

    Facts

    Jonai Washington struck and killed a pedestrian while driving. Police officers noted she admitted to consuming four beers earlier. She failed field sobriety tests and was arrested for driving while intoxicated. At police headquarters, she was read a chemical test authorization form and signed it, consenting to a breathalyzer test.
    Meanwhile, her family contacted an attorney who then called the Sheriff’s Department and was transferred to a sergeant at police headquarters. The attorney stated he represented Washington and asked the police not to question or test her. This call occurred before the breathalyzer test began, but Washington was not informed of the attorney’s call before the test was initiated.

    Procedural History

    Washington was indicted for manslaughter, vehicular manslaughter, and DWI. She moved to suppress the breathalyzer results, arguing a violation of her right to counsel. The Supreme Court granted the motion, suppressing the results. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the police violated Washington’s right to counsel by failing to inform her of her attorney’s contact before the breathalyzer test and that the People failed to show that providing such notice would have interfered with the administration of the test. The dissenting justice granted the People leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police are required to inform a DWI suspect that an attorney has contacted them on their behalf before administering a chemical test, even if the suspect has already consented to the test.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statutory right to legal consultation applies when an attorney contacts the police before a chemical test is performed, and the police must alert the suspect to the presence of counsel, whether the contact is made in person or telephonically, unless doing so would unduly interfere with the administration of the test. The suspect could have revoked her consent prior to administration of the test after conferring with counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. Gursey, which recognized a limited right to counsel in DWI cases based on the implied consent law. While Gursey primarily addressed situations where the suspect *personally* requests counsel, the Court extended its reasoning to situations where counsel intervenes on the suspect’s behalf *before* the chemical test is administered. The Court reasoned that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 grants a driver a qualified right to refuse a chemical test, and advice from counsel may be sought to inform that decision. The Court stated that the police must advise the accused that a lawyer has made contact on the accused’s behalf. Once so informed, the accused may choose to consult with counsel or forgo that option and proceed with the chemical test.

    The Court emphasized that the right to counsel is not absolute and cannot be used to unduly delay the administration of the chemical test, referencing the time-sensitive nature of blood alcohol content evidence. However, because the police failed to inform Washington of her attorney’s contact *before* the breathalyzer was administered, and the People did not demonstrate that providing such notice would have been unreasonable, the Court held that her right to counsel was violated, and suppression of the test results was warranted. The operative point is the actual performance of the procedure and, until it occurs, legal assistance may be sought “if such access does not interfere unduly” with the administration of the chemical test.

  • People v. Syrell, 22 N.Y.3d 922 (2013): Right to Counsel on Appeal for Indigent Defendants

    22 N.Y.3d 922 (2013)

    An indigent defendant is entitled to counsel on their first appeal as of right, even when the appeal’s dismissal is based on a procedural issue like failure to timely perfect, as this involves a discretionary determination on the merits.

    Summary

    Defendant Syrell’s appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Division for failure to timely perfect it. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Appellate Division erred in failing to assign counsel to represent Syrell before dismissing his first-tier appeal as of right. Even though the dismissal was based on a procedural rule (untimely perfection), the court considered it a discretionary determination on the merits of a threshold issue, requiring counsel for indigent defendants to ensure their rights are protected during the appellate process.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of a crime and sought to appeal. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal because the defendant failed to perfect the appeal in a timely manner, citing its rule mandating automatic dismissal for such failures.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division dismissed the defendant’s appeal. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division must assign counsel to an indigent defendant before dismissing their first-tier appeal as of right based on a failure to timely perfect the appeal.

    Holding

    Yes, because the dismissal, even for failure to timely perfect, constitutes a discretionary determination on the merits of a threshold issue, and the defendant is entitled to counsel to argue against the dismissal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principles established in Evitts v. Lucey, Douglas v. California, Taveras v. Smith, and Halbert v. Michigan, which collectively affirm an indigent defendant’s right to counsel on a first appeal as of right. The court emphasized that where an appeal involves consideration of the merits and claims not yet presented by appellate counsel, the appellate court must assign counsel. The court reasoned that even though the Appellate Division has a rule mandating dismissal of untimely perfected appeals, the decision to dismiss still involved discretion. The court noted that the defendant was ill-equipped to represent himself in opposing the dismissal motion. Therefore, the Appellate Division’s failure to appoint counsel without considering indigency or the merits of the dismissal warranted reversal. The court instructed the Appellate Division to determine if the defendant was indigent and, if so, to assign counsel to litigate the dismissal motion, then determine if dismissal is appropriate. The court highlighted that under New York law, the dismissal of a first-tier appeal based on fugitive disentitlement is a threshold issue requiring counsel (citing Taveras v. Smith). The court distinguished the situation from an automatic bar to appeal, noting that discretionary elements remained (citing People v. Evans). The Court emphasizes the importance of ensuring indigent defendants have adequate legal representation during critical stages of the appellate process, particularly when discretionary decisions impacting their right to appeal are being made by the court.

  • Matter of State of New York v. Timothy JJ., 22 N.Y.3d 942 (2013): Right to Counsel in Sex Offender Civil Management Proceedings

    Matter of State of New York v. Timothy JJ., 22 N.Y.3d 942 (2013)

    The right to counsel does not attach during a pre-petition psychiatric examination conducted as part of a screening process under New York’s Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act (SOMTA), Mental Hygiene Law Article 10.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a sex offender has the right to counsel during a psychiatric examination conducted before a formal civil management petition is filed under New York’s Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act (SOMTA). The Court of Appeals held that neither statutory nor constitutional rights to counsel were violated when a psychologist testified about the appellant’s admissions during a pre-petition examination. The court reasoned that the examination was part of a preliminary screening process, not a formal adversarial proceeding, and therefore the right to counsel had not yet attached.

    Facts

    Timothy JJ., a detained sex offender, was referred to a case review team for evaluation under Mental Hygiene Law Article 10 (SOMTA). As part of the screening process, a psychologist examined him. During the examination, Timothy JJ. admitted to having sexual contact with three additional children beyond those in his criminal records. Subsequently, the State filed an Article 10 petition, and the psychologist’s testimony, including Timothy JJ.’s admissions, was admitted as evidence.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found Timothy JJ. to be a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement. This determination was based, in part, on the psychologist’s testimony regarding Timothy JJ.’s admissions during the pre-petition examination. Timothy JJ. appealed, arguing that the admission of his statements violated his right to counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the admission of a sex offender’s statements made during a pre-petition psychiatric examination, conducted pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 10.05(e), violates the offender’s statutory or constitutional right to counsel.

    Holding

    No, because the statutory right to counsel under Mental Hygiene Law Article 10 does not attach until a petition is filed or a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation is requested. No, because under both the Federal and State Constitutions, the right to counsel had not attached at the time of the pre-petition examination, as it occurred before the commencement of formal adversarial proceedings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on both statutory and constitutional grounds. The court noted that Mental Hygiene Law § 10.08(g) explicitly states that a respondent is not entitled to counsel prior to the time provided in section 10.06, which specifies appointment of counsel upon the filing of a petition or a request for a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation. Since the examination occurred before either of those events, there was no statutory violation.

    Regarding the constitutional claim, the court stated that under the Federal Constitution, the right to counsel attaches only after adversarial judicial proceedings have been initiated (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972)). Under the State Constitution, attachment occurs when a person requests counsel, counsel enters the case, or a criminal proceeding commences (citing People v. Lopez, 16 N.Y.3d 375, 380 (2011)). The court found that neither federal nor state constitutional rights had attached because the examination preceded any formal adversarial proceeding.

    The court distinguished the examination from formal interrogations, emphasizing that it was part of a preliminary screening process to determine whether to bring Article 10 proceedings at all. The court emphasized that the examination was not court-ordered and participation was not mandatory. The court stated, “This was not fundamentally an adversarial procedure, and was not one in which counsel was necessary to protect appellant against ‘the coercive power of the State and its agents’ (Hawkins, 55 NY2d at 485 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).” The court explicitly stated that it was not deciding whether a broader constitutional right to counsel exists in Article 10 proceedings. The court contrasted the pre-petition screening process with the procedures following the filing of a petition, highlighting the more adversarial nature of the latter.

  • People v. Colville, 17 N.Y.3d 20 (2011): Allocating Decision-Making Authority on Lesser Included Offenses

    17 N.Y.3d 20 (2011)

    The decision of whether to request a jury charge on lesser-included offenses is a matter of strategy and tactics that ultimately rests with defense counsel, not the defendant.

    Summary

    Delroy Colville was convicted of second-degree murder. At trial, his attorney requested that the judge submit lesser-included offenses of first- and second-degree manslaughter to the jury, believing it was a sound trial strategy. However, Colville objected, and the judge deferred to Colville’s wishes and did not include the lesser-included offenses. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the decision to request a jury charge on lesser-included offenses is a strategic one that falls within the purview of defense counsel, not the defendant. This decision emphasizes the attorney’s role as the guiding hand in trial strategy, ensuring defendants receive the benefit of counsel’s expertise.

    Facts

    On October 28, 2004, Colville stabbed and killed Gregory Gardner, and injured Carl Jones in a shared residence. Colville claimed self-defense, alleging Gardner attacked him first. Witnesses presented conflicting accounts, some suggesting Colville was the aggressor. After the incident, Colville hid the knife and was later arrested.

    Procedural History

    Colville was indicted for second-degree murder and second-degree assault. At trial, the defense requested a justification charge and submission of lesser-included offenses of manslaughter. The trial judge initially hesitated but agreed, then ultimately deferred to Colville’s objection to including the lesser offenses. The jury convicted Colville of murder and acquitted him of assault. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the decision to request a jury charge on lesser-included offenses is a strategic decision entrusted to the attorney, or a fundamental decision reserved to the accused?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the decision is one of trial strategy, best left to the expertise of counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed conflicting authorities and commentary on the allocation of decision-making authority between attorney and client. It noted that while the American Bar Association (ABA) initially suggested the defendant should decide on lesser-included offenses, it later revised its stance. The court observed that most jurisdictions now consider this a strategic decision for the attorney. The court emphasized that CPL 300.50 allows either party to request a lesser-included offense instruction when a reasonable view of the evidence supports it. The court reasoned that this decision is unlike pleading guilty or asserting an extreme emotional distress defense, which are exclusively the defendant’s prerogative. The Court stated, “[I]t makes little sense to hold that the defendant personally has the last say about an issue when the defense as a whole does not.” The court found the trial judge erred by deferring solely to Colville’s wishes, denying him the benefit of his counsel’s judgment. “By deferring to defendant, the judge denied him the expert judgment of counsel to which the Sixth Amendment entitles him.” The court concluded that this error was not harmless, as the jury might have convicted Colville of manslaughter instead of murder had the lesser-included offenses been submitted. The conviction was reversed and a new trial was ordered.