Matter of De La Rosa v. Board of Elections, 41 N.Y.2d 144 (1976)

A statute restricting the right to be a candidate for public office is subject to rational basis review unless it directly and substantially impacts the right to vote, disenfranchises a specific class, or infringes on a fundamental right.

Summary

This case concerns the constitutionality of a New York Education Law provision prohibiting family members residing in the same household from serving on the same school board. The appellant, a wife of a current school board member, challenged the law arguing it violated the equal protection clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the rational basis test was the appropriate standard of review because the statute’s impact on the right to vote was incidental and remote, and the statute satisfied this test. The court emphasized the statute did not disenfranchise any identifiable class. The court found the restriction on candidacy constitutional because it rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

Facts

The appellant, De La Rosa, was the wife of a current member of a school board. She resided in the same household as her husband. She sought to run for a position on the same school board. A provision of the New York Education Law (§2103[3]) prohibited members of the same family who reside in the same household from simultaneously holding positions on the school board.

Procedural History

The lower court upheld the statute. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling. De La Rosa appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether subdivision 3 of section 2103 of the Education Law violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution by restricting the right of a family member residing in the same household as a current school board member to run for a position on the same board?

Holding

No, because the statute does not directly infringe upon the fundamental right to vote, nor does it disenfranchise an identifiable class. Therefore, the rational basis test applies, and the statute meets that test.

Court’s Reasoning

The court determined the appropriate standard of review was the rational basis test. The court reasoned that while statutes directly infringing on the fundamental right to vote require strict scrutiny, this statute only impacted the right to hold public office. The court distinguished this case from Bullock v. Carter, where substantial filing fees for candidates were deemed to have a direct and appreciable impact on the right to vote by disenfranchising less affluent voters. In this case, the court found no direct or appreciable impact on the right to vote and no identifiable class being disenfranchised.

The court stated, “No such direct and appreciable impact on the right to vote can be found in the present case. No identifiable class has been disenfranchised. The statute’s effect on the right to vote is merely incidental and remote and does not rise to a level which would require that the statute be closely scrutinized in order to pass constitutional muster.”

The court agreed with the Appellate Division that the rational basis test was appropriate. The court found the statute satisfied the rational basis test, deferring to the lower court’s reasoning. The court noted that while the term “family” might be ambiguous in other contexts, it clearly applied to the appellant as the wife residing in the same household as a current board member.

The court’s decision emphasizes the importance of direct impact on the right to vote when determining the appropriate level of scrutiny for election-related statutes. Restrictions on candidacy are permissible if they rationally relate to a legitimate state interest and do not substantially burden the right to vote.