New York Law Review

Tag: right to be present

  • People v. Sharp, 2024 NY Slip Op 05132 (2024): Right to be Present at Sandoval Hearing

    People v. Sharp, 2024 NY Slip Op 05132 (2024)

    A defendant’s right to be present during a Sandoval hearing is violated when the court holds an in-chambers conference on the admissibility of prior criminal conduct without the defendant’s presence, and the subsequent in-court proceeding does not provide an opportunity for meaningful participation.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding that the trial court violated his right to be present at a critical stage of the proceedings, specifically during a Sandoval hearing, by holding an in-chambers conference about the defendant’s prior criminal history without his presence. Even though a subsequent hearing was held with the defendant present, the Court found that this did not cure the initial error because the defendant was not given an opportunity for meaningful participation. The Court emphasized the defendant’s right to be present to address factual errors, controvert the prosecutor’s assertions, and provide details about the underlying facts of prior convictions.

    Facts

    Eric D. Sharp was charged with firearm offenses. Before trial, the prosecution filed a Sandoval application seeking to cross-examine Sharp about his prior convictions. The trial court held an in-chambers conference on the motion with the prosecution and defense counsel, but Sharp was not present. Subsequently, the court announced its Sandoval rulings in Sharp’s presence. Defense counsel stood by the prior discussion, and the court proceeded to rule on the admissibility of Sharp’s prior convictions. Sharp was ultimately convicted after a bench trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, but the dissenting justice granted Sharp leave to appeal.

    Procedural History

    Sharp was convicted in trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The dissenting justice granted Sharp leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court violated Sharp’s right to be present during a material stage of the prosecution by holding an in-chambers Sandoval hearing without his presence.

    2. Whether the subsequent in-court proceeding cured any violation of Sharp’s right to be present.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the in-chambers conference on the Sandoval application constituted a material stage of the proceedings at which Sharp had a right to be present.

    2. No, because the subsequent in-court proceeding did not provide Sharp with an opportunity for meaningful participation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Criminal Procedure Law § 260.20, which guarantees a defendant’s right to be present at trial, and case law, including People v. Dokes, holding that this right extends to the substantive portion of Sandoval hearings. The Court found that the in-chambers conference was a material stage because it concerned factual matters about which the defendant might have had unique knowledge, which could have been used to advance the defendant’s position. The Court distinguished the case from situations where a curative hearing provides an opportunity for meaningful participation. Here, the subsequent hearing did not cure the violation because the court did not ask the defendant if he wished to be heard, nor did the court meaningfully explain the nature of the proceeding to the defendant, nor did the court entertain any arguments on the merits. Instead, the court merely reiterated its rulings. The Court emphasized that the right to be present belonged to the defendant personally, not counsel, and required an affirmative waiver for a defendant’s exclusion.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the critical importance of a defendant’s presence during Sandoval proceedings. Attorneys must ensure that their clients are present during all substantive discussions about prior criminal conduct. The court’s ruling emphasizes that a defendant’s presence and opportunity to participate meaningfully are required. A defendant’s mere awareness of a Sandoval application or counsel’s presence is not sufficient to protect the right to be present. When a court holds a hearing in a defendant’s absence, the court must provide a subsequent opportunity for meaningful participation, which includes the ability to present arguments and address factual issues. Failure to do so can result in reversal of a conviction and the need for a new trial. Courts should be explicit in inviting defendants to participate and explaining the significance of the proceedings.

  • People v. Fabricio, 3 N.Y.3d 402 (2004): Defendant’s Right to Be Present at Sandoval or Ventimiglia Hearings

    People v. Fabricio, 3 N.Y.3d 402 (2004)

    A defendant’s right to be present at a sidebar conference is not violated when the conference concerns a pure legal issue, such as the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement, rather than factual matters about which the defendant has peculiar knowledge.

    Summary

    Fabricio was convicted of murder and robbery. During his trial, a sidebar conference was held to discuss the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement he allegedly made. Fabricio was not present at the sidebar. The New York Court of Appeals held that Fabricio’s right to be present was not violated because the sidebar concerned a legal issue – whether his testimony opened the door to the use of his prior inconsistent statement and whether the prosecution had a good faith basis to inquire about it – and did not involve factual matters about which Fabricio had peculiar knowledge. This case clarifies the scope of a defendant’s right to be present during legal discussions at trial.

    Facts

    Fabricio was charged with murder and robbery in connection with the shooting death of Jose Perez. At trial, Fabricio testified that he traveled from Florida to New York the day before the crimes and that an accomplice, Pedro Aviles, paid for his airfare. During cross-examination, the prosecutor sought to question Fabricio about a statement he allegedly made to Aviles and a taxi driver that he obtained the money for the ticket by committing a robbery. A sidebar conference was requested by the prosecution to determine the admissibility of this statement.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court convicted Fabricio of murder and robbery. Fabricio appealed, arguing he was denied his right to be present at a material stage of the trial because he was excluded from the sidebar conference, which he characterized as a Sandoval/Ventimiglia hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the conference concerned a pure issue of law. The dissenting Justice granted permission for Fabricio to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a sidebar conference, held while the defendant was on the witness stand and the jury was seated, constituted a Sandoval or Ventimiglia hearing at which the defendant had a right to be present, when the conference concerned the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement.

    Holding

    No, because the sidebar conference focused on a pure question of law – whether the defendant’s testimony opened the door to the use of his prior inconsistent statement and whether the People had a good faith basis to inquire about it – and did not implicate the defendant’s peculiar factual knowledge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a defendant has a right to be present during a particular proceeding if there is a potential for the defendant to meaningfully participate in the discussions. An important consideration is whether the proceeding involved factual matters about which the defendant might have peculiar knowledge that would be useful in advancing the defendant’s position or countering the People’s position. The Court distinguished this case from Sandoval/Ventimiglia hearings, which involve balancing the probative value of proposed evidence against its prejudicial impact. Here, the sidebar conference focused on a pure question of law: whether the defendant’s testimony “opened the door” to the use of his prior inconsistent statement and whether the People had a good faith basis to inquire about it. The Court stated, “Defendant did not have a right to be present, as the subject legal discussion did not implicate his peculiar factual knowledge or otherwise present the potential for his meaningful participation.”
    Furthermore, the Court noted that defense counsel only objected on the grounds of lack of notice, and the conference centered on that objection, with no inquiry about the alleged uncharged robbery itself. The Court found any claim based on Fabricio’s absence from the conference unpreserved for review.

  • People v. Collins, 99 N.Y.2d 14 (2002): Instructions on Verdict Sheet Do Not Violate Right to be Present

    99 N.Y.2d 14 (2002)

    A trial court’s instruction to a jury on a verdict sheet regarding the order in which submitted charges should be considered does not violate a defendant’s right to be present during a material stage of the trial, even if the instruction is not also delivered orally.

    Summary

    Collins was convicted of burglary and related charges. At trial, the court initially failed to instruct the jury to consider burglary in the third degree only if they acquitted him of burglary in the second degree. After the jury retired, the court, at defense counsel’s request and in the defendant’s presence, agreed to add language to the verdict sheet instructing the jury to consider the counts in the alternative. The defendant then left the room, and the specific language was decided upon in his absence. The Court of Appeals held that providing this instruction on the verdict sheet, as authorized by CPL 310.20, did not violate the defendant’s right to be present at a material stage of the trial, nor did it constitute a mode of proceedings error excusing the lack of preservation.

    Facts

    Collins was charged with burglary in the second and third degrees, criminal possession of stolen property, criminal trespass, and petit larceny, stemming from entering the victim’s apartment. The second-degree burglary count involved knowingly entering and remaining unlawfully with intent to commit a crime, while the third-degree count involved breaking into the building with the same intent. After the jury retired to deliberate, the defense requested the verdict sheet direct them to consider the burglary counts in the alternative. Collins then left the courtroom temporarily.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court convicted Collins on multiple counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Collins appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the manner in which the jury was instructed constituted a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal, despite the lack of a timely objection.

    Issue(s)

    Whether instructing the jury through a verdict sheet, outside the defendant’s presence, to consider burglary charges in the alternative constitutes a mode of proceedings error that violates the defendant’s right to be present during a material stage of the trial, requiring reversal despite the absence of a timely objection.

    Holding

    No, because the written communication was authorized under CPL 310.20 and did not violate the defendant’s right to be present under CPL 310.30. Failure to object to the lack of supplemental oral instruction is fatal to the claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while a defendant has the right to be present during instructions to the jury on fundamental legal principles, not every communication requires the jury to be recalled or the defendant to be present. CPL 310.20(2) authorizes a court to provide a written list of offenses and possible verdicts to the jury. Citing People v. Cole, the Court stated that a trial court may include on a verdict sheet “a direction regarding the order in which the submitted charges should be considered”. Because the instruction was authorized by statute, its submission on the verdict sheet outside the defendant’s presence was permissible. The court distinguished this situation from cases involving substantive irregularities in jury instructions where preservation is not required. The Court noted that the defendant was present when his counsel requested the alternative instruction, and his subsequent absence for the drafting of the instruction involved only a ministerial act and a purely legal argument. As such, his presence was not required.

  • People v. Keen, 94 N.Y.2d 533 (2000): Valid Waiver of Right to Be Present During Jury Selection

    People v. Keen, 94 N.Y.2d 533 (2000)

    A defendant may validly waive their right to be present during sidebar conferences with prospective jurors if the waiver is made knowingly and intelligently, either by the defendant personally or by defense counsel in the defendant’s presence.

    Summary

    This case concerns the validity of a defendant’s waiver of his right to be present during sidebar conferences with prospective jurors. The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant validly waived this right because his attorney, in his presence and on the record, explicitly waived it. The Court distinguished this from cases where the waiver was implicit or made outside the defendant’s presence, emphasizing the importance of ensuring the defendant’s understanding and voluntary relinquishment of their right. The dissent argued that a more explicit, on-the-record waiver directly from the defendant is required to ensure a truly knowing and intelligent waiver.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree. During jury selection, numerous prospective jurors were questioned at sidebar, outside the defendant’s presence. On the record, in the defendant’s presence, his attorney waived the defendant’s right to be present at these sidebar conferences. The defendant did not object to his attorney’s waiver at that time. The defendant later appealed, arguing that his waiver was invalid because he did not personally waive his right on the record.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding that the defendant had validly waived his right to be present. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s right to be present during sidebar conferences with prospective jurors is validly waived when defense counsel, in the defendant’s presence and on the record, explicitly waives that right.

    Holding

    Yes, because defense counsel’s explicit waiver in the defendant’s presence and on the record constitutes a valid waiver of the defendant’s right to be present during sidebar conferences with prospective jurors.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a defendant’s right to be present at trial, including during jury selection, can be waived. The Court emphasized that the waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The Court distinguished the present case from People v. Antommarchi, where the Court held that a defendant has the right to be present during sidebar questioning of prospective jurors concerning their biases. However, the Court clarified that this right can be waived.

    The Court found that the waiver was valid in this case because defense counsel, in the defendant’s presence and on the record, explicitly waived the defendant’s right. The Court noted that the defendant did not object to this waiver. The Court stated, “Here, defense counsel, in defendant’s presence, expressly waived defendant’s Antommarchi rights on the record. Thus, a valid waiver occurred.” The court distinguished this situation from scenarios where the waiver is implicit or made outside the defendant’s presence. According to the court, defense counsel can waive the defendant’s right.

    The dissenting judge argued that the waiver was insufficient because the defendant himself did not explicitly waive his right on the record. The dissent emphasized the importance of ensuring that the defendant fully understands the right being waived. “This is distinctly different from the situation in People v Keen (252 AD2d 278, 281, affd 94 NY2d 533), in which the Trial Judge asked the defense counsel in defendant’s presence, on the record, if he waived his Antommarchi rights and this Court ruled that there was a valid Antommarchi waiver.”

    The dissenting judge noted that the court reporter’s notes did not indicate anything about an Antommarchi waiver and that the defense attorney specifically stated that this waiver did not occur.

  • People v. Thompson, 90 N.Y.2d 615 (1997): Defendant’s Right to Be Present at All Material Stages of Trial

    People v. Thompson, 90 N.Y.2d 615 (1997)

    A defendant has a right to be present at all material stages of trial, including when evidence is received; however, unsupervised jury viewings of exhibits after their formal admission, but before deliberations, do not violate this right per se if proper admonishments are given.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant’s right to be present at all material stages of trial was violated when jurors were allowed to view evidentiary exhibits unsupervised after the exhibits had been formally admitted into evidence but before deliberations began. The Court held that while a defendant has a fundamental right to be present during the reception of evidence, the unsupervised viewing of exhibits in this case did not automatically warrant reversal, especially since the trial judge provided cautionary instructions. The dissent argued that the defendant’s right to be present extends to the time when the jury actually examines the exhibits, and the unsupervised viewing created a risk of prejudice and substantive irregularities.

    Facts

    During the trial, the judge permitted the jurors to examine exhibits during breaks and lunch periods, without the judge or counsel present. These exhibits had already been formally admitted into evidence. The judge provided the jury with general admonishments about their conduct during these viewings but was not present during the viewings themselves. The defendant was convicted, and the conviction was appealed based on the unsupervised jury viewings.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The defendant appealed, arguing the unsupervised jury viewings violated his right to be present at all material stages of trial. The appellate division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to consider the issue.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s right to be present at all material stages of trial is violated when jurors are permitted to view evidentiary exhibits unsupervised after those exhibits have been formally admitted into evidence but before deliberations begin?

    Holding

    No, because while a defendant has the right to be present during the reception of evidence, unsupervised jury viewings of exhibits already admitted into evidence do not automatically warrant reversal, provided that the jury receives appropriate cautionary instructions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the core concern is whether the defendant’s presence would have a substantial effect on his ability to defend against the charges. While the reception of evidence is a material stage of trial, the specific procedure employed by the trial court did not, in itself, compromise the defendant’s rights. The Court distinguished the act of formally admitting evidence from the act of jurors reviewing admitted evidence, finding the latter, under the circumstances, did not mandate the defendant’s presence. The Court emphasized that the trial judge gave cautionary instructions to the jury. The Court noted that the supervision of a judge is an important element of a jury trial, but determined that judicial presence isn’t required for every interaction with evidence, particularly when cautionary instructions have been given.

    The dissent argued that the defendant’s right to be present extends to the point when the jury actually examines the exhibits, not just when they are formally admitted. The dissent highlighted the potential for meaningful participation by the accused during the viewing of exhibits, as the defendant could observe juror reactions and suggest further lines of inquiry to counsel. The dissent also raised concerns about the informality of the procedure and the risk of substantive irregularities, such as some jurors viewing evidence while others did not. The dissent stated, “[T]he supervision of a Judge is an important and nonwaivable element of the right to a jury trial.”

  • People v. Maher, 89 N.Y.2d 318 (1996): Defendant’s Right to Be Present During Jury Selection

    People v. Maher, 89 N.Y.2d 318 (1996)

    A defendant has a right to be present during sidebar conferences with prospective jurors concerning potential biases, prejudices, or exposure to pretrial publicity, unless the juror is excused for cause or by the prosecution’s peremptory challenge, and the record negates the possibility that the defendant could have provided valuable input.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals consolidated appeals from three separate cases where the defendants’ convictions were reversed due to their exclusion from sidebar discussions with prospective jurors. The court held that defendants have a right to be present at sidebar conferences where potential juror biases or exposure to pretrial publicity are discussed. This right is violated when the defendant is excluded from these discussions and the record does not clearly indicate that the juror was excused for cause or through a peremptory challenge by the prosecution. The Court emphasized the importance of the defendant’s potential contribution to jury selection and affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversals.

    Facts

    In People v. Maher, the defendant was convicted of robbery. During jury selection, several prospective jurors were questioned at sidebar conferences regarding potential biases. The defendant was not present at these conferences. In People v. Ricks and People v. Mack, the codefendants were convicted of murder and attempted robbery. During their jury selection, several prospective jurors who indicated exposure to pretrial publicity were questioned at sidebar conferences outside the presence of the defendants.

    Procedural History

    In all three cases, the defendants were convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Division reversed the convictions in each case, finding that the defendants had been improperly excluded from material stages of their trial. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the exclusion of the defendants from sidebar conferences with prospective jurors regarding potential biases, prejudices, or exposure to pretrial publicity violated their right to be present at a material stage of trial, warranting reversal of their convictions.

    Holding

    Yes, because the sidebar interviews of prospective jurors concerned potential biases and exposure to pretrial publicity, which are material stages of trial. The records failed to negate the possibility that the defendants could have meaningfully contributed to the sidebar conferences from which they were excluded.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s rulings, holding that a defendant has a right to be present at sidebar conferences concerning a prospective juror’s bias or exposure to pretrial publicity, as these are material stages of the trial. The court stated, “A sidebar interview of a prospective juror which concerns that juror’s bias or hostility is a material stage of trial which defendants are entitled to attend.” The Court reasoned that although the jury selection process is an ancillary proceeding, the right to be present at sidebar conferences is governed by CPL 260.20. The court emphasized that a defendant can waive the right to attend such conferences. However, the Court also stated that even if a defendant is erroneously excluded, reversal is not required if the potential juror was excused for cause or through a peremptory challenge by the prosecution. In such cases, the record must clearly demonstrate that the juror was excused for one of these reasons to negate the possibility that the defendant could have provided valuable input. Because the records in these cases did not definitively show that the jurors in question were excused for cause or by prosecutorial peremptory challenge, and because the prosecutor conceded in Ricks and Mack that the record supported the conclusion the defendants weren’t present, the Court affirmed the reversals, emphasizing the defendant’s potential contribution to jury selection and the importance of an adequate record to determine whether a defendant’s rights were violated.

  • People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656 (1992): Defendant’s Right to Be Present at Trial Proceedings

    People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656 (1992)

    A defendant has a right to be present during a trial when their presence has a reasonably substantial relation to the opportunity to defend against the charge; however, presence is not required when the proceeding involves only questions of law or procedure.

    Summary

    Dokes was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. At issue was whether Dokes’ presence was required at a side-bar conference, held outside his earshot, to determine if his direct testimony opened the door to cross-examination about a prior conviction. The Court of Appeals held that Dokes’ presence was not required because the side-bar conference involved a purely legal question regarding the admissibility of evidence. The court reasoned that the conference did not implicate Dokes’ peculiar factual knowledge, nor did it present the potential for his meaningful participation, distinguishing it from hearings where factual matters are discussed.

    Facts

    Dokes was arrested for selling two vials, one containing cocaine and one without, to an undercover officer. Prior to trial, the court ruled that the prosecution could question Dokes about his prior felony conviction for attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance but could not inquire into the underlying facts of that conviction. During his direct testimony, Dokes described himself as a hustler who sold fake drugs to avoid jail time, stating that he had a prior felony selling drugs and another felony would result in jail time. The prosecutor then requested a side-bar to ask about cross-examining Dokes about the underlying facts of the prior conviction, which also involved selling one fake and one real vial of cocaine.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the prosecution’s request. Dokes was convicted. The Appellate Division reduced Dokes’ sentence but otherwise affirmed the conviction, rejecting Dokes’ argument that he was denied his right to be present at a material stage of trial. Dokes appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s presence is required at a side-bar conference where the attorneys argue, and the court determines, the legal issue of whether the defendant’s testimony had opened the door to cross-examination about a prior crime.

    Holding

    No, because the side-bar conference involved a purely legal discussion and did not implicate the defendant’s peculiar factual knowledge, nor present the potential for his meaningful participation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that a defendant has a statutory right to be present during the trial, including jury impaneling, evidence introduction, summations, and jury instructions. Furthermore, due process requires a defendant’s presence at ancillary proceedings that have a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of the opportunity to defend against the charge. However, a defendant’s presence is not required when the proceeding at issue involves only questions of law or procedure. The court distinguished the side-bar from Ventimiglia and Sandoval hearings, noting that the side-bar did not implicate Dokes’ factual knowledge or potential for meaningful participation. Regarding Dokes’ contention that he did not open the door, the court stated that when a defendant testifies to facts conflicting with evidence precluded by a Sandoval ruling, the defendant opens the door and is subject to impeachment using the otherwise precluded evidence. The court stated, “Where, as here, a defendant testifies to facts that are in conflict with evidence precluded by a Sandoval ruling, he or she ‘opens the door’ on the issue in question, and ‘is properly subject to impeachment by the prosecution’s use of the otherwise precluded evidence’” (People v. Fardan, 82 N.Y.2d 638, 646). The court noted it gave proper limiting instructions, cautioning the jury that evidence of prior convictions could not provide a basis for evaluating defendant’s guilt.

  • People v. Favor, 82 N.Y.2d 254 (1993): Retroactivity of Right to be Present at Sandoval Hearings

    People v. Favor, 82 N.Y.2d 254 (1993)

    The rule established in People v. Dokes, granting defendants the right to be present during Sandoval hearings, applies retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal at the time Dokes was decided, unless the defendant’s presence would have been superfluous.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the ruling in *People v. Dokes*, which grants defendants the right to be present during *Sandoval* hearings, applies retroactively. The Court of Appeals held that the *Dokes* rule does apply retroactively to cases on direct appeal when *Dokes* was decided. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the *Dokes* rule is to enhance the accuracy of *Sandoval* determinations, and there was no established precedent that permitted excluding defendants from *Sandoval* hearings. However, the Court clarified that the *Dokes* rule does not apply retroactively where the defendant’s presence at the *Sandoval* hearing would have been superfluous.

    Facts

    In *People v. Favor*, the defendant was excluded from an in-camera conference held to determine the admissibility of his prior convictions for cross-examination purposes. The trial court subsequently described the discussion and the *Sandoval* decision in the defendant’s presence. In *People v. Smith*, the defendant was excluded from a brief bench conference during which the court made a preliminary determination excluding ten of fourteen prior bad acts. The defendant was present for the remainder of the *Sandoval* hearing.

    Procedural History

    In *People v. Favor*, the Appellate Division upheld the conviction, noting the defendant did not preserve the argument by timely objection. Leave to appeal was granted after the *Dokes* decision. In *People v. Smith*, the Appellate Division held that the defendant’s exclusion from the bench conference did not require reversal, because the outcome was not prejudicial. The case was appealed by permission of a judge of the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the rule established in *People v. Dokes*, granting defendants the right to be present during *Sandoval* hearings, applies retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal.

    2. Whether the defendant’s exclusion from the *Sandoval* hearing in *People v. Favor* requires reversal of the conviction.

    3. Whether the defendant’s exclusion from the *Sandoval* hearing in *People v. Smith* requires reversal of the conviction.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the purpose of the *Dokes* rule is to enhance the accuracy of *Sandoval* determinations, and there was no firmly established body of case law approving the defendant’s exclusion from *Sandoval* hearings.

    2. Yes, because the defendant’s exclusion from the *Sandoval* hearing was a clear violation of the *Dokes* holding and the defendant was not afforded the opportunity for meaningful participation.

    3. No, because the portion of the proceeding from which the defendant was excluded resulted in a wholly favorable outcome; therefore, the defendant’s presence would have been superfluous.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that cases on direct appeal should generally be decided in accordance with the law as it exists at the time the appellate decision is made. The Court adopted a three-factor test from *People v. Pepper* to determine whether a new rule should be given retroactive effect: “(1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application.” Applying these factors, the Court determined that the *Dokes* rule should be applied retroactively. The Court reasoned that the purpose of *Dokes* is directly related to enhancing the accuracy of the *Sandoval* determination. The court found that there was no firmly established body of case law approving the exclusion of the defendant from *Sandoval* hearings. The Court further reasoned that there was no indication that retroactive application of *Dokes* would lead to wholesale reversals.

    Regarding *People v. Favor*, the Court found the defendant’s exclusion from the *Sandoval* hearing a clear violation of *Dokes*, because the trial court’s recitation of the decision did not provide the defendant the opportunity for meaningful participation. The Court rejected the argument that a case-specific “prejudice” test should be injected into the *Dokes* inquiry, because prejudice is inherent when a defendant is deprived of the opportunity for meaningful participation. The court also rejected the idea that a new *Sandoval* hearing would be an adequate remedy.

    Regarding *People v. Smith*, the Court found that the defendant’s presence would have been wholly “superfluous” because the portion of the proceeding from which the defendant was excluded resulted in a wholly favorable outcome. However, the Court noted that the better practice would be to have the accused present during every colloquy relating to the *Sandoval* question.

  • People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656 (1992): Defendant’s Right to Be Present at Sandoval Hearing

    People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656 (1992)

    A defendant has a right to be present at a Sandoval hearing because it is a material stage of the trial where the defendant’s peculiar knowledge about prior bad acts is essential for a fair determination of the permissible scope of cross-examination.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of drug sale and possession. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant’s right to be present at all material stages of the trial was violated when the trial court conducted a Sandoval hearing in his absence. The Court reasoned that a Sandoval hearing requires the defendant’s presence because the defendant possesses unique knowledge about their prior bad acts that is crucial for determining the permissible scope of cross-examination, thus impacting the decision whether to testify. This right is protected by both statute and due process.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance following a “buy and bust” operation. Prior to jury selection, the court held a conference in the judge’s robing room regarding the defendant’s Sandoval motion to preclude the prosecution from cross-examining him about prior crimes. The defendant was not present during this conference.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial, finding that the defendant’s absence from the Sandoval hearing violated his right to be present at a material stage of the trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s right to be present at all material stages of a trial is violated when a Sandoval hearing, determining the permissible scope of cross-examination regarding prior bad acts, is conducted in the defendant’s absence.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Sandoval hearing is a material stage of the trial where the defendant’s presence is necessary to ensure a fair determination of the permissible scope of cross-examination, as the defendant possesses unique knowledge about the underlying facts of prior bad acts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a defendant has a statutory and due process right to be present at all material stages of a trial, including instances where their presence has a reasonably substantial relation to their opportunity to defend against the charge. CPL 260.20 mandates the defendant be present during the trial of an indictment. The Court distinguished this case from precharge conferences involving only questions of law or procedure, where the defendant’s presence is not required. The court emphasized that the Sandoval hearing is a crucial proceeding because it determines the extent to which the defendant will be subject to impeachment by cross-examination about prior bad acts if he testifies. “Given the number of factors that are relevant to the court’s decision, the potential for meaningful participation by the defendant during the determination of the merits of a Sandoval motion is apparent.” The defendant is best positioned to point out errors in the DCJS report, controvert assertions by the prosecutor regarding uncharged acts, and provide counsel with details about the underlying facts. The Court noted, “[T]he defendant’s presence will help to ensure that the court’s determination will not be predicated on the prosecutor’s ‘unrebutted view of the facts’.” Furthermore, the court’s ruling on the permissible scope of cross-examination often significantly influences the defendant’s decision to testify. Therefore, unless the defendant’s criminal history and the issues at the hearing render their presence superfluous, the hearing should not be conducted in their absence. The court concluded that the Sandoval hearing was a material stage of the trial in this case, and the defendant’s presence was required.

  • People v. McMahon, 81 N.Y.2d 386 (1993): Defendant’s Right to be Present During Jury Questioning on Case-Specific Issues

    People v. McMahon, 81 N.Y.2d 386 (1993)

    A defendant has a right to be present during the questioning of prospective jurors when the questioning concerns issues touching upon the merits of the case, such as the jurors’ knowledge of pretrial publicity and their attitude toward key witnesses.

    Summary

    Defendants McMahon and Sloan were convicted of robbery and weapons possession. Prior to the formal voir dire, the trial judge conducted a side-bar voir dire of prospective jurors regarding their exposure to pretrial publicity and their familiarity with John Roland, a television newscaster involved in the robbery. The questioning occurred outside the presence of the defendants. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the defendants had a fundamental right to be present during questioning that delved into attitudes and feelings concerning events and witnesses involved in the case.

    Facts

    Defendants McMahon and Sloan allegedly robbed the Racing Club restaurant. Newscaster John Roland attempted to disarm Sloan during the robbery, leading to a struggle. Roland was hit on the head with a pistol by McMahon. Defendants were apprehended near the scene after a waiter alerted the police. Roland and other witnesses identified the defendants. Prior to the formal voir dire, the judge questioned prospective jurors about their exposure to pretrial publicity regarding the case and Roland’s involvement. Jurors were questioned on their ability to weigh Roland’s testimony fairly and whether their knowledge of him as a newscaster would affect their impartiality. Defendants were not present during this questioning.

    Procedural History

    Defendants were convicted of robbery and weapons possession after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant has a right to be present during conference questioning of prospective jurors concerning issues touching upon the merits of the case, such as their knowledge of and reaction to pretrial publicity and their attitude toward a key witness.

    Holding

    Yes, because the questioning went beyond general qualifications and delved into attitudes and feelings concerning some of the events and witnesses involved in the case, which could have substantially affected the defendant’s ability to defend against the charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle that defendants have a fundamental right to be present with counsel at all material stages of a trial. The court distinguished this case from People v. Velasco, which held that a defendant’s presence was not required when the court posed questions relating only to the general qualifications of jurors (physical impairments, family obligations, etc.). Here, the questioning went beyond general qualifications and delved into attitudes and feelings concerning events and witnesses involved in the case. “The effect on the jurors of the pretrial publicity, their attitudes toward and possible predisposition to believe Roland, a key prosecution witness, and their ability to weigh the evidence objectively were subjects properly addressed in a formal voir dire.” The court reasoned that the defendants’ presence could have been critical in making proper determinations relating to challenges for cause and peremptories, as assessing jurors’ facial expressions, demeanor, and subliminal responses could reveal bias or hostility. The court noted that, “[a]part from our statutory provision, due process requires the presence of a defendant at his trial ‘to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.’” (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 108). Because their exclusion from the questioning was error, the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial.