New York Law Review

Tag: right to appeal

  • People v. Montgomery, 24 N.Y.2d 130 (1969): Indigent Defendant’s Right to Know of Appeal

    People v. Montgomery, 24 N.Y.2d 130 (1969)

    An indigent criminal defendant has a right to be informed of their right to appeal, and failure to do so by counsel or the court warrants a hearing and possible resentencing to allow an appeal.

    Summary

    Montgomery, an indigent defendant convicted of second-degree murder, sought a writ of error coram nobis, alleging he was never informed of his right to appeal. The New York Court of Appeals held that every defendant has a fundamental right to appeal, and due process requires that indigent defendants not be deprived of this right due to ignorance or counsel’s failure. The court reversed the lower court’s denial of Montgomery’s application and ordered a hearing to determine if he was indeed unaware of his appeal rights, potentially leading to resentencing to allow a new appeal.

    Facts

    Samuel Montgomery, a 15-year-old, was involved in a street fight that resulted in the fatal stabbing of one of the other participants. He was indicted for second-degree murder along with two companions. Montgomery was allegedly the one who brandished the knife.

    Procedural History

    Montgomery and his companions were jointly tried, with court-appointed counsel representing each. Montgomery was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 25 years to life. His co-defendant May’s conviction was modified on appeal to manslaughter. Montgomery did not file an appeal at the time. Years later, Montgomery applied for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing that he was not informed of his right to appeal due to indigency, ignorance, and infancy. The Supreme Court, Bronx County, denied the application without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the petitioner’s allegation that he was not informed of his right to appeal presents an issue of fact which requires a hearing to determine the veracity of the contention.

    Holding

    Yes, because basic fairness and due process require that an indigent defendant not be deprived of the right to appeal either because the defendant was unaware of its existence or counsel failed to abide by a promise to either file or prosecute an appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the right to appeal is a fundamental right. The court stated, “The time has come for us to announce clearly that every defendant has a fundamental right to appeal his conviction and that, accordingly, basic fairness and due process require that the right not be dissipated either because the defendant was unaware of its existence or counsel failed to abide by a promise to either file or prosecute an appeal.” Because the state provides an absolute right to seek review in criminal prosecutions, an indigent defendant cannot be deprived of this review simply because of their poverty. The court reasoned that since the State has the responsibility to provide legal advice to indigent defendants, the State cannot permit a critical time period to lapse without the defendant’s awareness. The court concluded that Montgomery should be afforded a hearing to determine whether he was informed of his right to appeal. If not, he was denied equal protection and should be resentenced so his time to appeal will run anew. The court noted, “An indigent defendant cannot lose his right to appeal simply because the courts have deputized a lawyer to fulfill the function and he has failed properly to carry out his duties.”

  • People v. Lampkins, 21 N.Y.2d 138 (1967): Right to Appeal and Coram Nobis Relief

    People v. Lampkins, 21 N.Y.2d 138 (1967)

    A defendant is entitled to a hearing on a writ of error coram nobis if they present evidence suggesting they were unconstitutionally deprived of their right to appeal, even if their attorney believed abandoning the appeal was strategically advantageous.

    Summary

    Bex Lampkins, convicted of second-degree murder, sought coram nobis relief, alleging he was improperly denied his right to appeal by his assigned counsel. His attorney had strategically decided not to pursue the appeal fearing a first-degree murder conviction in a retrial. The New York Court of Appeals held that Lampkins was entitled to a hearing to determine whether he consented to this strategy. The court emphasized that the choice to appeal ultimately belonged to the defendant, not the attorney, and that if Lampkins demonstrably did not consent to abandoning the appeal, his rights were effectively frustrated.

    Facts

    Lampkins was convicted of second-degree murder in 1950 and sentenced to 30 years to life. He had three assigned counsel. Lampkins claimed his attorney fraudulently allowed his appeal to be dismissed without his consent or knowledge of his appeal rights. The attorney believed that pursuing the appeal was not in Lampkins’s best interest because a retrial could result in a first-degree murder conviction. Lampkins wrote a letter to a judge expressing his desire to appeal and another to his attorney questioning why his appeal was being dismissed.

    Procedural History

    Lampkins applied for a writ of error coram nobis in the Supreme Court, Bronx County, which was denied without a hearing. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the denial. Lampkins then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Lampkins was entitled to a hearing on his coram nobis application to determine if he was unconstitutionally deprived of his right to appeal.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Lampkins presented sufficient evidence suggesting he did not consent to his attorney’s strategy of abandoning the appeal, thus raising a question of fact as to whether his right to appeal was unconstitutionally frustrated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the attorney’s strategic reasoning for abandoning the appeal. However, the court emphasized that the ultimate decision to appeal rests with the defendant. The court cited Lampkins’ letters, particularly his letter to a judge expressing his desire to appeal and his attorney’s ambiguous response, as sufficient to raise a factual issue regarding his consent. The court distinguished between the attorney’s strategic advice and the defendant’s right to make the final decision. The court noted that Lampkins’ efforts to obtain his trial minutes after the appeal was dismissed further suggested he was unaware of or did not consent to the dismissal strategy. Referring to People v. Adams, the court stated that a defendant’s right to appeal is “effectively frustrated” if their appeal is dismissed without their knowledge. The court clarified that coram nobis is the appropriate vehicle for raising such claims, as a motion to reinstate the appeal in the Appellate Division is not appealable to the Court of Appeals. The court also addressed Lampkins’ claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, finding that the attorney’s strategic decisions, while potentially debatable, did not constitute representation “so patently lacking in competence or adequacy that it becomes the duty of the court to be aware of it and correct it,” quoting People v. Tomaselli.