New York Law Review

Tag: right to appeal

  • People v. Ventura, 17 N.Y.3d 675 (2011): Right to Appeal for Involuntarily Deported Defendants

    17 N.Y.3d 675 (2011)

    An involuntarily deported defendant retains the right to have their direct criminal appeal heard by an intermediate appellate court, and it is an abuse of discretion for the appellate court to dismiss the appeal solely based on the defendant’s deportation.

    Summary

    Carlos Ventura and Damian Gardner were convicted of crimes and filed appeals. While their appeals were pending, both were involuntarily deported by federal immigration authorities. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion by dismissing their appeals because the defendants were no longer present in the country. The Court of Appeals held that it was an abuse of discretion, emphasizing the importance of intermediate appellate review and the lack of voluntary evasion of justice by the defendants.

    Facts

    Carlos Ventura was convicted of criminal possession of stolen property and other offenses. He filed a timely notice of appeal. Ventura, a legal permanent resident from the Dominican Republic, was paroled to ICE and deported before his appeal was heard. The Appellate Division granted the People’s motion to dismiss the appeal.

    Damian Gardner was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance and filed a timely notice of appeal. Gardner was deported to Jamaica before his appeal was decided. The People’s motion to dismiss Gardner’s appeal was also granted by the Appellate Division.

    Procedural History

    Both Ventura and Gardner were convicted in trial courts. They both filed appeals to the Appellate Division. In both cases, the Appellate Division granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss the appeals due to the defendants’ deportation. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal in both cases to review the dismissals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion by dismissing the direct criminal appeals of defendants who were involuntarily deported while their appeals were pending.

    Holding

    Yes, because criminal defendants have a fundamental right to intermediate appellate review, and dismissing an appeal solely due to involuntary deportation undermines this right, especially when the defendant’s absence is not a voluntary evasion of justice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 450.10 provides a criminal defendant a right to appeal to an intermediate appellate court. Dismissal of appeals based on the defendant’s inability to obey the mandate of the court is usually reserved for cases where the defendant voluntarily absconds, thereby evading justice. In this case, the defendants’ deportations were involuntary, distinguishing them from cases where appeals are dismissed due to a defendant’s deliberate evasion. The Court emphasized the importance of intermediate appellate review in New York, highlighting the Appellate Division’s unique fact-finding powers and ability to review unpreserved issues. The court noted that while CPL 470.60(1) grants appellate courts discretion to dismiss appeals, this discretion cannot override a defendant’s fundamental right to appellate review. The Court also noted that the defendants continued to prosecute their appeals through counsel. The Court distinguished prior cases, such as People v. Del Rio, because those cases involved appeals dismissed by the Court of Appeals after intermediate appellate review had already occurred. Judge Read dissented, arguing that the Appellate Division has discretion to dismiss appeals, and that the majority’s rule strips the court of this discretion when the defendant is an involuntarily deported noncitizen. The dissent argued that unless the conviction caused the deportation or prevents reentry, the Appellate Division should have the discretion to dismiss the appeal.

  • Matter of Kachalsky v. Cacace, 14 N.Y.3d 743 (2010): Defining ‘Substantial Constitutional Question’ for Appellate Review

    14 N.Y.3d 743 (2010)

    The case addresses the interpretation of what constitutes a ‘substantial constitutional question’ sufficient to warrant an appeal as of right to the New York Court of Appeals under Article 6, § 3 (b) (1) of the New York Constitution and CPLR 5601 (b).

    Summary

    Alan Kachalsky appealed the denial of his application for a concealed carry pistol license, arguing that the ‘proper cause’ requirement of New York Penal Law § 400.00 (2) (f) violated the Second Amendment. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal sua sponte, finding that no substantial constitutional question was directly involved. Judge Smith dissented, arguing that the Second Amendment issues raised were indeed substantial, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s recent holdings and pending cases on the Second Amendment’s applicability to the states. The dissent contended that the court was improperly using its discretion to avoid hearing a case it was obligated to hear under the New York Constitution.

    Facts

    Alan Kachalsky applied for a license to carry a concealed pistol or revolver in New York. His application was denied because he failed to demonstrate ‘proper cause’ as required by New York Penal Law § 400.00 (2) (f). Kachalsky argued that this ‘proper cause’ requirement infringed upon his Second Amendment rights.

    Procedural History

    Kachalsky’s challenge to the denial of his pistol license application was rejected by the lower courts. He then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals as of right, asserting that his appeal directly involved the construction of the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal sua sponte, determining that no substantial constitutional question was directly involved.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the denial of a pistol license based on the ‘proper cause’ requirement of New York Penal Law § 400.00 (2) (f) raises a ‘substantial constitutional question’ regarding the Second Amendment, thereby entitling the applicant to an appeal as of right to the New York Court of Appeals under Article 6, § 3 (b) (1) of the New York Constitution and CPLR 5601 (b).

    Holding

    No, because the Court of Appeals determined, without further explanation, that the constitutional questions presented were not ‘substantial’ enough to warrant an appeal as of right.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority opinion provides no reasoning, simply stating that the appeal is dismissed because no substantial constitutional question is directly involved. Judge Smith’s dissent argues that the court is incorrectly interpreting the meaning of “substantial constitutional question.” Smith asserts that the Second Amendment issues are indeed substantial, especially considering the Supreme Court granted certiorari in McDonald v. City of Chicago to determine whether the Second Amendment applies to the states. Smith also points to District of Columbia v. Heller, arguing that it provides fair ground for litigation regarding whether ‘proper cause’ requirements for carrying concealed weapons are consistent with the Second Amendment. Smith contends that the court is improperly using its discretion to decide whether to hear the appeal, when the Constitution grants the appellant the right to have the appeal heard. Judge Smith stated, “I think, however, that petitioner has a constitutional right to have us hear this appeal, and that’s all there is to it.”

  • People v. West, 100 N.Y.2d 23 (2003): Abandonment of Right to Appeal Due to Delay

    100 N.Y.2d 23 (2003)

    A defendant abandons the right to appeal when they fail to perfect the appeal in a timely manner, despite being informed of their appellate rights and the process for seeking poor person relief.

    Summary

    The case concerns whether the defendant abandoned his right to appeal his conviction for rape and sodomy because he failed to perfect his appeal for over 14 years. The New York Court of Appeals held that he did abandon his right to appeal. The Court reasoned that the right to appeal is a statutory right that must be affirmatively exercised and timely asserted. Despite being informed of his appellate rights and how to apply for poor person relief, the defendant repeatedly attempted to bypass the state appellate process by filing petitions seeking federal habeas corpus relief. The Court found no due process violation in requiring the defendant to apply for legal representation.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of rape and sodomy in the first degree and adjudicated a persistent felony offender. He was advised of his right to appeal, including written notice of how to proceed as a poor person. He filed a timely notice of appeal. The defendant also moved pro se for copies of transcripts, alleging indigence. He filed multiple unsuccessful federal habeas corpus petitions before attempting to perfect his state appeal.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted and sentenced in the trial court. He filed a notice of appeal. He then filed multiple federal habeas corpus petitions, all of which were dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. Fourteen years after sentencing, he sought permission from the Appellate Division to prosecute his appeal as a poor person. The Appellate Division granted the People’s cross-motion to dismiss the appeal based on laches. Leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. After a federal court intervened, the Appellate Division again dismissed the appeal, concluding the defendant’s 14-year delay demonstrated abandonment. This decision was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant abandoned his right to appeal by failing to perfect his appeal for more than 14 years after being informed of his appellate rights.
    2. Whether an application for poor person relief is a critical stage of the proceeding to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the right to appeal is a statutory right that must be affirmatively exercised and timely asserted, and the defendant failed to pursue his appeal despite being informed of his rights and the necessary steps.
    2. No, because the Sixth Amendment does not encompass the right to counsel in appellate proceedings for poor person relief applications, and the information required for such applications is uniquely available to the appellant without the need for counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the right to appeal is a statutory right and must be timely asserted. The Court noted that the defendant was properly informed of his right to appeal and how to apply for poor person relief. The defendant’s repeated attempts to seek federal habeas corpus relief while neglecting his state appeal demonstrated an abandonment of his state appeal. The Court emphasized that assigned counsel is required to inform a defendant of their right to appeal after sentencing per 22 NYCRR 606.5 [b]; 671.3, 821.2 [a]; 1022.11 [a]. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that he was not informed of his right to seek poor person relief, citing the explicit instructions he received. The court also held that application for poor person relief is not a critical stage where the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches because the appellant need only advise the appellate court of income, its source(s), and a list of property owned and its value and “[t]his personal information is uniquely available to the appellant.”

  • People v. Stevens, 91 N.Y.2d 270 (1997): Right to Appeal Sex Offender Risk Level Determinations

    People v. Stevens, 91 N.Y.2d 270 (1997)

    A convicted sex offender does not have a discrete right to appeal a risk level determination made pursuant to New York’s Sex Offender Registration Act (Megan’s Law) under the Criminal Procedure Law.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether convicted sex offenders can directly appeal a court’s determination of their risk level classification under Megan’s Law. The New York Court of Appeals held that no such right exists within the framework of the Criminal Procedure Law. The Court reasoned that the risk level determination is not part of the original criminal action or sentence, but rather a post-sentence regulatory consequence. Because neither Megan’s Law nor the Criminal Procedure Law provides for a direct criminal appeal from such determinations, the appeals were properly dismissed.

    Facts

    Darryl Stevens pleaded guilty to attempted rape in 1990 and was sentenced to imprisonment. After his release in 1996, the County Court designated him a level three sexually violent predator under Megan’s Law, requiring him to register as a sex offender. Bernard Smith pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in 1993 and was similarly classified as a level three offender upon his release.

    Procedural History

    Both Stevens and Smith appealed their risk level classifications to the Appellate Division, arguing that the Megan’s Law determination was an additional condition on their original sentences. The Appellate Division dismissed their appeals, holding that the risk level determination was not an amended sentence or resentence and therefore not appealable under the Criminal Procedure Law. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a risk level determination under Megan’s Law constitutes a final disposition of the original criminal sentence, thereby granting a right of appeal.
    2. Whether the Legislature can curtail appellate jurisdiction from final judgments or orders in criminal actions.

    Holding

    1. No, because the risk level determination is a consequence of the conviction but not a part of the criminal action or its final adjudication.
    2. No, the Legislature cannot curtail the Appellate Division’s jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments of conviction; however, this principle does not create a right to appeal where no statute provides for one.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a risk level determination under Megan’s Law is predominantly regulatory, designed to protect the public from recidivism. The Court emphasized that a judgment incorporates both the conviction and the sentence, terminating the criminal action. The risk level determination occurs post-sentence and is not a part of the original judgment. The court stated that “the discrete risk level determinations are a consequence of convictions for sex offenses, but are not a part of the criminal action or its final adjudication”.

    The Court acknowledged that while Article VI, § 4(k) of the New York Constitution prohibits legislative curtailment of Appellate Division jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments, this only applies when a statutory right to appeal already exists. The Court found that neither Megan’s Law nor the Criminal Procedure Law provides a statutory basis for a direct criminal appeal from a risk level determination. The court stated that it could not “create a right to appeal out of thin air”.

    The Court also addressed policy arguments for allowing appeals of risk level determinations but stated that such policy concerns do not substitute for legislative authorization. The court deferred deciding whether a court making post-sentence risk level assessments is acting qua court or as a distinct quasi-regulatory entity.

  • People v. McLemore, 73 N.Y.2d 340 (1989): Delayed Appeal Due to State Action and Loss of Records

    People v. McLemore, 73 N.Y.2d 340 (1989)

    When a defendant is deprived of their right to appeal due to state action and the records of the trial are lost, making reconstruction or a new trial impossible, the conviction must be vacated and the indictment dismissed, even after a significant passage of time.

    Summary

    McLemore sought to reverse a 1963 New York assault conviction, which was used as an aggravating factor in a Mississippi murder trial where he was sentenced to death. He argued that he was never advised of his right to appeal the 1963 conviction and that the State thwarted his attempts to obtain review. The New York Court of Appeals held that because McLemore was denied his right to appeal due to state action and the trial records were lost, making a new trial impossible, the conviction was vacated, and the indictment dismissed.

    Facts

    In 1963, McLemore was convicted of assault in New York.

    McLemore was not advised of his right to appeal the assault conviction.

    The 1963 New York conviction was later used as an aggravating factor in a Mississippi murder trial, where McLemore was sentenced to death.

    McLemore made several attempts to appeal the 1963 conviction pro se, but these efforts were unsuccessful due to actions by the State.

    The records of McLemore’s 1963 trial were lost.

    Procedural History

    McLemore sought post-conviction relief in Mississippi, challenging the use of the 1963 New York conviction.

    He then sought to reverse the 1963 New York assault conviction.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of resentence, determining that review of the underlying 1963 conviction was unavailable.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the passage of time bars an appeal of a conviction when the defendant was not advised of their right to appeal, made diligent attempts to appeal pro se, and was prevented from obtaining review by the State.

    Whether vacatur of the conviction and dismissal of the indictment is the appropriate remedy when the trial records are lost, and neither reconstruction nor a new trial is possible.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s right to appeal was thwarted by the state, and the conviction was used as an aggravating factor in a capital case. The passage of time does not bar appeal in these circumstances.

    Yes, because the loss of trial records and the impossibility of reconstruction or a new trial leaves vacatur of the conviction and dismissal of the indictment as the only available remedy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the passage of time did not bar the appeal due to the unusual circumstances: McLemore was never advised of his right to appeal, he made diligent pro se attempts to appeal, and the State prevented him from obtaining review. The court stated, “It is undisputed that the actions of this State prevented defendant from ever obtaining the review of the conviction to which he was entitled.”

    The Court distinguished its prior holding in People v. Corso, noting that Corso did not involve a situation where the defendant had made timely efforts to raise an appealable issue before the statute imposing time limitations was adopted.

    Because the trial records were lost, making reconstruction or a new trial impossible, the Court determined that the only available remedy was vacatur of the conviction and dismissal of the indictment. The court cited People v. Rivera in support of this remedy.

    The court emphasized the People’s concession that McLemore had raised appealable issues with possible merit and that the records were lost preventing reconstruction or a new trial. This concession significantly influenced the Court’s decision to reverse the Appellate Division’s order.

  • People v. Montgomery, 24 N.Y.2d 130 (1969): Defendant’s Right to Know About Appeal

    People v. Montgomery, 24 N.Y.2d 130 (1969)

    A defendant has the right to be advised of their right to appeal, and failure to do so may warrant resentencing for the purpose of taking an appeal, provided a genuine appealable issue exists.

    Summary

    The Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant, convicted via guilty plea, is entitled to a hearing on a claim of not being advised of the right to appeal. The Court held that to warrant a hearing, the defendant must dispute the conviction’s validity and show a genuine appealable issue they might have raised but for ignorance of their rights. A mere claim of excessive sentencing, where the sentence is less than the maximum, is insufficient. Further, the Court clarified that applications for Montgomery relief are encompassed by CPL 460.30, requiring application to the intermediate appellate court.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree after pleading guilty. As a second felony offender, he faced a maximum sentence of 30 to 60 years. He received a sentence of 15 to 25 years. The defendant later claimed he was not advised of his right to appeal and that the District Attorney breached a promise of a lighter sentence. He sought resentencing to pursue an appeal.

    Procedural History

    The defendant previously litigated, unsuccessfully, the claim that the District Attorney breached a promise of a lighter sentence in prior coram nobis proceedings. He then sought a hearing based on the claim he was not advised of his right to appeal. The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant, convicted via guilty plea, is entitled to a hearing on a claim of not being advised of the right to appeal, based solely on a claim of excessive sentence where the sentence was less than the maximum permissible sentence?
    2. Whether applications seeking Montgomery relief are encompassed by CPL 460.30?

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant must demonstrate a genuine appealable issue, and a mere claim of excessive sentencing, where the sentence is less than the maximum, is insufficient.
    2. Yes, because CPL 460.30 directly applies to applications for extension of time for taking an appeal, encompassing the relief sought in a Montgomery claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that to be entitled to a Montgomery hearing, a defendant must dispute the validity of the conviction and demonstrate a genuine appealable issue. It cited People v. Melton, stating that an unsupported claim of excessiveness of sentence, where the defendant received less than the maximum, is not a tenable basis for relief. The Court emphasized that the defendant, facing a potential 30 to 60-year sentence, received 15 to 25 years, thus failing to establish a claim upon which Montgomery relief could be granted. The Court also noted the defendant’s claim of a breached promise had been unsuccessfully litigated previously.

    The Court further clarified the procedural mechanism for Montgomery relief. While acknowledging the traditional use of coram nobis, the Court stated that the enactment of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) sought to codify grounds for such relief. However, CPL 440.10, designed for vacating judgments, doesn’t address Montgomery claims which seek an extension of appeal time, not vacatur.

    Turning to CPL 460.30, the Court found it directly applicable to applications for extending appeal time. It stated that this statute eliminates the need for resentencing for taking a timely appeal. The application must be made to the intermediate appellate court, which may extend the appeal time if the failure to appeal was due to “improper conduct of a public servant or from improper conduct * * * of the defendant’s attorney.” The Court concluded that failing to advise a defendant of their right to appeal constitutes “improper conduct.” The Court also noted that CPL 460.30 provides for a hearing to resolve factual issues. Finally, the Court emphasized that CPL 460.30 motions must be made with due diligence and within one year of the appeal deadline and, regarding convictions prior to CPL 460.30’s enactment, within one year of the statute’s effective date.

  • People v. Rivera, 39 N.Y.2d 519 (1976): Right to New Trial When Transcript Unavailable After Delayed Appeal

    People v. Rivera, 39 N.Y.2d 519 (1976)

    When an indigent defendant’s right to appeal is reinstated after a significant delay due to not being informed of that right, and a trial transcript is unavailable, a new trial is warranted if no alternative means exist to perfect the appeal or demonstrate appealable issues.

    Summary

    Luis Rivera, an indigent defendant convicted in 1953, was not informed of his right to appeal. Years later, this omission was rectified via coram nobis, and he was resentenced nunc pro tunc to allow a new appeal. However, the trial transcript was missing. Rivera moved for summary reversal, but the Appellate Division ordered a hearing to determine if appealable issues existed. After a negative report, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under these special circumstances—where the defendant was not informed of his right to appeal, a transcript is unavailable, and no alternative means to demonstrate appealable issues exist—a new trial is warranted.

    Facts

    In 1953, Luis Rivera was convicted of selling a small amount of marijuana.
    He was not advised of his right to appeal at the time of sentencing.
    Years later, upon a second conviction, he faced a much harsher penalty due to his prior offense.
    He then learned of his right to appeal the 1953 conviction but the statutory time to appeal had long expired.
    Rivera spoke no English and relied on an interpreter during the trial.
    Post-incarceration, he received shock treatments resulting in retrograde amnesia regarding the trial.
    The original trial transcript and sentencing minutes could not be located.
    The prosecuting attorney had suffered a paralytic stroke, hindering his memory.
    Rivera’s original attorney had been disbarred and was untraceable.
    The trial judge had passed away.

    Procedural History

    Rivera applied for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing he was never informed of his right to appeal the 1953 conviction.
    He was resentenced nunc pro tunc to allow an appeal.
    Rivera moved in the Appellate Division for summary reversal due to the missing transcript.
    The Appellate Division referred the matter to the Supreme Court for a hearing and report on appealable issues.
    The Supreme Court reported that Rivera failed to establish the existence of appealable issues.
    The Appellate Division initially denied Rivera’s motion to disaffirm the report but then reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.
    The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indigent defendant, resentenced nunc pro tunc to allow an appeal after being initially deprived of his right to be informed of his appeal rights, is entitled to a new trial when the trial transcript is unobtainable, and no alternative sources for perfecting the appeal or demonstrating appealable issues exist.

    Holding

    Yes, because under these unique circumstances, the defendant’s right to appeal has been significantly impeded due to the unavailability of the transcript and the lack of alternative means to reconstruct the trial or identify appealable issues, which was passively related to the conduct of the People.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the “fundamental right” to appeal a conviction in New York State (People v Montgomery, 24 NY2d 130, 132). The court acknowledged that a transcript is an “invaluable aid” for most appeals and that denying its use to an indigent defendant solely due to their poverty is impermissible (People v Pride, 3 NY2d 545; Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12).

    The court recognized that transcripts are not always the only means to present appealable issues. Reconstruction via a narrative bill of exceptions or other available sources might suffice (Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12). However, in Rivera’s case, several factors combined to make a fair appeal impossible:

    Rivera’s inability to recall the trial due to his language barrier and subsequent amnesia.
    The unavailability of the prosecuting attorney and Rivera’s disbarred attorney.
    The death of the trial judge.

    Under these unusual circumstances, the presumption of regularity attaching to judicial proceedings (People v Richetti, 302 NY 290, 298) was insufficient. The court stated that to shift the burden of rebutting this presumption to Rivera, who was demonstrably unable to present evidence due to circumstances beyond his control, would be unfair. The unavailability of the minutes was not due to “destruction beyond the control of either party” but due to the long delay in informing Rivera of his right to appeal, a fact related to the conduct of the People.

    The court reiterated that furnishing legal advice to indigent defendants is a state responsibility (People v Montgomery, 24 NY2d 130, 133). The court emphasized that the state failed to provide safeguards against the lapse of a critical time period, of which the defendant was unaware. Therefore, under these unique circumstances, where a transcript is unavailable, and no alternatives exist to ensure a fair appeal following a delayed reinstatement of appeal rights, a new trial is warranted.

  • People v. Hall, 39 N.Y.2d 547 (1976): Limits on “Telescoping” Coram Nobis Applications into Summary Appeals

    People v. Hall, 39 N.Y.2d 547 (1976)

    An appellate court cannot summarily deny a coram nobis application seeking resentencing for the purpose of taking a direct appeal by treating the application as the appeal itself without providing the defendant with a full record, briefing, and oral argument.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether an appellate court can expedite a coram nobis application by treating it as a direct appeal and dismissing it on the merits without the benefit of a full appellate record or briefing. The New York Court of Appeals held that such a “telescoping” procedure, while well-intentioned, deprives the defendant of fundamental procedural protections, including the right to a complete record, briefing, and oral argument. The Court emphasized that while judicial efficiency is important, it cannot come at the expense of a defendant’s constitutional rights. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s orders and remitted the cases for resentencing.

    Facts

    In People v. Hall, Hall pleaded guilty to manslaughter and attempted robbery. He later filed a coram nobis application, arguing that he was not advised of his right to appeal. The trial court found that Hall was not advised of his right to appeal but denied the motion for resentencing. In People v. Santiago, Santiago pleaded guilty to manslaughter. He also filed a coram nobis application, contending that he was not advised of his right to appeal. The trial court denied the application, finding it difficult to believe he was unaware of his appeal rights.

    Procedural History

    In both cases, the Supreme Court denied the defendant’s coram nobis applications. The Appellate Division affirmed these denials, reasoning that the defendants had not demonstrated grounds for appeal. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to consider the propriety of the Appellate Division’s procedures.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an appellate court may, without advance notice, deny a coram nobis application seeking resentencing for the purpose of taking a direct appeal by considering the merits of the underlying appeal based solely on the coram nobis record.

    Holding

    No, because such a procedure deprives the defendant of the right to a full appellate record, briefing, and oral argument, thereby violating their rights to due process and equal protection.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the Appellate Division improperly “telescoped” the coram nobis application into a summary appeal. While acknowledging the desire to economize judicial resources, the Court emphasized the importance of fundamental procedural protections. The Court cited People v. Emmett (25 N.Y.2d 354, 356), quoting, “Implicit in the right of a defendant to appeal…and to have counsel on that appeal…is his right that such counsel be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to submit a brief on the merits of the case.” The Court also referenced Garrison v. Patterson (391 U.S. 464), which held that counsel must be given advance notice when an appellate court proposes to combine consideration of whether there exist viable appealable issues with consideration of the same issues on their merits. The Court reasoned that adopting the Appellate Division’s procedure would require coram nobis applicants to demonstrate not just a viable appealable claim, but a claim on which they could succeed on appeal. This would encourage all applicants to seek a full record and extensive briefing, slowing down the process. The court stated, “Much as one may sympathize with a sense of impatience and recognize the need to increase judicial efficiency…we must conclude that full constitutional protection is still to be assured individual convicts.” The Court concluded that absent carefully drafted legislation refining the procedure, such assurance would only increase calls on the public treasury and judicial burden.

  • People v. O’Brien, 30 N.Y.2d 95 (1972): Attorney’s Failure to Perfect Appeal

    People v. O’Brien, 30 N.Y.2d 95 (1972)

    An attorney’s failure to perfect a criminal defendant’s appeal, even after the defendant was informed of the right to appeal, can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, warranting reinstatement of the appeal.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant, who was informed of his right to appeal but whose attorney failed to perfect the appeal, was entitled to have his appeal reinstated. The court held that the attorney’s failure to act, even when the defendant knew of his appeal rights, deprived the defendant of effective assistance of counsel. The court distinguished this situation from a knowing waiver of the right to appeal, emphasizing the attorney’s responsibility to act on the client’s behalf once an appeal is initiated.

    Facts

    The defendant, O’Brien, was convicted of a crime. Following his conviction, he was informed of his right to appeal, satisfying the requirements established in People v. Montgomery. However, O’Brien’s attorney failed to take the necessary steps to perfect the appeal. As a result, the appeal was not pursued within the required timeframe.

    Procedural History

    The defendant sought to have his appeal reinstated, arguing that his attorney’s failure to perfect the appeal constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The lower courts denied his request. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an attorney’s failure to perfect a criminal defendant’s appeal, after the defendant has been informed of his right to appeal, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, thereby entitling the defendant to reinstatement of the appeal.

    Holding

    Yes, because an attorney’s inaction in perfecting an appeal, even after the defendant is aware of the right to appeal, deprives the defendant of meaningful legal representation and the opportunity for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the failure to perfect the appeal amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. The court distinguished this situation from a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to appeal. Even though the defendant was aware of his right to appeal as per People v. Montgomery, the attorney’s subsequent inaction prevented the defendant from actually exercising that right. The court emphasized that an attorney has a duty to diligently pursue an appeal once the client indicates a desire to appeal. The court stated, “Our decision, very simply, demonstrates a fundamental concern that defendants be informed of their right to appeal, and that, where an attorney, whether assigned or retained, fails to apprise his client of this vital privilege, there is no justification for making the defendant suffer for his attorney’s failing.” (emphasis added). The dissent argued that because the defendant was informed of his rights, his own lack of diligence should be viewed as a waiver of his right to appeal. However, the majority focused on the attorney’s failure to act, which effectively nullified the defendant’s right to appellate review. This case highlights the importance of an attorney’s ongoing responsibility to represent their client’s interests throughout the appellate process, even after the client is initially informed of their rights.

  • People v. Montgomery, 24 N.Y.2d 130 (1969): Indigent Defendant’s Right to Know of Appeal

    People v. Montgomery, 24 N.Y.2d 130 (1969)

    An indigent criminal defendant has a right to be informed of their right to appeal, and failure to do so by counsel or the court warrants a hearing and possible resentencing to allow an appeal.

    Summary

    Montgomery, an indigent defendant convicted of second-degree murder, sought a writ of error coram nobis, alleging he was never informed of his right to appeal. The New York Court of Appeals held that every defendant has a fundamental right to appeal, and due process requires that indigent defendants not be deprived of this right due to ignorance or counsel’s failure. The court reversed the lower court’s denial of Montgomery’s application and ordered a hearing to determine if he was indeed unaware of his appeal rights, potentially leading to resentencing to allow a new appeal.

    Facts

    Samuel Montgomery, a 15-year-old, was involved in a street fight that resulted in the fatal stabbing of one of the other participants. He was indicted for second-degree murder along with two companions. Montgomery was allegedly the one who brandished the knife.

    Procedural History

    Montgomery and his companions were jointly tried, with court-appointed counsel representing each. Montgomery was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 25 years to life. His co-defendant May’s conviction was modified on appeal to manslaughter. Montgomery did not file an appeal at the time. Years later, Montgomery applied for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing that he was not informed of his right to appeal due to indigency, ignorance, and infancy. The Supreme Court, Bronx County, denied the application without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the petitioner’s allegation that he was not informed of his right to appeal presents an issue of fact which requires a hearing to determine the veracity of the contention.

    Holding

    Yes, because basic fairness and due process require that an indigent defendant not be deprived of the right to appeal either because the defendant was unaware of its existence or counsel failed to abide by a promise to either file or prosecute an appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the right to appeal is a fundamental right. The court stated, “The time has come for us to announce clearly that every defendant has a fundamental right to appeal his conviction and that, accordingly, basic fairness and due process require that the right not be dissipated either because the defendant was unaware of its existence or counsel failed to abide by a promise to either file or prosecute an appeal.” Because the state provides an absolute right to seek review in criminal prosecutions, an indigent defendant cannot be deprived of this review simply because of their poverty. The court reasoned that since the State has the responsibility to provide legal advice to indigent defendants, the State cannot permit a critical time period to lapse without the defendant’s awareness. The court concluded that Montgomery should be afforded a hearing to determine whether he was informed of his right to appeal. If not, he was denied equal protection and should be resentenced so his time to appeal will run anew. The court noted, “An indigent defendant cannot lose his right to appeal simply because the courts have deputized a lawyer to fulfill the function and he has failed properly to carry out his duties.”