People v. Scott, 26 N.Y.2d 286 (1970)

A landlord is not liable for a tenant’s unlawful conduct on the leased premises unless the landlord has the right to re-enter the property and terminate the tenancy due to the unlawful activity.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of a landlord for violating a municipal ordinance prohibiting the storage of junked vehicles. The landlord had leased the property to his son, who then stored the vehicles. The court held that the landlord could not be held liable because he did not have the right to re-enter the property and stop his tenant’s actions. A dissenting opinion argued the landlord did have the right to re-enter to discontinue the unlawful use of his property, especially since the lease was a sham. This case illustrates the limits of a landlord’s responsibility for a tenant’s illegal activities and the importance of the right to re-entry.

Facts

The defendant, Scott, leased his property to his son. After the lease was executed, a municipal ordinance was enacted prohibiting the storage of junked vehicles. The son stored approximately 100 junked vehicles on the property. The defendant was arrested and convicted for violating the ordinance.

Procedural History

The Broome County Court convicted the defendant. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, holding that the landlord could not be held liable for his tenant’s actions because he lacked the right to re-enter the property and terminate the tenancy based on the unlawful activity. The dissent argued for affirmance, asserting the lease was a sham and the landlord had a right and a duty to re-enter.

Issue(s)

Whether a landlord can be held criminally liable for a tenant’s violation of a municipal ordinance on the leased property, when the landlord does not have the right to re-enter the property and terminate the tenancy?

Holding

No, because a landlord cannot be penalized for conduct over which he has no control. The court reasoned that the landlord’s inability to control his tenant’s unlawful acts precluded imposing any penalty upon him.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the defendant could not be held liable for his son’s actions because he had leased the property and did not have the legal right to re-enter and stop the unlawful activity. The court relied on the principle that a person cannot be penalized for conduct over which he has no control. The court stated that the owner “cannot permit an unlawful condition to persist with impunity,” but reasoned the landlord did not “permit” in this case since the lease transferred control to the tenant. They distinguished Bertholf v. O’Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509 stating that in this case, the lease was executed before the enactment of the ordinance, therefore no sanction can be imposed upon the defendant.

The dissenting opinion argued that the landlord did have the right to re-enter the property to discontinue the unlawful use, regardless of whether the activity was for profit. The dissent cited People ex rel. Jay v. Bennett, 14 Hun 63 stating: “This statute was intended not only to prevent the use of premises for an unlawful purpose, but to protect the landlord from the consequences of allowing such unlawful purpose to continue. It gave him in other words the power to put an end to it, and thus to shield himself from any penalty for knowingly permitting the premises to be used as indicated.” The dissent further argued the lease was a sham, granting the landlord the right to re-enter at any time. The dissent also noted the defendant took no action for almost a year after the ordinance was effective, which should warrant an affirmance (Tenement House Dept. of City of N. Y. v. McDevitt, 215 N. Y. 160).