New York Law Review

Tag: Revocation of Will

  • Matter of Cohen, 635 N.E.2d 151 (N.Y. 1994): Enforceability of Agreement to Make Mutual Wills When One Will is Revoked

    Matter of Cohen, 635 N.E.2d 151 (N.Y. 1994)

    An agreement to make mutual wills is unenforceable when one party revokes their will with the other party’s consent, as there is no unjust enrichment to justify imposing a constructive trust.

    Summary

    Harry and Rae Cohen executed mutual wills in 1982, agreeing to leave half their estate to Harry’s relatives and half to Rae’s, with the wills being irrevocable without mutual consent. Harry died in 1986, and Rae, claiming she couldn’t find his will, was appointed administrator of his estate. Harry’s nephew sought to probate a copy of the will or enforce the agreement. The court denied probate due to presumption of revocation but imposed a constructive trust on the estate based on the agreement. The Appellate Division modified this, limiting the trust. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because Harry’s will was deemed revoked with Rae’s consent, Rae wasn’t unjustly enriched, and the agreement couldn’t be enforced.

    Facts

    1. Harry and Rae Cohen, a childless couple, executed mutual wills in April 1982, each establishing a trust for the surviving spouse, with the remainder to be divided equally between relatives of Harry and Rae.
    2. The wills devised the residue of the estate to the surviving spouse outright.
    3. Simultaneously, they entered a written agreement making the wills irrevocable except with mutual consent, designating the legatees as third-party beneficiaries.
    4. Harry died in December 1986; Rae claimed she couldn’t find his will and was issued letters of administration.
    5. Harry’s nephew, a legatee under the will, sought to probate a copy of the will or enforce the agreement.

    Procedural History

    1. The Surrogate’s Court denied probate of the will due to the presumption of revocation but enforced the agreement, imposing a constructive trust on the entire estate.
    2. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of probate but modified the constructive trust, limiting it to the portion of the estate not passing outright to Rae under the original will.
    3. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, dismissing the petition.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an agreement to make mutual wills is enforceable through a constructive trust when one of the wills is deemed to have been revoked by the testator.

    Holding

    1. No, because the surviving spouse did not receive the estate as a result of the agreement but rather due to intestacy following the revocation of the will, and therefore was not unjustly enriched.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that prior cases enforcing agreements to make mutual wills involved situations where the first party to die performed the agreement by not revoking their will. The surviving party then breached the agreement by disposing of the estate inconsistently with the original agreement. The key principle is that equity prevents the surviving party from benefiting from the first party’s performance and then breaching the agreement. This is essentially a particular application of preventing unjust enrichment, a necessary element for a constructive trust. In this case, because the lower courts found that Harry’s will was revoked, Rae did not benefit from Harry’s performance of the agreement. Instead, she took the estate through intestacy. Therefore, there was no unjust enrichment to justify imposing a constructive trust. The court stated, “[T]o permit the one who survives to gain the benefits of the joint will and then to flout its provisions in violation of the promise made to the other ‘would be a mockery of justice’”. The court also noted that the designation of the legatees as third-party beneficiaries did not change the outcome, as Rae effectively assented to the revocation of Harry’s will when she applied for letters of administration. This precluded the third-party beneficiaries from asserting any vested rights under the agreement.

  • In re Estate of Maruccia, 54 N.Y.2d 191 (1981): Revocation of Will by Separation Agreement

    In re Estate of Maruccia, 54 N.Y.2d 191 (1981)

    For a separation agreement to revoke a prior will under EPTL 3-4.3, it must explicitly renounce testamentary dispositions or clearly manifest an intent to no longer be beneficiaries under each other’s wills.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a separation agreement containing a general release clause revoked a prior will that favored the testator’s estranged spouse. The New York Court of Appeals held that the separation agreement did not revoke the will because it lacked an explicit renunciation of testamentary gifts or clear intent to revoke beneficiary status. The court overruled prior precedent suggesting a general waiver of rights was sufficient for revocation, emphasizing the need for explicit language to ensure testamentary intent is honored. The decision underscores the importance of updating wills after separation agreements to reflect changed circumstances.

    Facts

    Alfred Maruccia executed a will in 1966, naming his second wife, Ethelyn, as a beneficiary and co-executor. In 1976, Alfred and Ethelyn entered into a separation agreement containing a general release of claims. The agreement addressed property division and waiver of statutory rights related to the marriage. Alfred died in 1977 without updating his will. His first wife and children from that marriage challenged Ethelyn’s status as beneficiary and executor, arguing the separation agreement revoked her rights under the will.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court ruled that the separation agreement’s language was “wholly inconsistent” with the will, revoking the provisions favoring Ethelyn. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the agreement only waived statutory rights, not voluntary bequests. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a separation agreement containing a general release clause, but lacking explicit renunciation of testamentary gifts or a clear manifestation of intent to revoke beneficiary status, is “wholly inconsistent” with a prior will under EPTL 3-4.3, thus revoking the will’s provisions favoring the estranged spouse.

    Holding

    No, because to revoke a prior will under EPTL 3-4.3, a separation agreement must either explicitly renounce testamentary dispositions or clearly manifest an intent to no longer be beneficiaries under each other’s wills; a general waiver of rights is insufficient.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that EPTL 3-4.3 requires a high standard for implied revocation of a will based on a subsequent act. The statute uses the term “wholly inconsistent,” indicating a strict approach. The court emphasized that testamentary instruments should not be invalidated based on conjecture about the testator’s intent, especially when they had the opportunity to update the will. The court explicitly overruled Matter of Hollister to the extent that it suggested a general waiver of rights “against the estate” was sufficient to revoke a prior will. The court stated that the separation agreement in this case only relinquished statutory rights arising from the marital relationship and did not explicitly renounce the voluntary bequests made to Ethelyn in Alfred’s will. The court quoted Matter of Torr, stating “a solemn testamentary instrument should not be rendered ineffectual upon conjecture as to the motivation of a testator who in his lifetime had ample opportunity to revoke or to amend the instrument had he desired to do so.” The court noted that while EPTL 5-1.4 automatically revokes testamentary dispositions to a former spouse after a divorce, this case involved a separation agreement without a subsequent divorce. The court emphasized the importance of updating wills to reflect changed circumstances after a separation or divorce.