New York Law Review

Tag: revocation of consent

  • In re Baby Boy C., 84 N.Y.2d 91 (1994): Limits on Forcing Adoption Over an Unwilling Party

    84 N.Y.2d 91 (1994)

    Courts have inherent equitable power to deny a party the right to discontinue a proceeding if it prejudices another party; however, this power should be used sparingly in adoption cases, only when a child will be severely prejudiced by not being granted legal status as the child of the adoptive parent.

    Summary

    A married couple jointly petitioned to adopt two children. Later, the husband sought to withdraw his consent. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a court can finalize an adoption over the objection of one adoptive parent. The Court held that while courts possess equitable power to prevent a party from withdrawing from a proceeding, this power should be rarely used to force an adoption. The Court found that less drastic remedies were available to protect the children’s interests, thus the adoption should not be forced.

    Facts

    A husband and wife sought to adopt two children. They filed joint petitions for adoption. Prior to finalization, the husband and wife became estranged, and the husband sought to withdraw his consent to the adoptions, arguing he was unwilling to adopt the children.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court dismissed the joint adoption petitions, finding no statutory authority to compel an unwilling parent to adopt. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the adoptions, reasoning the husband was equitably estopped from revoking consent and it was in the children’s best interest. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an adoption court has the power to finalize an adoption over the objection of one adoptive parent who seeks to revoke consent, and if so, under what circumstances should that power be exercised?

    Holding

    No, the New York Court of Appeals reversed, the power to impose an adoption against an unwilling party should only be exercised in the rarest and most exceptional circumstances where the child’s interests would be severely and unavoidably prejudiced by being deprived of status as the legal child of the adoptive parent because less drastic remedies were available to protect the children’s interests.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged the inherent power of courts to prevent parties from discontinuing proceedings if it would prejudice another party. The court stated that an adoption court is not powerless to grant an adoption over an adoptive parent’s objection, however that power should only be exercised in the rarest of circumstances. "[D]ue to the conduct of the adoptive parent in taking custody and processing the adoption, the child’s interests would be severely and unavoidably prejudiced as a result of being deprived of status as the legal child of the adoptive parent." The Court reasoned that forcing the husband to adopt the children was not necessary because the wife could adopt them as a single person living apart from her spouse. Additionally, the children could pursue an economic remedy against the husband in the pending divorce action or in a separate plenary action. The Court emphasized the importance of the parent-child relationship, stating, "Our adoption statute embodies the fundamental social concept that the relationship of parent and child may be established by operation of law… Despite the absence of any blood ties, in the eyes of the law an adopted child becomes `the natural child of the adoptive parent’ with all the attendant personal and proprietary incidents to that relationship." Judge Titone concurred, arguing that a child’s best interests can never be served by forcing an unfit and unwilling person to become a parent. Judge Bellacosa dissented, arguing that the husband’s actions had caused irreversible changes in the children’s lives, warranting equitable intervention to finalize the adoption.

  • Matter of Baby Girl S., 666 N.E.2d 1047 (N.Y. 1996): Operative Effect of Extrajudicial Adoption Consent

    Matter of Baby Girl S., 666 N.E.2d 1047 (N.Y. 1996)

    An extrajudicial adoption consent that is promptly withdrawn by the birth parent before any overt manifestation to a third party does not trigger the formal revocation mechanism of the Domestic Relations Law.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a birth mother’s privately signed adoption consent, immediately revoked before being shared with a third party, triggers the statutory revocation process under New York’s Domestic Relations Law. The New York Court of Appeals held that such a consent, immediately nullified by the birth mother, does not invoke the statutory revocation mechanism. The court reasoned that the law contemplates some overt manifestation to a third person for an extrajudicial consent to be operative, to protect the interests of all parties involved. The decision emphasizes the need for careful consideration by birth parents before executing consents, but also recognizes that immediate nullification prevents the consent from having legal effect.

    Facts

    The birth mother (respondent) signed an extrajudicial consent for adoption. Immediately after signing the consent, the birth mother notified her attorney of her decision to revoke it and keep her child. The potential adoptive parents (appellants) sought to enforce the adoption based on the initial consent.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after a lower court decision regarding the validity of the adoption consent.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an extrajudicial adoption consent, signed by a birth mother but immediately revoked before any overt manifestation to a third party, triggers the formal revocation mechanism of Domestic Relations Law § 115-b.

    Holding

    No, because the Domestic Relations Law contemplates some overt manifestation to a third person for an extrajudicial consent to be operative, and a document that is immediately nullified does not implicate the protected interests of others under the statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that interpreting the law to mean that every privately signed and immediately withdrawn consent triggers the formal revocation mechanism would be absurd. The court emphasized that the Domestic Relations Law refers to the adoptive parents and the court in which the adoption proceeding has been or is to be commenced, indicating that some overt manifestation to a third person is necessary for an extrajudicial consent to be operative. The court stated, “While such consents surely must be scrupulously weighed by birth parents before they are executed, a document that is immediately nullified may not implicate the protected interests of others under the statute.” The court explicitly stated that this analysis does not add a delivery requirement to the statute, but rather clarifies the circumstances under which the statutory revocation process is initiated. The court found the birth mother’s prompt notification to her attorney of her intent to keep the child sufficient to nullify the consent before it became operative.