New York Law Review

Tag: revocation

  • People v. Jaffe, 78 N.Y.2d 65 (1991): Authority to Revoke Youthful Offender Status After Sentencing

    People v. Jaffe, 78 N.Y.2d 65 (1991)

    Once a court has adjudicated a defendant a youthful offender and the proceeding has terminated with the entry of judgment, the court lacks the inherent power to revoke the youthful offender finding absent fraud or misrepresentation, even if the original sentence was illegal.

    Summary

    Jaffe pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance, a class B felony, with an agreed-upon sentence recommendation. The trial court initially sentenced him to 2 to 6 years and granted youthful offender status. Realizing this sentence was incompatible with youthful offender status, the court revoked the youthful offender adjudication and reimposed the 2 to 6-year sentence. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that absent fraud or misrepresentation, a court cannot revoke a youthful offender finding after judgment, even if the initial sentence was illegal. The proper remedy is to resentence the defendant within the parameters of the youthful offender law.

    Facts

    Defendant Jaffe pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, a class B felony. A plea agreement stipulated that the prosecution and defense would recommend a sentence of “no more than two to six years” imprisonment. The trial court preliminarily indicated its intent to impose a sentence within that range, subject to a presentence report. After receiving the presentence report, the court sentenced Jaffe to 2 to 6 years and granted him youthful offender status.

    Procedural History

    The trial court, recognizing that the 2-to-6-year sentence was incompatible with a youthful offender adjudication, reconvened and revoked the youthful offender status before reimposing the original sentence. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the trial court could correct its “illegal” sentence by revoking the youthful offender adjudication. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a trial court has the authority to revoke a finding that a defendant is a youthful offender after a proceeding has been terminated by the entry of judgment, in order to legitimate a sentence that is impermissible under the youthful offender law.

    Holding

    1. No, because absent fraud or misrepresentation, a court lacks the inherent power to revoke a youthful offender finding once the proceeding is terminated by entry of judgment; the proper remedy is to impose a new sentence consistent with the youthful offender finding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a youthful offender finding is distinct from the sentence. While courts have inherent power to correct clerical errors or sentences obtained by fraud, this power does not extend to revoking a youthful offender adjudication simply to validate an illegal sentence. The court emphasized that CPL 720.20 requires a court to determine whether an eligible youth is a youthful offender at the time of sentencing. If the court finds the youth is a youthful offender, the conviction is vacated and replaced by the youthful offender finding, and the defendant must be sentenced under Penal Law § 60.02. Quoting Matter of Kisloff v. Covington, the Court stated that it has not recognized a court’s inherent power to vacate a plea and sentence over the defendant’s objection where the error goes beyond mere clerical error and where the proceeding has been terminated by entry of judgment. Because the trial court did not rescind the youthful offender finding due to fraud or misrepresentation, but solely to legitimate the illegal sentence, the revocation was improper. “[T]he proper curative course in the absence of defendant’s consent to do otherwise, was to impose a new sentence consistent as a matter of law with [the youthful offender finding].” The court distinguished this case from situations where a court corrects its own inadvertence in pronouncing sentence or makes a clerical error. Here, the court intentionally adjudicated Jaffe a youthful offender but imposed an impermissible sentence. The appropriate remedy was to resentence Jaffe within the limits prescribed by the youthful offender law, which caps the maximum sentence at four years for a felony conviction.

  • Matter of Estate of Friedrich, 59 N.Y.2d 1023 (1983): Revocation of Totten Trusts by Withdrawal of Funds

    Matter of Estate of Friedrich, 59 N.Y.2d 1023 (1983)

    A depositor’s withdrawal of funds from a Totten trust account operates as a revocation of the trust, preventing the beneficiary from claiming the proceeds unless extraordinary circumstances such as fraud or duress are present.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the withdrawal of funds from a Totten trust account by the depositor, who subsequently died intestate, effectively revoked the trust. The decedent had established a Totten trust for Camphill Village, U.S.A., Inc., but later withdrew the funds, depositing a portion into a new account in his name alone. The Court held that the withdrawal, coupled with the change in account designation, revoked the trust in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as fraud or duress, thus precluding Camphill Village from claiming the funds.

    Facts

    The decedent created a Totten trust in 1969, naming Camphill Village, U.S.A., Inc. as the beneficiary. He informed Camphill of the account in 1973. In 1980, the decedent withdrew all funds from the Totten trust account. He transferred $8,000 to a new, higher-interest account in his name alone, $3,930 to his personal checking account, and took $50 in cash. The signature card for the new account indicated it was under the decedent’s name individually, and he made no subsequent request to change the title of the account to reflect a trust.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court initially found that the decedent did not intend to revoke the trust and dismissed the State’s claim that the funds should escheat. The Appellate Division modified this decision, concluding that the withdrawal of funds revoked the trust under EPTL 7-5.2 (subd 1) and allowing the State’s objection. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s result.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the decedent’s withdrawal of funds from a Totten trust account, coupled with the deposit of a portion of the funds into a new account in his name alone, constituted a revocation of the Totten trust.

    Holding

    Yes, because a depositor’s withdrawal of funds in a Totten trust operates as a revocation, and the beneficiary cannot claim the proceeds unless there are extraordinary circumstances such as fraud or duress, which were not present in this case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while EPTL 7-5.2 (subd 1) provides an objective standard for revoking Totten trusts via withdrawals, it doesn’t mandate that every withdrawal necessarily revokes the trust. The key principle, according to the court, is that a withdrawal generally acts as a revocation unless extraordinary circumstances exist. The court emphasized the importance of the depositor’s actions in changing the account and not designating the new account as a trust for Camphill Village. “By withdrawing the funds, requesting the change in the account without instructing the bank officer to record the new account as one in trust for Camphill Village, and executing the necessary documents after the account had been opened in his name individually, decedent here revoked the Totten trust.” The Court cited precedent, including Matter of Totten, and the Restatement of Trusts 2d, § 58, Comment c, to support the general rule that withdrawal revokes the trust. The absence of any indication of fraud, duress, or unauthorized action led the Court to conclude that the Totten trust was effectively revoked. The Court distinguished the statute (EPTL 7-5.2) from the common law rule regarding revocation by withdrawal, clarifying that the statute addresses a different issue concerning the objective evidence required for revocation, but does not eliminate the common law principle that a withdrawal, in the absence of unusual circumstances, acts as a revocation.