New York Law Review

Tag: retroactivity

  • People v. Jones, 19 N.Y.2d 407 (1967): Retroactive Application of Penal Law §1943 Amendment Allowing Challenges to Prior Convictions

    People v. Jones, 19 N.Y.2d 407 (1967)

    The 1964 amendment to New York Penal Law § 1943, which allows a defendant to challenge the constitutionality of prior convictions used for multiple offender sentencing, applies retroactively to sentences imposed before the amendment’s effective date and applies equally to both in-state and out-of-state prior convictions.

    Summary

    Defendant Jones, previously convicted of robbery and sentenced as a second felony offender based on a prior grand larceny conviction, sought resentencing after the 1964 amendment to Penal Law § 1943, arguing his prior conviction was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals held that the amendment, which allows challenges to prior convictions used for multiple offender sentencing, applies retroactively and encompasses both in-state and out-of-state convictions. The Court reasoned that the clear language of the statute made no distinction between in-state and out-of-state convictions, despite the legislature’s primary focus on addressing the lack of remedy for challenging out-of-state convictions.

    Facts

    In 1963, Jones was convicted of robbery in Westchester County. He was sentenced as a second felony offender based on a 1952 grand larceny conviction in Queens County.
    The 1964 amendment to Penal Law § 1943 allowed challenges to prior convictions used for multiple offender sentencing based on constitutional violations.
    In December 1964, Jones moved for resentencing, arguing his 1952 conviction was unconstitutional.

    Procedural History

    The Westchester County Court denied Jones’s motion without a hearing, interpreting the 1964 amendment to apply only to out-of-state convictions.
    The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed, holding that the amendment applied retroactively and to both in-state and out-of-state convictions.
    The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the 1964 amendment to Penal Law § 1943 applies retroactively to multiple offender sentences imposed before the amendment’s effective date.
    2. Whether the 1964 amendment to Penal Law § 1943 permits challenges to the constitutionality of prior convictions obtained in New York State, or whether it is limited to out-of-state convictions.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Court’s prior decisions in People v. Machado, People v. Cornish, and People v. Broderick established that the amendment is generally retroactive.
    2. Yes, because the statute’s clear and unambiguous language refers to a “previous conviction in this or any other state,” and the Court cannot disregard this language.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court addressed the People’s arguments against retroactive application and the limitation to out-of-state convictions. Regarding retroactivity, the Court cited its prior decisions in People v. Machado, People v. Cornish and People v. Broderick as settling the issue that the amendment is generally retroactive. The District Attorney argued that retroactivity should only apply to out-of-state convictions because coram nobis was already available for in-state convictions. However, the Court found no such distinction in the statute’s language.

    Addressing the scope of the amendment, the Court acknowledged that the primary impetus for the amendment was to address the lack of a remedy for challenging unconstitutional out-of-state convictions, as highlighted in People v. Wilson. Prior to the amendment, the court in People v. McCullough held that a defendant could only litigate the constitutionality of prior convictions in the court where the conviction was rendered, precluding challenges to out-of-state convictions in New York courts. However, the Court emphasized that the amendment’s language explicitly includes “previous conviction in this or any other state.” The Court stated, “Be that as it may and conceding that this was probably the principal purpose of the amendment, we find no way of getting around the statutory language ‘previous conviction in this or any other state’.”

    The Court recognized the potential for inconvenience and expense in challenging prior New York State convictions in any county where a defendant is charged as a multiple offender. However, it reiterated that it could not ignore the amendment’s clear language. As the Court stated, “To reverse here we would have to ignore the amendment’s language ‘in this * * * state’”.

  • People v. Nicholson, 16 N.Y.2d 414 (1965): Retroactive Application of Right to Counsel

    16 N.Y.2d 414 (1965)

    A decision regarding right to counsel is not to be accorded retroactive effect.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the principles established in *Jackson v. Denno* and *People v. Huntley*, regarding the voluntariness of confessions, and *People v. Howard* regarding the right to counsel, should be applied retroactively. The court held that its prior decision in *People v. Nicholson* remains valid and that defendants are not automatically entitled to a hearing on the voluntariness of their confessions based on *Jackson v. Denno* or *Huntley*. Furthermore, it affirmed its stance that decisions concerning the right to counsel, as articulated in *People v. Howard*, are not to be applied retroactively.

    Facts

    The defendant sought a hearing before the trial court to challenge the voluntariness of his confession, relying on the principles established in *Jackson v. Denno* and *People v. Huntley*. Additionally, he argued for the retroactive application of decisions concerning the right to counsel, based on *People v. Howard*. The defendant also asserted that his guilty plea was induced by coercion, thus presenting a triable issue.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after lower courts denied the defendant’s request for a hearing on the voluntariness of his confession and the retroactive application of right-to-counsel decisions. The Court of Appeals reviewed these decisions to determine if a hearing was warranted and if previous rulings should be overturned or modified.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the principles established in *Jackson v. Denno* and *People v. Huntley* require the court to overrule its decision in *People v. Nicholson*, thus entitling the defendant to a hearing on the voluntariness of his confession.
    2. Whether the decision in *People v. Howard* regarding the right to counsel should be applied retroactively.

    Holding

    1. No, because the court approved the holding and reasoning in *People v. Nicholson*, finding no basis to overrule it based on *Jackson v. Denno* or *People v. Huntley*.
    2. No, because no argument had been presented to warrant any change or modification of the conclusion in *People v. Howard* that retroactive effect is not to be accorded to decisions of the court respecting right to counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reaffirmed its prior holding in *People v. Nicholson*, stating that nothing in *Jackson v. Denno* or *People v. Huntley* required it to overrule that decision. The court emphasized its approval of the holding and reasoning in *Nicholson*. Regarding the retroactive application of right to counsel decisions, the court maintained its position, as stated in *People v. Howard*, that such decisions are not to be applied retroactively. The court found no compelling arguments to justify altering this stance. The court also concluded that the defendant failed to present a triable issue on the question of coercion. The dissenting judges believed the petition raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the guilty plea was induced by coercion, citing *People v. Picciotti*, *People v. Pearson*, *People v. Lake*, and *People v. Zilliner*.