New York Law Review

Tag: retroactivity

  • McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 75 N.Y.2d 852 (1990): Retroactive Application of Tax Law Amendments

    McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 75 N.Y.2d 852 (1990)

    A statutory amendment to tax law should be applied retroactively when failure to do so would leave the taxpayer remediless after significant overpayment, and the state fails to demonstrate that repayment would impose an undue burden.

    Summary

    McGraw-Hill challenged the constitutionality of tax levied on it from 1976-1979. The State Tax Commission argued that even if the tax was unconstitutional, a 1981 statutory amendment shouldn’t apply retroactively due to a prior ruling in 1976. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment in favor of McGraw-Hill. The court reasoned that denying retroactive application would leave McGraw-Hill without recourse after paying a substantial sum. The court rejected the Commission’s argument because the commission didn’t prove that reimbursement would cause an unreasonable burden.

    Facts

    McGraw-Hill, Inc. was subjected to a tax assessment by the State Tax Commission for the tax years 1976 through 1979.
    The taxpayer paid $1,731,617.30 in taxes, interest, and penalties as a result of the assessment.
    The taxpayer challenged the constitutionality of the tax assessment.
    The State Tax Commission argued that a 1981 amendment to the tax law should not be applied retroactively.
    The Commission’s argument rested on the premise that the tax methodology had been approved in a prior case, Matter of Conde Nast Pubis, v State Tax Commn., in 1976.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division ruled in favor of McGraw-Hill, Inc. (146 AD2d 371).
    The State Tax Commission appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the retroactivity issue for the first time.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a 1981 statutory amendment to the Tax Law should be applied retroactively to tax years 1976-1979, where the taxpayer claims the tax levied was unconstitutional and has already paid a significant sum, and the state argues a prior ruling in 1976 validated the tax methodology.

    Holding

    Yes, because denying retroactive application would leave the taxpayer virtually remediless after having paid a considerable amount in taxes, interest, and penalties, and the State failed to prove that requiring repayment would impose any undue burden.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals adopted the reasoning of the Appellate Division. The court emphasized the unfairness of denying retroactive application of the tax law amendment.
    The court noted that McGraw-Hill had already paid a substantial amount ($1,731,617.30) in taxes, interest, and penalties. To deny retroactivity would leave McGraw-Hill without a remedy to recover these improperly charged sums.
    The court distinguished the case from situations where retroactive application might impose an undue burden on the government, citing Foss v City of Rochester, 65 NY2d 247, 260.
    The court highlighted the State’s failure to demonstrate that requiring repayment would create such an undue burden.
    The court implicitly acknowledged the principle of fairness and equity in tax law, suggesting that a taxpayer should not be penalized when a tax is later determined to be unconstitutional, especially when they have already made substantial payments.
    The decision emphasizes the importance of the State demonstrating a concrete burden to avoid retroactivity. The lack of such a showing weighed heavily against the State’s position.
    The court’s decision serves as a signal to taxpayers that they may have recourse even after paying disputed taxes if the underlying law is later amended or found unconstitutional, particularly when the state can’t show hardship from repayment.

  • People v. Oliver, 1 NY2d 152 (1956): Retroactive Application of Ameliorative Criminal Statutes

    People v. Oliver, 1 NY2d 152 (1956)

    When the legislature reduces the punishment for a crime via an ameliorative amendment, the lesser penalty applies to cases decided after the amendment’s effective date, even if the underlying act occurred before the change.

    Summary

    Oliver, a 14-year-old, was charged with first-degree murder. While awaiting trial, a law was enacted that treated those under 15 as juvenile offenders rather than criminals. The Court of Appeals addressed whether this ameliorative amendment applied retroactively to Oliver, entitling him to treatment as a juvenile offender. The court held that the amendment was indeed ameliorative and should be applied retroactively, reasoning that the legislature’s reduction in punishment indicated its belief that a lesser penalty sufficiently serves the demands of criminal law. Imposing a harsher penalty would serve no penological purpose.

    Facts

    Oliver, a 14-year-old boy, was charged with first-degree murder for killing his two-year-old brother. At the time of the crime, this was punishable by death.

    While Oliver was awaiting trial, the New York legislature amended the Penal Law to treat children under 15 as juvenile offenders rather than criminals, subjecting them to a different, less severe system of corrective treatment.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals, which considered whether the ameliorative amendment should apply to Oliver’s case, which was pending at the time of the amendment’s enactment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an ameliorative amendment to the Penal Law, which reduces the punishment for a particular crime, should be applied retroactively to cases pending but not yet decided at the time of the amendment’s effective date.

    Holding

    Yes, because when the legislature mitigates punishment, it is presumed to have determined that the lesser penalty sufficiently addresses the needs of criminal law, rendering a harsher penalty pointless.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the general rule against retroactive application of non-procedural statutes unless explicitly stated. However, it emphasized the exception for ameliorative amendments that reduce punishment. The court stated, “the law is settled that the lesser penalty may be meted out in all cases decided after the effective date of the enactment, even though the underlying act may have been committed before that date.”

    The court reasoned that by lessening the punishment, the legislature implies that the lesser penalty adequately serves the aims of criminal law. Applying a harsher penalty in such cases would not serve any legitimate penological purpose.

    The court differentiated between altering the definition of a crime by decriminalizing conduct altogether and merely reducing the punishment. In the former situation, the state may retain the right to prosecute the previously committed act, but in the latter, the rationale for imposing the stricter penalty vanishes.

    The Court quoted: “[W]hen the legislature changes the punishment…the new statute applies to all cases tried thereafter. ” The court reasoned that to not apply the new, more lenient, statute would “result in a futility.”

    The case emphasizes the importance of considering the legislative intent behind changes in criminal law, especially when it comes to punishment. If the intent is to be more lenient, the courts should apply the new law to all cases where it is possible.

  • People v. Catalanotte, 67 N.Y.2d 15 (1986): Retroactivity and Predicate Felonies

    People v. Catalanotte, 67 N.Y.2d 15 (1986)

    For purposes of determining whether a prior conviction “was unconstitutionally obtained” and thus may not be counted for predicate felony purposes, the proper inquiry is whether the conviction was obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights as defined by the law at the time of the conviction or by present law which is properly applied to it under recognized principles of retroactivity.

    Summary

    Catalanotte was convicted of attempted robbery and sentenced as a second felony offender. He challenged the use of a 1971 drug conviction as a predicate felony, arguing that the courtroom closure during his 1971 trial, a practice later deemed unconstitutional in People v. Jones, rendered the conviction invalid for enhancement purposes. The New York Court of Appeals held that the validity of a prior conviction for predicate felony purposes is determined by the law at the time it was entered, or by subsequent law applied retroactively. Because Catalanotte’s 1971 conviction was constitutional under the law at the time, and Jones was not retroactive, the conviction could be used as a predicate felony.

    Facts

    On March 5, 1971, Catalanotte, then a New York City police officer, sold heroin to an undercover officer.
    Six days later, he was arrested and found to be in possession of heroin and methadone.
    He was subsequently convicted of drug-related felonies.
    During the trial, the court summarily closed the courtroom to the public before the undercover officer testified, citing the hazards to undercover officers. Catalanotte appealed, arguing a violation of his right to a public trial, but his conviction was affirmed.
    In 1986, Catalanotte was convicted of attempted robbery.

    Procedural History

    Catalanotte was convicted in 1971; the Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed.
    In 1986, he was convicted of attempted robbery and sentenced as a second felony offender based on the 1971 conviction. He objected to the predicate felony status. He moved to vacate the 1971 conviction, arguing that People v. Jones should be applied retroactively; the court denied the motion, and Catalanotte did not appeal. The Appellate Division affirmed the 1986 conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a prior conviction, valid when obtained but based on procedures later deemed unconstitutional, can be used as a predicate felony for enhanced sentencing.

    Holding

    No, because the validity of a conviction for predicate felony purposes is determined by the law at the time of the conviction, or by subsequent law applied retroactively, and the rule announced in People v Jones was not retroactive.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that CPL 400.21(7)(b), which states that a prior conviction “obtained in violation of the rights of the defendant under the applicable provisions of the constitution of the United States must not be counted,” implies that the validity of the conviction is determined at the time it was entered. A conviction becomes unconstitutional only if it violated the defendant’s rights as defined by the law at the time or by subsequent law applicable under principles of retroactivity. The court emphasized that the predicate felony statute operates upon the prior conviction itself. The court stated that “[a]n unconstitutional conviction is, by definition, a conviction which was obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights, i.e., his rights as defined by the law existing at the time the conviction was obtained or by subsequent law applicable to the judgment under principles of retroactivity. The conviction does not become unconstitutional merely because the law has changed subsequent to the defendant’s direct appeal of that conviction”.

    The court distinguished People v. Love, where the prior conviction was vacated because it violated the defendant’s constitutional rights under the law at the time of the conviction. In Catalanotte’s case, his rights were respected under the law at the time of his 1971 conviction.

    The court also addressed the implications of a contrary ruling, noting that retroactively applying changes in constitutional interpretation could jeopardize numerous convictions and sentences. “To apply such changes retroactively when the court has not declared them retroactive, may open to question hundreds of convictions and enhanced sentences based upon them”.

  • People v. Pepper, 68 N.Y.2d 775 (1986): Retroactivity of Batson v. Kentucky

    68 N.Y.2d 775 (1986)

    The procedural safeguards established in Batson v. Kentucky regarding peremptory challenges do not apply retroactively to cases where the normal appellate process was exhausted before Batson was decided.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of attempted murder and appealed, arguing that the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors violated his right to an impartial jury under Batson v. Kentucky. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Batson’s new procedural rules do not apply retroactively to cases where the appellate process was complete before Batson was decided. The court also addressed and dismissed other claims related to the defendant’s mental state and the constitutionality of certain penal law sections.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted on six counts, including attempted murder in the first degree, stemming from an alleged attempt to rob a gas station, commandeer a police car, and shoot at a police officer.

    At trial, the defendant claimed mental disease or defect as a defense.

    The prosecution introduced evidence that the defendant invoked his right to remain silent and requested an attorney after receiving Miranda warnings, to rebut the defense of mental disease or defect.

    The defendant alleged the prosecutor systematically used peremptory challenges to exclude black prospective jurors.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted and appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the conviction.

    A judge of the Court of Appeals initially denied leave to appeal but reconsidered after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Batson v. Kentucky and subsequently granted leave.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of the defendant’s post-Miranda silence and request for counsel to rebut the insanity defense, and whether defense counsel adequately preserved this issue for appeal.

    2. Whether the rule established in Batson v. Kentucky, regarding the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on race, applies retroactively to cases where the appellate process had been exhausted before Batson was decided.

    3. Whether the defendant’s argument regarding the unconstitutionality of Penal Law § 110.05, raised for the first time in the reply brief, should be considered by the court.

    Holding

    1. No, because defense counsel’s generalized objections did not adequately alert the trial judge to the specific arguments raised on appeal, thus failing to preserve the issue for review.

    2. No, because Batson v. Kentucky is not applicable to cases where the normal appellate process has been exhausted.

    3. No, because the argument was improperly raised for the first time in the appellant’s reply brief.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that the defense counsel’s generalized objections at trial were insufficient to preserve the issue of the defendant’s post-Miranda silence for appellate review. The court emphasized that specific objections are required to alert the trial judge to the precise nature of the alleged error.

    Regarding the Batson issue, the Court relied on principles of retroactivity, stating that Batson does not apply retroactively to cases where the normal appellate process had already been exhausted. The Court cited Allen v. Hardy, which held that Batson’s rule is not mandated by Federal constitutional retroactivity principles. The court stated, “Batson is not applicable to a case where the normal appellate process has been exhausted, as occurred here.“

    Finally, the Court declined to consider the defendant’s argument concerning the unconstitutionality of Penal Law § 110.05 because it was raised for the first time in the reply brief, violating established procedural rules against raising new arguments in reply briefs. The court cited State Farm Fire & Cos. Co. v LiMauro, noting the prohibition against sur-reply briefs. “This contention was improperly raised for the first time in appellant’s reply brief to this court.“

  • Berkeley Kay Corp. v. New York City Conciliation and Appeals Bd., 68 N.Y.2d 852 (1986): Limits on Retroactive Rent Reclassification

    Berkeley Kay Corp. v. New York City Conciliation and Appeals Bd., 68 N.Y.2d 852 (1986)

    Rent control agencies cannot retroactively reclassify properties and roll back rents to periods prior to the effective date of the statute authorizing the reclassification, especially when it impairs landlords’ accrued substantive rights.

    Summary

    Berkeley Kay Corp., owner of the Hotel Berkeley, challenged a decision by the New York City Conciliation and Appeals Board (CAB) to reclassify the hotel as an apartment building and roll back rents to June 30, 1982. The CAB’s decision stemmed from tenant complaints about the lack of hotel services. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the CAB (and later, the DHCR) could reclassify the building prospectively under the Omnibus Housing Act of 1983, it could not retroactively roll back rents to a date before the Act’s effective date (June 30, 1983). The court reasoned that the Act was prospective and could not impair the landlord’s substantive rights that had accrued prior to that date. The case was remitted for individual consideration of tenant complaints.

    Facts

    • Berkeley Kay Corp. owned the Hotel Berkeley, classified as a rent-stabilized hotel.
    • Between June 30 and November 10, 1982, 26 tenants filed complaints with the CAB, alleging a lack of required hotel services or that the premises were rented as apartments.
    • The owner did not deny failing to provide typical hotel services.
    • On January 26, 1984, the CAB reclassified the hotel as an apartment building and ordered a rent rollback to June 30, 1982, along with refunds of excess rent and security deposits.

    Procedural History

    • Berkeley Kay Corp. filed an Article 78 proceeding challenging the retroactive reclassification.
    • Supreme Court partially granted the petition, annulling the rent rollback to 1982.
    • The Appellate Division modified the order and dismissed the petition, upholding the rent rollback based on Amended Hotel Code § 33(g).
    • The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the CAB had the authority to retroactively reclassify the property and order rent rollbacks to a date prior to the effective date of the Omnibus Housing Act of 1983.

    Holding

    No, because the Omnibus Housing Act is prospective and cannot impair the landlord’s substantive rights that accrued prior to its effective date.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the prospective nature of the Omnibus Housing Act. The statute states that after a determination that a building is not a hotel, “it shall thereafter be subject to this law.” (emphasis in original). The Court reasoned that the CAB’s action improperly nullified hotel guidelines increases that accrued before the Act’s June 30, 1983 effective date. The court stated, “The Omnibus Housing Act is prospective and it cannot affect the substantive rights of landlords that accrued prior to effective date by authorizing retroactive reclassification of the premises or rollback of the rents.” The court distinguished Matter of Ansonia Holding v New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., noting that deficiencies in services in that case applied to common areas of the building and affected all tenants. Here, the deficiencies related to individual tenants. The court interpreted Amended Hotel Code § 33(g) as only allowing adjustments for complaining tenants, not a building-wide rollback. It stated, “[U]nder this section, the Board could order the owner to refund to the complaining tenants that portion of the past rents which reflect the value of services not provided by the owner, but section 33 (g) adjustments could not be made to noncomplaining tenants who did not seek administrative relief nor could it be used to justify a pre-1983 reclassification of the property and rollback of the rents.” The case was remitted to consider individual tenant complaints and potential rent adjustments based on the lack of provided hotel services.

  • Matter of Rios v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 226 (1984): Retroactivity of Workers’ Compensation Amendments for Hearing Loss Claims

    Matter of Rios v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 226 (1984)

    Amendments to workers’ compensation laws are generally applied prospectively unless there is a clear indication of legislative intent for retroactive application; in the absence of such intent, a new six-month filing window for hearing loss claims applies only to claims that were viable on the amendment’s effective date.

    Summary

    This case concerns the retroactive application of a 1980 amendment to the New York Workers’ Compensation Law that created a six-month window for filing occupational hearing loss claims for employees whose disablement and knowledge of disablement occurred before October 1, 1980. The Court of Appeals held that the amendment applied only to claims that were viable on October 1, 1980, and not to claims that were already time-barred under the previous law. The Court reasoned that there was no clear legislative intent for retroactive application, and retroactive application would revive numerous stale claims, potentially causing significant hardship to employers.

    Facts

    The claimant, Rios, retired from Bethlehem Steel Corporation on August 1, 1970. More than ten years later, on January 16, 1981, he filed a claim for compensation for occupational hearing loss. Bethlehem Steel rejected the claim, arguing that it was not filed within the two-year statute of limitations required by the Workers’ Compensation Law in effect at the time of Rios’s retirement.

    Procedural History

    The Workers’ Compensation Board referee initially disallowed the claim as time-barred. However, the Workers’ Compensation Board reversed the referee’s decision, relying on the 1980 amendment to section 49-bb, which they interpreted as creating a six-month grace period for filing claims. The Appellate Division reversed the Board’s decision, and the case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the 1980 amendment to section 49-bb of the Workers’ Compensation Law, which provided a six-month filing window for occupational hearing loss claims, applies retroactively to revive claims that were already time-barred under the previous law.

    Holding

    No, because there is no clear legislative intent for the amendment to apply retroactively, and retroactive application would revive long-barred claims and disrupt the balance of the legislative scheme.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals began by stating the general rule that amendments are to be applied prospectively unless there is a clear indication that the legislature intended for them to be applied retroactively. The Court found no such clear indication in the language of the amendment or in the available legislative history. The Court noted that while there were concerns expressed about the potential for the legislation to expose employers to barred claims, there was also an indication that the amendments would result in minimal additional costs to employers and insurers.

    The Court also emphasized the potential for drastic consequences if the amendment were applied retroactively, as it would open the door to hundreds of stale claims that may be impossible to defend due to the passage of time. As the Court stated, giving the amended section 49-bb retroactive application, reviving claims that were already barred at the time of its enactment, would require us to ignore the provisions of section 28 of the Workers’ Compensation Law.

    The Court reconciled the amendment with other provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law, particularly subdivision 2 of section 49-ee, which stated that employers would not be liable for claims barred by the statute of limitations. The court read “the six-month ‘grace’ period for employees whose disablement and knowledge of disablement occurred prior to October 1, 1980 as a transitional measure for those with viable claims at October 1, 1980, who could by virtue of the amendment otherwise have had their remaining time to file claims reduced even below three months.” This interpretation gives effect to all parts of the statute and avoids reviving long-barred claims.

    Therefore, the Court concluded that the amendment should not be applied retroactively and affirmed the order of the Appellate Division dismissing the claim.

  • People ex rel. Flores v. Dalsheim, 56 N.Y.2d 895 (1982): Retroactive Application of Sentencing Law Amendments

    People ex rel. Flores v. Dalsheim, 56 N.Y.2d 895 (1982)

    Amendments to sentencing laws are generally not applied retroactively unless the legislature clearly indicates such an intent, particularly when the amendment would disrupt the efficient administration of justice.

    Summary

    Flores was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term, but the sentencing court did not set a minimum period of incarceration (MPI). At the time, the Board of Parole had the authority to set the MPI if the court did not. Before the Board acted, the law changed, vesting the power to set MPIs exclusively with the sentencing court. Flores argued the amendment should apply retroactively, requiring his return to the sentencing court. The Court of Appeals held that the amendment was not retroactive. The Board of Parole’s action in setting the MPI was valid because the legislature did not intend for the amendment to apply retroactively, as evidenced by the failure to repeal a related section of the Executive Law and the legislative purpose to avoid duplication of effort.

    Facts

    Flores was convicted of grand larceny and sentenced on January 16, 1980, to an indeterminate prison term of zero to three years. The sentencing court did not set a minimum period of incarceration (MPI). At the time of sentencing, if the sentencing court did not set an MPI, the State Board of Parole was authorized to do so. Flores’ conviction was affirmed, and he surrendered to serve his sentence. On April 27, 1982, the Board of Parole set Flores’ MPI at 28 months.

    Procedural History

    Flores initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the Board of Parole’s authority to fix his MPI. The lower court initially sided with Flores. This decision was appealed. The Appellate Division’s order was reversed by the New York Court of Appeals, the determination of the Board of Parole was reinstated, and the petition was dismissed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an amendment to Penal Law § 70.00(3), which transferred the authority to set minimum periods of incarceration (MPIs) from the Board of Parole to the sentencing court, should be applied retroactively to a defendant sentenced before the amendment’s effective date, where the Board of Parole had not yet set the MPI at the time of the amendment.

    Holding

    No, because at the time Flores was sentenced, the Board of Parole had the authority to fix Flores’ MPI, and the legislature did not intend for the amendment to apply retroactively, and retroactive application would not further the legislation’s purpose of streamlining the MPI determination process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the amendment to Penal Law § 70.00(3), which took effect on September 1, 1980, was not intended to be applied retroactively. At the time Flores was sentenced, the Board of Parole had the authority to set the MPI. Only Flores’ release pending appeal delayed the board’s action until after the amendment’s effective date.

    The court emphasized that “A prime goal of the legislation was to eliminate duplication by placing the function of setting MPI’s in one body.” Requiring inmates sentenced before September 1, 1980, to be returned to the sentencing court for a new MPI determination would not further this goal.

    The court also noted that the legislature’s failure to repeal Executive Law § 259-i(1), which outlines the procedures for the Board of Parole to set MPIs, suggests that the legislature anticipated the Board of Parole would continue to set MPIs for individuals sentenced before September 1, 1980. Although section 259-i does not confer any independent authority on the Board of Parole to set MPI’s, the failure to repeal it indicates that the Legislature contemplated that the Board of Parole would continue to set MPI’s for persons sentenced before September 1, 1980.

    Therefore, the Board of Parole acted within its authority when it established Flores’ MPI. The court focused on the practical implications and the legislature’s intent to avoid duplication, indicating a preference for maintaining the Board’s MPI determination for those sentenced before the amendment’s effective date.

  • People v. Ready, 61 N.Y.2d 790 (1984): Retroactive Application of Right to Counsel and Jury Charge on Voluntariness

    61 N.Y.2d 790 (1984)

    When a suspect in custody requests counsel, they cannot be questioned without an attorney present, and this principle applies retroactively; furthermore, a defendant is entitled to a jury charge instructing them to consider evidence that the defendant requested counsel when determining the voluntariness of a confession.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order for a new trial. The court held that the principle established in People v. Cunningham, stating that a suspect who requests counsel cannot be questioned without an attorney present, applies retroactively. Since the defendant had made a suppression motion, he could assert his Cunningham argument on appeal from his retrial. Additionally, the court found that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury that they could consider testimony about the defendant’s requests for counsel when determining the voluntariness of his confession.

    Facts

    The defendant, Ready, made incriminating statements that the prosecution sought to admit at trial. Prior to trial, Ready made a suppression motion. Two witnesses testified that Ready had requested counsel. The defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that they could consider the testimony of the two witnesses regarding Ready’s request for counsel in determining whether Ready’s confession was voluntary.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried and convicted. He appealed, arguing that his right to counsel had been violated and that the trial court erred in refusing his requested jury charge. The Appellate Division ordered a new trial. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the principle established in People v. Cunningham, that a suspect in custody who requests counsel cannot be questioned without an attorney present, applies retroactively to cases on appeal?

    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing the defendant’s request to charge the jury that they could consider testimony regarding the defendant’s request for counsel when determining the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Court had already determined in People v. Pepper that the Cunningham principle must be applied retroactively.

    2. Yes, because the requested charge was relevant to an issue before the jury, and the court perceived no valid reason for its denial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decisions in People v. Pepper and People v. Cunningham. In People v. Pepper (53 NY2d 213), the court determined that the rule in Cunningham must be applied retroactively. The court reasoned that, because the defendant had made a suppression motion, he could now assert his Cunningham argument on the appeal from his retrial, citing People v. Sanders (56 NY2d 51, 66). The court emphasized the importance of allowing the jury to consider all relevant evidence when determining the voluntariness of a confession. The court stated, “The charge was relevant to an issue before the jury and we perceive no valid reason for its denial.” By denying the requested charge, the trial court prevented the jury from fully considering the circumstances surrounding the confession, potentially impacting their assessment of its voluntariness. This case highlights the importance of providing a jury charge when it is relevant to the issues being presented.

  • Sommer v. Hilton, 46 N.Y.2d 831 (1978): Contract Clause and Rent Control Retroactivity

    Sommer v. Hilton, 46 N.Y.2d 831 (1978)

    The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution is not violated when a state law requires landlords to refund rent exceeding fair market value, if the leases were entered into after the enactment of the law, as the landlords were already operating in a regulated environment.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974 (ETPA), requiring landlords to refund excess rent paid before a rent control resolution’s adoption, unconstitutionally impaired contracts. The court held that because the leases were made after the ETPA’s passage, landlords were on notice of potential rent adjustments. The court reasoned that the ETPA’s power to determine fair market rent and order refunds was a reserved state power, negating any claim of unconstitutional retroactivity under the Contract Clause. Landlords’ argument for a hearing on comparable rents was also rejected because the law distinguishes between tenant and owner applications for rent adjustments. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed.

    Facts

    Landlords entered into leases with tenants before the Village of Freeport adopted a resolution declaring a rent control emergency under the ETPA. After the resolution, the state division determined that the rent charged exceeded fair market rent and ordered a refund of the excess. The landlords challenged the refund requirement, arguing it was an unconstitutional impairment of contract and that they were entitled to a hearing on comparable rents.

    Procedural History

    The landlords challenged the order requiring a refund of excess rent. The Appellate Division ruled against the landlords. The landlords then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the ETPA’s requirement that landlords refund rent exceeding fair market value, for leases entered into before the adoption of a rent control resolution, constitutes an unconstitutional impairment of contract under the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution.

    2. Whether landlords were entitled to a hearing on comparable rents in the process of establishing the fair market rent for the housing units involved.

    Holding

    1. No, because the leases were entered into after the passage of the ETPA, making them subject to the state’s reserved power to regulate rents and order refunds of excess payments.

    2. No, because the ETPA distinguishes between tenant and owner applications for rent adjustments, and the landlords did not file an application that would necessitate consideration of comparable rents.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the leases were made after the ETPA’s enactment, which expressly allowed for refunds of rent exceeding fair market value. Therefore, the landlords operated in an “enterprise already regulated in the particular” at the time the leases were made. Citing Ogden v. Saunders and Veix v. Sixth Ward Assn., the court stated that the “retroactivity” claim was invalid because the landlords were aware of the potential for rent adjustments under the ETPA. The court emphasized that every lease entered after the ETPA’s effective date was subject to the State’s power to determine the emergency need for rent control and to require refunds for rent exceeding fair market value.

    Regarding the comparability argument, the court noted that subdivision b of section 9 of the ETPA mandates that the State Division of Housing and Community Renewal be guided by guidelines promulgated by the local rent guidelines board when considering a tenant application. Comparability of rents in the area is only considered for applications made under subdivision a of section 9. Since the landlords did not file an application under subdivision a, their argument for a hearing on comparable rents was rejected. The court pointed out that subdivision a allows an owner to seek adjustment of the “initial legal regulated rent,” which “has nothing to do with local guidelines.”

  • Tucker v. Tucker, 55 N.Y.2d 378 (1982): Voluntary Discontinuance to Gain Equitable Distribution Benefits

    Tucker v. Tucker, 55 N.Y.2d 378 (1982)

    A plaintiff in a matrimonial action commenced before the effective date of the Equitable Distribution Law cannot discontinue that action solely to initiate a new action after that date to benefit from the new law’s broader property distribution provisions.

    Summary

    The wife initiated a divorce action before New York’s Equitable Distribution Law took effect. Seeking to benefit from the new law, she moved to discontinue her original action and file a new one under the Equitable Distribution Law. The husband opposed this and sought to amend his answer to include counterclaims for divorce. The Court of Appeals held that the wife could not discontinue her initial action solely to gain the benefits of the new law, as this would frustrate the legislature’s intent regarding the law’s applicability. The court also found that the lower court improperly conditioned the husband’s amendment to include counterclaims.

    Facts

    The wife commenced a divorce action on December 12, 1978, prior to the effective date of New York’s Equitable Distribution Law (July 19, 1980). In July 1980, the husband began a separate action for divorce. The wife, after the Equitable Distribution Law came into effect, moved to discontinue her original action intending to start a new one under the new law to benefit from its equitable distribution provisions. The husband opposed the wife’s motion and cross-moved to amend his answer to assert counterclaims for divorce.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the wife’s motion to discontinue her action and denied the husband’s cross-motion. The Appellate Division reversed, denying the wife’s motion to discontinue and granting the husband’s cross-motion to amend his answer, but conditioned that amendment on the husband stipulating that the wife’s rights would not be affected even if she were found guilty of misconduct. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a plaintiff who commenced a matrimonial action before the effective date of the Equitable Distribution Law may discontinue that action for the sole purpose of commencing a new action under the new law to take advantage of its more favorable property distribution provisions.

    2. Whether it was proper for the Appellate Division to condition the grant of the husband’s motion to amend his answer on a stipulation that the wife’s rights would not be affected if she were found guilty of misconduct.

    Holding

    1. No, because allowing such a discontinuance would frustrate the legislature’s intent in defining the applicability of the Equitable Distribution Law.

    2. No, because the condition improperly altered the substantive provisions of the law applicable to the pre-Equitable Distribution Law action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while courts generally have discretion to grant voluntary discontinuances, discontinuance should be denied when it would prejudice the defendant or lead to other improper consequences. The wife’s sole purpose in seeking discontinuance was to circumvent the legislative mandate that actions commenced before July 19, 1980, be governed by Part A of the amended statute, which did not include equitable distribution. Allowing the discontinuance would permit the wife to evade this mandate and receive disparate treatment compared to other plaintiffs in pre-July 1980 actions. The court stated, “Prevention of such intentional frustration of the considered decision by the Legislature…is an objective which mandates denial as a matter of law of the discontinuance requested in the present case.”

    Regarding the husband’s appeal, the court noted that CPLR 3025(b) directs that leave to amend pleadings “shall be freely given.” The condition imposed by the Appellate Division improperly sought to circumvent the provisions of Part A, which would have allowed the husband to cut off the wife’s right to alimony if he proved her misconduct. As the wife acknowledged, the effect of the condition was to disregard both the mandate of the statute and the existence of the husband’s own independent action for divorce. The court concluded that the Appellate Division could not require the husband’s consent to a variation of the substantive provisions applicable to the Part A action.