New York Law Review

Tag: retroactivity

  • Brothers v. Florence, 95 N.Y.2d 290 (2000): Retroactive Application of Amended Statute of Limitations

    Brothers v. Florence, 95 N.Y.2d 290 (2000)

    When a statute of limitations is shortened, potential litigants must be afforded a reasonable time to commence an action before the bar takes effect, even for claims that accrued before the amendment.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether an amendment to CPLR 214(6), shortening the statute of limitations for nonmedical malpractice claims, applies retroactively to claims that accrued before the amendment’s effective date. The Court of Appeals held that the amendment does apply to previously accrued claims, but that due process requires a reasonable grace period for commencing actions that would otherwise be immediately time-barred. The Court established a one-year grace period from the amendment’s effective date for such claims.

    Facts

    Several plaintiffs brought malpractice actions after CPLR 214(6) was amended to shorten the limitations period. In Brothers, Easton, and Rachimi the application of the new limitations period would result in an immediate time bar. In Early v. Rossback, the plaintiff still had four months to sue under the new limitations period. All claims accrued before the amendment’s effective date but were filed afterward.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division applied the new, shortened limitations period to the previously accrued claims in all four cases, holding that the suits were time-barred. The cases were then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the amendment to CPLR 214(6) applies to claims that accrued before its effective date but were not commenced until after that date.
    2. Whether the retroactive application of the shortened limitations period violates Procedural Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the legislative history indicates an intent to clarify the law and remediate the impact of prior court decisions, suggesting that the amendment should apply to claims that accrued before its effective date.
    2. No, because Due Process requires that potential litigants be afforded a “reasonable time… for the commencement of an action before the bar takes effect,” and the Court establishes a one-year grace period to satisfy this requirement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court determined that the Legislature intended the amended limitations period to apply to previously accrued claims. The Court emphasized the Legislature’s intent to “reaffirm” the original legislative intent for a universally applied three-year limitations period. The Court cited the legislative history, which showed the amendment was meant to remediate the impact of court decisions that had allowed a six-year limitations period for certain malpractice claims. The Court stated, “[t]he remedial purpose of the amendment would be undermined if it were applied only prospectively.”

    Regarding the Due Process challenge, the Court acknowledged that while a litigant has no vested right in a specific limitations period, a shortened period must provide a reasonable time for commencing an action. Since the legislature didn’t provide a grace period, the Court established one. It rejected a case-by-case approach, opting instead for a bright-line rule. It was determined that “an outside one-year grace period for claims immediately time-barred upon the effective date of the amendment to CPLR 214(6) strikes the appropriate balance between State and litigants’ personal interests for Procedural Due Process purposes.”

    For Early v. Rossback, where the plaintiff had four months remaining under the new statute, the court found the four-month period to be unreasonably brief and applied the one-year grace period, reasoning that it would be unfair to treat that plaintiff more harshly than those whose claims were immediately time-barred.

    The court emphasized the need to “reconcile legislative goals with constitutional restraints and fairness to litigants.”

  • City of New York v. Wing, 93 N.Y.2d 430 (1999): Retroactive Application of Social Services Law § 153-i

    City of New York v. Wing, 93 N.Y.2d 430 (1999)

    Social Services Law § 153-i can be applied retroactively to allow the State to recoup from New York City the full amount of federal disallowances for foster care expenses, including interest, when the final federal agency decision or settlement occurred after July 1, 1995, regardless of when the underlying mismanagement occurred.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute between New York State and New York City over who should bear the cost of federal recoupment of foster care aid due to mismanagement by the City. The central issue is the retroactive application of Social Services Law § 153-i, which allows the state to recoup federal disallowances from the city. The Court of Appeals held that the amended statute applied retroactively because the final settlement between the State and the federal agency occurred after July 1, 1995, the date to which the amendment retroactively pertained. The Court also found the State had authority to recoup the interest charges associated with the disallowance from the City.

    Facts

    From 1983 to 1985, New York City received federal funds for foster care expenses under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act. In 1988, a federal audit found that the City did not comply with federal eligibility requirements in numerous cases. As a result, the federal government sought to recoup approximately $92 million from the State. The State appealed the disallowance. In April 1995, HHS issued a negative grant award and recouped $31.2 million. A final settlement between HHS and DSS was reached in December 1996, with DSS paying HHS an additional $42.8 million. DSS then notified the City it would recoup the entire $74 million.

    Procedural History

    The City sued the State in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding, seeking to annul the recoupment efforts. Supreme Court granted relief to the City, rejecting retroactive application of Social Services Law § 153-i. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, agreeing that the State was responsible for half the disallowance but concluding that the State could recoup half the interest. Both the State and the City appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Social Services Law § 153-i may be applied retroactively to authorize the State to recoup federal foster care expenditures from the City.

    2. Whether the State may recover from the City the associated interest charges assessed by the Federal Government.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the 1999 amendment to Social Services Law § 153-i (8) applies retroactively irrespective of whether the actions underlying the disallowance occurred prior to July 1, 1995, if the final settlement occurred after that date.

    2. Yes, because Social Services Law § 153-i authorizes the State to recoup any disallowance based on a final agency decision or settlement, which includes the interest component.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that the 1999 amendment to Social Services Law § 153-i (8) clearly states that the law applies retroactively. The crucial factor is when the final settlement between the State and the federal agency occurred. The Court determined that the final settlement occurred in December 1996, after July 1, 1995. Before that point, the disagreement over disallowance between DSS and HHS was still subject to review and dispute. The Court cited DAB’s acknowledgment that the administrative decision on the 72 uncontested sample cases was not yet final as of August 2, 1995. Therefore, the City is accountable for the entire amount recouped from the State by HHS.

    Regarding the interest charges, the Court noted that Social Services Law § 153-i (8) declares that the “block grant apportionment shall reflect the state share of sanctions or disallowances taken against the district pursuant to this chapter or federal law.” The Court reasoned that federal regulations, such as 45 CFR 30.13 (a) (1), stipulate that interest accrues on debts from the date the party has notice of the debt and is treated as part of the disallowance under federal law. Therefore, the State has the authority to recoup the interest amount from the City.

    The Court rejected any other contentions, stating they did not alter the outcome of the litigation. They concluded that the State is entitled to recoup from the City the entire amount of the Federal disallowance, including its interest component.

  • People v. Martello, 93 N.Y.2d 645 (1999): Retroactivity of New State Law on Pen Registers

    People v. Martello, 93 N.Y.2d 645 (1999)

    A new rule of New York statutory law regarding the use of pen registers, which does not implicate federal constitutional principles, should be applied prospectively only, considering the purpose of the new rule, reliance on the old rule, and the effect on the administration of justice.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether its prior decision in People v. Bialostok, which required a warrant based on probable cause for pen registers capable of monitoring conversations, should be applied retroactively. Martello argued that evidence obtained through pen registers not meeting this standard should be suppressed. The Court held that Bialostok should be applied prospectively only, considering the purpose of the rule (deterrence, not fact-finding), law enforcement’s reliance on the prior standard, and the potential burden on the administration of justice. The Court also clarified that the enactment of CPL Article 705 after Bialostok further supported the prospective application.

    Facts

    Paul Martello, a union officer, was convicted of attempted coercion and criminal mischief based partly on evidence from electronic eavesdropping. The eavesdropping warrants were based on information from prior pen register surveillance conducted between 1990 and 1992. Martello sought to suppress the eavesdropping evidence, arguing the pen registers were capable of monitoring conversations and thus required a probable cause warrant under Bialostok. The People argued Bialostok should not be applied retroactively and that the pen register surveillance complied with CPL Article 705.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied Martello’s motion to suppress, holding that Bialostok applied prospectively only. The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that Bialostok should not apply retroactively to pen register orders issued before the decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the rule established in People v. Bialostok, requiring probable cause for pen registers capable of monitoring conversations, should be applied retroactively to cases pending on direct review.

    Holding

    1. No, because Bialostok is based on an interpretation of New York state statutory law (CPL Article 700), not the Fourth Amendment, and New York uses a flexible approach to retroactivity that considers the purpose of the new rule, reliance on the old rule, and the effect on the administration of justice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the issue was whether Bialostok was grounded in the Fourth Amendment (which would require retroactive application under Griffith v. Kentucky) or in New York state law. The Court found that Bialostok was based on the interpretation of CPL Article 700, focusing on statutory compliance rather than constitutional concerns. The Court emphasized that “[t]he issue [in the case was] not the reasonableness of the search but statutory compliance.”

    Analyzing the Pepper-Mitchell factors, the court found that Bialostok established a new rule by placing audio-capable pen registers under CPL Article 700. The court then considered:

    • Purpose of the rule: The rule served as a deterrent to unauthorized electronic eavesdropping and did not affect the determination of guilt or innocence.
    • Reliance on the old rule: Law enforcement extensively relied on the previous rule that a probable cause warrant was not required for pen register surveillance.
    • Effect on the administration of justice: Retroactive application would burden the administration of justice and affect many pending cases without serving as a deterrent or benefiting the truth-seeking process.

    The Court also noted the significance of CPL Article 705, enacted after the operative facts in Bialostok. This article defines “pen register” without excluding those capable of being converted into eavesdropping devices, and it excludes the use of pen registers authorized under Article 705 from the definition of “eavesdropping” in CPL 700.05(1). This evinced a legislative intent to treat all pen registers complying with CPL Article 705 as pen registers, not eavesdropping devices, regardless of their potential for modification.

  • Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Central School District, 91 N.Y.2d 577 (1998): Retroactive Application of Workers’ Compensation Law Amendments

    91 N.Y.2d 577 (1998)

    Statutes are presumed to apply prospectively unless the language expressly or by necessary implication requires retroactive application; classifying a statute as “remedial” does not automatically overcome this presumption.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Law, specifically those affecting third-party actions against employers, should be applied retroactively to pending actions. Plaintiff Majewski, an employee of AMC, sued Broadalbin-Perth Central School District for injuries sustained at the school. The School District then brought a third-party action against AMC for contribution/indemnification. The Workers’ Compensation Law was amended to limit employer liability for such third-party claims unless the employee sustained a “grave injury.” AMC sought summary judgment based on this amendment. The Court of Appeals held that the amendments should be applied prospectively, not retroactively, to actions filed after the amendment’s effective date. The Court emphasized that legislative intent, while aiming to reduce insurance costs, did not explicitly mandate retroactive application, and the presumption against retroactivity prevails.

    Facts

    Plaintiff, an employee of Adirondack Mechanical Corporation (AMC), was injured on October 26, 1994, while performing repair work at a school operated by Broadalbin-Perth Central School District. The plaintiff fell from an allegedly defective ladder provided by the school district.
    Plaintiff sued the school district on December 20, 1995, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 240(1).
    On January 29, 1996, the school district commenced a third-party action against AMC, claiming negligent supervision and seeking contribution/indemnification for any damages the plaintiff might recover.
    On July 12, 1996, the Omnibus Workers’ Compensation Reform Act of 1996 was passed, amending Workers’ Compensation Law § 11 to limit employer liability for contribution/indemnity to cases involving “grave injury.” The Act took effect immediately on September 10, 1996.

    Procedural History

    AMC moved for summary judgment on September 20, 1996, arguing the amended law barred the school district’s third-party claim.
    Supreme Court granted AMC’s motion, finding the legislation retroactive.
    The Appellate Division reversed, holding the amendments applied prospectively only.
    The Appellate Division certified the question to the Court of Appeals: “Did this court err as a matter of law in reversing the order of the Supreme Court and denying the third-party defendant’s motion for summary judgment?”

    Issue(s)

    Whether the amendments to Workers’ Compensation Law § 11, enacted as part of the Omnibus Workers’ Compensation Reform Act of 1996, should be applied retroactively to third-party actions pending on the effective date of the amendments.

    Holding

    No, because the legislative intent, while aiming to modify the impact of Dole v. Dow Chemical Co. and reduce insurance costs, did not clearly mandate retroactive application, and the strong presumption against retroactive operation of statutes was not overcome.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court began by stating that statutory interpretation aims to effectuate legislative intent, primarily gleaned from the statutory text itself. The phrase “take effect immediately” is not definitive on the issue of retroactivity. The Court reiterated the fundamental principle that retroactive operation is disfavored unless expressly required. While remedial legislation can be applied retroactively, this classification alone does not overcome the presumption of prospectivity. Examining the legislative history, the Court acknowledged that the Act intended to modify Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., which allowed third-party actions against employers for contribution/indemnification. However, legislative declarations during debates and a task force report suggested a prospective application. Statements by the Governor supporting retroactive application were given limited weight, as individual opinions of legislators are not definitive. Critically, an initial draft of the Act that explicitly applied to pending lawsuits was removed, indicating an intent against retroactivity. The Court rejected the argument that sections of the Act concerning audits and assessments on insurance carriers required retroactive application, as those sections could still function with a prospective approach. The court agreed with the Appellate Division that the purpose of the act was to abolish most third-party actions in order to enhance the exclusivity of the Workers’ Compensation Law, thereby reducing insurance premiums and decreasing the cost of doing business in New York. The court stated that prospective application of the legislation would still accomplish the legislative purpose of reducing insurance premiums and workers’ compensation costs for employers and, in that way, assist “our State’s ability to attract and maintain businesses and jobs”.
    The Court concluded that applying the legislation prospectively to actions filed after the effective date aligned with the legislative goals, upholding the presumption against retroactive application in the absence of a clear expression of intent to the contrary. The Court emphasized that “it is in considerations of good sense and justice that the solution must be found in the specific circumstances of each case,” quoting Matter of Berkovitz v Arbib & Houlberg, 230 NY 261, 271.

  • In re OnBank & Trust Co., 90 N.Y.2d 725 (1997): Retroactive Application of Banking Law Amendments

    90 N.Y.2d 725 (1997)

    When a statutory amendment clarifies existing law and is designed to remedy a controversy, it should be applied retroactively to achieve its intended purpose, especially when the language and legislative history support such application.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether an amendment to New York Banking Law § 100-c (3), which allows common trust fund trustees to charge the fund for mutual fund management fees, should be applied retroactively. OnBank & Trust Co., trustee of two common trust funds, invested a portion of the funds in mutual funds. The guardians ad litem for the beneficiaries objected, arguing that this subjected the funds to double management fees in violation of Banking Law § 100-c (3). The Court of Appeals held that the amendment should be applied retroactively, reversing the lower court’s decision and allowing the trustee to charge the common trust fund for the mutual fund management fees. The Court reasoned that the amendment clarified existing law and was intended to remedy a controversy.

    Facts

    OnBank & Trust Company, as trustee, invested approximately 4% of its common trust fund assets in mutual funds. The mutual fund management fees during the accounting period totaled approximately $50,000. The guardians ad litem for the beneficiaries of the trust objected to the accounting, arguing that the investment in mutual funds resulted in a double layer of management fees: one paid to the trustee and another to the mutual fund managers.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court initially held that while the investment in mutual funds was not an improper delegation, the trustee was required to absorb the mutual fund management fees. The Appellate Division agreed that investing in mutual funds was proper, but a majority affirmed the Surrogate’s decision that the trustee should be surcharged for the mutual fund management fees. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to resolve the surcharge issue.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the amendment to Banking Law § 100-c (3), which permits a trust company to charge common trust funds for the fees and expenses of mutual funds, should be applied retroactively to the accounting period in question.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Legislature intended the amendment to clarify existing law and remedy a controversy, and its language and legislative history support retroactive application.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the amendment to Banking Law § 100-c (3) should be applied retroactively based on the language of the amendment and its legislative history. The Court noted that the amendment’s reference to EPTL 11-2.2, which applied to investments made before January 1, 1995, would be rendered meaningless if the amendment were applied only prospectively. The court stated, “If Banking Law § 100-c (3) were prospective only, there would have been no need for reference to EPTL 11-2.2 and that portion of the statute would be meaningless.” The Court also considered the legislative history, including statements by the amendment’s sponsor, Senator Farley, who indicated that the amendment was intended to clarify that trustees could pass along the costs of mutual fund management to the common trust funds and that it “is the legislative intent that the trustees thereof should not be subject to liability for prudent investment in mutual funds whether made in the past or the future”. The Court reasoned that the amendment’s remedial purpose would be undermined if it were applied only prospectively. The court emphasized that while there is a general rule against retroactive application of statutes, the principle does not apply when the legislative goal indicates otherwise. The Court stated, “the reach of the statute ultimately becomes a matter of judgment made upon review of the legislative goal”. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.

  • People v. Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d 265 (1995): Retroactivity of Cruz v. New York and Harmless Error

    85 N.Y.2d 265 (1995)

    A new rule for criminal procedure will only be applied retroactively to cases that are already final if it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe or if it alters a bedrock procedural element of criminal procedure which implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the trial.

    Summary

    Cecilio Eastman was convicted of murder and weapon possession. His appeal centered on the admission of his non-testifying co-defendant’s confession, which implicated him in the crime, a violation of the Sixth Amendment under Cruz v. New York. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether Cruz should be applied retroactively, and if so, whether admitting the co-defendant’s redacted confession constituted harmless error. The court held that Cruz should be applied retroactively because it alters a bedrock procedural element of criminal procedure which implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the trial. The court also held that admitting the confession was not harmless error, mandating a new trial due to the prejudice against Eastman.

    Facts

    Wilfred Barrett, a security guard, was fatally shot during an attempted robbery. Barrett may have shot one of his assailants. Eastman was found at the same location with a gunshot wound. Carlos Croney and Carlos Richards were seen near the emergency room; they were believed to have information. Croney and Richards were in the car that fled the scene with Eastman, and the murder weapon was dropped off at Rubin Charles’s apartment. Croney gave a statement implicating Eastman and Richards. Eastman initially claimed he was dropped off and didn’t know who shot him. Later, he admitted Richards wanted to rob Barrett, but denied having a weapon or planning the robbery.

    Procedural History

    Eastman and Croney were jointly charged with murder and weapon possession. Eastman’s motion to sever the case, arguing a Bruton violation, was denied, but the court ordered Croney’s statement redacted. Eastman was convicted; the Appellate Division affirmed. After the Supreme Court decided Cruz v. New York, Eastman moved to vacate the judgment, arguing a violation of the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed, finding harmless error. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave and reversed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Cruz v. New York should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.

    2. If Cruz v. New York is applied retroactively, whether the admission of the co-defendant’s confession constituted harmless error in this case.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the rule announced in Cruz is central to an accurate determination of guilt or innocence.

    2. No, because Eastman’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was abridged by the admission of the codefendant’s inculpatory confession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Cruz departed from prior precedents regarding interlocking confessions. The Supreme Court stated that the interlocking nature of confessions pertains not to its harmfulness but rather its reliability (Cruz v New York, 481 US, at 192). The court determined that Cruz should be applied retroactively because it implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the trial, a bedrock procedural element. Retroactive application of Cruz is constitutionally commanded on collateral review. Analyzing harmless error, the court found that the co-defendant’s statement prejudiced Eastman, especially considering Eastman’s attempt to repudiate his earlier statements. The court found it probable the jury would not accept the defense theory. The statement linked Eastman to the crime and ascribed intent to him. Consequently, the court found that Eastman’s conviction resulted from the violation of his Sixth Amendment right and ordered a new trial. The dissent argued that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because ballistics evidence tied Eastman to the crime scene. In the dissent’s view, Eastman’s acknowledgment of presence and other activity at the crime scene confirm beyond the sphere of reasonable doubt. The dissent concludes the error does not bear any reasonable possibility of having affected the jury’s verdict.

  • People v. Butts, 84 N.Y.2d 585 (1994): Knowledge of Drug Weight Required for Criminal Sale Conviction

    People v. Butts, 84 N.Y.2d 585 (1994)

    To convict a defendant of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree under Penal Law § 220.41 (1), the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly sold at least one-half ounce of a substance containing a narcotic drug; this knowledge requirement applies retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal when People v. Ryan was decided.

    Summary

    Butts was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree. The prosecution’s evidence included statistical sampling to estimate the drug’s weight. Butts argued the evidence failed to prove he knew the contraband weighed at least one-half ounce and that the jury should have been instructed on this knowledge requirement. The New York Court of Appeals held that the knowledge requirement of People v. Ryan applies retroactively to cases on direct appeal. While the evidence was sufficient to establish the weight of the drugs, the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the knowledge element warranted a new trial.

    Facts

    An undercover detective purchased heroin from Butts on multiple occasions. On two occasions, Butts contacted a third party who delivered the drugs. During one transaction, Butts directed the undercover agent into a shop where another individual dropped the drugs. The undercover agent paid Butts, who counted the money and passed it on. The prosecution presented expert testimony using statistical sampling to estimate the weight of the drugs sold on June 30 and September 26, 1988, exceeded one-half ounce.

    Procedural History

    Butts was convicted in Supreme Court of two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree and two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, rejecting Butts’s argument regarding the weight of the contraband and the expert’s qualifications. A dissenting Justice granted Butts leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the weight of the contraband to support a conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree.
    2. Whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the prosecution was required to prove Butts’s knowledge of the weight of the contraband.
    3. Whether the ruling in People v. Ryan, requiring proof of knowledge of drug weight, applies retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the jury was entitled to credit the statistical testimony of the witness as sufficient evidence of the weight of the controlled substance.

    2. Yes, because the knowledge requirement established in People v. Ryan applies to the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree.

    3. Yes, because People v. Ryan is retroactive to cases pending on direct appeal at the time of that decision.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the expert’s testimony on statistical sampling was admissible because it helped clarify a technical issue beyond the ken of the typical juror. Citing People v. Argro, the Court held that it was for the jury to decide whether the expert had adequately analyzed the contents and whether his opinion was entitled to be credited.

    Regarding the knowledge requirement, the Court relied on People v. Ryan, which held that the term “knowingly” in Penal Law § 220.18 applies not only to the possession of the illicit substance itself but also to the weight of the substance. The Court stated that “a judicial decision construing the words of a statute * * * does not constitute the creation of a new legal principle” (quoting Gurnee v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 55 NY2d 184, 192). Therefore, Ryan should be applied retroactively.

    The Court also applied the three-part test from People v. Pepper (purpose of the new rule, reliance on the old rule, and effect of the new rule on the administration of justice) and concluded that retroactive application was appropriate. The Court stated, “The knowledge of the weight requirement is determinative of whether a particular accused has actually committed the crime charged.”

    The Court found sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that Butts knew he was participating in the sale of at least one-half ounce of a substance containing heroin, citing the price negotiations and Butts’s handling of the drugs. Because the jury was not instructed on this knowledge requirement a new trial was warranted.

  • People v. Weinberg, 83 N.Y.2d 262 (1994): Retroactive Application of Tax Law & Ex Post Facto

    People v. Weinberg, 83 N.Y.2d 262 (1994)

    A statute is not applied retroactively when it applies to future transactions, even if those transactions are founded upon antecedent events; enhanced penalties for repeat offenses do not violate ex post facto laws when applied to offenses committed after the law’s enactment, even if prior offenses occurred before.

    Summary

    Weinberg was convicted of failure to file tax returns and repeated failure to file, a felony under Tax Law § 1802, based on failures in 1983, 1984, and 1985. He argued the felony charge was an improper retroactive application of the law and violated ex post facto principles. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the law wasn’t retroactive because the last failure to file (1985) occurred after the law’s enactment. The court also ruled that the enhanced penalty for repeated offenses didn’t violate ex post facto principles because it was a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, not additional punishment for earlier non-filings.

    Facts

    Defendant failed to file New York State personal income tax returns for 1983, 1984, and 1985. In 1985, New York enacted the Omnibus Tax Equity and Enforcement Act, which included Tax Law § 1802, making repeated failure to file a felony. Weinberg filed the delinquent returns in August 1987, after being indicted. He was then convicted of misdemeanor counts for each year and a felony count for repeated failure to file.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Weinberg on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the application of Tax Law § 1802 to Weinberg’s failure to file tax returns, based in part on failures occurring before the statute’s effective date, constitutes an improper retroactive application of the statute.

    2. Whether applying Tax Law § 1802 to Weinberg constitutes an unconstitutional ex post facto law.

    3. Whether the trial court erred in giving supplemental instructions to the jury regarding the timeliness element of the offenses.

    4. Whether the trial court erred in preventing defense counsel from presenting the concept of jury nullification during summation.

    Holding

    1. No, because Tax Law § 1802 was applied to the 1985 failure to file, which occurred after the statute’s effective date.

    2. No, because Weinberg committed the repeated failure to file offense after section 1802’s effective date; the law didn’t punish acts innocent when performed or enhance punishment for a crime after its commission.

    3. No, because the trial court has a duty to respond meaningfully to the jury’s inquiry, and the supplemental instruction was a correction to assure the jury was not deliberating under a misapprehension of the law.

    4. No, because encouraging jury nullification would contravene the trial court’s authority to instruct the jury that they must follow and properly apply the law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Tax Law § 1802 was not applied retroactively because the defendant “committed” the offense when he failed to file his 1985 tax return by April 15, 1986, after the law’s effective date. The court noted that “[a] statute is not retroactive * * * when made to apply to future transactions, merely because such transactions relate to and are founded upon antecedent events”. The court also pointed to a companion bill providing for a tax amnesty period, indicating the legislature intended § 1802 to take effect relatively soon after its enactment.

    Regarding the ex post facto argument, the Court relied on People v. Morse, stating that the conviction under § 1802 “‘is not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier [nonfilings]. It is a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one’”. The Court emphasized that the defendant had fair warning that failing to file in 1985 would result in criminal liability under § 1802.

    On the jury instruction issue, the Court cited CPL 310.30, noting the trial court must give requested information or instruction it deems proper. The timeliness instruction was deemed a meaningful response to the jury’s request for a recapitulation of all elements, especially given the defendant’s ultimate failure to file timely returns.

    Finally, the Court cited People v. Goetz, stating that while a jury can acquit despite finding the prosecution has proven its case, this “‘mercy-dispensing power’ * * * is not a legally sanctioned function of the jury and should not be encouraged by the court”.

  • People v. Favor, 82 N.Y.2d 254 (1993): Retroactivity of Right to be Present at Sandoval Hearings

    People v. Favor, 82 N.Y.2d 254 (1993)

    The rule established in People v. Dokes, granting defendants the right to be present during Sandoval hearings, applies retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal at the time Dokes was decided, unless the defendant’s presence would have been superfluous.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the ruling in *People v. Dokes*, which grants defendants the right to be present during *Sandoval* hearings, applies retroactively. The Court of Appeals held that the *Dokes* rule does apply retroactively to cases on direct appeal when *Dokes* was decided. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the *Dokes* rule is to enhance the accuracy of *Sandoval* determinations, and there was no established precedent that permitted excluding defendants from *Sandoval* hearings. However, the Court clarified that the *Dokes* rule does not apply retroactively where the defendant’s presence at the *Sandoval* hearing would have been superfluous.

    Facts

    In *People v. Favor*, the defendant was excluded from an in-camera conference held to determine the admissibility of his prior convictions for cross-examination purposes. The trial court subsequently described the discussion and the *Sandoval* decision in the defendant’s presence. In *People v. Smith*, the defendant was excluded from a brief bench conference during which the court made a preliminary determination excluding ten of fourteen prior bad acts. The defendant was present for the remainder of the *Sandoval* hearing.

    Procedural History

    In *People v. Favor*, the Appellate Division upheld the conviction, noting the defendant did not preserve the argument by timely objection. Leave to appeal was granted after the *Dokes* decision. In *People v. Smith*, the Appellate Division held that the defendant’s exclusion from the bench conference did not require reversal, because the outcome was not prejudicial. The case was appealed by permission of a judge of the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the rule established in *People v. Dokes*, granting defendants the right to be present during *Sandoval* hearings, applies retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal.

    2. Whether the defendant’s exclusion from the *Sandoval* hearing in *People v. Favor* requires reversal of the conviction.

    3. Whether the defendant’s exclusion from the *Sandoval* hearing in *People v. Smith* requires reversal of the conviction.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the purpose of the *Dokes* rule is to enhance the accuracy of *Sandoval* determinations, and there was no firmly established body of case law approving the defendant’s exclusion from *Sandoval* hearings.

    2. Yes, because the defendant’s exclusion from the *Sandoval* hearing was a clear violation of the *Dokes* holding and the defendant was not afforded the opportunity for meaningful participation.

    3. No, because the portion of the proceeding from which the defendant was excluded resulted in a wholly favorable outcome; therefore, the defendant’s presence would have been superfluous.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that cases on direct appeal should generally be decided in accordance with the law as it exists at the time the appellate decision is made. The Court adopted a three-factor test from *People v. Pepper* to determine whether a new rule should be given retroactive effect: “(1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application.” Applying these factors, the Court determined that the *Dokes* rule should be applied retroactively. The Court reasoned that the purpose of *Dokes* is directly related to enhancing the accuracy of the *Sandoval* determination. The court found that there was no firmly established body of case law approving the exclusion of the defendant from *Sandoval* hearings. The Court further reasoned that there was no indication that retroactive application of *Dokes* would lead to wholesale reversals.

    Regarding *People v. Favor*, the Court found the defendant’s exclusion from the *Sandoval* hearing a clear violation of *Dokes*, because the trial court’s recitation of the decision did not provide the defendant the opportunity for meaningful participation. The Court rejected the argument that a case-specific “prejudice” test should be injected into the *Dokes* inquiry, because prejudice is inherent when a defendant is deprived of the opportunity for meaningful participation. The court also rejected the idea that a new *Sandoval* hearing would be an adequate remedy.

    Regarding *People v. Smith*, the Court found that the defendant’s presence would have been wholly “superfluous” because the portion of the proceeding from which the defendant was excluded resulted in a wholly favorable outcome. However, the Court noted that the better practice would be to have the accused present during every colloquy relating to the *Sandoval* question.

  • People v. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d 524 (1992): Retroactivity of Rule on Defendant’s Presence During Jury Selection

    People v. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d 524 (1992)

    A new rule of criminal procedure regarding a defendant’s right to be present during jury selection will generally be applied prospectively only, considering the purpose of the new rule, reliance on the old rule, and the effect on the administration of justice.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the rule established in People v. Antommarchi, which expanded a defendant’s right to be present during jury selection, should be applied retroactively. The Court of Appeals held that the Antommarchi rule, based on state statutory law, should be applied prospectively only. The Court considered the purpose of the rule, the extent of reliance on the old practice, and the potential impact on the administration of justice. Because the prior procedure was long-standing and a retroactive application would create a substantial burden, the Court declined to apply the new rule retroactively.

    Facts

    The defendants in these consolidated appeals were tried before the Court of Appeals decided People v. Antommarchi. During jury selection, portions of the examination of prospective jurors occurred at sidebar conferences outside the presence of the defendants. These conferences covered topics such as whether jurors or their relatives had been crime victims or involved in criminal proceedings. The defendants did not object to their exclusion from these sidebars.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions of Mitchell and Casiano. The Appellate Division also affirmed Chambers’ conviction initially, but the Court of Appeals reversed the order in Chambers due to a Batson violation (racial discrimination in jury selection), while affirming the orders in Mitchell and Casiano after determining that the Antommarchi rule should not be applied retroactively.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the rule established in People v. Antommarchi, regarding a defendant’s right to be present during jury selection, should be applied retroactively.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Antommarchi rule is based on state statutory law, and applying the factors outlined in People v. Pepper (purpose of the new rule, reliance on the old rule, and effect on the administration of justice) favors prospective application only.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Antommarchi decision was based on New York’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL 260.20), which requires a defendant to be present during trial, a right extended to jury impanelment under state law. While this right has due process underpinnings, its scope is broader than federal constitutional rights. The Court distinguished the statutory right from the federal constitutional right to be present, which is evaluated based on whether a defendant’s absence would thwart a fair hearing. Because the questioning involved matters of general bias and hostility, the Court found no violation of the defendants’ constitutional rights under the pre-Antommarchi standard.

    The Court then applied the retroactivity analysis from People v. Pepper, which considers the purpose of the new rule, the extent of reliance on the old rule, and the effect on the administration of justice. The purpose of the Antommarchi rule is to permit a more active role for the defendant in jury selection, not to cure a constitutional infirmity. Courts had substantially relied on the prior practice of examining jurors in the defendant’s absence to expedite jury selection and encourage candor. Retroactive application would create a substantial burden on the administration of justice by requiring the reconsideration of countless pending cases, many with no record of the side-bar conferences. The Court stated, “The reversal, or even the reconsideration, of these appeals on Antommarchi grounds would create a substantial burden on the administration of justice and delay the disposition of countless pending cases.”

    Therefore, the Court held that the Antommarchi rule applies only to jury selections occurring after October 27, 1992, the date People v. Antommarchi was decided. Because the side-bar questioning in Mitchell and Casiano involved matters of general bias, the Court found no violation of the defendants’ statutory or constitutional rights.