New York Law Review

Tag: retroactivity

  • NYP Holdings, Inc. v. New York City Police Dept., 2025 NY Slip Op 01009: Retroactive Application of FOIL Repeal and Law Enforcement Disciplinary Records

    2025 NY Slip Op 01009

    The repeal of Civil Rights Law § 50-a, which had exempted certain law enforcement personnel records from disclosure, applies retroactively to records created before the repeal, thereby making such records subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL).

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether law enforcement disciplinary records created before the repeal of Civil Rights Law § 50-a, which shielded certain personnel records from public disclosure, are subject to disclosure under FOIL. The court held that the repeal had retroactive effect, thereby making pre-repeal records subject to disclosure. The decision emphasized the Legislature’s intent to enhance public trust and accountability by increasing access to police disciplinary records, concluding that this purpose would be undermined by exempting pre-repeal records. The court’s decision also weighed the remedial nature of the law and the legislative history to support the decision, which rejected the PBA’s argument that the repeal should only apply prospectively.

    Facts

    NYP Holdings, Inc., and New York Post reporter Craig McCarthy submitted FOIL requests to the NYPD seeking disciplinary records of specific police officers. The NYPD effectively denied most requests, citing that the burden of compliance would be too onerous. The Police Benevolent Association (PBA) intervened, arguing that records created before the repeal of Civil Rights Law § 50-a were not subject to disclosure. The Supreme Court granted the Post’s petition, and the Appellate Division affirmed, determining that the repeal of section 50-a applied retroactively. The PBA appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the Post’s petition to compel disclosure, rejecting both the NYPD’s burden argument and the PBA’s retroactivity argument. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the repeal of Civil Rights Law § 50-a applied retroactively to records created before the repeal. The Court of Appeals granted the PBA leave to appeal and stayed the Appellate Division’s order pending the appeal’s resolution.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the repeal of Civil Rights Law § 50-a applies retroactively to law enforcement disciplinary records created before the repeal.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Court determined that the Legislature intended the repeal to have retroactive effect, making pre-repeal records subject to disclosure under FOIL.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals examined whether the repeal of Civil Rights Law § 50-a should be applied retroactively. The court began by noting that retroactive application of statutes is not favored unless expressly required or implied by the language of the statute. It then assessed that the legislation was remedial in nature and considered other factors relevant to retroactivity, including legislative intent and the statute’s design. The court concluded that the Legislature intended the repeal to have retroactive effect, based on the plain reading and intent of the law as well as its legislative history. The court found that the amendments did not single out records for special treatment based on the date they were created. The court cited legislative history indicating the legislation’s urgent response to public demands for reform and its intent to increase public trust and accountability by allowing access to records related to police misconduct. The court noted that “remedial legislation should be given retroactive effect in order to effectuate its beneficial purpose”. The court found that the legislation was enacted in rapid response to public outcry over the killing of George Floyd by a police officer with an extensive disciplinary record. The court found that the legislative purpose could not be achieved if the pre-repeal records were not subject to FOIL.

    Practical Implications

    This decision reinforces the presumption that government records, including law enforcement disciplinary records, are accessible under FOIL unless specifically exempted. It clarifies that repeals of statutory exemptions may apply retroactively when the legislative intent supports such application. The decision influences the scope of FOIL requests and the records that must be produced, particularly in cases involving allegations of police misconduct, or in cases where a government entity has withheld documents based on now-repealed statutes. This means that media outlets and the public have greater access to disciplinary records, promoting transparency and accountability. This case highlights the importance of legislative intent and the remedial nature of statutes in determining their retroactive application. Attorneys should consider legislative history and the overall purpose of statutes when assessing whether a change in law applies to prior events.

  • Matter of Jeter v. Poole, 2024 NY Slip Op 05868: Application of New Law to Pending Administrative Appeals in Child Abuse Cases

    2024 NY Slip Op 05868

    When a new law alters the legal standard in a case that is pending on appeal, the appellate court must apply the new law unless the legislature clearly indicated otherwise or applying the new law would create a manifest injustice.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether amendments to the Social Services Law, which changed the standards for removing individuals from the Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment (SCR), applied to a case that was pending appeal when the new law took effect. The court held that the amendments did not apply retroactively because the legislature explicitly set a future effective date for the changes. The court also addressed whether a party has a constitutional right to counsel in SCR proceedings.

    Facts

    Shani Jeter was accused of abusing her daughter, T. The police, a teacher, and a caseworker received reports of the incident. Subsequently, the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) initiated a neglect proceeding in Family Court, and the police made a report to the SCR. After an investigation, ACS indicated that the report against Jeter was substantiated. Family Court ultimately dismissed the neglect proceeding. Jeter challenged the SCR determination administratively, but the New York State Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) upheld it. Jeter then initiated an Article 78 proceeding, arguing that the new legislative amendments to Social Services Law § 422 should apply to her case, entitling her to have the indication of child abuse expunged from the SCR due to the Family Court dismissal, and she had a constitutional right to assigned counsel during the SCR hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed OCFS’s determination, and Jeter appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    ACS commenced a Family Court article 10 neglect proceeding, which was eventually adjourned in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) and then dismissed. An administrative hearing was held before OCFS, which determined that Jeter had maltreated her daughter. Jeter sought judicial review of the OCFS determination via an Article 78 proceeding, which was transferred to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division confirmed OCFS’s determination, and Jeter appealed to the Court of Appeals, which granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the amendments to Social Services Law § 422, which took effect during the pendency of Jeter’s Article 78 proceeding, applied to her case, specifically regarding the presumption to be applied to the SCR determination following the Family Court’s dismissal of the neglect proceeding.

    2. Whether Jeter had a constitutional right to assigned counsel during the SCR administrative hearing.

    Holding

    1. No, because the legislature specifically provided that these amendments would not apply until January 1, 2022.

    2. No, because Jeter’s interest in her reputation and employment prospects were not sufficient to warrant the appointment of counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while a party is typically entitled to the benefit of the law as it exists at the time of appeal, the legislature clearly stated that the 2020 amendments would not take effect until January 1, 2022, months after the administrative hearing and OCFS determination. The court emphasized that the legislature’s intent should be effectuated, and there was no indication that the legislature intended for the new provisions to apply retroactively. Regarding the right to counsel, the Court noted that, unlike Family Court proceedings where a person’s physical liberty or the custody of their children is at stake, SCR proceedings do not implicate such fundamental rights. As a result, due process was satisfied by providing the opportunity for counsel, not requiring its assignment.

    Practical Implications

    The decision reinforces the principle that when a statute’s effective date is delayed, courts must respect the legislature’s intent not to apply the new law to pending matters. It highlights the limited scope of the constitutional right to assigned counsel in administrative proceedings, particularly those affecting reputation or employment. The case clarifies the importance of analyzing legislative intent when considering the application of statutory amendments during appellate review, demonstrating that a delayed effective date is a strong indicator against retroactivity. The ruling also impacts child welfare cases. The outcome of an ACD or a dismissal in Family Court may not automatically result in the expungement of a report from the SCR if the administrative review happened before the amendments took effect. This means that the Family Court’s determination is not binding if OCFS made a decision before January 1, 2022.

  • People v. Maxam, 25 N.Y.3d 531 (2015): Finality of a Criminal Judgment for Retroactivity Purposes When No Direct Appeal is Filed

    People v. Maxam, 25 N.Y.3d 531 (2015)

    When a defendant does not file a direct appeal, a criminal judgment becomes final 30 days after sentencing, coinciding with the expiration of the automatic right to appeal, for the purpose of applying new rules of federal constitutional criminal procedure in state post-conviction collateral review proceedings.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the determination of finality of a judgment in a criminal case when the defendant does not file a direct appeal. The case involved a defendant seeking to apply the rule from Padilla v. Kentucky, which required counsel to advise non-citizen clients of potential deportation consequences of a guilty plea. The court held that when a defendant does not file a direct appeal, the judgment becomes final 30 days after sentencing. This finality date is based on the expiration of the timeframe for filing a notice of appeal under CPL 460.10 (1)(a), and the judgment does not remain open until the end of a potential year-long window to seek an extension to file a late notice of appeal under CPL 460.30 (1).

    Facts

    In 2008, Maxam was charged with assault. He pleaded guilty in 2009 and was sentenced to probation. Maxam did not file a direct appeal. Later, he sought to vacate his conviction, citing Padilla v. Kentucky, claiming his counsel failed to inform him about potential deportation consequences. The Supreme Court denied Maxam’s motion, concluding that Padilla should not be applied retroactively. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the judgment did not become final until the end of the CPL 460.30 (1) period. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    Maxam was convicted in Supreme Court in 2009. He did not appeal. He filed a CPL 440.10 motion in Supreme Court seeking to vacate the judgment which was denied. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal, and subsequently, the Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s order. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a judgment of conviction becomes final for purposes of applying a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure when a defendant does not file a direct appeal, specifically, whether the relevant date of finality is 30 days after sentencing or the end of the one-year period during which a defendant could seek an extension of time to appeal under CPL 460.30(1).

    Holding

    No, the judgment becomes final 30 days after sentencing, because this aligns with the expiration of the defendant’s automatic right to appeal, not when a defendant could potentially file a late notice of appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals noted that the US Supreme Court in Chaidez v. United States held that Padilla was a “new rule” that would not be applied retroactively. The court differentiated finality in cases with a direct appeal (final when direct review and discretionary review is exhausted) from those without a direct appeal. The court found that, where no direct appeal is taken, the judgment becomes final when the opportunity to appeal expires. It rejected the defendant’s argument that the finality date should be extended by the one-year grace period in CPL 460.30 (1). The court reasoned that adopting the defendant’s view would create uncertainty and potentially broaden the retroactive application of Padilla. The court emphasized that the defendant had not sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. The court noted that “a defendant seeking to file a late notice of appeal pursuant to CPL 460.30 (1) must demonstrate that he or she was prevented from timely filing a notice of appeal due to the “improper conduct of a public servant or improper conduct, death or disability of the defendant’s attorney,” or the “inability of the defendant and his attorney to have communicated . . . concerning whether an appeal should be taken” (CPL 460.30 [1] [a], [b]).”

    Practical Implications

    This case is essential for determining the availability of new constitutional rules for defendants who did not file direct appeals. Attorneys must understand that, for cases where there’s no appeal filed, the clock starts running on the 30th day after sentencing to determine finality for the purpose of applying new rules of criminal procedure. This impacts the ability of a defendant to collaterally attack a conviction based on a new legal principle, which can affect immigration consequences such as deportation. The ruling also clarifies the finality of judgments in the context of Padilla v. Kentucky and its retroactivity. This case sets a clear rule for finality, avoiding potential extensions based on the availability of actions that were not taken. The practical effect is that the defendant’s opportunity to claim that the attorney was ineffective for failing to advise on immigration consequences is restricted because his judgment became final before the Padilla case was decided.

  • People v. Baret, 23 N.Y.3d 777 (2014): Retroactivity of Padilla v. Kentucky in State Postconviction Proceedings

    23 N.Y.3d 777 (2014)

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, requiring counsel to advise noncitizen clients of deportation risks, does not apply retroactively in state court postconviction proceedings.

    Summary

    Defendant Baret, a noncitizen, pleaded guilty to a drug charge in 1996. Years later, relying on Padilla v. Kentucky, he sought to vacate his conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to advise him about deportation risks. The New York Court of Appeals held that Padilla does not apply retroactively in state postconviction proceedings. Applying federal retroactivity principles established in Teague v. Lane, the court determined that Padilla announced a new rule, not simply an application of existing ineffective assistance standards, and does not fall within the narrow exceptions to non-retroactivity. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Facts

    In 1995, Roman Baret was indicted on multiple drug sale and possession charges. In 1996, he pleaded guilty to one count of third-degree sale of a controlled substance as part of a plea bargain. During the plea colloquy, he acknowledged his rights and stated the plea was voluntary. He later moved to withdraw the plea, claiming threats from a codefendant, but the motion was denied. He failed to appear for sentencing, leading to a bench warrant, and was sentenced in 2004 to 2 to 6 years’ incarceration.

    Procedural History

    Baret appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed that decision in 2008. In 2010, Baret moved to vacate his conviction under CPL 440.10, arguing ineffective assistance based on Padilla v. Kentucky. Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, applying Padilla retroactively to pleas taken after 1996, and remanded for a hearing. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and then reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Padilla v. Kentucky applies retroactively in state court postconviction proceedings in New York.

    Holding

    No, because Padilla announced a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure that does not fall within the narrow exceptions to non-retroactivity established in Teague v. Lane and therefore does not apply retroactively in state collateral review under CPL 440.10.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that, under Teague v. Lane, new rules of federal constitutional criminal procedure generally do not apply retroactively to cases that were final before the new rule was announced. A new rule exists if the result was not dictated by precedent at the time the conviction became final. The court acknowledged that Danforth v. Minnesota allows states to give broader retroactive application to new rules than federal courts do under Teague. However, it declined to do so here.

    The court found that Padilla established a new rule by imposing a new obligation on states because, before Padilla, New York law, as articulated in People v. Ford, did not require counsel to advise defendants of potential deportation consequences. The court rejected the argument that Padilla merely clarified existing ineffective assistance standards under Strickland v. Washington.

    The court further reasoned that Padilla does not qualify for the watershed exception to the Teague doctrine. Watershed rules must be necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction and alter the understanding of bedrock procedural elements. While important, advice regarding immigration consequences does not go to the heart of a reliable determination of guilt or innocence. The Court quoted Schriro v. Summerlin, stating, “[t]hat a new procedural rule is ‘fundamental’ in some abstract sense is not enough; the rule must be one ‘without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.’”

    Finally, the court applied the three-part test from People v. Pepper. The court found that Padilla did not involve standards that go to the heart of a reliable determination of guilt or innocence. It also considered the reliance of law enforcement on the prior standard and the effect of retroactive application on the administration of justice, concluding that these factors also weighed against retroactivity.

    The court distinguished People v. Eastman, emphasizing that in Eastman, the Supreme Court had not yet addressed whether the rule at issue (Cruz v. New York) applied retroactively in collateral proceedings.

    Because the Appellate Division decision mandated a hearing nearly two decades after the plea, it imposed significant administrative burdens based on faded memories and off-the-record conversations. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the Supreme Court’s order.

  • Raynor v. Landmark Chrysler, 16 N.Y.3d 57 (2011): Mandatory Aggregate Trust Fund Deposits for Non-Schedule Awards

    Raynor v. Landmark Chrysler, 16 N.Y.3d 57 (2011)

    The 2007 amendments to Workers’ Compensation Law § 27(2) require private insurance carriers to deposit the present value of permanent partial disability awards into the Aggregate Trust Fund (ATF), regardless of whether the injury occurred before or after the amendment’s effective date, provided the award is made after July 1, 2007.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the 2007 amendments to New York’s Workers’ Compensation Law mandate private insurance carriers to deposit the present value of non-schedule permanent partial disability awards into the ATF, even if the injury occurred before the amendments’ effective date. The Court of Appeals held that the amended statute requires such deposits for awards made after July 1, 2007, regardless of when the injury occurred. The Court reasoned that the statute’s plain language and lack of exceptions indicate the legislature’s intent for broad application. The Court rejected arguments of retroactivity, unconstitutional taking, and due process violations.

    Facts

    Claimant Randy Raynor injured his lower back on December 14, 2004, while working for Landmark Chrysler. On June 25, 2008, a workers’ compensation law judge determined that Raynor was permanently partially disabled. The judge directed Landmark Chrysler’s insurance carrier, Erie Insurance Company of New York, to deposit the present value of all unpaid benefits ($196,865.73) into the ATF. Erie Insurance challenged this directive, arguing that mandatory deposits should only apply to awards made under the amended section 15(3)(w) for injuries occurring after the amendment’s effective date.

    Procedural History

    The Workers’ Compensation Board upheld the determination, requiring the deposit of the present value into the ATF. The carrier sought full Board review, raising constitutional arguments. The full Board affirmed the decision, stating the statute’s plain language required the deposit and the statute was not impermissibly retroactive or unconstitutional. The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the amended Workers’ Compensation Law § 27(2) requires private insurance carriers to deposit the present value of a permanent partial disability award into the ATF when the award is made after the amendment’s effective date, but the injury occurred before.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plain language of the amended Workers’ Compensation Law § 27(2) mandates that if any award made on or after July 1, 2007, requires payment for permanent partial disability, the Board shall compute the present value and require payment into the ATF, regardless of when the injury occurred.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the plain language of the statute, stating, “As the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof.” The Court noted that the legislature specifically chose the date of the award as the trigger for the deposit requirement, not the date of the injury. The court rejected the argument that the statute was impermissibly retroactive, stating, “ ‘A statute is not retroactive . . . when made to apply to future transactions merely because such transactions relate to and are founded upon antecedent events.’ ” The Court distinguished Burns v. Varriale, noting that while ascertaining the present value of future benefits can be speculative, the use of actuarial tables as mandated by Workers’ Compensation Law § 27(5) makes the calculation sufficiently reliable for the purposes of the deposit requirement. The Court dismissed the carrier’s constitutional arguments, finding no violation of the Takings Clause because the statute doesn’t increase the amount owed or appropriate the carrier’s assets. Similarly, the Court found no Contracts Clause violation because the amendment only made mandatory what was previously discretionary. The Court found a rational basis for treating private insurers differently from the State Insurance Fund and self-insurers, justifying the differential treatment under the Equal Protection Clause. Finally, the Court rejected the Due Process argument, finding that the carrier had sufficient procedural protections and that the statute served a rational legislative purpose. The Court concluded, “It is for the Legislature to limit the statute, if it so desires.”

  • Nation v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.3d 454 (2010): Retroactive Application of Professional Disciplinary Rules

    Nation v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.3d 454 (2010)

    A statute or regulation is not considered to operate retroactively when applied to future actions, even if those actions are based on past conduct, particularly when the law serves a remedial purpose such as ensuring public safety.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB) properly applied Administrative Code § 26-124 (c) to an engineer, Leon St. Clair Nation, who had submitted falsified documents. The Commissioner barred Nation from submitting any documents to DOB for two years, followed by a three-year probationary period, based on Nation’s prior misconduct. The Court held that this was not an improper retroactive application of the law because the law regulated future professional eligibility and served a public safety purpose by preventing the filing of false information.

    Facts

    Leon St. Clair Nation, a licensed engineer, submitted digitally altered photographs to the DOB in 2004 and attested to a falsified photograph in 2005. In 2006, he submitted a false application for alterations to a nonexistent second floor. The DOB initiated administrative proceedings to revoke Nation’s professional certification privileges due to these falsified submissions.

    Procedural History

    The Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH) recommended rescinding Nation’s certification privileges. The DOB Commissioner adopted this recommendation and, relying on Administrative Code § 26-124 (c), barred Nation from filing any documents with DOB for two years, followed by a three-year probation. Nation challenged this determination via a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The Appellate Division upheld the revocation of certification privileges but vacated the penalty imposed under Administrative Code § 26-124 (c), deeming it a retroactive application of the law. The Court of Appeals granted DOB leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Administrative Code § 26-124 (c) was improperly applied retroactively when the Commissioner of the DOB barred an engineer from submitting documents based on past falsifications, where the law was enacted after the misconduct occurred.

    Holding

    Yes, because applying the law to bar the engineer from submitting future documents based on past falsifications is not an improper retroactive application, as the law regulates future professional eligibility and serves a public safety purpose.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the Commissioner properly applied Administrative Code § 26-124 (c). The Court relied on Matter of Miller v. DeBuono, which established that a statute is not retroactive when it applies to future transactions, even if those transactions relate to antecedent events. The Court emphasized that § 26-124 (c) regulates future professional eligibility by allowing the Commissioner to refuse documents from individuals who have knowingly or negligently submitted falsified materials. The purpose of the code provision is to promote public safety by preventing the repeated filing of false information. The Court stated, “[W]here the requirements for engaging in specified professional activity are changed to govern future professional eligibility, a statute does not operate retroactively in any true sense even though its application may be triggered by an event which occurred prior to its effective date.” The Court distinguished the case from scenarios involving truly retroactive laws, which are disfavored unless explicitly stated. Because the law aimed to regulate future conduct, its application was deemed prospective, not retroactive. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the Commissioner’s determination did not shock the conscience, given Nation’s repeated submission of false materials.

  • People v. Jean-Baptiste, 11 N.Y.3d 539 (2008): Retroactivity of Feingold’s Depraved Indifference Standard on Direct Appeal

    People v. Jean-Baptiste, 11 N.Y.3d 539 (2008)

    When a defendant’s conviction for depraved indifference murder is pending on direct appeal and the defendant has adequately challenged the sufficiency of the proof, the appellate court must apply the subjective mental state standard for depraved indifference established in People v. Feingold.

    Summary

    Jean-Baptiste was convicted of depraved indifference murder under the then-prevailing objective standard. While his appeal was pending, People v. Feingold redefined depraved indifference murder to require a culpable, subjective mental state. Jean-Baptiste argued that his conviction should be overturned because the evidence did not establish the mental state required under Feingold. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Feingold standard applies to cases on direct appeal where the defendant has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, distinguishing direct appeals from collateral attacks on final convictions. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to reduce the conviction to manslaughter in the second degree.

    Facts

    Michael Weekes attended a party and had a confrontation with a man nicknamed “Back-shot,” striking him with a bottle. Jean-Baptiste, Back-shot’s cousin, then pulled a handgun and shot Weekes in the chest at close range, killing him.

    Procedural History

    Jean-Baptiste was initially charged with intentional murder and depraved indifference murder. The first trial resulted in an acquittal on the intentional murder charge but a hung jury on the depraved indifference charge. A superseding indictment added manslaughter in the first degree. At the second trial, the jury convicted Jean-Baptiste of depraved indifference murder under the objective standard established in People v. Register. The Appellate Division reversed the depraved indifference murder conviction, finding insufficient evidence of the mental state required under the new standard established in People v. Feingold, and reduced the conviction to manslaughter in the second degree. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the subjective mental state standard for depraved indifference murder articulated in People v. Feingold applies retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal where the defendant has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a depraved indifference murder conviction.

    Holding

    Yes, because cases on direct appeal are generally decided in accordance with the law as it exists at the time the appellate decision is made, and a failure to apply the new standard would result in a conviction even though one of the elements of the crime had not been established.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on common-law principles that cases on direct appeal should be decided based on the current state of the law. The Court cited People v. Hill, which held that a new definition of “knowingly” applied to cases pending on direct appeal. The Court reasoned that failing to apply the new, more demanding standard for depraved indifference murder would result in a person being found guilty even if an essential element of the crime (depraved indifference mental state) was not proven.

    The Court distinguished Policano v. Herbert, which held that the new depraved indifference standard did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Court emphasized the critical difference between cases on direct appeal and those where the appellate process had concluded. Applying the new standard to cases on direct appeal is consistent with ensuring convictions are based on legally sufficient evidence, while retroactive application to final convictions would create a flood of collateral attacks, disrupting the finality of judgments.

    The Court also addressed the People’s argument that the legal sufficiency should be measured by the jury charge given at trial. The Court noted that defense counsel made a specific motion for a trial order of dismissal based on legal insufficiency, anticipating the change in law brought by Feingold, therefore preserving the issue for appeal.

    Ultimately, the Court agreed with the Appellate Division, stating that, in applying the Feingold standard, “the evidence failed to establish that defendant acted with the requisite mental state of depraved indifference to human life.” The Court further concurred that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for manslaughter in the second degree.

  • In re Heller, 6 N.Y.3d 649 (2006): Trustee’s Unitrust Election Despite Being a Remainder Beneficiary

    In re Heller, 6 N.Y.3d 649 (2006)

    A trustee who is also a remainder beneficiary is not automatically barred from electing unitrust status for a trust, but such an election will be subject to heightened scrutiny by the courts to ensure fairness to all beneficiaries.

    Summary

    This case concerns a trustee’s ability to elect unitrust status for a trust under New York’s EPTL 11-2.4, even when the trustee is also a remainder beneficiary. Jacob Heller created a trust for his wife, Bertha, with his sons, Herbert and Alan, as trustees after his brother’s death, and his daughters and sons as remainder beneficiaries. The trustees elected unitrust status, reducing Bertha’s income. Bertha challenged the election, arguing the trustees’ self-interest invalidated it. The Court of Appeals held that a trustee’s status as a remainder beneficiary does not automatically invalidate the election, but it necessitates careful scrutiny. The court also decided that the unitrust election could be applied retroactively.

    Facts

    Jacob Heller’s will created a trust for his wife, Bertha, with income paid to her during her life. The remainder would be split between his four children. He appointed his brother Frank as trustee, followed by his sons, Herbert and Alan. After Frank’s death, Herbert and Alan became trustees. Bertha’s average annual income was approximately $190,000. In 2003, the trustees elected unitrust status, applying it retroactively to January 1, 2002. This reduced Bertha’s annual income to approximately $70,000.

    Procedural History

    Sandra Davis, Bertha’s attorney-in-fact, moved for summary judgment to annul the unitrust election and remove Herbert and Alan as trustees. Surrogate’s Court voided the retroactive application but denied the other relief requested. Davis appealed, and the Hellers cross-appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of Davis’s motion and reversed the annulment of the retroactive application. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether trustees who are also remainder beneficiaries are barred from electing unitrust status for a trust.
    2. Whether trustees can elect unitrust status retroactively to January 1, 2002, the effective date of EPTL 11-2.4.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Legislature did not include a prohibition against interested trustees electing unitrust treatment in EPTL 11-2.4, unlike a similar prohibition in EPTL 11-2.3(b)(5) regarding adjustments between principal and income.
    2. Yes, because the Legislature structured EPTL 11-2.4 to allow for retroactive application, giving trustees the authority to specify the effective date of unitrust elections.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the 2001 legislation aimed to facilitate investment for total return under the Prudent Investor Act. While the common law prohibits self-dealing by fiduciaries, the trustees here owed duties to all remainder beneficiaries, not just themselves. The Court emphasized that the absence of a specific prohibition against interested trustees in EPTL 11-2.4, in contrast to EPTL 11-2.3(b)(5), indicated legislative intent not to create a per se ban. The court noted, “the trustees owe fiduciary obligations not only to the trust’s income beneficiary, Bertha Heller, but also to the other remainder beneficiaries, Suzanne Heller and Faith Willinger. That these beneficiaries’ interests happen to align with the trustees’ does not relieve the trustees of their duties to them.” However, the Court cautioned that such elections would be subject to close scrutiny to ensure fairness, referencing EPTL 11-2.4 (e) (5) (A) factors. Regarding retroactivity, the Court pointed to EPTL 11-2.4(b)(6), which instructs trustees to determine the unitrust amount payable for any preceding year. The court stated that this provision “envisages retroactive application of a unitrust regime. The required recomputation of preceding years’ beneficial interests would serve no purpose if retroactive application were barred.”

  • In re Marino S., 2 N.Y.3d 365 (2004): Retroactive Application of Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA)

    In re Marino S., 2 N.Y.3d 365 (2004)

    The Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) can be applied retroactively to pending cases to expedite permanency planning for abused children and determine whether diligent efforts to reunite a family are required, especially when severe abuse is present.

    Summary

    This case concerns the termination of parental rights of Raquel T. and Marino S. The central issue is whether the foster care agency was required to make diligent efforts to reunite the parents with their children, given Marino’s rape of one child and Raquel’s subsequent actions. The court addresses the retroactive application of the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) and derivative findings of severe abuse. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that ASFA was properly applied retroactively, diligent efforts were not required due to the severe abuse, and derivative findings of severe abuse were permissible for the siblings not directly abused.

    Facts

    Marino raped his eight-year-old stepdaughter, Shaina, while her mother, Raquel, was present in the home. Raquel delayed seeking medical attention for Shaina, fabricated a story to conceal Marino’s involvement, and cleaned up the evidence. The children were placed in foster care. Marino pleaded guilty to rape and Raquel to reckless endangerment. Termination of parental rights proceedings were initiated.

    Procedural History

    Child abuse proceedings were initiated, resulting in findings of abuse. Subsequently, petitions to terminate parental rights were filed based on permanent neglect. During these proceedings, New York passed ASFA, leading to amendments of the termination petitions to include causes of action for “severe abuse.” Family Court found severe abuse, concluded diligent efforts were not required, and terminated parental rights. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether ASFA can be applied retroactively to pending proceedings to include a cause of action for severe abuse based on a felony sex offense.
    2. Whether the agency was required to exercise diligent efforts to reunite the parents with the children.
    3. Whether derivative findings of severe abuse were permissible for the children who were not direct victims of the rape.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because ASFA is remedial in nature, does not impair vested rights, and was enacted to bring New York into compliance with federal law.
    2. No, because admissible evidence clearly and convincingly established that diligent efforts to reunite the family were not required due to the heinous acts and utter disregard for the child’s life.
    3. Yes, because an underlying finding that a child was abused may itself be derivative, even in cases other than those involving homicide or assault, and New York child welfare law favors keeping siblings together.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that ASFA’s retroactive application was proper because the statute is remedial, aimed at expediting permanency planning for abused children. The court emphasized the state’s paramount concern for the health and safety of children, noting that ASFA aligns with existing New York law in this regard. The court also dismissed the argument that ASFA could only determine the need for future efforts, stating that such a construction would be at odds with the remedial nature of ASFA.

    Regarding derivative findings, the court found implicit support for them within the Social Services Law and Family Court Act, stating that a parent whose judgment is so defective as to harm one child is likely to harm others. The court explicitly stated, “derivative findings of severe abuse may be ‘predicated upon the common understanding that a parent whose judgment and impulse control are so defective as to harm one child in his or her care is likely to harm others as well.’” The court rejected the argument that derivative findings should be limited strictly to homicide and assault, highlighting that the law favors keeping siblings together.

  • Matter of Solkav Solartechnik v. Besicorp Group, 99 N.Y.2d 118 (2002): Retroactive Application of Remedial Legislation

    Matter of Solkav Solartechnik, G.m.b.H. (Besicorp Group), 99 N.Y.2d 118 (2002)

    Remedial legislation intended to clarify existing law and promote judicial economy should be applied retroactively, especially when the legislature acts swiftly to correct an unintended judicial interpretation.

    Summary

    This case concerns the retroactive application of an amendment to CPLR 7502(a), which was enacted to address a problem created by the Court of Appeals’ prior decision in Matter of Solkav Solartechnik. The amendment mandates that all applications related to an arbitration be brought within the same action or proceeding, even after a final judgment in a pre-arbitration special proceeding. The Court of Appeals held that the amendment should be applied retroactively because it was remedial, intended to clarify the original legislative intent, and designed to promote judicial economy by preventing forum shopping. The swift legislative action following the prior court decision indicated a sense of urgency supporting retroactivity.

    Facts

    Petitioners and respondents were involved in a dispute arising from the sale of a restaurant. The sale agreement included a covenant not to compete and an arbitration clause. After respondents took employment at a nearby restaurant, petitioners commenced a special proceeding seeking to enjoin respondents from working there pending arbitration. The Supreme Court denied the injunction, and the matter proceeded to arbitration, where petitioners won damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioners then moved to confirm the arbitration award, using the same index number as the original proceeding. Respondents cross-moved to vacate the award.

    Procedural History

    1. Petitioners commenced a special proceeding in Supreme Court seeking a preliminary injunction which was denied.
    2. Petitioners then moved in the same proceeding to confirm an arbitration award they received.
    3. The Supreme Court confirmed the award.
    4. The Appellate Division reversed, citing Matter of Solkav Solartechnik, which required a new proceeding to confirm the award. This reversal occurred before the amendment to CPLR 7502(a).
    5. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the amendment to CPLR 7502(a)(iii), requiring all arbitration-related applications to be brought within the same action or proceeding, should be applied retroactively to cases pending when the amendment was enacted.

    Holding

    Yes, because the amendment to CPLR 7502(a)(iii) is remedial legislation designed to clarify existing law, promote judicial economy, and correct an unintended judicial interpretation; therefore, it should be applied retroactively.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals considered the following factors to determine whether retroactive application was appropriate:

    1. Whether the Legislature explicitly stated a preference for retroactivity: While there was no explicit statement, the swift legislative action conveyed a sense of urgency.
    2. Whether the legislation was remedial: The amendment was designed to clarify the original intent of CPLR 7502(a), which was to ensure that all applications concerning an arbitration be presented in the same case.
    3. Whether the legislation was designed to rewrite an unintended judicial interpretation: The amendment directly addressed the problem created by the Court’s prior decision in Matter of Solkav Solartechnik.
    4. Whether the enactment reaffirmed a legislative judgment: The legislative history showed that the amendment was intended to promote judicial economy and prevent forum shopping, reaffirming the Legislature’s judgment about what the law should be.

    The Court noted that the Governor’s veto message regarding an earlier version of the bill supported the view that the amendment was intended to clarify existing law. The Court also highlighted the immediate effective date of the amendment as evidence of the Legislature’s sense of urgency. The court stated: “These factors together persuade us that the remedial purpose of the amendment should be effectuated through retroactive application”. Therefore, the Appellate Division’s order was reversed, and the matter was remitted for consideration of other issues not previously addressed.