New York Law Review

Tag: Retroactive Application of Law

  • Matter of Hecht v. New York State Educ. Dept., 69 N.Y.2d 986 (1987): Application of Amended Law During Appeal

    Matter of Hecht v. New York State Educ. Dept., 69 N.Y.2d 986 (1987)

    A court must apply the law as it exists at the time of the appeal, especially when the amended law is procedural and remedial in nature.

    Summary

    This case concerns the revocation of an accountant’s license and whether amendments to Education Law § 6510, enacted after the initial determination but before the appeal, should apply. The Regents Review Committee had refused to make a stenographic record of its proceedings, which the petitioner argued was a denial of due process. The Court of Appeals held that the amended law, requiring a stenographic record, should apply because the amendments were procedural and remedial, designed to correct imperfections in prior law and provide relief to aggrieved parties. Therefore, the court reversed the lower court’s judgment and remitted the matter for further proceedings in accordance with the amended statute.

    Facts

    Petitioner, an accountant, had his license revoked following a professional conduct proceeding authorized by Education Law § 6510 (2) (d), based on his conviction of a crime. The Regents Review Committee, during its proceedings, refused to make a stenographic record.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division upheld the revocation. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the refusal to create a stenographic record was a denial of due process. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment, annulled the respondents’ determination, and remitted the case for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether amendments to Education Law § 6510, which mandate a stenographic record and allow the presentation of evidence regarding the severity of the penalty, apply to proceedings where the initial determination occurred before the amendments’ effective date but the appeal occurred after.

    Holding

    Yes, because the amendments to Education Law § 6510 are procedural and remedial in nature, and the Legislature intended them to apply to pending proceedings to correct imperfections in the prior law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the established rule is that a court applies the law as it exists at the time of the appeal, not at the time of the original determination. The court noted that the amendments to Education Law § 6510, enacted by Chapters 1005 and 1018 of the Laws of 1984, were explicitly made effective immediately and applicable to proceedings where a notice of hearing had already been served. The court emphasized that when an amended law “is procedural and remedial in nature… it should be liberally construed to spread its beneficial effects as widely as possible.” (Post v 120 E. End Ave. Corp., 62 NY2d 19, 24). By directing the amendments to take effect immediately, the Legislature signaled its intent that they be viewed as remedial, “ ‘designed to correct imperfections in prior law, by * * * giving relief to [an] aggrieved party’ ” (Cady v County of Broome, 87 AD2d 964, 965). Therefore, because the amendments required a stenographic record and allowed the petitioner to present evidence regarding the severity of the penalty, a new proceeding was required to conform to the amended statute. The court found that the absence of a stenographic record in the initial proceeding was a prejudicial error that warranted reversal and a new hearing under the updated law.

  • Weissblum v. Mostafzafan Foundation, 59 N.Y.2d 917 (1983): Law Office Failure and Vacating Default Judgments

    59 N.Y.2d 917 (1983)

    CPLR 2005, enacted after the initial appeal, mandates that courts exercise discretion to excuse defaults resulting from law office failure in pending cases, requiring consideration of CPLR 3012(d) and 5015(a) requirements.

    Summary

    This case concerns the defendant’s attempt to vacate a default judgment due to law office failure. The Court of Appeals initially decided against the defendant, applying precedent that disfavored vacating defaults for such reasons. However, after the initial decision, the New York Legislature enacted CPLR 2005, allowing courts discretion to excuse defaults caused by law office failure in pending cases. Because the damages portion of the trial was still pending, the Court of Appeals granted reargument, vacated its prior order, and remitted the case to the Appellate Division to reconsider under the new statute, taking into account the requirements of CPLR 3012(d) and 5015(a).

    Facts

    The defendant failed to timely file an answer in the case, leading to a default judgment against them. The reason for the failure was attributed to law office failure. The defendant sought to vacate the default judgment. The lower courts initially found the default excusable, but the Court of Appeals reversed, citing existing precedent. Subsequently, CPLR 2005 was enacted, impacting the case’s status.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially ruled on the motion to vacate the default. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals initially reversed the Appellate Division. Following the enactment of CPLR 2005, the Court of Appeals granted a motion for reargument, vacated its prior decision, reversed the Appellate Division’s order, and remitted the case to the Appellate Division to reconsider its decision in light of the new legislation.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPLR 2005, allowing courts discretion to excuse delay or default resulting from law office failure, applies to cases pending before a court after the statute’s enactment, even if liability has already been determined but damages remain to be resolved.

    Holding

    Yes, because the action was still pending before a court as the issue of damages was yet to be resolved at trial, CPLR 2005 must be applied.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the plain language of CPLR 2005 states it applies to every action or proceeding still pending before a court. Because the issue of damages was yet to be resolved at trial, the action was considered pending. The court emphasized that while the liability question had been decided, the entire case was not fully resolved until damages were determined. Therefore, the statute’s applicability was triggered. The court noted that both courts below decided the default was excusable but without considering the requirements of CPLR 3012 (subd [d]) and 5015 (subd [a]) as mandated by CPLR 2005. The court stated: “That statute, by its terms, was made applicable to every action or proceeding still pending before a court. Although we previously disposed of the liability question in this matter, the issue of damages is yet to be resolved at trial. Consequently, the “action * * * still is pending before a court” and CPLR 2005 must, therefore, be applied.”