New York Law Review

Tag: Retrial

  • Suarez v. Byrne, 10 N.Y.3d 523 (2008): Double Jeopardy and Retrial After Reversal of Depraved Indifference Murder

    10 N.Y.3d 523 (2008)

    A defendant can be retried for intentional manslaughter after the reversal of a conviction for depraved indifference murder, even if the jury in the first trial was instructed on intentional manslaughter but did not reach a verdict on that charge due to an “acquit-first” instruction and a guilty verdict on the depraved indifference murder charge.

    Summary

    Santos Suarez was convicted of depraved indifference murder, but acquitted of intentional murder. The Court of Appeals reversed the depraved indifference murder conviction for legal insufficiency. The key issue was whether Suarez could be retried for first-degree (intentional) manslaughter, a charge presented to, but not decided by, the jury in the first trial. The Court of Appeals held that retrial was permissible. Because the jury did not have a full opportunity to consider the intentional manslaughter charge due to an erroneous “acquit first” instruction, double jeopardy did not bar retrial on that charge.

    Facts

    Suarez stabbed his girlfriend, Jovanna Gonzalez, resulting in her death. He was charged with second-degree murder (intentional and depraved indifference), first-degree manslaughter (intentional), and weapon possession. At trial, he claimed self-defense and extreme emotional disturbance, denying intent. The judge instructed the jury to consider intentional murder first, then depraved indifference murder. He told them not to consider intentional manslaughter unless they acquitted Suarez of depraved indifference murder.

    Procedural History

    The jury acquitted Suarez of intentional murder but convicted him of depraved indifference murder. The trial court did not record a verdict on the manslaughter charge. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Suarez’s actions did not constitute depraved indifference murder as a matter of law, and remitted the case to the Appellate Division to address the appropriate remedy. On remittitur, the Appellate Division held that double jeopardy did not bar retrial for intentional manslaughter. Suarez appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions bar Suarez from being retried for intentional manslaughter after his acquittal of intentional murder and the reversal of his conviction for depraved indifference murder on legal insufficiency grounds.

    Holding

    1. No, because the jury did not have a full opportunity to consider the intentional manslaughter charge in the first trial due to the trial court’s instructions and the jury’s verdict on the depraved indifference murder charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Double Jeopardy Clauses prevent a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction. However, retrial is permissible after a successful appeal, except when the reversal is based on legal insufficiency of the evidence for that specific charge. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Biggs, where retrial was barred because the jury was never given an opportunity to consider the charge in question. Here, the jury was instructed on intentional manslaughter, but because of the trial court’s “acquit-first” instruction regarding the depraved indifference murder charge, the jury never reached it. The Court analogized the situation to a mistrial, where retrial is typically permissible. The Court also emphasized that its reversal was based on legal insufficiency of the evidence for depraved indifference murder, but not for intentional manslaughter. Therefore, retrial for intentional manslaughter did not violate double jeopardy principles. The Court also determined that depraved indifference murder and intentional manslaughter are not inconsistent counts, as a defendant can recklessly cause a grave risk of death while intentionally inflicting serious physical injury, citing People v. Trappier. The court stated, “While different theories have been advanced to support the permissibility of retrial, of greater importance than the conceptual abstractions employed to explain the Ball principle are the implications of that principle for the sound administration of justice.”

  • People v. Evans, 94 N.Y.2d 500 (2000): Applicability of Law of the Case to Sandoval Rulings

    People v. Evans, 94 N.Y.2d 500 (2000)

    A Sandoval ruling, which determines the extent to which a prosecutor can cross-examine a defendant about prior bad acts, is an evidentiary ruling based on the trial court’s discretion and is not binding on a successor judge in a retrial under the law of the case doctrine.

    Summary

    Following a hung jury, the defendant was retried for armed robbery. At the first trial, the judge issued a Sandoval ruling precluding the prosecution from cross-examining the defendant about his extensive criminal record. At the retrial, a different judge ruled that the prosecution could inquire about three felony convictions and one misdemeanor. The defendant argued that the law of the case doctrine bound the second judge to the first judge’s Sandoval ruling. The New York Court of Appeals held that a Sandoval ruling is an evidentiary ruling based on the trial court’s discretion, and thus, the law of the case doctrine did not require the successor judge to adhere to the original Sandoval ruling. This determination turned on the discretionary, evidentiary nature of Sandoval hearings, distinguishing them from suppression hearings which involve determinations of law and fact.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of armed robbery. Prior to the first trial, Justice Leff conducted a Sandoval hearing regarding the admissibility of the defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes. The defendant’s record included a youthful offender adjudication, eight misdemeanor convictions (primarily drug-related), and three felony convictions (drug and weapons charges). Justice Leff precluded the prosecution from inquiring into any of the defendant’s prior criminal history. The first trial resulted in a hung jury. Before the retrial, Justice Figueroa determined that the prosecution could inquire into the three felony convictions and one misdemeanor conviction. The defendant did not testify at the second trial. The jury convicted him.

    Procedural History

    The first trial ended in a hung jury, and a retrial was ordered. Prior to the second trial, the defendant argued that the Sandoval ruling from the first trial was binding under the law of the case doctrine. Justice Figueroa disagreed and made a new Sandoval ruling. The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the law of the case doctrine requires a successor trial judge to adhere to a Sandoval ruling made at a prior trial that ended in a hung jury.

    Holding

    No, because a Sandoval ruling is an evidentiary ruling based on the trial court’s discretion and does not bind a successor judge in a retrial under the law of the case doctrine.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished the law of the case doctrine from res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion), noting that the law of the case addresses judicial determinations made during a single litigation before final judgment. Unlike res judicata and collateral estoppel, the law of the case is a judicially crafted policy that “expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, [and is] not a limit to their power.” The Court highlighted that a Sandoval determination is an evidentiary ruling based on the court’s discretion in controlling cross-examination and impeachment. This contrasts with a CPL article 710 suppression hearing, which involves mixed questions of law and fact and requires the court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court noted that while Sandoval determinations are typically made before trial, this timing does not change their character as evidentiary rulings. The Court emphasized the ad hoc discretionary nature of Sandoval rulings, quoting “the nature and extent of cross-examination have always been subject to the sound discretion of the Trial Judge,” (People v Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 374, 376). Because Justice Leff’s original Sandoval ruling was solely an exercise of discretion, Justice Figueroa was not bound by it and could exercise his own discretion in deciding whether to revisit the issue. The Court’s distinction is crucial for guiding trial judges, indicating that routine evidentiary rulings are not binding in retrials, allowing flexibility, while determinations of law are more likely to be binding. This helps ensure fairness while preventing unnecessary relitigation of settled legal issues.

  • People v. Young, 94 N.Y.2d 171 (1999): Presumption of Vindictiveness After Retrial

    94 N.Y.2d 171 (1999)

    A presumption of vindictiveness in sentencing does not automatically arise when a defendant receives a greater sentence on an individual count after retrial, but a lesser overall sentence; courts must examine the record for a reasonable likelihood that the enhanced sentence was retaliatory.

    Summary

    Defendant was initially convicted of multiple offenses and sentenced to an aggregate term of 45 years to life. After a successful appeal and retrial, he was convicted of only one offense, but received a sentence of 25 years to life on that count, exceeding the original sentence for that specific count, though the aggregate sentence was reduced. The New York Court of Appeals held that a presumption of vindictiveness did not automatically arise because his aggregate sentence was lower and required examination of the record to determine the likelihood the enhanced sentence was a result of vindictiveness. It affirmed the sentence because the record indicated it was based on his extensive criminal history.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with burglary and related offenses. He was convicted and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 45 years to life. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction. Upon retrial, Defendant was convicted of only one count: criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree. The second trial court sentenced Defendant, as a persistent felony offender, to 25 years to life on that count.

    Procedural History

    The initial conviction was reversed by the Appellate Division. After retrial and a new sentence, the Appellate Division affirmed the new sentence, finding no increased sentence. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a presumption of vindictiveness arises when a defendant receives a lesser overall sentence following retrial, but a greater sentence on an individual count?

    Holding

    No, because the presumption of vindictiveness arises only if the circumstances evince a reasonable likelihood that the greater sentence on the individual count was the result of vindictiveness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the principle that defendants should not be penalized for exercising their right to appeal, citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation ‘of the most basic sort’”). It noted the presumption of vindictiveness arises when defendants who have won appellate reversals are given greater sentences after retrials. However, this presumption is not absolute. Quoting Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 (1989), the court stated that the presumption of vindictiveness “do[es] not apply in every case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial”. The court reasoned that the key is whether there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the enhanced sentence was retaliatory.

    The court declined to adopt a strict “aggregate” or “count-by-count” approach. Instead, it mandated examination of the record to determine whether there’s a “reasonable likelihood” that the enhanced sentence was due to vindictiveness. In this case, the court emphasized Defendant’s extensive criminal history, including convictions for murder, robbery, and burglary, and the sentencing judge’s focus on this history. The court explained that the initial lenient sentence on the stolen property count was because the other convictions allowed for the desired overall sentence, but after retrial, the stolen property conviction was the only means to impose an appropriate sentence. Therefore, no presumption of vindictiveness arose because it was clear the increased sentence was based on his criminal history.

  • People v. Adames, 83 N.Y.2d 92 (1993): Double Jeopardy After Vacated Verdict Due to Prosecutorial Misconduct

    People v. Adames, 83 N.Y.2d 92 (1993)

    When a trial court vacates a jury verdict due to prosecutorial misconduct that does not intentionally provoke a mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a retrial.

    Summary

    Adames was convicted of drug sale and possession. His first trial ended with a guilty verdict, but the trial court vacated it due to prosecutorial misconduct. Adames argued that retrying him violated double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed his second conviction, holding that double jeopardy did not apply because the prosecutorial misconduct, while improper, did not force him to seek a mistrial and was more akin to trial error correctable on appeal. The court emphasized that Adames received a verdict from his initial jury, satisfying his right to have the trial completed by a particular tribunal.

    Facts

    Adames was arrested in a narcotics buy-and-bust operation. No drugs or buy money were found on him at the time of arrest. At his first trial, a co-defendant testified, offering an alibi. The prosecutor improperly cross-examined the co-defendant about his post-arrest silence, asking if he had told anyone he didn’t commit the crime. The trial judge sustained objections but the prosecutor persisted. During summation, the prosecutor repeatedly stated the facts were “uncontroverted,” which the court cautioned against. The trial court ultimately vacated the guilty verdict due to the prosecutor’s misconduct during cross-examination and summation.

    Procedural History

    1. First Trial: Adames was convicted, but the trial court vacated the verdict due to prosecutorial misconduct.
    2. Motion to Dismiss: Adames moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds; the motion was denied.
    3. Second Trial: Adames was retried and convicted.
    4. Appellate Division: The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, rejecting the double jeopardy claim.
    5. Court of Appeals: The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial after a trial court vacates a guilty verdict due to prosecutorial misconduct, when the misconduct did not intentionally provoke a mistrial.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecutorial misconduct was not so egregious as to warrant a double jeopardy bar, especially since the defendant received a verdict from his initial jury. The vacatur of the verdict was more akin to a reversal on appeal for trial error, for which retrial is the appropriate remedy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant’s right to have their trial completed by a particular tribunal. Since Adames received a jury verdict in his first trial, this right was satisfied, even though the verdict was later vacated. The court distinguished this situation from cases where a mistrial is granted due to prosecutorial misconduct designed to provoke a mistrial, referencing Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982). The court stated that the vacatur was “more analogous to a reversal on appeal for relatively ordinary trial error. In such instances, the double jeopardy bar to retrial should not attach and the correct and proportionate remedy should allow for retrial.” The court emphasized that the misconduct in this case, while improper, did not rise to the level of egregious conduct that would bar retrial. They stated, “Some prosecutorial error may be so egregious or provocative as to warrant the interposition of the double jeopardy bar, even when no mistrial is granted, but that is not this case.”

  • People v. Mayo, 48 N.Y.2d 245 (1979): Double Jeopardy and Retrial After Insufficient Evidence

    People v. Mayo, 48 N.Y.2d 245 (1979)

    When a trial court dismisses a charge due to insufficient evidence, it is equivalent to an acquittal, and retrying the defendant on that charge, even if the jury only considers lesser included offenses, violates the double jeopardy clause.

    Summary

    Mayo was initially tried for first-degree robbery. The trial court found insufficient evidence for the first-degree charge but allowed the jury to consider lesser charges of second and third-degree robbery, resulting in a mistrial. The prosecution retried Mayo on the original indictment, including the first-degree charge, but the judge instructed the jury to only consider the lesser charges. Mayo was convicted of second-degree robbery. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that retrying Mayo on the original indictment violated double jeopardy, even though he was only convicted of a lesser charge, because the initial dismissal for insufficient evidence acted as an acquittal on the first-degree charge. The court rejected a “harmless error” analysis, emphasizing the anxiety and stigma of a second trial.

    Facts

    1. Mayo was indicted on a single count of first-degree robbery.
    2. At the first trial, the court found insufficient evidence to support the first-degree robbery charge (specifically, the use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon).
    3. The judge instructed the jury to consider only the lesser included offenses of second and third-degree robbery.
    4. The jury was unable to reach a verdict, and a mistrial was declared.
    5. The prosecution retried Mayo on the original first-degree robbery indictment.
    6. At the second trial, the judge instructed the jury not to consider the first-degree robbery charge, but only the lesser included offenses.
    7. Mayo was convicted of second-degree robbery.

    Procedural History

    1. The trial court dismissed the first-degree robbery charge for insufficient evidence but declared a mistrial on the lesser charges.
    2. The trial court denied Mayo’s motion to dismiss the indictment before the second trial, allowing the retrial on the original indictment.
    3. The Appellate Division upheld the conviction, applying a harmless error analysis, finding that the jury did not consider the first-degree robbery charge.
    4. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and dismissed the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether retrying a defendant on an indictment that includes a charge previously dismissed for insufficient evidence violates the double jeopardy clause, even if the jury is instructed to only consider lesser included offenses.
    2. Whether a violation of the double jeopardy clause can be considered harmless error when the defendant is convicted of a lesser included offense in the second trial.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the initial dismissal of the first-degree robbery charge for insufficient evidence was equivalent to an acquittal, and retrying Mayo on the original indictment subjected him to double jeopardy.
    2. No, because the double jeopardy clause protects against the risk and anxiety of a second trial, regardless of the ultimate verdict; the error is too fundamental for harmless error analysis.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court’s initial decision to withdraw the first-degree robbery count from the jury’s consideration due to insufficient evidence was functionally equivalent to an acquittal on that charge. Quoting Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331 (1970), the court emphasized that “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause…is cast in terms of the risk or hazard of trial and conviction, not of the ultimate legal consequences of the verdict.” Bringing Mayo to trial a second time on the original indictment, which included the charge he had effectively been acquitted of, violated his constitutional right not to be twice placed in jeopardy.
    The court rejected the harmless error analysis, explaining that certain constitutional errors are so fundamental that they invalidate the entire trial process. A violation of the double jeopardy clause falls into this category because it implicates the very power of the court to conduct the trial. The court found it difficult to ascertain if the first-degree charge affected the jury’s view of the evidence or the defense’s trial strategy. The court stated, “When a defendant is brought to trial in violation of his rights under the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, the very power of the court to try him is implicated”. Because Mayo objected to being retried for first-degree robbery, the criminal proceeding was a nullity, requiring reversal of the second-degree robbery conviction and dismissal of the original indictment.

  • People v. Graham, 27 N.Y.2d 678 (1970): Double Jeopardy Limits Retrial Severity

    People v. Graham, 27 N.Y.2d 678 (1970)

    When a defendant is convicted of a lesser offense at a first trial, double jeopardy prevents a subsequent retrial from resulting in a conviction for a greater offense on the same count.

    Summary

    Graham was indicted on two counts of first-degree murder: felony murder and common-law murder. His first trial resulted in a conviction for felony murder and second-degree murder on the common-law count. Upon retrial, he was convicted of felony murder and first-degree murder on the common-law count. The New York Court of Appeals held that because Graham was initially convicted of second-degree murder on the common-law count, double jeopardy principles barred a subsequent conviction for first-degree murder on the same count. The court modified the judgment, reducing the degree of the crime to second-degree murder.

    Facts

    The defendant, Graham, was indicted on two counts of first-degree murder. The first count was felony murder, and the second count was common-law murder. At his initial trial, Graham was convicted of felony murder and second-degree murder under the common-law murder count. A retrial was ordered, and at the second trial, Graham was convicted of both felony murder and first-degree murder under the common-law count.

    Procedural History

    The case began in the County Court where Graham was initially tried and convicted. After the first trial resulted in a conviction for felony murder and second-degree murder on the common-law count, a retrial was granted. At the retrial, the defendant was convicted of felony murder and first-degree murder under the common-law count. The case then went to the Appellate Division, and subsequently, was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s judgment, reducing the degree of crime for which the defendant was convicted on the common-law count from murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree and remanded the defendant to the County Court for resentencing.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, after being convicted of second-degree murder on a common-law murder count in an initial trial, the defendant could be retried and convicted of first-degree murder on the same common-law murder count without violating double jeopardy principles.

    Holding

    No, because the initial conviction of second-degree murder on the common-law count limited the scope of permissible conviction on retrial to no more than second-degree murder on that count.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the principle of double jeopardy, citing People v. Ressler, 17 N.Y.2d 174. The court reasoned that because Graham was initially convicted of murder in the second degree under the common-law count, he could not be tried for a greater offense (murder in the first degree) on the same count in a subsequent retrial. The court stated: “Having been convicted of murder, second degree, instead of murder, first degree, under the common-law count at the first trial, he could be tried for no more than murder, second degree, at the second trial.” This limitation stems from the constitutional protection against being placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. The court found no merit in the other arguments raised by the defendant. The decision emphasizes the finality and protection afforded by an initial conviction for a lesser included offense, preventing the prosecution from seeking a higher degree of culpability upon retrial.

  • People v. Jackson, 20 N.Y.2d 440 (1967): Double Jeopardy and Felony Murder Retrial

    20 N.Y.2d 440 (1967)

    When a jury is instructed that it can only return one verdict in a case involving both premeditated and felony murder, its silence on the felony murder theory does not constitute an acquittal, and retrial on that theory after a successful appeal does not violate double jeopardy.

    Summary

    Nathan Jackson was retried and convicted of felony murder after his initial conviction for common-law murder was overturned by the Supreme Court due to a coerced confession. On appeal, Jackson argued that the retrial for felony murder violated double jeopardy, and the trial court erred in its instructions regarding the termination of the underlying felony, along with issues relating to the sentencing hearing and the use of a special jury. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the original jury’s silence on the felony murder count, coupled with instructions to return only one verdict, did not constitute an acquittal. Thus, retrial on the felony murder charge was permissible.

    Facts

    Jackson robbed a hotel clerk at gunpoint, taking $56.50. He then escorted the clerk and several guests to a third-floor room, warning them not to follow him. As Jackson exited the hotel, Patrolman Ramos confronted him. A scuffle ensued, and Jackson shot and killed Ramos.

    Procedural History

    Jackson was initially convicted of first-degree murder. This conviction was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial due to a coerced confession (Jackson v. Denno). On retrial, Jackson was convicted of felony murder. He appealed, arguing double jeopardy and other errors. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the second conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Jackson’s retrial and conviction for felony murder violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy.

    2. Whether the trial judge committed reversible error in rulings and instructions to the jury concerning when the underlying felony had terminated.

    3. Whether the trial judge committed substantial error in the “second stage” penalty hearing by denying defendant the protection against involuntary confessions guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

    4. Whether Jackson’s trial before a special jury violated his rights under the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Holding

    1. No, because the jury in the first trial was instructed to render only one verdict, their silence on felony murder did not constitute an acquittal.

    2. No, because although the instruction was incomplete, the evidence of guilt was so convincing that any error was harmless.

    3. No, because the defendant did not properly object and show that the confession used during sentencing was coerced.

    4. No, because the use of special juries had been previously upheld as constitutional.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that double jeopardy only applies when a defendant is retried for the same offense after an acquittal or conviction. Here, the jury in the first trial was instructed to return only one verdict, making it impossible to determine whether they had considered and rejected the felony murder charge. The court distinguished this case from those involving retrials on higher degrees of a crime after a successful appeal from a conviction on a lesser degree, where a “grisly choice” is imposed on the defendant’s right to appeal.

    Regarding the jury instruction on the termination of a felony, the court acknowledged that the trial judge’s response was uninformative. However, they concluded that the error was harmless because the evidence strongly suggested that the robbery and the shooting were closely connected in time and place, making it highly unlikely that the jury would have found the felony had terminated even with proper instruction.

    As to the introduction of confessions during the sentencing phase, the court held that the defendant was required to object to the confession’s use by demonstrating it was involuntary. Since he had only objected based on the lack of a Huntley hearing, he did not properly preserve the issue for appeal. Finally, the court dismissed the challenge to the special jury based on established precedent upholding their constitutionality, citing Fay v. New York.