Matter of Marro v. Bartlett, 46 N.Y.2d 674 (1979)

The Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference has broad discretion in deciding whether to certify retired judges for additional service, and this discretion is not generally subject to judicial review unless there’s a substantial claim of a constitutional or statutory violation unrelated to the certification process itself.

Summary

This case addresses the extent to which courts can review the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference’s decisions regarding the certification of retired Supreme Court Justices for additional judicial service. Marro, a former Supreme Court Justice, applied for certification after reaching mandatory retirement age. The Board denied his application without a hearing or explanation. Marro then sued, arguing he was entitled to certification if he was mentally and physically capable. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Board has nearly unfettered discretion in these matters, and its decisions are not reviewable absent a showing of a violation of constitutional or statutory law unrelated to the certification process. This discretion is essential for the board to effectively assess the needs of the court and the suitability of individual candidates.

Facts

Marro served as a Judge of the Civil Court of the City of New York and then as a Supreme Court Justice in the First Judicial Department, elected in November 1973.
He reached the mandatory retirement age of 70 in March 1977 and retired at the end of that year.
He applied for certification for a further two-year term as a retired Justice, as permitted by the New York Constitution and Judiciary Law.
The Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference denied his application without a hearing or providing any reasons.
Marro commenced an Article 78 proceeding seeking to compel the Board to certify him.

Procedural History

The Supreme Court initially annulled the Board’s denial and directed certification unless physical or mental disability was alleged, in which case a hearing was required.
The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision and dismissed Marro’s petition.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, upholding the Board’s broad discretion.

Issue(s)

Whether the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference has discretion to deny certification to a retired judge who meets the minimum qualifications (mental and physical capacity and necessity of services to expedite court business).
Whether a retired judge is entitled to a hearing and a statement of reasons when the Administrative Board denies their application for certification.

Holding

No, because the Constitution and Judiciary Law grant the Board broad discretion in determining which retired judges to certify, and this discretion is not subject to judicial review absent a claim of a violation of law unrelated to the certification process.
No, because the certification process is an initiatory action creating a new judicial designation, and the retired judge has no property right or entitlement to continued service that would trigger due process protections.

Court’s Reasoning

The court emphasized that the Constitution states a former justice “may” perform duties if certified, interpreting “may” as enabling but not entitling. The court noted that the constitutional provision recognizes a break in service and that the certification initiates a new designation.
The court highlighted that the standard for certification considers “the services of such judge or justice,” implying an individualized evaluation beyond simply determining a need for judicial services.
The court found that the statute implementing the constitutional provision gives the Administrative Board broad authority, specifying no particular procedures.
The court reasoned that requiring specific determination standards or articulation of reasons would be artificial because the certification process relies on non-objective evaluations.
The court stated that the board must be vested with broad authority for the exercise of responsible judgment, relying on the integrity and collective wisdom of the board members.
The court noted that designation as a Supreme Court Justice is a high-level position, and weighing personal considerations is inherent in determining whether a former judge’s services are necessary.
The court rejected the argument that denial of certification attaches a stigma, absent public disclosure of reasons, and found no property right was involved.
The court quoted from the Constitution: “Each such former * * * justice * * * may thereafter perform the duties of a justice of the supreme court * * * provided, however, that it shall be certified”.