New York Law Review

Tag: Resubmission

  • People v. Cade, 74 N.Y.2d 410 (1989): Limits on Grand Jury Re-Presentation After Withdrawal

    74 N.Y.2d 410 (1989)

    When the People withdraw a case from a grand jury before the grand jury has had an opportunity to fully consider the evidence and the charges, judicial approval is not required to resubmit the charges to a subsequent grand jury.

    Summary

    Cade was convicted of arson. Prior to trial, he argued that the indictment should be dismissed because the charges had been improperly submitted to the second grand jury without court approval, violating CPL 190.75 and People v. Wilkins. The first grand jury heard testimony from a firefighter and a fire inspector, but neither witness linked Cade to the crime. The prosecution withdrew the case because a key witness was unavailable and the grand jury refused to extend its term. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the first grand jury did not fully consider the evidence or charges against the defendant, the withdrawal was not equivalent to a dismissal, and judicial approval wasn’t needed to resubmit to a second grand jury.

    Facts

    Cade was convicted of first-degree arson for allegedly hiring four men to set fire to an apartment building he owned. The building was subject to rent control, and Cade sought to convert it into condominiums.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Cade’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecutor’s withdrawal of a case from a grand jury, after presenting minimal evidence that does not link the defendant to the crime, constitutes a dismissal requiring judicial approval before resubmitting the case to another grand jury under CPL 190.75.

    Holding

    No, because the key factor in determining whether an unauthorized withdrawal of the case must be treated as a dismissal is the extent to which the grand jury considered the evidence and the charge. Here, the grand jury did not have the opportunity to fully evaluate the evidence or charges against an identified defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that CPL 190.75 aims to prevent repeated resubmissions of charges to successive grand juries after a dismissal. The court distinguished People v. Wilkins, where the prosecution’s presentation to the first grand jury was complete, and all witnesses had testified. In that case, withdrawal was deemed equivalent to a dismissal. Here, the court reasoned that because the first grand jury heard limited evidence that did not link Cade to the crime, and the case was withdrawn due to witness unavailability, the grand jury did not have an adequate opportunity to consider the evidence and charges. The court stated, “[T]he key factor in determining whether an unauthorized withdrawal of the case must be treated as a dismissal is the extent to which the Grand Jury considered the evidence and the charge.” The court concluded that allowing resubmission without judicial approval in this context did not undermine the integrity of the grand jury proceedings or the purpose of CPL 190.75. The court also found that a remark by the judge’s law clerk did not render Cade’s waiver of his right to a jury trial involuntary, because there was no promise of favorable treatment.

  • People v. Adessa, 89 N.Y.2d 910 (1996): Limits on Resubmitting Charges to Grand Juries After Dismissal

    People v. Adessa, 89 N.Y.2d 910 (1996)

    When a court dismisses an indictment due to insufficient evidence, the prosecution is not limited in the number of times it can resubmit the charges to a grand jury, unlike when a grand jury itself dismisses the charges.

    Summary

    The defendant was initially indicted on robbery charges, but the court dismissed the indictment due to insufficient evidence. After a second grand jury declined to indict, the prosecution obtained permission to present the case to a third grand jury, which then indicted the defendant. The defendant argued that this third presentation violated CPL 190.75(3), which limits resubmissions after a grand jury dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals held that CPL 190.75(3) applies only to grand jury dismissals, not to court-ordered dismissals based on insufficient evidence under CPL 210.20. Therefore, the prosecution was permitted to resubmit the charges.

    Facts

    The defendant was initially charged with two counts of robbery in the second degree.

    The Supreme Court dismissed the initial indictment because the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was legally insufficient.

    The court granted leave to resubmit the charges to another Grand Jury.

    A second Grand Jury considered the charges, including two additional charges for attempted robbery, but voted “no true bill” (declined to indict).

    The People moved for leave to resubmit to a third Grand Jury, stating that the defendant’s friend, who had already pleaded guilty in connection with the crimes, would be willing to testify.

    The court granted leave, and the third Grand Jury indicted the defendant on all charges.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially dismissed the indictment due to insufficient evidence.

    After the third grand jury indicted the defendant, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the presentation to a third grand jury violated CPL 190.75(3).

    The Supreme Court rejected this argument.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 190.75(3), which limits resubmissions to a grand jury after a grand jury dismissal, applies when a court dismisses an indictment due to insufficient evidence under CPL 210.20.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 190.75(3) applies only to Grand Jury dismissals, not court-ordered dismissals based on insufficiency of evidence under CPL 210.20.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that at common law, a prosecutor could repeatedly resubmit charges to Grand Juries until an indictment was obtained. The Legislature enacted provisions in the Criminal Procedure Law to prevent prosecutorial abuse, including CPL 190.75, which governs Grand Jury dismissals, limiting the number of times the People can resubmit after a Grand Jury has dismissed charges. Specifically, CPL 190.75(3) states that if a Grand Jury dismisses a charge, the People can resubmit only after obtaining permission from the court, and if the charge “is again dismissed, it may not again be submitted to a grand jury.”

    By contrast, CPL 210.20, governing judicial dismissals, provides without qualification that where a court dismisses an indictment based on insufficiency of the evidence, it “may, upon application of the people, in its discretion authorize the people to submit the charge or charges to the same or another grand jury” (CPL 210.20[4]).

    The court emphasized that “discretionary judicial dismissals do not present the same potential for prosecutorial abuse, and are subject to their own check of appellate review,” thus the provision for judicial dismissals does not limit the number of resubmissions.

    The court concluded that CPL 190.75(3) and 210.20 are separate statutory provisions addressing separate legislative concerns. The dismissal of the first indictment was court-ordered pursuant to CPL 210.20, not a Grand Jury dismissal that implicates the limitations imposed on resubmission pursuant to CPL 190.75(3). Thus, the People’s single resubmission after the Grand Jury dismissed the charges was consistent with the law.

    The court also addressed the defendant’s reliance on language in People v. Cade, clarifying that CPL 190.75(3) applies solely to Grand Jury dismissals, not court-ordered dismissals.

  • People v. Wilkins, 68 N.Y.2d 269 (1986): Grand Jury Withdrawal Equals Dismissal Requiring Court Approval

    People v. Wilkins, 68 N.Y.2d 269 (1986)

    When a prosecutor withdraws a case from a grand jury after the presentation of evidence, such withdrawal is considered the equivalent of a dismissal, requiring court approval before resubmitting the case to a second grand jury.

    Summary

    Wilkins was charged with second-degree murder. The prosecution presented the case to a grand jury but withdrew it before a vote on indictment. A second grand jury indicted Wilkins, and his trial ended in a mistrial. Wilkins learned of the withdrawal/resubmission and moved for a hearing, arguing impropriety. The court found the prosecutor acted in good faith but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the unauthorized withdrawal was the equivalent of a dismissal. Resubmission without court approval violated the statutory scheme protecting the grand jury’s integrity. The indictment was dismissed, with leave to the District Attorney to apply for resubmission.

    Facts

    Wilkins was charged with second-degree murder for fatally shooting a victim. The prosecution initially presented the case to a grand jury. Before the grand jury could vote on whether to issue an indictment, the prosecutor withdrew the case. The case was then presented to a second grand jury, which indicted Wilkins for second-degree murder. A trial on this charge resulted in a mistrial because the jury couldn’t reach a verdict. It was during this trial that the defense learned of the withdrawal and resubmission.

    Procedural History

    Following the mistrial, Wilkins moved for an evidentiary hearing regarding the circumstances of the resubmission to the second grand jury. The trial court granted the motion and concluded that the prosecutor acted in good faith. Wilkins was then retried and convicted of first-degree manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Wilkins appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the withdrawal and resubmission of charges at the grand jury level was improper.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a prosecutor may withdraw a case from a grand jury after presenting evidence and resubmit it to a second grand jury without the consent of the first grand jury or the court that impaneled it.

    Holding

    No, because such withdrawal is the equivalent of a dismissal by the first grand jury, and the prosecution may only resubmit the charges with the consent of the court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized that at common law, a prosecutor could resubmit charges to successive grand juries without limitation until an indictment was voted. However, the Legislature enacted statutes to insulate the grand jury process from prosecutorial excesses. CPL 190.75(3) dictates that when a charge has been dismissed, it may not be resubmitted to a grand jury unless the court authorizes or directs the resubmission. The court emphasized that the statutory scheme doesn’t contemplate terminating deliberations without grand jury action. The court noted that once a grand jury hears evidence, the key factor is the extent to which it considered the evidence. In this case, the first presentation was essentially complete. The court reasoned that allowing the prosecutor to unilaterally withdraw the case so late in the process would undermine CPL 190.75(3). “An explicit recognition of such power by this court would furnish the prosecutor the means of defeating CPL 190.75 (3) in almost every case by withdrawing all but ‘open and shut’ cases and resubmitting them after further preparation or a more compliant Grand Jury is impaneled.” The court also noted that the prosecutor could have sought an extension of the grand jury’s term. The resubmission without court leave violated Article 190, impairing the integrity of the process. The court rejected the harmless error argument based on the subsequent conviction, emphasizing that New York law allows for dismissal based on the mere possibility of prejudice.

  • Matter of Pastore v. Boone, 58 N.Y.2d 831 (1983): When Grand Jury Resubmission Rules Do Not Apply

    Matter of Pastore v. Boone, 58 N.Y.2d 831 (1983)

    A prosecutor does not need court authorization to present a perjury charge to a grand jury when the charge is based on testimony given to that grand jury, even if a prior grand jury considered a similar perjury charge based on different testimony arising from the same underlying events.

    Summary

    Pastore testified before a grand jury in 1980 regarding arson, leading to consideration of criminal contempt and perjury charges against him. The grand jury directed indictment for contempt, but not perjury. The District Attorney later dropped the contempt charge. In 1981, the arson charge was resubmitted to a new grand jury, and Pastore testified similarly. This time, he was indicted for perjury. Pastore argued that the perjury charge required court authorization for resubmission under CPL 190.75(3). The Court of Appeals held that authorization was not required because the perjury charge before the 1981 grand jury was a distinct offense based on new testimony, not a resubmission of the original charge considered by the 1980 grand jury.

    Facts

    1. Pastore testified before a 1980 grand jury investigating arson.
    2. The grand jury considered criminal contempt and perjury charges against Pastore.
    3. The grand jury directed the District Attorney to indict Pastore for criminal contempt but not for perjury.
    4. The District Attorney later dropped the contempt charge.
    5. In 1981, the arson charge was resubmitted to a new grand jury.
    6. Pastore testified again, substantially paralleling his 1980 testimony.
    7. The 1981 grand jury indicted Pastore for perjury based on his 1981 testimony.

    Procedural History

    1. Pastore moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing failure to obtain authorization to “resubmit” the perjury charge under CPL 190.75(3).
    2. The motion was denied.
    3. Pastore initiated an Article 78 proceeding in the nature of prohibition.
    4. The Appellate Division dismissed the proceeding.
    5. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the indictment for perjury based on testimony before the 1981 Grand Jury constituted a “resubmission” of a charge previously dismissed by the 1980 Grand Jury, thus requiring court authorization under CPL 190.75(3).

    Holding

    No, because the perjury charge before the 1981 Grand Jury was based on different testimony and constituted a separate and distinct offense from the charge considered by the 1980 Grand Jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that CPL 190.75(3) did not apply in this case. The statute requires authorization for resubmission of a charge previously dismissed by a grand jury. Even assuming the 1980 grand jury’s failure to indict for perjury was equivalent to a dismissal, the court reasoned that the charge presented to the 1981 grand jury was not the same charge. The perjury charge before the 1981 grand jury was based on Pastore’s testimony before that specific grand jury, constituting a new and distinct offense. The court emphasized that the “giving of false testimony before the 1981 Grand Jury nearly a year later” was a separate criminal transaction. The court stated, “That the content of defendant’s testimony on the two occasions was parallel or even identical does not in any way diminish the fact that there were two separate and discrete criminal transactions — the alleged swearing falsely before the 1980 Grand Jury and the alleged swearing falsely before the 1981 Grand Jury.” The indictment was based on the new offense and did not constitute a resubmission of the original charge. Therefore, no authorization was needed.