New York Law Review

Tag: resisting arrest

  • In re Gabriela A., 22 N.Y.3d 157 (2013): Limits on Converting PINS Status to Juvenile Delinquency

    In re Gabriela A., 22 N.Y.3d 157 (2013)

    A Person In Need of Supervision (PINS) cannot be subject to the same penalties as a juvenile delinquent, and conduct stemming from PINS status cannot be used to justify a juvenile delinquency adjudication and secure detention.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a PINS (Person In Need of Supervision) can be adjudicated a juvenile delinquent based on actions taken while resisting being returned to a non-secure detention facility. The Court of Appeals held that resisting such restraint, an action stemming directly from her PINS status, could not be the basis for a juvenile delinquency adjudication. Allowing such a conversion would undermine the statutory limitations on the treatment of PINS, specifically the prohibition against placing them in secure detention. The court emphasized the importance of distinguishing between actions warranting PINS status and those constituting true juvenile delinquency.

    Facts

    Gabriela A., a 15-year-old, was adjudicated a PINS and placed on probation. After several PINS violations, a juvenile delinquency petition was filed against her based on a physical abuse complaint. She absconded from a non-secure detention facility. Probation officers visited her home to execute a PINS warrant. Gabriela A. resisted the officers, leading to a juvenile delinquency petition charging her with acts that would constitute resisting arrest and obstructing governmental administration if committed by an adult. The presentment agency submitted a superseding amended petition alleging resisting arrest, obstructing governmental administration, attempted assault, and menacing.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court found Gabriela A. committed acts constituting resisting arrest and obstructing governmental administration, dismissing the attempted assault and menacing charges, and remanded her to secure detention. The Appellate Division reversed, vacated the fact-finding order, and dismissed the petition, holding that Gabriela A.’s conduct was consistent with PINS behavior, not juvenile delinquency. The presentment agency appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether resisting restraint by probation officers attempting to return a PINS to a non-secure detention facility constitutes resisting arrest or obstructing governmental administration, thereby justifying a juvenile delinquency adjudication and secure detention.

    Holding

    No, because the restraint of a PINS pursuant to Family Court Act § 718 is not the same as a criminal arrest, and the legislature did not intend for behavior characteristic of a PINS to be the basis for secure detention.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a PINS proceeding is civil in nature, not criminal. Resisting restraint under Family Court Act § 718 is not equivalent to resisting an authorized arrest under Penal Law § 205.30. “[A] PINS who resists being restrained or transported back to a placement facility is not resisting arrest within the meaning of Penal Law § 205.30.” While Gabriela A. admitted to obstructing the officers, the court emphasized that a PINS’s disobedience is inherent in their PINS status, as defined by Family Court Act § 712(a). Allowing such behavior to justify secure detention would contradict the legislative intent of Family Court Act § 720(1) and (2), which prohibit placing a PINS in secure detention. The court distinguished this case from situations where the Family Court’s contempt powers are improperly used to “bootstrap” PINS behavior into juvenile delinquency. The court deferred to the Appellate Division’s factual finding that Gabriela A.’s resistance fell within the bounds of acting “beyond the lawful control of . . . lawful authority” rather than constituting a criminal obstruction of governmental administration. The court found that the Appellate Division’s factual findings more nearly comported with the weight of the evidence.

  • People v. Baker, 20 N.Y.3d 269 (2012): Sufficiency of Information for Disorderly Conduct

    People v. Baker, 20 N.Y.3d 269 (2012)

    An information charging disorderly conduct must contain factual allegations establishing a prima facie case that the defendant intended to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly created a risk thereof.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s order and dismissed the information against the defendant, holding that the factual allegations in the information were insufficient to establish a prima facie case of disorderly conduct. The information stated that the defendant, along with others, stood on a public sidewalk at 2:01 a.m., obstructing pedestrian traffic after being directed to move by a police officer. The court found that the information lacked allegations demonstrating that the defendant acted with the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly created such a risk.

    Facts

    On June 12, 2004, at approximately 2:01 a.m., the defendant was observed by a police officer standing with a group of people on a public sidewalk at 42nd Street and Seventh Avenue in Manhattan. The group was not moving, causing pedestrians to walk around them. The officer directed the defendant to move, but the defendant refused and then ran away as the officer attempted to stop him.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged by information with disorderly conduct under Penal Law § 240.20(5) and resisting arrest under Penal Law § 205.30. The defendant moved to dismiss the information for facial insufficiency, which the court denied. The defendant pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct, and the resisting arrest charge was dismissed. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the factual allegations in the information were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disorderly conduct under Penal Law § 240.20(5).
    2. Whether the charge of resisting arrest can stand when the underlying charge of disorderly conduct is deemed facially insufficient.

    Holding

    1. No, because the information failed to allege facts demonstrating that the defendant acted with the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly created such a risk.
    2. No, because the resisting arrest charge requires a lawful, “authorized” arrest, and the information was insufficient to establish that the arrest for disorderly conduct was authorized.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the information was jurisdictionally defective because it failed to set forth a prima facie case of disorderly conduct. The court emphasized that an information must contain non-hearsay allegations that, if proven true, establish every element of the offense charged. The court reasoned that merely standing on a sidewalk at 2:01 a.m., even if it inconveniences pedestrians, is not enough to establish the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly create a risk thereof. The court quoted People v. Carcel, 3 N.Y.2d 327, 331 (1957) stating that “something more than a mere inconvenience of pedestrians is required to support the charge.” The court further cited People v. Nixon, 248 N.Y. 182, 185 (1928), stating that while congregating on the street may display “atrociously bad manners” by “discommoding some other persons,” such conduct alone does not necessarily give rise to disorderly conduct. Regarding the resisting arrest charge, the court noted that Penal Law § 205.30 requires that the arrest be “an authorized arrest.” Because the information lacked sufficient facts to support the underlying disorderly conduct charge, it could not be deemed sufficient to allege that the arrest was “authorized.”

  • People v. Bowman, 6 N.Y.3d 144 (2005): Filing New Informations with Additional Facts and Charges

    People v. Bowman, 6 N.Y.3d 144 (2005)

    The Criminal Procedure Law authorizes the prosecution to file a new information that alleges additional facts or charges offenses not included in a previously filed information, provided they stem from the same criminal transaction.

    Summary

    This case addresses the permissible scope of amending or supplementing a criminal information. The Court of Appeals held that prosecutors are not limited to using a prosecutor’s information when adding new charges or facts. They can file a new, separate information. The court reasoned that CPL 100.50(1) permits filing “another information” without restricting the type of crimes included. This implies new facts can be alleged to support additional offenses. The decision aligns with the legislative intent to allow prosecutors flexibility in pursuing charges based on evolving evidence and mirrors the freedom to obtain new grand jury indictments. The court also clarified that hearsay statements can be used to establish reasonable cause for arrest, even if inadmissible to prove guilt.

    Facts

    Police responded to a domestic violence report. The alleged victim stated Bowman assaulted her and requested his removal from the home. Bowman refused to leave, allegedly threatened an officer, struck him with a bag, and resisted arrest. The victim later declined to press assault charges.

    Procedural History

    Bowman was initially charged with assault and resisting arrest. After the victim refused to cooperate on the assault charge, the prosecution filed a superseding information elaborating on the resisting arrest charge and a successive information charging second-degree harassment. The original assault and resisting arrest informations were dismissed. The District Court dismissed the new informations, arguing CPL 100.50 prohibited the harassment charge and that both new informations were defective due to new, unsupported factual allegations. The Appellate Term modified, reinstating the informations. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Term’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether CPL 100.50 prohibits the People from charging a new crime (harassment) in a successive information when that crime was not charged in the original information.
    2. Whether a superseding information charging resisting arrest is defective if it relies on hearsay statements to establish reasonable cause for the arrest.

    Holding

    1. No, because CPL 100.50(1) authorizes the People to file “another information” prior to the entry of a plea or commencement of a trial, without restrictions on the type of crimes included. This implies new facts can be alleged to support additional offenses.
    2. No, because the information was not used to prove the truth of the victim’s assertion but to demonstrate that there was reasonable cause to arrest the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court interpreted CPL 100.50(1) to permit filing a new information with new charges and facts. The statute does not restrict the crimes that may be included. The court reasoned that the legislative intent behind CPL 100.50(1) was to establish authority for superseding informations, mirroring the rules for superseding indictments. Quoting People v. Franco, 86 NY2d 493, 500 (1995), the court noted that a prosecutor has freedom to obtain a new grand jury indictment with charges not considered by the first grand jury, based on additional proof. The court stated that “the Legislature intended that prosecutors should also be able to issue an information that charges new, joinable crimes premised on factual allegations that were not included in the original information.” Regarding the hearsay issue, the court cited People v. Huertas, 75 NY2d 487, 492 (1990) and People v. Felder, 37 NY2d 779, 780-781 (1975) to support the principle that hearsay can be used to establish reasonable cause.

  • People v. Jensen, 86 N.Y.2d 248 (1995): Sufficiency of Evidence for Grand Jury Indictment

    86 N.Y.2d 248 (1995)

    A grand jury indictment requires legally sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for each element of the charged offense, but the reviewing court is limited to ascertaining the “legal sufficiency” of the evidence, without weighing the proof or examining its adequacy.

    Summary

    Michael Jensen was indicted on charges including petit larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, resisting arrest, and second-degree assault after an incident involving the theft of a dorm chair. He was stopped by campus police while carrying a lounge chair, admitted to taking it as a prank, and then resisted arrest, injuring an officer. The County Court dismissed the indictment, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division, holding the Grand Jury evidence was sufficient to indict on all counts. The court reasoned that larcenous intent could be inferred, the arrest was based on probable cause, and the assault occurred while preventing a lawful duty.

    Facts

    At 3:13 A.M. on November 6, 1992, Cornell University Public Safety Officers observed Michael Jensen carrying a dormitory lounge chair on his head. Jensen admitted to taking the chair from a residence hall as a prank. He refused to identify himself or confirm if he was a student. After repeated requests for identification, Jensen eventually reached for his pocket, but an officer attempted to retrieve the ID instead. Jensen slapped the officer’s hand away and fled. During the pursuit, Officer Zoner was injured when Jensen dragged her down a gorge slope as he attempted to escape.

    Procedural History

    Jensen was indicted on charges of petit larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, resisting arrest, and second-degree assault. The County Court granted Jensen’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating all charges. A Justice of the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was legally sufficient to support the indictment on charges of petit larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, resisting arrest, and second-degree assault.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, was legally sufficient for the Grand Jury to infer larcenous intent, probable cause for arrest, and intent to prevent a lawful duty, causing physical injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the standard that a Grand Jury indictment requires legally sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, including all elements of the crime and reasonable cause to believe the accused committed the offense. The court stated, “[L]egally sufficient means prima facie, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court emphasized its review is limited to ascertaining legal sufficiency, without weighing the proof. The court found that the Grand Jury could rationally infer larcenous intent from Jensen’s actions of carrying the chair at 3:13 A.M., his admission that the chair did not belong to him, and his evasive behavior. The court reasoned that there was probable cause to arrest Jensen for larceny, thus justifying the charge of resisting arrest. Finally, there was legally sufficient evidence that Jensen intended to prevent Officer Zoner from performing a lawful duty, causing her physical injury, thus supporting the charge of second-degree assault. The dissent argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of larceny or the lawfulness of the arrest, and the officer’s injury stemmed from the officer’s own misconduct. The dissent noted, “[T]here must still be a showing that the underlying police conduct was lawful.”

  • People v. Voliton, 83 N.Y.2d 192 (1994): Resisting Arrest After Unlawful Police Seizure

    83 N.Y.2d 192 (1994)

    A defendant can be convicted of resisting arrest even if the initial attempt to detain them was unlawful, provided there was a subsequent, authorized basis for the arrest.

    Summary

    Voliton was convicted of assault and resisting arrest after an encounter with police. The Appellate Division overturned the felony assault convictions, finding the initial police seizure unlawful under People v. May. However, they upheld the convictions for reckless assault and resisting arrest. Voliton appealed, arguing a due process violation and that the resisting arrest conviction was invalid because the initial detention was unlawful. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the due process claim unpreserved and finding that the reckless assault provided a basis for a subsequent, authorized arrest, thus supporting the resisting arrest conviction, focusing on his actions after being apprehended on foot.

    Facts

    Two police officers observed Voliton in a car parked near a suspected drug location. They blocked his car and approached with weapons drawn, suspecting criminal activity. Voliton attempted to drive away, injuring the officers. Shots were fired, and Voliton was eventually apprehended after a chase and physical struggle where he punched and kicked the officers.

    Procedural History

    Voliton was convicted in the trial court of assault in the second degree (two counts), assault in the third degree, and resisting arrest. The Appellate Division overturned the second-degree assault convictions, citing an unlawful seizure, but affirmed the remaining convictions. Voliton appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether substantive due process bars convicting a defendant for actions in direct response to a police seizure later deemed illegal.
    2. Whether a resisting arrest conviction can stand when the initial attempt to detain the defendant was unlawful.

    Holding

    1. No, because the constitutional objection was raised for the first time on appeal and is therefore unpreserved.
    2. Yes, because the defendant’s commission of an assault, third degree, against one officer during the initial encounter furnished the predicate for his subsequent authorized arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court held the due process argument was unpreserved because it was raised for the first time on appeal, and it did not fall under an exception to the preservation rule. The Court distinguished this case from situations impacting the court’s fundamental jurisdiction. Regarding the resisting arrest charge, the Court reasoned that although the initial attempt to detain Voliton may have been unlawful, his subsequent reckless assault of an officer provided probable cause for a lawful arrest. Because the jury found that Voliton punched and kicked the officers while they were attempting to handcuff him after the foot chase, the resisting arrest conviction was valid. The Court also cited Penal Law § 35.27, noting that a person may not use physical force to resist an arrest, authorized or unauthorized, when it reasonably appears the person is a police officer. The court highlighted the lack of a requested jury instruction regarding self-defense against excessive force. Judge Smith dissented, arguing that the trial was fundamentally flawed because the jury wasn’t instructed on justification, and they should have been informed the initial police conduct was illegal when considering the assault charge. He also argued no basis existed for the resisting arrest conviction because the initial police conduct was unlawful: “It is inconsistent for this Court, as it was for the Appellate Division, to sustain a charge of resisting arrest in the face of the conclusion that the police officers violated the law.”

  • People v. Voliton, 66 N.Y.2d 116 (1985): Resisting Arrest Requires Authorized Arrest

    People v. Voliton, 66 N.Y.2d 116 (1985)

    To be guilty of resisting arrest under Penal Law § 205.30, the arrest being resisted must be an authorized arrest.

    Summary

    Voliton was charged with resisting arrest. The Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order and dismissed the information, holding that because the officer lacked probable cause to believe Voliton had committed, was committing, or was about to commit an offense, the arrest was not authorized. Consequently, Voliton could not be guilty of resisting arrest under Penal Law § 205.30. The court clarified that Penal Law § 35.27 concerns the defense of justification and does not amend § 205.30 to criminalize resisting an unauthorized arrest.

    Facts

    An officer attempted to detain Voliton. The People conceded the officer had no grounds to believe Voliton was committing, had committed, or was about to commit an offense. Voliton struck the officer’s arm in reaction to the attempted detention.

    Procedural History

    The County Court of St. Lawrence County issued an order which was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can be guilty of resisting arrest under Penal Law § 205.30 when the arrest was not authorized due to a lack of probable cause.

    Holding

    No, because Penal Law § 205.30 defines resisting arrest as preventing an officer from effecting an “authorized arrest,” and an arrest without probable cause is not authorized.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court based its reasoning on the plain language of Penal Law § 205.30, which requires the arrest to be “authorized” for a resisting arrest charge to stand. The People’s concession that the officer lacked probable cause was fatal to their case. The court emphasized that Penal Law § 35.27, concerning justification, does not alter the requirement of an authorized arrest under § 205.30. The court explicitly stated that “Penal Law § 35.27, as its title indicates, is concerned with the defense of justification and does not amend Penal Law § 205.30 to make resistance to an unauthorized arrest an offense.” The court also disapproved of any prior case law that suggested otherwise, stating, “To the extent that People v Simms (36 AD2d 23) and People v Lattanzio (35 AD2d 313) may be read to indicate otherwise, they are not to be followed.” This clarification reinforces the principle that the legality of the underlying arrest is a prerequisite for a resisting arrest conviction. The dissent, if any, is not mentioned in the memorandum opinion.

  • People v. Ailey, 47 N.Y.2d 932 (1979): Resisting Facially Valid Warrants and Speedy Trial Rights

    People v. Ailey, 47 N.Y.2d 932 (1979)

    A defendant cannot resist the execution of a warrant that is facially valid, and a motion for a speedy trial can be denied without a hearing if the defendant was not incarcerated and contributed to the delay, absent a showing of impairment to the defense.

    Summary

    Ailey was convicted of obstructing governmental administration for resisting a warrant’s execution. The County Court reversed, citing defects in the warrant. The Court of Appeals reversed the County Court, holding that because the warrant was facially valid, it could not be resisted. The Court emphasized that challenges to a warrant’s validity should be made in court, not through resistance. The Court also held that the City Court properly denied Ailey’s speedy trial motion without a hearing because Ailey was not incarcerated, contributed to the delay, and failed to demonstrate impairment to his defense.

    Facts

    Defendant Ailey was convicted in Jamestown City Court for obstructing governmental administration. This charge stemmed from his resistance to the execution of a warrant by a police officer. The warrant’s issuance followed a motion where the defendant was present in court.

    Procedural History

    The Jamestown City Court convicted Ailey. The Chautauqua County Court reversed, finding the warrant invalid and that Ailey, therefore, had the right to resist. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order and remitted the case to that court for review of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether defects in the papers supporting a warrant that is facially valid give the defendant the right to resist its execution?

    2. Whether the City Court Judge erred in denying defendant’s speedy trial motion without an evidentiary hearing?

    Holding

    1. No, because the proper venue for challenging a warrant’s validity is in court, not through resistance to its execution.

    2. No, because the defendant was not incarcerated, contributed to the delay, and failed to allege any impairment to his defense as a result of the delay.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that allowing resistance to facially valid warrants would undermine orderly government. It cited People v. Briggs, 19 NY2d 37, 42, stating: “No orderly government would be possible if the sufficiency of the proof before a Magistrate upon which a warrant, good on its face, is issued, were to be decided by armed resistance to the execution of the warrant. The place to test out a process as being good or bad is in a court.”

    The Court rejected the argument that Briggs was distinguishable because Penal Law § 35.27 only applies to arrests, pointing out that Penal Law § 195.05 and § 120.05(3) protect officers performing official functions, regardless of the specific action.

    Regarding the speedy trial motion, the Court acknowledged it could consider the issue under CPL 470.35(2)(b). However, the Court found the motion meritless because it was made under CPL 30.20, not 30.30, and the supporting affidavit showed that Ailey was not incarcerated and that his actions contributed to the 13-month delay. Furthermore, Ailey failed to allege any impairment of his defense due to the delay. The Court cited People v. Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445, indicating a hearing was unnecessary given these circumstances. Therefore, the Court held that the motion could be denied without a hearing.

  • People v. Williams, 41 N.Y.2d 762 (1977): Establishing Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt in Disorderly Conduct Cases

    People v. Williams, 41 N.Y.2d 762 (1977)

    To sustain a conviction for resisting arrest or disorderly conduct, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the legality of the underlying arrest and the defendant’s specific actions constituting resistance or disorderly behavior.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, finding the prosecution failed to establish her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution did not adequately prove the basis for her brother’s arrest, which she was accused of resisting, and the evidence of her resisting her own arrest was insufficient. The officer’s testimony regarding the disorderly conduct charge was too ambiguous to prove she failed to comply with a lawful order to disperse.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting the arrest of her brother and her own arrest. The arrest occurred outside a building. The specifics of the events leading to the arrest, particularly the reasons for her brother’s arrest, were not clearly established during the trial.

    Procedural History

    The case was initially heard at a lower court, which convicted the defendant. The defendant appealed. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the conviction and reversed the lower court’s decision, dismissing the information.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant resisted her own arrest.

    2. Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant resisted the lawful arrest of her brother, including establishing a legal basis for that arrest.

    3. Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of disorderly conduct for failing to comply with a lawful order to disperse.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was insufficient evidence that the defendant resisted her own arrest outside the building.

    2. No, because the prosecution failed to prove the basis for the underlying arrest of her brother, as required by Penal Law § 205.30.

    3. No, because the police officer’s testimony about what he said to the defendant was too ambiguous to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that she was guilty of disorderly conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all charges. Regarding the charge of resisting her brother’s arrest, the court emphasized the requirement under Penal Law § 205.30 that the prosecution prove the legality of the underlying arrest. The court noted the prosecution made no effort to establish the basis for her brother’s arrest, and the trial court even sustained the prosecutor’s objection when the defendant attempted to elicit this information. The court stated, “[S]peculation and conjecture are no substitute for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” As to the disorderly conduct charge, the court found the officer’s testimony too ambiguous to establish that the defendant failed to comply with a lawful order to disperse, as required by Penal Law § 240.20, subd 6. The court focused on the lack of concrete evidence and the ambiguity of the testimony, reinforcing the high standard of proof required for criminal convictions. The court implied that a lawful order must be clear and understandable to support a conviction for failing to obey it.

  • People v. Stevenson, 31 N.Y.2d 108 (1972): Self-Defense and Resisting Arrest

    People v. Stevenson, 31 N.Y.2d 108 (1972)

    A defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense when charged with resisting arrest if the defendant’s own testimony establishes the intent to resist arrest before any alleged excessive force by the police occurred.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of resisting arrest and harassment. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that self-defense could be a defense to the charges of second-degree assault and resisting arrest. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant’s own testimony established his intent to resist arrest prior to any alleged excessive force by the police. Therefore, a self-defense instruction was not warranted because the initial act of resisting was not justified. The court emphasized that while a citizen may use reasonable force to defend against excessive force by police, the defendant’s actions demonstrated resistance before any such force was applied.

    Facts

    Police Officer Davis observed the defendant’s illegally parked car creating a traffic jam. The car’s registration had expired. When Davis reached into the car to remove the keys, the defendant pushed him. The defendant questioned the officer’s actions, stating, “What the God damn hell are you doing in that car? You have no damn business going in my car.” Officer Davis informed the defendant he was under arrest for harassment. The defendant resisted, swinging his fists at the officer. The defendant testified that the officer pushed him first when he tried to hand food to his passengers and that he was afraid of being beaten by approaching officers, so he grabbed Officer Davis to use him as a shield.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with possession of a weapon as a felony, second-degree assault, resisting arrest, and inciting to riot. He was convicted of resisting arrest and harassment in a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that self-defense is a defense to the crimes of second-degree assault and resisting arrest when the defendant claims he used force to defend himself against excessive force by the arresting officer.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s own testimony established that he demonstrated the requisite intent to resist arrest before any alleged excessive force by the police occurred, negating the justification for a self-defense instruction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that a citizen may use reasonable force in self-defense against excessive force used by police during an arrest. However, the court found that the defendant’s testimony revealed that he had already resisted arrest before any alleged excessive force was used against him. The court quoted the defendant’s own words: “ [Officer Davis] said, ‘You are under arrest.’ I said, ‘No, for what?’ And all the time he was telling, no, I was under arrest and I was asking for what, you know. * * * And he just kept on saying, ‘No, you are under arrest,’ and was grabbing for me.”

    The court reasoned that resisting arrest does not require the use of force; any conduct demonstrating an intent to prevent the officer from effecting an authorized arrest is sufficient. The court cited prior cases such as People v. Simms, 36 A.D.2d 23 and People v. Lattanzio, 35 A.D.2d 313 to support this conclusion. The court emphasized, “It is enough that he engage in some conduct with the intent of preventing the officer from effecting an authorized arrest of himself or another person”. Because the defendant resisted before any alleged excessive force, the court held that the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury on self-defense.

    The court distinguished this case from situations involving an “unprovoked police assault or of the use of excessive physical force” at the outset of an arrest, which might justify a self-defense claim. Because no such situation was apparent from the defendant’s own testimony regarding his initial resistance, there was no basis for a self-defense charge.

  • People v. Horelick, 30 N.Y.2d 453 (1972): Self-Help is Not a Defense to Criminal Trespass

    People v. Horelick, 30 N.Y.2d 453 (1972)

    The right to enter property, even when arguably justified, does not permit the use of force or illegal methods to gain entry; self-help is not a defense to criminal trespass or resisting arrest.

    Summary

    Horelick, a teacher, was convicted of criminal trespass and resisting arrest after he and others forcibly entered a locked high school during a teachers’ strike. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that regardless of whether the school should have been open, Horelick’s use of force to enter was unlawful. The court emphasized that disputes should be resolved through legal channels, not through self-help and force. The decision highlights the importance of maintaining order and resolving conflicts through established procedures, even when motivated by a sincere belief in a cause.

    Facts

    During a city-wide teachers’ strike, a high school principal ordered the school to remain closed and locked. Horelick, a teacher, disagreed with the closure and planned to enter the building. He gained access through a basement window and was confronted by a member of the custodial staff. A struggle ensued as Horelick attempted to unlock the doors to allow others to enter. Police were called, and Horelick resisted arrest, including physically resisting the officer. A crowd of supporters gathered during the arrest.

    Procedural History

    Horelick was convicted of criminal trespass in the second degree and resisting arrest. He appealed the conviction. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. Horelick then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a person, believing they have a right or duty to be in a building, can use self-help, including force or illegal methods, to enter that building when it is locked and closed, and then resist arrest when police intervene.

    Holding

    No, because regardless of any perceived right or duty, the use of force or illegal methods to enter property, and resistance of arrest, is unlawful and cannot be justified by the belief in the righteousness of one’s cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the central issue was not the lawfulness of the school’s closure, but Horelick’s use of force to enter the building. The court stated, “Even such property rights, by still being subject to restrictions on the use of force, emphasize the policy against self-help by force or other illegal methods.” The court emphasized that established procedures must be followed, even if those procedures are inconvenient. The court highlighted the availability of remedies through superiors, police assistance, and ultimately the courts, rather than resorting to force. It noted that the Penal Law defines trespass in terms of a “license” or “privilege” to enter (Penal Law, § 140.00, subd. 5), and Horelick’s actions exceeded any such license. The court explicitly rejected the notion that controversies should be resolved in the streets or school corridors, stating that “it is not tolerable that the controversies be resolved in the streets or the school corridors, instead of under law, and in the courts, if necessary.” While acknowledging Horelick’s possible sincere motivation, the court held that condoning self-help force would be a grave consequence. The court implied that the appropriate course of action would have been to seek assistance from superiors or the police, and if necessary, to pursue legal action in the courts.