New York Law Review

Tag: Residential Use

  • Bartoo v. Buell, 87 N.Y.2d 362 (1996): Homeowner Exemption and Mixed-Use Properties Under Labor Law

    Bartoo v. Buell, 87 N.Y.2d 362 (1996)

    When a homeowner contracts for work that directly relates to the residential use of their one- or two-family dwelling, they are shielded by the homeowner exemption from Labor Law §§ 240 and 241, even if the work also serves a commercial purpose.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the scope of the homeowner exemption under New York Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 when a property is used for both residential and commercial purposes. The Court of Appeals held that the homeowner exemption applies if the work contracted for directly relates to the residential use of the home, even if it also serves a commercial purpose. The Court emphasized a ‘site and purpose’ test. In Bartoo, the repair of a barn roof used for both personal storage and commercial golf cart storage fell under the exemption. In Anderson, adding a bedroom to a home with a daycare also qualified, as the bedroom served a residential purpose.

    Facts

    In Bartoo v. Buell, Robert Buell hired contractors to repair the roof of his barn. The barn was used to store his personal belongings, a neighbor’s belongings (without charge), and golf carts for nine individuals who paid a $25 annual storage fee. During the repairs, three workers were injured when a scaffold collapsed.

    In Anderson v. Flanagan, Mary Flanagan, who ran a daycare center in her home, contracted to add a bedroom to the first floor. A worker was injured when he fell from the roof while attempting to descend.

    Procedural History

    Bartoo: The Supreme Court initially granted summary judgment to the injured workers, finding the homeowner exemption inapplicable due to the barn’s commercial use. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to Buell and dismissing the Labor Law claims. The workers appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Anderson: The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Flanagan, holding that the homeowner exemption applied. The Appellate Division affirmed. The worker appealed to the Court of Appeals after leave to appeal was granted.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the homeowner exemption of Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6) applies to a structure or dwelling jointly used for residential and commercial purposes.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because when an owner of a one- or two-family dwelling contracts for work that directly relates to the residential use of the home, even if the work also serves a commercial purpose, that owner is shielded by the homeowner exemption from the absolute liability of Labor Law §§ 240 and 241.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the legislative intent behind the homeowner exemption, which was to protect homeowners from the strict liability imposed by Labor Law §§ 240 and 241, recognizing that typical homeowners are not as capable as businesses to ensure workplace safety and obtain appropriate insurance.

    The Court reaffirmed the ‘site and purpose’ test established in prior cases like Cannon v. Putnam, where the focus is on whether the work was undertaken in connection with the residential use of the property. The Court distinguished the case from Van Amerogen v. Donnini, where the one-family dwelling was used *exclusively* for commercial purposes, making it essentially a commercial enterprise.

    The Court reasoned that in Bartoo, the barn repair was primarily for residential purposes (protecting personal belongings), with the commercial benefit being ancillary. The barn was considered an extension of the dwelling. In Anderson, adding a bedroom directly related to the residential use of the home, even though the home also housed a daycare center.

    The Court quoted Cannon v. Putnam stating that a homeowner who hires someone to paint his own living-room ceiling should be afforded the benefit of the statutory exemption from liability even if he also maintains a business on the property. In terms of the legislative purpose, such a homeowner is no more or less likely to ‘know about, or provide for the responsibilities of absolute liability’ for home-improvement-related injuries than is a similarly situated homeowner who happens to conduct a business on a separate parcel of land. (76 NY2d, at 650)

  • Devereux v. Berger, 40 N.Y.2d 709 (1976): Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants in Residential Areas

    Devereux v. Berger, 40 N.Y.2d 709 (1976)

    A restrictive covenant limiting land use to residential purposes is enforceable unless the character of the neighborhood has so changed as to defeat the covenant’s original purpose.

    Summary

    This case concerns the enforceability of a restrictive covenant limiting property use to private residences. Plaintiffs sought to prevent the defendant from using their property for non-residential, religious purposes. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the enforcement of the covenant, finding that the area retained its residential character and that the plaintiffs’ contractual rights should be protected. The court emphasized that absent a significant change in the neighborhood’s character rendering the covenant’s purpose obsolete, the covenant remains enforceable. A dissenting judge believed the plaintiffs’ own violation (using their property as a medical office) should prevent them from enforcing the covenant, given changes in the neighborhood.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs and defendant owned properties subject to a restrictive covenant limiting their use to “one private residence.” The defendant, with knowledge of the covenant and the plaintiffs’ intent to enforce it, began using its property for a purpose that violated the covenant. The surrounding area retained a residential character of substantial value.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted judgment directing enforcement of the covenant. The appellate division affirmed this judgment. The case then came before the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a restrictive covenant limiting property use to residential purposes is enforceable when the defendant knowingly violates the covenant, and the area retains its residential character.

    Holding

    Yes, because the affirmed findings of fact show the defendant knowingly violated the covenant, and the area retains a residential character of substantial value, thereby justifying enforcement of the covenant to protect the plaintiffs’ contractual rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the importance of upholding contractual rights and enforcing restrictive covenants when the original purpose of the covenant remains viable. The court relied on affirmed findings of fact, meaning those findings were not in dispute on appeal. The court stated that “in the absence of a proper quantum of proof or a finding that ‘the character of the neighborhood has so changed as to defeat the object and purposes for which the restrictions were imposed’, such a covenant is enforceable.” The court cited Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Sahlem, 254 N.Y. 161, 166, and Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law § 1951, to support this principle. The dissent argued that the plaintiffs’ own violation of the covenant (using their property for a medical office) and changes in the neighborhood should preclude them from enforcing the covenant against the defendant. The dissent also argued the general language of the covenant should be limited by the specific enumeration within the agreement, likely referring to an interpretation of “one private residence.” The majority, however, did not find these arguments persuasive in light of the affirmed finding that the neighborhood retained its residential character. The court’s decision underscores the significance of factual findings and the high bar for proving that a neighborhood’s character has changed so drastically as to render a restrictive covenant unenforceable.