New York Law Review

Tag: Residency Requirements

  • Matter of Stewart v. Chautauqua County Bd. of Elections, 14 N.Y.3d 143 (2010): Validating Ballots with Technical Defects and Establishing Residency Requirements

    Matter of Stewart v. Chautauqua County Bd. of Elections, 14 N.Y.3d 143 (2010)

    Election boards must substantially comply with election law, and ballots should be counted if voter intent is clear, but residency for voting requires physical presence and intent to remain.

    Summary

    This case involves a dispute over several ballots cast in a Chautauqua County election. The New York Court of Appeals addressed the validity of an affidavit ballot, two optical scan ballots, and two absentee ballots. The Court held that one affidavit ballot was invalid due to the voter’s lack of residency in the district, but validated the two optical scan ballots that were initially rejected by the machine because the voters’ intent was clear. The Court also validated two absentee ballots despite a procedural error by the Board of Elections, finding substantial compliance with election law. The decision emphasizes voter intent when technical errors occur and clarifies residency requirements for voting purposes.

    Facts

    Robert Stewart and Leon Beightol were candidates for Chautauqua County Legislator. Disputes arose over the validity of certain ballots: (1) an affidavit ballot of J.K., challenged for residency; (2) two absentee ballots where the applications were allegedly incomplete when sent; (3) two optical scan ballots rejected by the scanning machine but manually counted. The absentee ballots were sent to voters R.Y. and W.Y. with instructions to return completed applications. Both voters complied.

    Procedural History

    Stewart initiated a proceeding challenging the affidavit ballot and absentee ballots. Beightol counterclaimed, seeking to validate the affidavit and absentee ballots. Subsequently, Beightol commenced another proceeding to invalidate the absentee ballots, arguing that absentee voter applications should not have been included in the return envelopes. The Supreme Court ordered the affidavit and absentee ballots counted, but not the optical scan ballots, resulting in a tie. The Appellate Division modified, invalidating the affidavit ballot but validating the optical scan ballots. Beightol appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether J.K.’s affidavit ballot should be invalidated due to lack of residency in the voting district.
    2. Whether the two optical scan ballots, initially rejected by the machine, should be counted.
    3. Whether the two absentee ballots should be invalidated because the Board of Elections sent the ballots before receiving fully completed applications and included extrinsic materials (applications) in the return envelope.

    Holding

    1. No, because J.K. did not maintain a fixed, permanent, and principal home in the district, and lacked significant attachments to the Chautauqua County address.
    2. Yes, because the voters’ intent was clear, and the ballots were “non-machine processable as submitted by the voter[s],” requiring a manual count under applicable regulations.
    3. No, because the Board of Elections substantially complied with election law, and the inclusion of absentee ballot applications did not invalidate the ballots as no marks on the ballots themselves identified the voters.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Residency requires physical presence with the intent to remain. The Court relied on People v. O’Hara, 96 N.Y.2d 378 (2001), stating that an individual must have “legitimate, significant and continuing attachments as [his or] her residence for purposes of the Election Law.” Because J.K. had a more permanent residence elsewhere and lacked significant ties to the Chautauqua County location, her affidavit ballot was invalid.

    For the optical scan ballots, the Court looked to 9 NYCRR 6210.13 (A) (8), stating “If a ballot is ‘non-machine processable as submitted by the voter, [it] shall be manually counted by a bipartisan team of election inspectors and such vote totals shall be added to the canvass’”. Since the ballots were rejected by the machine, the Court validated them to ensure voter intent was honored.

    Regarding the absentee ballots, while the Board of Elections deviated from the ideal procedure, they substantially complied with the law. Citing Matter of Gross v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 3 N.Y.3d 251 (2004), the Court distinguished this case, noting that the Board had a basis to determine the voters were entitled to absentee ballots. The Court also found that including the applications in the return envelope did not violate Election Law § 9-112(1) as it states extrinsic marks must appear on the ballot itself.

    The Court emphasized that “[a] vote for any candidate or ballot measure shall not be rejected solely because the voter failed to follow instructions for marking the ballot.” This underscored the importance of counting ballots where voter intent is clear, even with technical imperfections.

  • Matter of Hosley v. LeBlanc, 96 N.Y.2d 413 (2001): Establishes Continuous Residency Requirement for State Legislators

    Matter of Hosley v. LeBlanc, 96 N.Y.2d 413 (2001)

    Article III, Section 7 of the New York State Constitution requires a candidate for the State Legislature to have resided in New York for five years immediately preceding the election.

    Summary

    This case concerns the residency requirements for candidates for the New York State Legislature, specifically regarding the interpretation of Article III, Section 7 of the New York Constitution. Petitioners challenged the candidacy of Kenneth LeBlanc, arguing that his continuous residency in California from 1987 to 1999 disqualified him due to not meeting the five-year state residency requirement immediately preceding the election. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling, holding that the five-year residency requirement must be satisfied in the five years immediately before the election to ensure familiarity with current state issues.

    Facts

    Kenneth P. LeBlanc was designated as the Independence and Democratic Party candidate for the New York State Assembly, 99th Assembly District.

    Petitioners challenged LeBlanc’s candidacy, arguing he did not meet the New York State residency requirements because he lived in California from 1987 to 1999.

    Article III, Section 7 of the New York Constitution requires state legislative candidates to have been a resident of New York for five years and of the relevant assembly or senate district for the twelve months immediately preceding the election.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially concluded that only the 12-month district residency needed to immediately precede the election, finding any five years of residency sufficient.

    The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the five-year state residency must immediately precede the election.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted review and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Article III, Section 7 of the New York State Constitution requires a candidate for the State Legislature to reside in New York for the five years immediately preceding the election.

    Holding

    Yes, because the constitutional language, when interpreted in light of the record from the 1938 Constitutional Convention, indicates that the five-year residency requirement must be satisfied in the period immediately preceding the election.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the intent behind the constitutional provision, as revealed in the records of the 1938 Constitutional Convention. The Court acknowledged that the constitutional language was open to multiple interpretations. However, reviewing the convention records clarified that the sponsors and opponents of the provision understood that the five-year residency period must immediately precede the election. The Court emphasized that the purpose of the residency requirement was to ensure that legislators possess a current and relevant understanding of the issues facing the state and the communities they represent.

    The court cited the sponsor’s argument during the convention: “if a man lives in the State for 20 years and he moves out to San Francisco and stays there for five years, I still contend that being away for five years, he loses close touch with the local situation, and he should live here another five years, if he wants to be a legislator in the State.” This quote demonstrates the intent to ensure contemporaneous familiarity with local issues.

    The Court reasoned that interpreting the provision to allow for non-consecutive residency would frustrate the objective of ensuring legislators are currently familiar with state issues. This decision highlights the importance of examining the historical context and legislative intent when interpreting constitutional provisions, especially when the text is ambiguous. It provides a clear rule for residency requirements for state legislative candidates in New York, emphasizing the need for recent and continuous connection to the state.

  • Uniformed Firefighters Association v. City of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 87 (1980): State Law Prevails Over Local Law on Residency Requirements When a Matter of State Concern

    Uniformed Firefighters Association v. City of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 87 (1980)

    When a state law addresses a matter of statewide concern, such as residency requirements for civil service members, it supersedes any conflicting local law, even under municipal home rule provisions.

    Summary

    The Uniformed Firefighters Association challenged New York City’s Local Law No. 20, which imposed residency requirements on municipal officers and employees, arguing it conflicted with exemptions in the Public Officers Law for members of the police, fire, correction, and sanitation departments. The Court of Appeals held that the state law prevailed because residency of municipal service members, unlike the structure and control of municipal service departments, is a matter of statewide concern, thus not subject to municipal home rule. The court emphasized that home rule is not implicated when the legislature acts in areas other than the property, affairs, or government of a local government.

    Facts

    New York City enacted Local Law No. 20 of 1978, which mandated residency requirements for municipal officers and employees. This local law conflicted with existing exemptions from municipal residency requirements outlined in Section 3 and Section 30 of the Public Officers Law, particularly concerning members of the city’s police, fire, correction, and sanitation departments.

    Procedural History

    The Uniformed Firefighters Association brought suit challenging the validity of Local Law No. 20. The case reached the New York Court of Appeals, which reviewed the lower court’s decision regarding the conflict between the local law and the state’s Public Officers Law.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York City, through its local law, could impose residency requirements on members of its police, fire, correction, and sanitation departments, when those requirements conflicted with exemptions provided under the state’s Public Officers Law.

    Holding

    No, because the residency of municipal service members is a matter of statewide concern, and therefore, the state law supersedes the local law under the principles of municipal home rule.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that municipal home rule does not apply when the Legislature acts in areas outside the property, affairs, or government of a local government. While the structure and control of municipal service departments are local concerns, the residence of their members is a matter of statewide concern, especially regarding the civil service. The court noted that the city failed to demonstrate the insubstantiality of the state’s interest in affording residential mobility to civil service members. The Court cited Adler v. Deegan, 251 NY 467 and Hotel Dorset Co. v Trust for Cultural Resources of City of N. Y., 46 NY2d 358 to support the holding that legislation of state import does not impinge upon municipal home rule simply because it touches matters that concern the affairs or property of the city. The Court further explained that a state law dealing with matters of state concern is not invalid simply because it affects fewer than all cities, as long as the classification is defined by conditions common to the class and related to the subject of the statute. The court acknowledged that New York City could reasonably receive different treatment, but that Local Law No. 20 was inconsistent with the Public Officers Law, and thus, could not stand. As the court stated, “Home rule simply is not implicated when the Legislature acts in areas ‘other than the property, affairs or government of a local government’ (NY Const, art IX, § 3, subd [a], par [3]).”

  • Matter of Merrill v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 46 N.Y.2d 983 (1979): Residency Requirements for Voting by Psychiatric Center Residents

    Matter of Merrill v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 46 N.Y.2d 983 (1979)

    An affidavit from a voluntary resident of a psychiatric center, stating their intent to reside there permanently and lacking any contradictory evidence, is sufficient proof of residency for voter registration purposes.

    Summary

    This case concerns the registration of residents of the Pilgrim State Psychiatric Center to vote. The Suffolk County Board of Elections argued that an evidentiary hearing was always required to establish residency. The Court of Appeals held that an unrefuted affidavit from a resident, stating their voluntary and long-term residency at the center, and declaring the center as their home, was sufficient proof of residency for voter registration when the board presented no opposing evidence. The court also held the case was not moot, because the issue of voter registration was a continuing one.

    Facts

    An individual voluntarily residing at the Pilgrim State Psychiatric Center for over 30 years submitted an affidavit to the Suffolk County Board of Elections. The affidavit stated that the individual had no other residence, considered Suffolk County their home, and intended to remain at the psychiatric center. The Board of Elections sought an evidentiary hearing to verify the individual’s residency, arguing the affidavit was insufficient.

    Procedural History

    The case began as a proceeding to compel the Suffolk County Board of Elections to allow certain residents of the Pilgrim State Psychiatric Center to register to vote. The Appellate Division found the affidavit adequate, and the Board of Elections appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an affidavit from a voluntary resident of a psychiatric center, stating their intent to reside there permanently and lacking any contradictory evidence, is sufficient proof of residency for voter registration purposes, or whether the Board of Elections can demand an evidentiary hearing in all such cases.

    Holding

    Yes, because the affidavit, unrefuted by any factual showing from the Board of Elections, constitutes sufficient proof of residency under Election Law § 335.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from Matter of Palla v Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, where issues of fact were raised by opposing affidavits. Here, the Board of Elections provided no opposing evidence to contradict the resident’s affidavit. The court emphasized that the affidavit, stating the resident’s voluntary long-term residency and intent to make the center their home, was sufficient. The court relied on Election Law § 335, which allows the court to consider the affidavit as sufficient proof of residency when unrefuted. The court stated, “Under the circumstances here, however, the court had a right to consider and rely upon an affidavit by the individual seeking registration, unrefuted by any factual statement or showing, as sufficient proof of residency.” The court further noted that registration to vote is a continuing status, so the matter was not moot despite the passing of the election. The court also cited Matter of Carr v New York State Bd. of Elections, noting that review should not be declined on mootness grounds when the issue is likely to recur.

  • Matter of Bifulco v. Luger, 27 A.D.2d 187 (1967): Upholding Residency Requirements for Primary Elections

    Matter of Bifulco v. Luger, 27 A.D.2d 187 (1967)

    A state’s residency requirements for participation in primary elections will be upheld if there is a rational basis for the classification enacted by the legislature, even if the statute may lead to apparent unequal treatment of voters in some instances.

    Summary

    This case examines the constitutionality of New York State Election Law provisions concerning residency requirements for primary elections. Specifically, it questions whether a distinction in residency requirements between voters moving within a city/village that spans multiple counties versus those moving into such entities from outside warrants judicial intervention. The court ultimately upheld the statute, finding a rational basis for the legislature’s classification. The decision underscores that legislative classifications need not be perfect but must have a reasonable basis related to legitimate state interests.

    Facts

    The case arose from a challenge to certain provisions of the New York Election Law concerning the ability of voters to participate in primary elections after changing their residence. The specific facts regarding the individual voters challenging the law are not clearly detailed in this particular excerpt, but the legal issue centered on the differential treatment based on the location of the voter’s prior residence.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in the lower courts of New York and was appealed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Fourth Department. The specific ruling being reviewed is not fully outlined in this excerpt.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the residency requirements established by subdivision 6 of section 187 and section 386 of the Election Law violate equal protection by creating an unreasonable classification between voters based on whether they move within or into a city/village spanning multiple counties.

    Holding

    No, because there is a reasonable basis for the legislative classification distinguishing between voters moving within a city or village that spans multiple counties and those moving into such an entity from outside, particularly regarding their familiarity with local candidates and issues.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court, in its concurring opinion by Justice Witmer, emphasizes judicial deference to legislative classifications. While acknowledging potential inequalities, the opinion asserts that such imperfections are inherent in most legislation. The critical inquiry is whether a rational basis supports the classification. The court found such a basis in the presumption that voters moving within a city or village that crosses county lines are more likely to be familiar with local candidates and issues than those moving in from other areas (e.g., from New York City or Westchester County to a more rural county). Therefore, the legislature could reasonably impose different residency requirements for primary election participation based on this distinction. The court stated, “It is not the function of this court to review legislation which is reasonably based upon policy and matters of legislative judgment reasonably calculated to remedy conditions requiring correction.” This highlights the court’s reluctance to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature on matters of policy, provided the legislative action is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. This case illustrates a practical application of the rational basis test in election law.

  • Palla v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 31 N.Y.2d 36 (1972): Student Voter Residency Requirements

    Palla v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 31 N.Y.2d 36 (1972)

    A state can impose reasonable residency requirements for voting, but these requirements must be applied neutrally and cannot create undue burdens on specific classes of voters, such as students, to effectively deny their right to vote.

    Summary

    This case addresses the constitutionality of New York Election Law § 151, concerning student residency for voting purposes. A group of students were denied voter registration based on their residency in university dormitories. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the state can ensure that only bona fide residents vote, the law must be applied neutrally without creating a presumption against student residency. The court found that the law itself was not unconstitutional but that the summary denial of registration based solely on student status was improper and required further individualized inquiry.

    Facts

    Several groups of students residing in college or university dormitories in New York were denied voter registration or had their registrations challenged by county election boards. The Suffolk County Board of Elections used questionnaires with an extensive line of inquiry. The Oneida and Onondaga County Boards of Elections either refused registration outright or notified students that their existing registrations would be voided or challenged. The students argued that Section 151 of the Election Law, as amended, was unconstitutional.

    Procedural History

    In Palla, Special Term found that the petitioners were subjected to a special line of inquiry and established residency. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for proceedings with sworn witness testimony. In Bell and Gorenberg, Special Term consolidated the actions, upheld the constitutionality of Election Law § 151, and dismissed the petitions. The Appellate Division affirmed in Bell and Gorenberg.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Section 151 of the New York Election Law, concerning student residency for voting purposes, is facially unconstitutional as violating the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Voting Rights Act, or the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.

    2. Whether the summary denial of voter registration to students based solely on their student status violates the Election Law.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statute itself is a permissible effort to ensure that all applicants for the vote actually fulfill the traditional requirements of bona fide residence.

    2. Yes, because the Board of Elections erred in summarily denying the petitioners’ applications based solely on their student status. The law requires an individualized assessment of residency based on expressed intent, conduct, and attendant circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the right to vote is fundamental but that states have a legitimate interest in ensuring that only bona fide residents vote. Section 151 of the Election Law, the court stated, does not impose additional qualifications for voting but provides a framework for determining residency, which is a prerequisite for voting. The court acknowledged that students, like other transient populations, may require a more detailed inquiry to determine their true domicile. However, the court emphasized that the inquiry must be neutral and cannot presume that students are not residents. The court stated: “[t]he intention to change is not alone sufficient. It must exist, but must concur with and be manifested by resultant acts which are independent of the presence as a student in the new locality”. The court differentiated this case from others where statutes explicitly disenfranchised specific groups. Here, the court found that the law’s criteria were applicable to all prospective registrants, and the classification of students was a reasonable effort to assure that applicants for the vote actually fulfill the requirements of bona fide residence. The court held that the election boards erred in summarily denying the student’s applications. They should have allowed them the opportunity to demonstrate residency through the procedures outlined in the Election Law. The court remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with the Election Law, emphasizing the need for individualized assessment of residency.