New York Law Review

Tag: residence

  • Longwood Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Springs Union Free Sch. Dist., 772 N.E.2d 387 (2002): Determining School District Responsibility Based on ‘Residence’

    Longwood Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Springs Union Free Sch. Dist., 772 N.E.2d 387 (2002)

    Under Education Law § 3202 (4)(a), a student’s “residence,” for determining which school district bears educational costs, requires both physical presence and an intent to remain, akin to domicile, not merely temporary presence in a location like a homeless shelter.

    Summary

    This case addresses which school district is financially responsible for the education of foster children who resided in a homeless shelter with their mother immediately before entering foster care. The New York Court of Appeals held that the term “resided” in Education Law § 3202(4)(a) requires both physical presence and an intent to remain permanently, similar to the concept of domicile. Since the children’s stay in the homeless shelter was temporary, their last permanent residence (Springs Union Free School District) was responsible for their educational costs, not the district where the shelter was located (Longwood Central School District). The Court emphasized the importance of predictable cost allocation and avoiding penalizing districts that host homeless shelters.

    Facts

    A family with four children lived in the Springs Union Free School District from December 1991 until their eviction in July 1993. After the eviction, the family moved between temporary housing, including motels and relatives’ homes. For a period, the mother was incarcerated. In August 1993, the family moved into Shelter Plus, a homeless shelter in Lake Grove. The children did not attend school while at the shelter. In September and October 1993, the Suffolk County Department of Social Services (DSS) placed the children in foster care within the Longwood Central School District. DSS records listed Springs as the “district of origin” for each child.

    Procedural History

    Longwood filed a claim against Springs for the cost of educating the children. When Springs did not pay, Longwood initiated three lawsuits seeking tuition reimbursement for the 1994-1995, 1995-1996, and 1996-1997 school years. The Supreme Court consolidated the actions and granted summary judgment to Longwood, concluding the mother’s last permanent residence was Springs. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the temporary residence at Shelter Plus obligated the Longwood district to pay. Longwood appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the term “resided” in Education Law § 3202(4)(a) requires only physical presence, or does it also require an intent to remain in a place permanently for the purposes of determining which school district bears the cost of instruction for foster children.

    Holding

    No, because the term “resided” in Education Law § 3202(4)(a) requires both physical presence and an intent to remain in a place permanently. A temporary stay, such as in a homeless shelter, does not establish residence for the purpose of assigning educational costs under this statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that within Education Law § 3202, “residence” is consistently interpreted as akin to domicile, requiring both physical presence and an intent to make a place a fixed and permanent home. An existing domicile is presumed to continue until a new one is acquired. Education Law § 3202 creates a rebuttable presumption that children share the domicile of their parents. The purpose of § 3202 is to allocate educational costs sensibly between school districts and avoid burdening districts with the costs of educating nonresident children. The Court cited Matter of Newcomb, 192 N.Y. 238, 250 (1908). and Catlin v Sobol, 77 NY2d 552, 560 (1991). The court also referenced the Department of Education’s interpretation of “resided” in similar contexts, emphasizing the requirement of “physical presence as an inhabitant of the district combined with an intent to remain” (Appeal of Haldane Cent. School Dist., 32 Ed Dept Rep 156, 159 [Decision No. 12,790] [1992]). The Court emphasized that adopting a physical presence-only definition would create instability and unfairly penalize communities with homeless shelters. A short stay in a district before foster care placement should not obligate that district to pay educational costs for months or years thereafter. The Court specifically rejected Springs’ argument that the mother established a domicile at Shelter Plus. To illustrate the rule, the court quoted that “residence is established by one’s physical presence as an inhabitant within the district, combined with an intent to remain” (Appeal of Stokes, 32 Ed Dept Rep 93, 95 [Decision No. 12,769] [1992]).

  • Antone v. General Motors Corp., 64 N.Y.2d 20 (1984): Defining ‘Residence’ Under New York’s Borrowing Statute

    64 N.Y.2d 20 (1984)

    For the purpose of New York’s borrowing statute (CPLR 202), ‘residence’ is not equivalent to ‘domicile’; instead, it requires a significant connection to a locality within the state through living there for a substantial period during the year.

    Summary

    Samuel Antone sued General Motors (GM) for injuries sustained in a car accident in Pennsylvania, alleging negligence and strict liability. GM moved for summary judgment, arguing the suit was time-barred under New York’s borrowing statute (CPLR 202) because Antone was not a New York resident when the cause of action accrued in Pennsylvania, which has a two-year statute of limitations. The New York Court of Appeals held that ‘residence’ under CPLR 202 is distinct from ‘domicile’ and requires a significant connection to a New York locality. Because Antone was not a New York resident at the time of the accident, the Pennsylvania statute of limitations applied, barring his claim.

    Facts

    Antone, while employed at a nursing home in Rossiter, Pennsylvania, was injured in a one-car accident on September 12, 1977. He had moved to Pennsylvania from Olean, New York, in May 1977. Prior to living in Olean he had lived in Jamestown, New York. At the time of the accident, he maintained a post office box in Jamestown, New York, but had no place of residence in New York. In June 1980, Antone received a recall letter from GM regarding his 1975 Buick Skyhawk due to potential wheel-bearing problems. He commenced the lawsuit against GM on August 27, 1980.

    Procedural History

    Antone filed suit in New York. The trial court held a hearing and found that Antone failed to prove he was a resident of New York at the time of the accident. Special Term granted GM’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision without opinion. Antone appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the term ‘resident’ in CPLR 202 is equivalent to ‘domiciliary,’ such that Antone, who claimed to be domiciled in New York, could take advantage of New York’s statute of limitations despite the cause of action accruing outside the state.

    Holding

    No, because ‘resident’ as used in CPLR 202 is not synonymous with ‘domiciliary’; it requires a substantial connection to a locality within New York demonstrated by living there for a meaningful period during the year.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that New York law has long distinguished between ‘residence’ and ‘domicile,’ noting that a person can have multiple residences but only one domicile. The legislative history of CPLR 202 shows no intent to equate ‘resident’ with ‘domiciliary.’ The purpose of CPLR 202, which is to prevent forum shopping by non-residents, is better served by focusing on whether a plaintiff has a substantial connection to New York. If ‘resident’ were interpreted as ‘domiciliary,’ an individual with significant contacts in New York might unfairly be treated the same as someone with no New York connections. The court found Antone’s action time-barred because he was not a New York resident at the time of the accident, and the Pennsylvania statute of limitations was two years, which had already expired. The court rejected Antone’s arguments that GM should be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations or that he should be allowed to amend his complaint to add a cause of action for fraudulent concealment, finding no evidence to support these claims. As the court stated, “the determination of whether a plaintiff is a New York resident, for purposes of CPLR 202, turns on whether he has a significant connection with some locality in the State as the result of living there for some length of time during the course of a year”.

  • In re Schley, 31 A.D.2d 535 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968): Proper Venue for Incompetency Proceedings

    In re Schley, 31 A.D.2d 535 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968)

    In proceedings to declare incompetency, the proper venue is the judicial district where the alleged incompetent resides.

    Summary

    This case concerns the proper venue for initiating proceedings to declare a person incompetent. The Appellate Division held that the proceeding must be maintained in the judicial district where the alleged incompetent resides, emphasizing the statutory requirement outlined in Mental Hygiene Law § 101, subd. (2). The court found that the initial papers filed were contradictory regarding the alleged incompetent’s residence, necessitating further inquiry. Ultimately, the court reversed the lower court’s order and remitted the proceeding to the Supreme Court, New York County, with instructions to transfer it to the Tenth Judicial District (Suffolk County), where the alleged incompetent resided.

    Facts

    The record indicated that the alleged incompetent resided in Suffolk County. Despite this, a proceeding to declare him incompetent was initiated in New York County. Documents within the moving papers referenced the alleged incompetent’s Suffolk County residence multiple times. The initial papers filed for the order to show cause contained contradictory information about his residence, leading to uncertainty about the appropriate venue.

    Procedural History

    The proceeding was initially brought in the Supreme Court, New York County. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division reviewed the lower court’s decision regarding the venue. The Appellate Division determined that the proceeding was improperly venued and reversed the order. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court, New York County, with instructions to transfer the proceeding to the Tenth Judicial District.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a proceeding to declare an individual incompetent must be maintained in the judicial district where the alleged incompetent resides, as mandated by Mental Hygiene Law § 101, subd. (2), even if the initial papers filed contain contradictory information regarding residency.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statute requires that a Supreme Court proceeding to declare incompetency be maintained in the judicial district of the residence of the incompetent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court based its decision on the clear statutory mandate of Mental Hygiene Law § 101, subd. (2), which dictates that incompetency proceedings must be held in the judicial district of the alleged incompetent’s residence. The court noted that the submitted papers contained contradictory information regarding the residence, however, other instruments referred to in the moving papers repeatedly referenced the alleged incompetent’s residence in Suffolk County. The court cited several prior cases, including Matter of McKitterick, Matter of Schley, and Matter of Porter, to support its holding. The court stated, “In such circumstances the statute requires a Supreme Court proceeding be maintained in the Tenth Judicial District.” The court also addressed the issue of allowances for services performed in good faith under prior orders, stating that the Special Term in the Tenth District has the discretion to make such allowances. Finally, the court ruled that the existing committee should continue its duties under the supervision of the Supreme Court, Tenth Judicial District, until a determination of incompetency is made and a new committee is appointed or the current committee is continued by the court with jurisdiction. This ensures continuity in the management of the alleged incompetent’s affairs during the transition.