New York Law Review

Tag: resentencing

  • People v. Acevedo, 17 N.Y.3d 297 (2011): Resentencing and Predicate Felony Status

    17 N.Y.3d 297 (2011)

    A resentencing sought by a defendant to correct an illegally lenient sentence (e.g., omission of mandatory post-release supervision) does not automatically alter the original sentencing date for the purposes of determining predicate felony status in a subsequent conviction.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a resentencing to correct an illegally lenient sentence (specifically, the omission of mandatory post-release supervision (PRS)) could be used to retroactively alter the sentencing date and nullify the prior conviction’s status as a predicate felony. Defendants Acevedo and Collado sought resentencing on prior convictions to eliminate them as predicates for later felony offenses. The Court of Appeals held that resentencing to correct a lenient sentence, particularly where the original sentence had been fully served, does not alter the original sentencing date for predicate felony purposes. The Court reasoned that resentencing should not be used as a tactic to evade enhanced punishment for reoffending.

    Facts

    In People v. Acevedo, Acevedo was convicted in 2006 of drug offenses and sentenced as a second felony drug offender. His predicate conviction was for a 2001 attempted robbery, for which he was originally sentenced to a determinate term without the statutorily required PRS. After completing the 2001 sentence, Acevedo moved for resentencing in 2008 to add the PRS term, which was granted. He then argued that because the resentencing occurred after the 2006 drug offense, the 2001 conviction could no longer serve as a predicate. In People v. Collado, Collado was convicted in 2005 of robbery and sentenced as a second violent felony offender, based on a 2000 attempted robbery conviction that also lacked a PRS term. After his 2005 conviction was affirmed, Collado moved for resentencing on the 2000 conviction to add the PRS term, arguing this invalidated its predicate status.

    Procedural History

    In Acevedo, the motion court denied vacatur of the 2006 predicate adjudication. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the 2001 sentence was vacated and resentenced, and therefore did not qualify as a predicate. In Collado, the motion court resentenced Collado on both the 2000 and 2005 convictions, rejecting his argument that the 2009 resentencing invalidated the predicate status of the 2000 conviction. The Appellate Division reversed, relying on its decision in Acevedo. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal in both cases.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a resentencing sought by a defendant to correct an illegally lenient sentence (i.e., one lacking mandatory post-release supervision) is effective to retroactively alter the original sentencing date for purposes of determining predicate felony status in a subsequent conviction?

    Holding

    No, because resentencing to correct a lenient sentence, particularly where the original sentence has been fully served, does not alter the original sentencing date for predicate felony purposes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the decisive factor was that the sentencing errors were in the defendants’ favor. The Court emphasized that resentencing is not a device to be used to simply alter a sentencing date in order to affect the utility of a conviction as a predicate for enhanced punishment. The Court distinguished People v. Sparber, noting that while Sparber held that the sole remedy for failure to pronounce PRS is resentencing, the resentencing sought by the defendants in these cases was an attempt to evade the consequences of reoffending, not a genuine attempt to correct an illegal sentence. The Court stated that “[r]esentence is not a device appropriately employed simply to alter a sentencing date and thereby affect the utility of a conviction as a predicate for the imposition of enhanced punishment.” The concurring opinion argued that the underlying conviction remains undisturbed during a Sparber resentencing, as the resentencing court lacks the power to reconsider either the conviction or the incarceration component of the original sentence. The dissent argued that because Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (ii) requires the sentence upon the prior conviction to have been imposed before commission of the present felony, and the resentencing occurred after the commission of the subsequent felony, the defendants could no longer be classified as second felony offenders. The majority rejected this argument, emphasizing the manipulative nature of the defendants’ attempts to exploit the Sparber remedy.

  • People v. Paulin, 17 N.Y.3d 240 (2011): Parole Violators and Drug Law Resentencing

    17 N.Y.3d 240 (2011)

    Prisoners who have been paroled and then reincarcerated for violating parole are not barred from seeking resentencing relief under the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA).

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) allows prisoners sentenced under the Rockefeller Drug Laws to be resentenced, even if they were paroled and subsequently reincarcerated for violating their parole. The Court held that reincarcerated parole violators are not automatically barred from seeking relief under the DLRA. The Court reasoned that the statute’s plain text and purpose of addressing inordinately harsh punishments for low-level drug offenders applied equally to parole violators. The Court emphasized that lower courts retain discretion to deny resentencing if “substantial justice dictates.”

    Facts

    David Lance Paulin, Jesus Pratts, and James Phillips were convicted of class B felonies involving narcotics and sentenced to indeterminate prison terms under the Rockefeller Drug Laws. Paulin received a sentence of 2 to 6 years, Pratts received 2 to 6 years, and Phillips 5 to 10 years. All three were paroled, violated their parole, and were reincarcerated. Following the enactment of the 2009 DLRA, they applied for resentencing.

    Procedural History

    Supreme Court denied the applications, holding that relief under the statute was not available to reincarcerated parole violators. The Appellate Division affirmed in Paulin and Pratts, but reversed in Phillips, holding that the DLRA did not render parole violators ineligible to apply for resentencing. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal in all three cases.

    Issue(s)

    Whether prisoners who have been paroled and then reincarcerated for violating their parole are barred from seeking resentencing relief under the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA).

    Holding

    No, because the 2009 DLRA’s plain text and purpose of addressing inordinately harsh punishments applies equally to parole violators, and courts retain discretion to deny resentencing if substantial justice dictates.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the 2009 DLRA, codified in part at CPL 440.46, permits individuals imprisoned for class B drug felonies committed before January 13, 2005, to apply for resentencing under the current, less severe sentencing regime. Paulin and Pratts fit squarely within the statute’s text, as they were in the custody of the Department of Correctional Services, convicted of qualifying felonies, and serving indeterminate sentences exceeding three years. The Court rejected the People’s argument that the DLRA should not apply to parole violators, finding no absurdity in granting relief from harsh sentences to individuals who violated parole. The Court emphasized that the purpose of the DLRA, like its predecessors, was to address the “inordinately harsh punishment for low level non-violent drug offenders” required by the Rockefeller Drug Laws. The Court cited the Assembly Sponsor’s Memorandum. The Court also emphasized that CPL 440.46(3) allows courts to deny resentencing applications where “substantial justice dictates that the application should be denied.” The court distinguished People v. Mills, explaining that it interpreted a provision of the 2005 DLRA, which has no counterpart in the 2009 act. The Court stated it would not “write into a statute an exception that simply is not there.”

  • People v. Lingle, 16 N.Y.3d 621 (2011): Double Jeopardy and Resentencing for Post-Release Supervision

    16 N.Y.3d 621, 949 N.E.2d 952, 926 N.Y.S.2d 4 (2011)

    When a defendant’s original sentence omitted the mandatory post-release supervision (PRS) term, resentencing to include PRS after the defendant has served a substantial portion, but not all, of the original prison sentence does not violate double jeopardy or due process rights under the New York or Federal constitutions, and the resentencing court’s authority is limited to correcting the PRS error without revisiting the initial prison term.

    Summary

    This case addresses the permissible scope of resentencing when a court initially fails to pronounce the mandatory post-release supervision (PRS) term. The New York Court of Appeals held that resentencing to include PRS, even after a defendant has served a significant portion of their prison sentence, does not violate double jeopardy or due process, provided the original sentence wasn’t fully served. The court clarified that such resentencing is a limited procedural correction, not a plenary resentencing, and the resentencing court may only correct the PRS component, not reconsider the length of the original prison term. Furthermore, the Appellate Division’s power to modify the sentence is limited to correcting errors at resentencing.

    Facts

    Six defendants were originally sentenced to determinate prison terms, but the sentencing courts failed to pronounce the mandatory PRS terms, a “Sparber error.” Five of the defendants were still incarcerated when the error was discovered and they were resentenced to include PRS. One defendant, Sharlow, had been conditionally released from prison after serving six-sevenths of his term before being resentenced.

    Procedural History

    Following resentencing to include PRS, the defendants appealed, arguing that resentencing violated double jeopardy and due process principles. The Appellate Division reversed in Sharlow’s case, concluding that his release from prison barred the addition of PRS. The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and granted leave to appeal to address the scope of resentencing for Sparber errors.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether resentencing a defendant to include a mandatory term of post-release supervision (PRS) after the defendant has served a substantial portion, but not all, of their original prison sentence violates double jeopardy protections?

    2. Whether resentencing a defendant to include a mandatory term of post-release supervision (PRS) after the defendant has served a substantial portion, but not all, of their original prison sentence violates due process rights?

    3. Whether a resentencing court may reconsider the propriety of a defendant’s entire sentence, including the incarceratory component, when resentencing to correct a Sparber error?

    4. Whether the Appellate Division may reduce a defendant’s sentence on appeal from a resentencing to correct a Sparber error?

    Holding

    1. No, because defendants are presumed to know that a determinate prison sentence without PRS is illegal and subject to correction; therefore, they cannot claim a legitimate expectation of finality until they have completed their entire sentence, including any term of post-release supervision.

    2. No, because resentencing to impose statutorily-required sentences does not shock the conscience, particularly when the State acts diligently and the defendants are aware of their PRS obligations.

    3. No, because a Sparber error is a procedural error akin to a misstatement or clerical error, and the resentencing court’s authority is limited to making the required pronouncement of the PRS term.

    4. No, because the defendant’s right to appeal is limited to the correction of errors or abuse of discretion at the resentencing proceeding, and since the resentencing court lacks discretion to reconsider the prison sentence, the appellate court also lacks such authority.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that double jeopardy protections do not bar resentencing because defendants are presumed to know their original sentences were illegal without the mandatory PRS term. The Court emphasized its prior decision in People v. Williams, stating that a legitimate expectation of finality arises only when a defendant completes the lawful portion of an illegal sentence, including any appeals. Because the defendants had not fully served their sentences, resentencing to include PRS was permissible.

    Regarding due process, the Court adopted the “shocks the conscience” standard, holding that merely imposing a statutorily-required sentence does not violate due process, especially absent malice or sadism on the part of the State. The court also considered factors such as the defendant’s awareness of the PRS requirement and the government’s diligence in correcting the Sparber error.

    The Court clarified that resentencing for a Sparber error is a limited procedural correction, not a plenary resentencing. Citing People v. Yannicelli, the court emphasized that resentencing should only address the specific error prompting the resentencing. Therefore, the resentencing court’s authority is limited to properly pronouncing the PRS term, and it cannot reconsider the incarceratory component of the sentence.

    Finally, the Court reasoned that because the trial court’s discretion is limited at a Sparber resentencing, the Appellate Division’s review is correspondingly limited to addressing errors made at the resentencing proceeding itself. The Appellate Division cannot exercise its interest of justice jurisdiction to reduce the prison sentence when the trial court had no authority to do so at resentencing.

    Justice Ciparick dissented in People v. Sharlow, arguing that his conditional release from custody entitled him to a legitimate expectation that his sentence was final. She also dissented in People v. Rodriguez, contending that the Appellate Division retains the authority to modify a sentence in the interest of justice upon appeal from a resentencing.

  • People v. Acevedo, 15 N.Y.3d 828 (2010): Limits on Resentencing Authority Under the Drug Law Reform Act

    People v. Acevedo, 15 N.Y.3d 828 (2010)

    A court resentencing a defendant under the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) does not have the authority to modify the original sentencing court’s determination regarding whether sentences should run concurrently or consecutively.

    Summary

    Acevedo was convicted of drug and weapon offenses and sentenced to consecutive terms for the drug and weapon charges. Subsequently, he sought resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) of 2004. The resentencing court reduced his drug sentence but maintained the original sentencing court’s directive that the weapon possession sentences run consecutively to the drug sentences. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the DLRA allows for alteration of the existing sentence as authorized by law, but does not empower a resentencing court to alter the consecutive or concurrent nature of the original sentences. The court clarified that DLRA resentencing does not constitute imposing an “additional term of imprisonment” allowing modification of the original sentencing structure.

    Facts

    Acevedo was convicted in County Court on November 7, 1997, of multiple drug and weapon offenses. He received sentences that included an indeterminate prison term of 15 years to life for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree. The sentencing court ordered the sentences for the weapon possession convictions to run consecutively to the drug convictions.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division affirmed Acevedo’s convictions and sentences. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. In 2005, Acevedo moved for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) of 2004, arguing for a reduced sentence on the drug felony and for concurrent sentences on the weapon charges. The County Court reduced the drug sentence but declined to change the consecutive nature of the weapon sentences. The Appellate Division affirmed the resentence. The Court of Appeals granted Acevedo leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court, when granting a defendant’s application for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act, has the authority to modify the conditions of a sentence by changing its terms from consecutive to concurrent.

    Holding

    No, because the purpose of the DLRA is to ameliorate harsh sentences, not to grant resentencing courts the power to modify the original sentencing court’s determinations regarding consecutive or concurrent sentences.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that reliance on Penal Law § 70.25 (1) and Matter of Murray v. Goord was misplaced. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the DLRA is to address the severity of the Rockefeller Drug Laws by allowing for a reduced sentence. However, reducing a sentence under the DLRA does not constitute imposing an “additional term of imprisonment” under Penal Law § 70.25 (1), which would trigger the court’s discretion to determine whether sentences should run concurrently or consecutively. The court distinguished the DLRA proceeding from a typical resentencing, stating that the DLRA proceeding is designed to “effect an alteration of the existing sentence as authorized by law.” The Court cited People v. Vaughan, stating that “a court that resentences a defendant pursuant to the 2004 DLRA does not possess the authority, conferred by Penal Law § 70.25 (1), to determine whether the sentence is to be served concurrently or consecutively with respect to other sentences.”

  • People v. Williams, 14 N.Y.3d 198 (2010): Double Jeopardy and Resentencing After Release

    People v. Williams, 14 N.Y.3d 198 (2010)

    The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a court from resentencing a defendant to add a mandatory term of post-release supervision (PRS) after the defendant has served the determinate term of imprisonment and been released from confinement.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether it is permissible to impose post-release supervision (PRS) at resentencing for defendants who have already completed their prison terms and been released. The New York Court of Appeals held that resentencing to add PRS after a defendant has completed their original sentence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court reasoned that once a defendant is released from prison after serving their court-ordered sentence, they have a legitimate expectation of finality in that sentence, and adding PRS constitutes an impermissible second punishment. The Court reversed the Appellate Division orders in four cases and affirmed one case where prohibition was sought, discharging the defendants from PRS.

    Facts

    Five defendants were originally sentenced to determinate prison terms but did not have PRS formally pronounced as part of their sentences. After the defendants served their prison terms and were released, the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) initiated resentencing proceedings under Correction Law § 601-d to add PRS. Some defendants had signed DOCS certificates acknowledging PRS before release. Defendant Williams had PRS mentioned during his plea, but it was not formally pronounced at sentencing. Defendant Rodriguez did not object at resentencing.

    Procedural History

    In *People v. Williams*, *People v. Hernandez*, *People v. Lewis*, and *People v. Rodriguez*, the sentencing courts resentenced the defendants to include PRS. The Appellate Division affirmed these resentencings. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal. In *Matter of Echevarria v. Marks*, the Appellate Division dismissed Echevarria’s Article 78 petition seeking to prevent resentencing, and the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a court from resentencing a defendant to add a mandatory term of PRS after the defendant has served the determinate term of imprisonment and been released from confinement.

    2. Whether the resentencing courts retained jurisdiction to modify the original judgments when the defendants had completed their original sentences.

    3. Whether Rodriguez preserved his double jeopardy claim for review.

    4. Whether Echevarria properly sought a writ of prohibition to prevent resentencing.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because after release from prison, a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence arises, and the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents reformation to attach a PRS component to the original completed sentence.

    2. No, because the Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant from being resentenced to a more severe punishment after serving the sentence of imprisonment and being released into the community, the resentencing courts did not retain jurisdiction.

    3. Yes, because Rodriguez’s double jeopardy claim implicates a fundamental mode of proceedings, it is reviewable absent preservation.

    4. No, because the record in this case does not indicate that the judge had considered whether it was appropriate to impose a term of PRS.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while courts have the inherent authority to correct illegal sentences, this power is limited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. CPL 440.40 does not limit the court’s ability to correct its own errors. Penal Law § 70.85 specifies a court may decline to impose PRS during resentencing only when the People issue the statutorily required consent. CPL 380.30 requires that sentences must be imposed “without unreasonable delay” (CPL 380.30 [1]), and there was no violation of the statute here. After reviewing federal precedent, the court found it persuasive and concluded that a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence arises after release from prison. State law permitted defendants’ release after having served substantial portions of their determinate prison terms. The administrative imposition by DOCS of any additional penalty other than that issued by the sentencing court is a nullity and cannot negate a defendant’s reasonable expectation that, once completed, the imposed sentence will not be increased.

    Since Rodriguez’s double jeopardy claim implicates a fundamental mode of proceedings, it is reviewable absent preservation. In Echevarria’s case, there was no need to seek prohibition relief before the court determined “the lawfulness of the sentence that was imposed” or whether it would accept the served sentence without a term of PRS.

  • People v. Mills, 11 N.Y.3d 527 (2008): Eligibility for Resentencing Under the Drug Law Reform Act

    11 N.Y.3d 527 (2008)

    To be eligible for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2005, a class A-II felony drug offender must not be eligible for parole within three years of applying for resentencing.

    Summary

    This case interprets the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) of 2005, specifically who is eligible for resentencing. The Court of Appeals held that to qualify for resentencing under the 2005 DLRA, class A-II felony drug offenders must not be eligible for parole within three years of their resentencing application. The Court reasoned that the plain meaning of the statute and its legislative history support this interpretation. The Court rejected arguments that prior parole or subsequent offenses should alter this eligibility requirement, emphasizing the legislature’s intent to target offenders facing the longest prison terms. The orders of the lower courts were affirmed, denying resentencing to both defendants.

    Facts

    Donald Mills pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in 1995 and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of three years to life. He was denied parole multiple times. Jose Then pleaded guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance in 1999 and was sentenced to five years to life, then paroled in 2002. He was arrested again on drug charges, convicted in 2003, and sentenced to six years to life. His parole on the 1999 conviction was revoked.

    Procedural History

    Mills moved for resentencing under the 2005 DLRA, which was initially granted but later vacated by the County Court. The Appellate Division affirmed the vacatur. Then moved for resentencing on both his 1999 and 2003 convictions; the Supreme Court granted it for both. The Appellate Division reversed the resentencing for the 1999 conviction. Both Mills and Then appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Drug Law Reform Act of 2005 applies to A-II felony drug offenders who are eligible for parole within three years of applying for resentencing.

    2. Whether a defendant who has been released on parole for a class A-II drug felony conviction is eligible for resentencing under the 2005 DLRA for that conviction after parole revocation and re-incarceration.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statute explicitly requires applicants to be more than twelve months from being an “eligible inmate,” as defined by Correction Law § 851(2), which includes those eligible for parole within two years. Therefore, to qualify for resentencing, offenders must not be eligible for parole within three years of their resentencing application.

    2. No, because once a defendant has been released to parole supervision for a class A-II drug felony conviction, they no longer qualify for 2005 DLRA relief for that particular conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the plain language of the 2005 DLRA, specifically referencing Correction Law § 851(2), unambiguously requires that A-II felony drug offenders must not be eligible for parole within three years of their resentencing application. The Court rejected alternative interpretations, finding no support in legislative history or policy considerations. The Court cited letters from the Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Services and the Executive Director of the New York State Defenders Association, both of which explicitly mentioned the three-year limitation.
    Regarding Then, the Court reasoned that allowing a resentencing opportunity based on a subsequent offense would create an illogical outcome. The Court emphasized that the Legislature did not intend for fresh crimes to trigger resentencing opportunities. “A valid and more sensible reading of the statutory text is that in order to be eligible for resentencing, an inmate must be more than three years from parole eligibility for the same class A-II drug felony for which resentencing is sought.” In short, the 2005 DLRA was designed to “ameliorate[] the conditions of those A-II offenders facing the longest prison time“.

  • People v. Bautista, 7 N.Y.3d 838 (2006): Appealability of Resentencing Order Denials

    7 N.Y.3d 838 (2006)

    The Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals from orders denying resentencing applications under Chapter 643 of the Laws of 2005 unless specifically authorized by statute.

    Summary

    This case concerns the appealability of an order denying a resentencing application. Patricio Bautista sought to appeal the denial of his resentencing application to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the legislature did not explicitly authorize appeals to the Court of Appeals from such orders in Chapter 643 of the Laws of 2005, nor did it amend CPL 450.10 or CPL 450.15 to include such orders within the scope of CPL 450.90(1). The Court emphasized that appeals in criminal cases are strictly limited to those authorized by statute.

    Facts

    The relevant fact is that Patricio Bautista sought to appeal an order denying his application for resentencing based on Chapter 643 of the Laws of 2005.

    Procedural History

    Bautista appealed the denial of his resentencing application to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Chapter 643 of the Laws of 2005 authorizes an appeal to the Court of Appeals from an order denying a resentencing application.

    Holding

    No, because the legislature did not explicitly mention CPL 450.90 in Chapter 643, nor did it amend CPL 450.10 or CPL 450.15 to include orders denying resentencing applications within the scope of CPL 450.90(1).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that its jurisdiction in criminal cases is strictly limited to appeals authorized by statute. It noted that CPL 450.90(1) only allows appeals to the Court of Appeals by permission from adverse or partially adverse orders of intermediate appellate courts entered upon appeals taken pursuant to CPL 450.10, 450.15, or 450.20. Chapter 643 of the Laws of 2005 allows appeals as of right from orders denying resentencing. However, the legislature did not amend CPL 450.10 or CPL 450.15 to specifically include orders denying resentencing applications. The court stated, “[t]he Legislature failed to mention CPL 450.90 in chapter 643 of the Laws of 2005. Moreover, the Legislature did not amend the language of CPL 450.10 or CPL 450.15 to provide in those sections for appeals to the intermediate appellate court from orders denying applications for resentencing, so as to bring such orders within the scope of CPL 450.90 (1).” The court distinguished orders denying resentencing from appealable sentences or orders denying motions to set aside sentences. Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The practical implication of this decision is that, absent explicit statutory authorization, orders denying resentencing applications cannot be appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

  • People v. Murray, 2 N.Y.3d 32 (2004): Determining Consecutive vs. Concurrent Sentences After Resentencing

    2 N.Y.3d 32 (2004)

    When a judgment of conviction is vacated and a defendant is resentenced while subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the discretion to determine whether the sentences should run consecutively or concurrently rests with the last judge in the sentencing chain.

    Summary

    Murray was originally convicted of drug charges and sentenced to 7½ to 15 years. Subsequently, he pleaded guilty to manslaughter and received a consecutive sentence of 7½ to 15 years. His drug conviction was then overturned, and he pleaded guilty again to a drug charge, agreeing to a concurrent sentence of 4½ to 9 years. The Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), relying on a since-overruled case, computed his sentences as consecutive. The Court of Appeals held that the last sentencing judge has the discretion to decide whether sentences run concurrently or consecutively and that DOCS must follow the commitment order.

    Facts

    Murray was initially convicted of criminal possession and sale of a controlled substance and sentenced to concurrent terms of 7½ to 15 years.

    He then pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to 7½ to 15 years, to run consecutively with the prior drug sentence. This was per the negotiated plea agreement.

    The Appellate Division reversed the drug convictions and remitted for a new trial, but affirmed the manslaughter conviction.

    In lieu of retrial, Murray pleaded guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance, with an agreed sentence of 4½ to 9 years, to run concurrently with the manslaughter sentence.

    The third trial judge sentenced Murray accordingly, but DOCS computed his sentences as consecutive, relying on Matter of Muntaqim v Herbert.

    Procedural History

    Murray initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging DOCS’s computation of his sentence.

    The Appellate Division ruled in favor of Murray, holding that the last sentencing judge has the discretion to determine whether sentences run concurrently or consecutively.

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, when a judgment of conviction is vacated and the defendant is resentenced while subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the discretion to decide whether the sentences should run consecutively or concurrently remains with the second judge who acted in the sentencing sequence.

    Holding

    No, because the sentencing discretion afforded by Penal Law § 70.25 (1) devolves upon the last judge in the sentencing chain.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Penal Law § 70.25 (1) grants sentencing discretion to the court at the time of sentencing regarding whether terms should run concurrently or consecutively. The court noted that divesting the last sentencing judge of this discretion would limit the parties’ latitude in negotiating a plea.

    The Court explicitly overruled Muntaqim, stating it is no longer good law.

    The Court emphasized that DOCS is “conclusively bound by the contents of commitment papers accompanying a prisoner” (Middleton v State of New York, 54 AD2d 450, 452 [3d Dept 1976], affd 43 NY2d 678 [1977] on op below [emphasis added]). DOCS’s only option is to comply with the last commitment order received.

    The Court indicated that prison officials are not free to disregard a commitment order. The court stated DOCS must comply with the plain terms of the last commitment order received, and further indicated that DOCS claimed to have been forced to choose between inconsistent directives.

  • People v. Stephens, 55 N.Y.2d 778 (1981): Appealability of Resentencing Denials

    55 N.Y.2d 778 (1981)

    The Court of Appeals held that an appeal from an order denying resentencing under Penal Law § 60.09 requires permission from a judge of the intermediate appellate court, and failure to obtain such permission warrants dismissal of the appeal.

    Summary

    Defendant Stephens, convicted under the Rockefeller Drug Laws, sought resentencing under Penal Law § 60.09. After his motion was denied without counsel or his presence, he appealed to the Appellate Division, which ruled on the merits without granting permission for the appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed Stephens’s appeal, finding that failure to obtain leave to appeal from the Appellate Division as required by CPL 450.15 and 460.15 was fatal. The dissent argued that the Appellate Division’s determination on the merits was functionally equivalent to granting permission, and that due process concerns warranted review.

    Facts

    Stephens was originally sentenced under the severe Rockefeller Drug Laws.

    He later moved for resentencing pursuant to Penal Law § 60.09, arguing he was a model prisoner who had addressed his drug issues.

    Stephens requested counsel for the resentencing proceedings, but counsel was never assigned.

    The District Attorney initially indicated no opposition to Stephens’s resentencing.

    Stephens’s motion was denied without his presence or representation by counsel, and without any specific findings by the court.

    Procedural History

    Stephens filed a motion under CPL 440.20 to set aside his sentence, which was denied by the County Court.

    He appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department, which considered the appeal on its merits without granting permission for the appeal as required by statute.

    The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that the Appellate Division lacked jurisdiction because Stephens had not obtained leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division’s consideration of the merits of an appeal from the denial of a resentencing motion under Penal Law § 60.09, without granting permission to appeal as required by CPL 450.15 and 460.15, is a procedural defect that deprives the appellate court of subject matter jurisdiction.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 450.15 and 460.15 require permission for an appeal from the denial of a CPL 440.20 motion; failure to obtain that permission means the Appellate Division lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the statutory requirements of CPL 450.15 and 460.15, which mandate that permission be granted by a judge of the intermediate appellate court before an appeal can be taken from an order denying a motion to set aside a sentence under CPL 440.20. The court found that the appellant’s failure to obtain such permission was a fatal defect, depriving the Appellate Division of the power to hear the appeal. The court distinguished this case from situations where the Appellate Division lacked the power to consider an appeal by permission or otherwise. The majority opinion relied on precedent established in People v. De Jesus, 54 N.Y.2d 447, to support its holding. The dissenting judge argued that the Appellate Division’s decision to consider the merits of the case was functionally equivalent to granting permission for the appeal. The dissent also highlighted the importance of ensuring due process in resentencing proceedings, particularly when significant liberty interests are at stake. The dissent suggested that the court should fill the apparent gap in the statutory scheme to harmonize it with legislative intent, especially when constitutional matters are concerned. The dissent further pointed out that Stephens was denied counsel and the right to be present during the resentencing proceedings, which raised concerns about fairness and due process: “Believing these contentions are not without merit, it follows that I would reverse and remand the case to the County Court for proceedings on appellant’s motion under *782 section 60.09 of the Penal Law in accordance with constitutional notions of due process.”

  • People v. Favale, 56 N.Y.2d 449 (1982): Appealability of Resentencing Application Denials

    People v. Favale, 56 N.Y.2d 449 (1982)

    In New York, there is no right to appeal the denial of an application for resentencing unless a statute expressly authorizes such an appeal.

    Summary

    The defendant, Favale, sought resentencing under Penal Law § 60.09, which allows for discretionary resentencing for certain drug felonies. His application was denied, and he appealed. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that because no statute explicitly allows an appeal from the denial of a resentencing application under § 60.09, no such right exists. The court emphasized the distinction between appealing a sentence or resentence and appealing the denial of an application for resentencing.

    Facts

    Favale was convicted of a class A-II or A-III drug felony. He applied for resentencing pursuant to Penal Law § 60.09, a statute designed to mitigate the harsh sentencing consequences of the 1973 drug laws in appropriate cases.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Favale’s application for resentencing. Favale appealed this denial to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal. Favale then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing jurisdiction was proper under CPL 470.60(3).

    Issue(s)

    Whether the denial of an application for resentencing pursuant to Penal Law § 60.09 is appealable in the absence of a specific statutory provision authorizing such an appeal?

    Holding

    No, because in the absence of a statute expressly authorizing a criminal appeal, there is no right to appeal in a criminal case in New York.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the fundamental principle that the right to appeal in a criminal case exists only when explicitly authorized by statute, citing Matter of State of New York v. King, 36 NY2d 59, 63. Since no provision in Penal Law § 60.09 or any other statute permits an appeal from the denial of a resentencing application under § 60.09, the Court concluded that the Appellate Division correctly dismissed Favale’s appeal.

    The Court distinguished the case from situations where a defendant appeals from a sentence or resentence, which are covered by CPL 450.10(2) and 450.30(1, 2), or from the denial of a motion for resentencing under CPL 450.15(2) and 440.20. The Court reasoned that Favale was not appealing a sentence, but the denial of a request for resentencing, which is a different procedural posture.

    The Court emphasized that the legislature’s failure to provide for an appeal in § 60.09 implies that no such appeal was intended. The Court stated, “Indeed, we are required to conclude that since the Legislature failed to provide for an appeal from the denial of an application for resentencing pursuant to section 60.09 of the Penal Law, no appeal was intended.”

    The court explicitly declined to address the defendant’s arguments regarding the right to a hearing or representation by counsel during the resentencing application process, deeming those issues outside the scope of the procedural question before it.