New York Law Review

Tag: Required Records Exception

  • In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 45 N.Y.2d 677 (1978): Required Records Exception to Fifth Amendment Privilege

    In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 45 N.Y.2d 677 (1978)

    The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to records that are required by law to be kept and are subject to governmental regulation and inspection.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether physicians can invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to avoid producing records subpoenaed by a grand jury. The New York Court of Appeals held that the “required records exception” to the Fifth Amendment privilege applies because the physicians were legally obligated to maintain the records, which were subject to governmental inspection. This exception ensures that regulatory laws are enforceable by preventing individuals from using the Fifth Amendment to shield required records.

    Facts

    A Grand Jury issued a subpoena duces tecum to physician appellants, demanding the production of certain medical and billing records. These records related to patient treatments and financial transactions. The physicians refused to produce the records, asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, arguing that the records could potentially incriminate them.

    Procedural History

    The lower courts ordered the physicians to produce the subpoenaed records. The physicians appealed, arguing that the subpoena violated their Fifth Amendment rights. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects physicians from being compelled to produce medical and billing records that they are required by law to maintain and are subject to governmental inspection.
    2. Whether the demand for billing records exceeded the scope of disclosure permitted under Section 17 of the Public Health Law.

    Holding

    1. No, because the required records exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege applies to records that are required by law to be kept and are subject to governmental regulation and inspection.
    2. The court did not rule on this issue because of its holding regarding the required records exception rendering the issue moot.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Fifth Amendment privilege, which typically protects private papers from compelled disclosure, does not extend to records required to be kept by law and subject to governmental regulation. The court relied on the “required records exception,” citing Shapiro v. United States, Davis v. United States, Wilson v. United States, Matter of Cappetta, and Matter of Sigety v. Hynes. These cases establish the principle that allowing the Fifth Amendment privilege to protect such records would undermine the enforcement of state and federal laws.

    The court emphasized that physicians were legally obligated to maintain the subpoenaed records under 8 NYCRR 29.2(3) and, under certain circumstances, to make them available for governmental inspection as per Public Health Law § 230(10)(k). Therefore, the court held that the physicians’ personal privilege against self-incrimination did not apply to the records sought.

    The court quoted United States v. White, stating that to allow the privilege to cloak such records would make enforcement of State and Federal laws impossible.

    The court found it unnecessary to rule on the appellants’ claim that the demand for billing records exceeded the scope of disclosure pursuant to section 17 of the Public Health Law, noting that CPL 190.40(1) requires witnesses in Grand Jury proceedings to provide “any evidence legally requested”. The Court disposed of the appeal based on the “required records exception”.

  • Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena (NYS), 397 N.E.2d 1333 (NY 1979): Regarding the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and Bank Records

    Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena (NYS), 397 N.E.2d 1333 (NY 1979)

    A public employee’s records related to public funds are considered records of the employing institution, not the employee’s private property, and are subject to subpoena without violating the privilege against self-incrimination; similarly, bank records are the business records of the bank, not the personal property of the account holder, and are not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a public employee can invoke the privilege against self-incrimination to avoid producing records subpoenaed by a grand jury, and whether a subpoena to the employee’s bank violates the same privilege. The New York Court of Appeals held that records pertaining to public funds, kept by a public employee, are records of the employing institution and not subject to the employee’s personal privilege against self-incrimination. Additionally, bank records are the property of the bank, not the customer, and therefore not subject to the customer’s privilege against self-incrimination or unreasonable search and seizure. The court affirmed the lower court’s order rejecting the petitioner’s challenges to the subpoenas.

    Facts

    The petitioner, an employee of the Board of Education, received a subpoena duces tecum requiring him to produce certain records. A separate subpoena duces tecum was issued to the petitioner’s bank, seeking the bank’s records related to the petitioner’s accounts. The petitioner challenged both subpoenas, arguing that they violated his privilege against self-incrimination and, concerning the bank records, his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s challenges to both subpoenas. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the subpoena duces tecum addressed to the petitioner, requiring him to produce records related to public funds he handled as a public employee, violates his privilege against self-incrimination.

    2. Whether the subpoena duces tecum addressed to the petitioner’s bank, requiring the bank to produce records related to the petitioner’s accounts, violates the petitioner’s privilege against self-incrimination or his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

    Holding

    1. No, because the records sought were those of the Board of Education, the employing institution, and therefore not the petitioner’s private property subject to his personal privilege against self-incrimination. Additionally, these records fall within the “required records exception” to the privilege against self-incrimination.

    2. No, because the records sought from the bank are not subject to the constitutional privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures, and because the documents are the business records of the bank, not the personal property of the petitioner, requiring their production does not violate the petitioner’s privilege against self-incrimination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that because the petitioner was a public servant dealing with public funds and responsible for public records, the records sought were effectively those of the Board of Education. Citing Bellis v. United States, the court emphasized that the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to records held in a representative capacity. Furthermore, the court invoked the “required records exception,” stating that because the petitioner was required to maintain records of public funds, these records were not protected by the privilege. The court noted that the obligation to keep records was imposed by administrative regulation, which is sufficient for the “required records exception” to apply.

    Regarding the subpoena to the bank, the court relied on United States v. Miller, stating that bank records are not subject to the constitutional privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures. The court further explained that because the bank records are the property of the bank, not the petitioner, requiring the bank to produce them does not violate the petitioner’s privilege against self-incrimination. The court emphasized that the privilege protects a person from being compelled to produce their own private papers, not the business records of a third party.

    The court found no reason to disturb the lower courts’ findings, affirming the order to enforce the subpoenas.