New York Law Review

Tag: reputation evidence

  • People v. Fernandez, 17 N.Y.3d 70 (2011): Admissibility of Reputation Evidence Within a Family

    17 N.Y.3d 70 (2011)

    A witness’s reputation for truthfulness within their family and among family friends can be admissible as evidence, provided a proper foundation is laid demonstrating the reliability of the community’s assessment.

    Summary

    In a child sexual abuse case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony from the defendant’s parents regarding the complainant’s reputation for untruthfulness within their family. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding such testimony, finding that the family and family friends could constitute a relevant community for assessing reputation, and the parents’ testimony laid a sufficient foundation. This decision clarifies that reputation evidence is not strictly limited to residential or professional communities, but can extend to any group where an individual’s character is observed sufficiently to form a reliable reputation.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with sexually abusing his niece between August and December 2005. At trial, the niece testified to multiple instances of abuse in the defendant’s bedroom. The defendant denied the allegations. The defendant’s parents testified, corroborating his alibi. Defense counsel sought to introduce testimony from the parents that the complainant had a bad reputation for truthfulness among their family and family friends.

    Procedural History

    The trial court sustained objections to the reputation testimony, finding an improper foundation. The defendant was convicted of sexual abuse and endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the trial court erred in precluding the reputation testimony. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in precluding the defendant from presenting testimony from family members regarding the complainant’s reputation for untruthfulness within their family and circle of family friends.

    Holding

    Yes, because the family and family friends can constitute a relevant community for purposes of introducing testimony pertaining to an opposing witness’s bad reputation for truth and veracity, and a proper foundation had been laid.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on established precedent affirming a party’s right to present witnesses testifying to an opposing witness’s bad reputation for truthfulness, provided a proper foundation exists (citing People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282 (1983)). The court stated, “a trial court must allow such testimony, once a foundation has been laid, so long as it is relevant to contradict the testimony of a key witness and is limited to general reputation for truth and veracity” (citing People v. Hanley, 5 N.Y.3d 108, 112 (2005)). The Court emphasized that reputation evidence may stem from any community where an individual’s associations permit sufficient observation to ensure reliability (citing People v. Bouton, 50 N.Y.2d 130 (1980)). It rejected the argument that family members’ potential bias justified excluding the testimony, stating that credibility is a jury question, not a basis for excluding relevant evidence. The court found the parents’ testimony established an adequate foundation, as they demonstrated extensive knowledge of the complainant and awareness of her reputation within the extended family. Therefore, excluding this evidence prevented the jury from properly assessing the complainant’s credibility, warranting a new trial.

  • People v. Hanley, 5 N.Y.3d 108 (2005): Admissibility of Witness Reputation for Truthfulness

    5 N.Y.3d 108 (2005)

    A defendant has the right to present evidence that a key prosecution witness has a bad reputation in the community for truth and veracity, provided a proper foundation is laid.

    Summary

    Thomas Hanley was convicted of robbery based on the testimony of two bartenders who claimed he robbed them, implying the presence of a gun. Hanley sought to introduce a witness who would testify that the bartenders had a reputation in the community for dishonesty. The trial court disallowed this testimony. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the exclusion of this reputation evidence was reversible error because the credibility of the bartenders was crucial, and the defendant had a right to present evidence challenging their truthfulness. The court also addressed that the witness worked with the bartenders. The Court of Appeals determined that the case rested largely on the bartender’s testimony and by not allowing the fellow bartender’s testimony, the jury was not able to properly assess the key witnesses’ credibility.

    Facts

    James McEnroe and Brendan Sean Byrne, bartenders at Wilson’s Bar, testified that Hanley robbed them on separate occasions. McEnroe stated that Hanley implied he had a gun. Byrne testified that Hanley demanded money and pointed at him, leading Byrne to believe he had a weapon. No gun was ever recovered. Hanley was charged with robbery. A third bartender was willing to testify that McEnroe and Byrne had a bad reputation in the community for truthfulness.

    Procedural History

    Hanley was convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, vacating one robbery count and reducing the sentence for menacing, but otherwise affirmed. Two dissenting justices believed the exclusion of the reputation evidence was a denial of a fair trial. A Justice of the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defendant to present a witness who would testify that two key prosecution witnesses had a bad reputation in the community for truth and veracity.

    Holding

    Yes, because a party has a right to call a witness to testify that a key opposing witness has a bad reputation in the community for truth and veracity, provided a proper foundation has been established, and in this case, the credibility of the witnesses was essential to proving the crime charged.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the precedent set in People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282 (1983), stating that a party has the right to call a witness to testify about the bad reputation for truthfulness of a key opposing witness. The Court emphasized that the element of displaying what appeared to be a weapon was essential to proving first-degree robbery, making the bartenders’ credibility critical. The Court also stated that the proposed witness’ testimony was not discretionary and the failure to allow the fellow bartender to testify was highly prejudicial as it deprived the jury of properly assessing the credibility of the prosecution’s key witnesses. The court stated, “[a]s we made clear in Pavao, a party may introduce reputation testimony as a matter of right if a proper foundation has been established.” The court stated that even though the trial court stated that such evidence was too “nebulous,” the defendant had a right to present a witness with personal knowledge of the bartenders’ bad reputation. A witness’ reputation among coworkers can be considered. The Court found that the exclusion of the reputation evidence could have altered the jury’s decision, warranting reversal.

  • People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282 (1983): Admissibility of Reputation Evidence for Witness Credibility

    People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282 (1983)

    A party has the right to call a witness to testify that a key opposing witness, who gave substantive evidence, has a bad reputation in the community for truth and veracity.

    Summary

    Frank Pavao was convicted of assault. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction due to the trial court’s improper refusal to allow a defense witness to testify about the bad reputation for truthfulness of a key prosecution witness. The Court of Appeals held that excluding this testimony was prejudicial error. Furthermore, the Court found insufficient evidence to support the convictions for second-degree assault. This case clarifies the admissibility of reputation evidence to impeach a witness’s credibility and highlights the importance of a fair trial.

    Facts

    A fight occurred at “Pop’s Bar” where James Irwin and John Staganelli were assaulted. The fight spilled outside where Patricia Pittman and Thomas Walters were passing by. Defendant Pavao allegedly hurled racial slurs at Pittman and Walters, leading to another fight. Walters was beaten, shot by the defendant, and Pittman identified Pavao as the shooter.

    At trial, Serafim Pelarigo, a witness for the prosecution, testified that Pavao admitted to shooting a black man. Defense counsel attempted to call James Velasquez to testify regarding Pelarigo’s reputation for truthfulness in the community.

    Procedural History

    Pavao was convicted of assault in the first degree and two counts of assault in the second degree in the Supreme Court, Queens County. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. Pavao appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the first-degree assault conviction and dismissed the second-degree assault counts.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow a defense witness to testify regarding the bad reputation for truthfulness of a key prosecution witness.
    2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions for assault in the first and second degrees.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a party has the right to present evidence that a key opposing witness has a bad reputation for truth and veracity.
    2. No, the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions for second degree assault because the complainants and another witness testified that the defendant was not the person who assaulted them.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while extrinsic evidence to contradict a witness’s answers on collateral matters is generally inadmissible for impeachment purposes, this rule does not apply when the aim is to demonstrate the witness’s bad reputation for truthfulness. Citing People v. Hinksman, the court emphasized that such testimony is limited to the witness’s reputation for truth and veracity, distinguishing it from general reputation evidence. The court found that denying the defendant the opportunity to challenge the key prosecution witness’s (Pelarigo) veracity deprived the jury of evidence assisting them in evaluating credibility. The court stated, “When the use of extrinsic impeaching testimony is limited to a general statement that the witness’ reputation in the community for truth and veracity is bad, there is no fear that trials will become unnecessarily protracted affairs involving numerous minitrials over whether or not a witness’ answer was accurate or whether a witness did a particular act.” The court emphasized that “the known reputation of a key witness for honesty and truth should be considered in testing his credibility.” As for the second-degree assault charges, the court found the evidence insufficient as the alleged victims themselves testified that Pavao was not their assailant, along with testimony from a barmaid that Pavao was not present.