New York Law Review

Tag: Republication

  • Geraci v. Probst, 15 N.Y.3d 343 (2010): Limits on Liability for Republication of Defamatory Statements

    Geraci v. Probst, 15 N.Y.3d 343 (2010)

    A party who makes a defamatory statement is not liable for its subsequent republication by a third party unless the original speaker authorized, requested, or participated in the republication.

    Summary

    Geraci sued Probst for defamation after Probst falsely accused him of receiving a commission on fire truck sales to the Syosset Fire District. At trial, the court admitted a Newsday article republishing the defamatory statement, which appeared years after Probst’s original statement and without his involvement. The Court of Appeals held that the admission of the republication was error because Probst had no connection to the Newsday article. The Court clarified the standard for republication liability, emphasizing that the original defamer must have authorized, requested, or participated in the republication to be held liable for it.

    Facts

    Geraci and Probst were former business partners selling fire trucks. Geraci, a Syosset Fire District commissioner, stated he would not profit from sales to the district. Probst sent a letter to the Board of Fire Commissioners claiming Geraci shared a commission from a Syosset rescue vehicle sale, which was false. More than two years after the suit was filed and three years after the letter, Newsday published an article about an investigation into fire apparatus sales, mentioning the allegation of a “hidden commission for Geraci.” Probst had no involvement with the Newsday article.

    Procedural History

    Geraci sued Probst for defamation in Supreme Court. The trial court admitted the Newsday article over Probst’s objection. The jury found for Geraci. The Supreme Court reduced the damages award. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the republication argument unpreserved. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Newsday article republishing Probst’s defamatory statement.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that Probst’s statement was defamatory per se.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Probst had no connection to the Newsday article’s republication of the defamatory statement.

    2. No, because Probst’s statement alleged acts constituting a misdemeanor in violation of the General Municipal Law and could damage Geraci’s professional reputation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found the republication argument preserved. Citing Schoepflin v. Coffey, 162 N.Y. 12 (1900), the Court reiterated the long-standing rule that a person is not responsible for the voluntary and unjustifiable repetition of a defamatory statement by others without their authority or request. The Court reasoned that each person who repeats the defamatory statement is responsible for the resulting damages. Admission of the Newsday article was erroneous because there was no evidence Probst had any connection to the article. The Court rejected Geraci’s argument that republication was reasonably expected, clarifying that the foreseeability standard in Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d 531 (1980), and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 576(c), applied only when the original speaker made the statement directly to a reporter or widely disseminated the information, neither of which occurred here. The Court distinguished Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 52 N.Y.2d 422 (1981) to support this holding. As for the defamatory per se instruction, the Court held that Probst’s statement alleged acts constituting a misdemeanor under General Municipal Law § 801(1) and could damage Geraci’s professional reputation, justifying the instruction. The Court noted: “[G]enerally, a written statement may be defamatory ‘if it tends to expose a person to hatred, contempt or aversion, or to induce an evil or unsavory opinion of him in the minds of a substantial number of the community’”.

  • Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 52 N.Y.2d 422 (1981): Statute of Limitations and Actual Malice in Libel Cases

    Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 52 N.Y.2d 422 (1981)

    A new edition of a book constitutes a republication for Statute of Limitations purposes; summary judgment is disfavored in public figure libel cases where actual malice is at issue, especially before discovery.

    Summary

    Justice Rinaldi sued Viking Penguin for libel over statements in “The Abuse of Power.” The book alleged Rinaldi released a mobster from police custody. The hardcover was published in May 1977. Rinaldi demanded a retraction. A paperback edition with minor changes was released in May 1978. Rinaldi sued, claiming the paperback was a republication, restarting the Statute of Limitations. The court addressed whether the paperback was a republication and the standard for summary judgment on actual malice. The Court of Appeals held the paperback was a new edition, restarting the limitations period, and affirmed denial of summary judgment for the publisher due to unresolved issues of actual malice, especially before discovery.

    Facts

    Viking Penguin published “The Abuse of Power” in hardcover in May 1977. The book contained statements alleging Justice Rinaldi released an alleged mobster, Santo Patti, from police custody on two occasions. Rinaldi protested the statements as false and demanded a retraction and correction. Viking offered to delete the reference to police stations but refused further changes. Rinaldi claimed the statements implied he was connected to organized crime. In May 1978, Viking released a paperback edition of the book, making minor changes but leaving the allegedly libelous statement intact. The paperback had a new cover, publisher’s name, title page, copyright page, and identifying numbers.

    Procedural History

    Rinaldi sued Viking Penguin and the authors for libel. Special Term denied defendants’ motions for summary judgment and granted plaintiff’s cross-motion dismissing the Statute of Limitations defense. The Appellate Division modified, granting summary judgment to the authors but otherwise affirming. The Appellate Division granted Viking leave to appeal. Rinaldi appealed as of right, challenging the dismissal against the authors.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the publication of the paperback edition constituted a republication of the allegedly libelous material for the purpose of the Statute of Limitations?
    2. Whether summary judgment was appropriate on the issue of actual malice, given the status of Justice Rinaldi as a public figure?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the paperback edition was a new edition, not merely a delayed circulation of the original.
    2. No, because the issue of actual malice requires further factual exploration, particularly through discovery, and summary judgment is disfavored in such cases.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished the “single publication rule” established in Gregoire v. Putnam’s Sons, which held that the Statute of Limitations runs from the initial publication date for a single issue of a book or magazine. The court stated that Gregoire did not preclude a new cause of action for a repetition of the defamation in a later edition. Here, the paperback edition was not a mere sale from existing stock, as in Gregoire, but a conscious decision to create and distribute a new edition with significant alterations, including a new cover, publisher’s name, and copyright page. The court emphasized that “whatever reediting, repricing, reprinting, restyling, rebinding, redistributing, republicizing, re-registering, reidentifying or recovering took place, these were directed to the new project.”

    On the issue of actual malice, the court acknowledged the requirement for public figures to prove that the defamatory falsehood was uttered with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth. However, the court noted that the Supreme Court had expressed disapproval of widespread summary judgment use in public figure defamation cases. The court emphasized that proving “actual malice” involves questioning the defendant’s state of mind, which “does not readily lend itself to summary disposition” (Hutchinson v. Proxmire). The court found that Rinaldi presented sufficient evidence, including his own affidavit, evidence of the publisher’s awareness of inaccuracies before publishing the paperback, and the failure to implement corrections, to warrant a trial on the issue of malice. The court also considered the fact that discovery had been stayed and that Rinaldi had not been given an opportunity to fully explore the issue of malice. Citing CPLR 3212(f), the court stated that summary judgment could be denied to allow for discovery. The court noted that the publisher’s own investigation revealed inaccuracies. The court held that the issue of actual malice was not ripe for summary disposition pending completion of discovery. As to the authors, the court affirmed the dismissal of the case as they had no participation in the decision to publish the paperback edition.