New York Law Review

Tag: Replevin

  • Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell, 77 N.Y.2d 311 (1991): Statute of Limitations in Replevin Actions for Stolen Art

    77 N.Y.2d 311 (1991)

    In replevin actions for stolen art, the statute of limitations begins to run when the owner demands the return of the chattel and the possessor refuses, without imposing a duty of reasonable diligence on the owner to locate the stolen property.

    Summary

    The Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation sued Rachel Lubell to recover a stolen Chagall gouache. Lubell argued the statute of limitations barred the claim because the museum failed to diligently search for the painting after its theft in the late 1960s. The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations begins to run upon demand and refusal, rejecting a reasonable diligence requirement for owners of stolen art. The court reasoned that imposing such a duty would be impractical and would encourage illicit trafficking in stolen art, while noting that the defendant could still assert a laches defense at trial.

    Facts

    The Guggenheim Museum owned a Chagall gouache, donated in 1937. The gouache was last seen at the museum on April 2, 1965. Sometime in the late 1960s, the museum discovered it was missing but didn’t know it was stolen until a 1969-1970 inventory. The museum did not report the theft to authorities, believing publicity would hinder recovery. In 1974, the museum “deaccessioned” the gouache. In 1967, Mrs. Lubell and her husband bought the painting from a gallery for $17,000. The painting was traced back to Mrs. Lubell in 1985. The museum demanded its return in January 1986, and she refused.

    Procedural History

    The Guggenheim sued Lubell in 1987 to recover the painting. The trial court granted summary judgment to Lubell, finding the claim time-barred due to the museum’s lack of diligence. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the statute of limitations defense and denying Lubell’s summary judgment motion. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a museum’s failure to take reasonable steps to locate a stolen painting affects the statute of limitations defense in a replevin action against a good-faith purchaser.

    Holding

    No, because in New York, a cause of action for replevin against a good-faith purchaser of stolen property accrues when the true owner demands the return of the chattel and the possessor refuses, and there is no requirement that the owner exercise reasonable diligence in locating the stolen property for the statute of limitations to apply.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals upheld the demand and refusal rule, stating that it “affords the most protection to the true owners of stolen property.” The court rejected the imposition of a reasonable diligence requirement, noting that while New York case law recognizes that a true owner cannot unreasonably delay making demand once they discover the location of their property, imposing a duty of diligence before the true owner has reason to know where its missing chattel is to be found would be imprudent. The court highlighted the difficulty in defining “reasonable diligence” due to the varied circumstances of art theft. The Court was also influenced by New York’s status as a preeminent cultural center, reasoning that placing the burden of locating stolen art on the true owner would encourage illicit trafficking. The court noted prior legislative attempts to institute a discovery rule, which were ultimately vetoed by the governor due to concerns of turning New York into a haven for cultural property stolen abroad. However, the court clarified that the museum’s conduct would be considered in the context of Lubell’s laches defense. The court stated, “Despite our conclusion that the imposition of a reasonable diligence requirement on the museum would be inappropriate for purposes of the Statute of Limitations, our holding today should not be seen as either sanctioning the museum’s conduct or suggesting that the museum’s conduct is no longer an issue in this case.”

  • Moreno v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 435 (1987): Replevin Action After Criminal Charges Dismissed

    Moreno v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 435 (1987)

    A property owner’s common-law right to demand the return of seized property, or its value in a replevin action, is not extinguished by a city administrative code provision that allows the property clerk to transfer unclaimed money to another fund after a statutory period.

    Summary

    Mayra Moreno was arrested, and money was seized by New York City police. After the criminal charges were dismissed, she assigned her rights to her attorney, who then demanded the money’s return more than 90 days after the dismissal. The City refused, claiming the demand was untimely under the Administrative Code and the *McClendon v. Rosetti* ruling, asserting the funds were abandoned. Moreno then commenced a replevin action. The New York Court of Appeals held that the City’s administrative code provision merely fixed the point at which the property clerk could transfer funds, not extinguish the owner’s common-law right to demand the property’s return via a replevin action.

    Facts

    On December 15, 1982, Mayra Moreno was arrested in New York City on gambling charges, and $156,150 was seized by the police.
    The seized money was delivered to the New York City Police Department property clerk.
    On March 8, 1983, Moreno served a notice of claim on the City while criminal charges were pending.
    The criminal charges against Moreno were dismissed on September 19, 1983.
    Six months later, Moreno assigned her rights to the seized funds to her attorney, Paul Lieber.
    On March 19, 1984, Lieber demanded the Police Department return the money.
    On March 27, 1984, the Police Department informed Lieber that his demand was untimely based on the Administrative Code and *McClendon v. Rosetti*, claiming the funds were deemed abandoned and paid over to the City.

    Procedural History

    Moreno commenced a common-law replevin action to recover the funds and served a second notice of claim.
    The City moved to dismiss, arguing the demand was untimely.
    The trial court granted the City’s motion, dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
    The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted Moreno’s motion for leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a replevin action to recover property seized by the City of New York in connection with a criminal prosecution may be maintained when the owner has not demanded return of the property within 90 days of the dismissal of the criminal charges, given the City’s administrative code provision regarding unclaimed property.

    Holding

    No, because the Administrative Code provision cited by the City merely fixes the point at which the property clerk may transfer the money to another fund, but it does not impose an obligation on the owner to demand the money within 90 days nor does it impair the owner’s common-law right to demand return of the property seized or its value in a replevin action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals considered the interplay between the City’s Administrative Code § 435-4.0(e) (now § 14-140(e)), which addresses the handling of unclaimed property by the police property clerk, and the common-law right to replevin.
    The Court acknowledged that the Administrative Code allows the property clerk to transfer unclaimed money to the Police Pension Fund after three months.
    However, the Court emphasized that the code provision does not impose an affirmative duty on the owner to demand the money within 90 days of the dismissal of criminal charges, nor does it impose a penalty for failing to do so. The court stated: “It does not, in short, impair the owner’s common-law right to demand return of the property seized or its value in a replevin action.”
    The court distinguished the City’s reliance on *McClendon v. Rosetti*, noting that while *McClendon* established a procedure for demanding property within 90 days to avoid having to commence a court action, it did not eliminate the owner’s right to pursue other remedies, such as replevin or an Article 78 proceeding.
    The Court rejected the City’s argument that failing to claim the funds within three months resulted in the loss of any right of possession. The court clarified that the code provision simply relieves the property clerk of the responsibility of retaining the moneys in custody after the statutory period.
    The Court also noted that the claimant bears the burden of proving title and lawful use of the money, but this burden does not negate the right to bring a replevin action.

  • Boyle v. Kelley, 42 N.Y.2d 88 (1977): Notice of Claim Required in Replevin Action Against County

    Boyle v. Kelley, 42 N.Y.2d 88 (1977)

    A replevin action against a county to recover property seized pursuant to a warrant is subject to the notice of claim requirements of the County Law, even if the underlying criminal charges are dismissed.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a plaintiff must file a notice of claim before bringing a replevin action against a county to recover money seized during a criminal investigation, after the charges were dismissed. The Court of Appeals held that the notice of claim requirement applies. The court reasoned that the County Law’s broad language encompasses claims for the invasion of property rights, regardless of whether the action is framed as legal or equitable. Failure to file a notice of claim mandates dismissal of the complaint. This decision reinforces the importance of adhering to statutory prerequisites when suing governmental entities.

    Facts

    Donald J. Boyle was arrested and charged with gambling offenses after police seized $14,960.35 from his apartment pursuant to a warrant. The search was invalidated as to Donald, and the evidence suppressed. Donald J. Boyle died, and the charges against him were dismissed. The administrator of Boyle’s estate then sought to recover the seized money from the Suffolk County Police Commissioner. The administrator filed a summons and complaint seeking return of the funds plus interest but did not file a notice of claim.

    Procedural History

    The administrator of Boyle’s estate moved for the return of the money, which was initially withdrawn pending appointment of an administrator. After being appointed, the administrator commenced an action against the Police Commissioner without filing a notice of claim. Special Term granted the administrator’s motion for summary judgment, finding wrongful detention. The Appellate Division affirmed, relying on equitable grounds. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the notice of claim requirement applied and that the failure to comply required dismissal of the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a replevin action against a county for the return of money seized pursuant to a warrant, following the dismissal of criminal charges, requires the plaintiff to file a notice of claim under Section 52 of the County Law.

    Holding

    Yes, because Section 52 of the County Law requires a notice of claim for any claim against a county for the invasion of property rights, regardless of whether the action is characterized as legal or equitable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the Appellate Division’s reliance on equitable principles to circumvent the notice of claim requirement. The court stated that an equitable action is inappropriate where an adequate remedy at law exists, such as replevin or an Article 78 proceeding. More importantly, the court emphasized the broad language of Section 52(1) of the County Law, which mandates a notice of claim for “any claim…for invasion of personal or property rights…and any other claim for damages arising at law or in equity.” The court found that this language encompasses the administrator’s claim for the return of the seized money. The Court stated: “Any claim or notice of claim against a county for damage, injury or death, or for invasion of personal or property rights, of every name and nature, and whether casual or continuing trespass or nuisance and any other claim for damages arising at law or in equity, alleged to have been caused or sustained in whole or in part by or because of any misfeasance, omission of duty, negligence or wrongful act on the part of the county, its officers, agents, servants or employees, must be made and served in compliance with section fifty-e of the general municipal law.” The failure to file a notice of claim as required by statute was deemed fatal to the plaintiff’s case, warranting reversal and dismissal.

  • Menzel v. List, 24 N.Y.2d 91 (1969): Damages for Breach of Warranty of Title

    Menzel v. List, 24 N.Y.2d 91 (1969)

    In cases of breach of warranty of title for personal property, the buyer is entitled to recover the fair market value of the property at the time of dispossession, not merely the original purchase price.

    Summary

    This case concerns the proper measure of damages for breach of an implied warranty of title when a painting, later discovered to be stolen, was sold and subsequently recovered by its rightful owner. The New York Court of Appeals held that the buyer was entitled to recover the present market value of the painting at the time of dispossession, reflecting the buyer’s actual loss and putting them in the position they would have occupied had the title been good, rather than simply refunding the original purchase price.

    Facts

    Erna Menzel purchased a Marc Chagall painting in Belgium in 1932. In 1940, fleeing the German invasion, the Menzel’s left the painting behind. German authorities seized it. In 1955, Klaus and Erna Peris, operating an art gallery in New York, purchased the painting in Paris for $2,800, unaware of its history. They sold it to Albert List in October 1955 for $4,000. In 1962, Mrs. Menzel discovered the painting in List’s possession and demanded its return.

    Procedural History

    Mrs. Menzel sued List in replevin to recover the painting. List, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against the Peris for breach of implied warranty of title. The trial court ruled in favor of Mrs. Menzel, ordering List to return the painting or pay $22,500, its then-current value. The court also found for List against the Peris for $22,500 plus List’s costs in the Menzel action. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing List’s recovery against the Peris to $4,000 (the original purchase price) plus interest. List appealed to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the damage calculation. The Peris cross-appealed concerning the date interest began accruing.

    Issue(s)

    1. What is the proper measure of damages for breach of an implied warranty of title in the sale of personal property?

    2. From what date should interest run on the judgment in favor of List against the Peris?

    Holding

    1. No, the proper measure of damages is the value of the painting at the time of trial of the original action, not merely the original purchase price, because that represents the buyer’s actual loss resulting from the breach of warranty.

    2. No, interest should be included from the date on which Mrs. Menzel’s judgment was entered, because List was not damaged until he was required to surrender the painting or pay its present value.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the measure of damages for breach of warranty should place the injured buyer in as good a position as they would have occupied had the contract been kept. Awarding only the purchase price would merely restore the buyer to the status quo ante, effectively denying any damages for the breach. The court found existing New York case law on the issue to be sparse and inconsistent, treating the issue as one of first impression. It relied on Section 150(6) of the New York Personal Property Law (counterpart to Section 13 of the Uniform Sales Act), stating that damages for breach of warranty should be the loss directly and naturally resulting from the breach. Quoting Williston on Contracts, the court emphasized that the injured buyer should receive “such damages as will put him in as good a position as he would have occupied had the contract been kept.” The court dismissed concerns about potentially ruinous liability for sellers, noting that sellers could protect themselves by investigating title or excluding warranties under Section 94 of the Personal Property Law. Regarding interest, the court held that List was not damaged until the judgment in favor of Mrs. Menzel, and therefore interest should run from that date. As the court stated, “Manifestly, the present-value measure of damages has no necessary connection with the date of purchase and is, in fact, inconsistent with the running of interest from the date of purchase since List’s possession was not disturbed until the judgment directing delivery of the painting to Mrs. Menzel, or, in the alternative, paying her the present value of the painting.”

  • First National Bank of Oswego v. Dunn, 97 N.Y. 149 (1884): Property Subject to Replevin Cannot Be Levied Upon

    First National Bank of Oswego v. Dunn, 97 N.Y. 149 (1884)

    Property that is the subject of a replevin action and is in the custody of the law, either with the officer or the plaintiff in replevin, cannot be levied upon by an execution issued against the defendant in the replevin action.

    Summary

    This case addresses the conflict between a replevin action and a subsequent execution levy on the same property. The First National Bank of Oswego initiated a replevin action against Dunn to recover malt. Before the malt was delivered to the bank, the Second National Bank of Oswego issued an execution against Dunn and attempted to levy on the same malt. The court held that the property subject to replevin is in the custody of the law and cannot be levied upon by another execution against the defendant in replevin. This ruling ensures the integrity of the replevin action and prevents inconsistent legal mandates.

    Facts

    Dunn was in possession of certain malt.
    The First National Bank of Oswego brought a replevin action against Dunn to recover the malt, claiming ownership.
    Dunn did not post a bond to retain the property.
    Before the sheriff delivered the malt to the First National Bank, the Second National Bank of Oswego, a judgment creditor of Dunn, issued an execution to the sheriff and directed him to levy on the same malt.
    The sheriff levied on the malt.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term set aside the levy by the Second National Bank.
    The General Term reversed the Special Term’s order, upholding the levy.
    The First National Bank appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether property held under a writ of replevin, either by the officer or the plaintiff, can be levied upon by an execution issued against the defendant in the replevin action.

    Holding

    Yes, because property subject to a replevin action is in the custody of the law, and allowing a subsequent levy would create inconsistent legal duties and undermine the purpose of the replevin action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that allowing the levy would place the sheriff in an impossible situation, requiring him to both deliver the property per the replevin writ and retain it under the execution. This would also undermine the plaintiff’s right in the replevin action, forcing them to give a bond for the property’s return while simultaneously preventing that return due to the levy.

    The court emphasized that the replevin action is an in rem proceeding, with the court holding the property subject to its ultimate disposition. Allowing other processes to disturb this custody would defeat the purpose of replevin. The court cited Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 404, stating that property taken on a writ is in the custody of the law and cannot be disturbed by any process, especially from another jurisdiction.

    The court distinguished the case from successive executions issued to the same officer, where the later executions operate as a constructive levy without disturbing the officer’s possession. Here, the execution following the replevin sets the officer at war with himself, creating inconsistent duties. The court stated, “[A]n execution following a writ of replevin sets the officer at once at war with himself.”

    The court noted that while the Code provides for claimants with prior claims (§ 1709), it does not address situations where the creditor’s judgment and execution occur after the replevin. In such cases, the creditor’s rights are derived from the debtor’s title, and if that title is already in dispute and the property lawfully removed, the creditor cannot disturb the custody.

    The court suggested that the creditor could pursue an equitable remedy, making all claimants parties to avoid a multiplicity of suits and determine the controversy in one action. The court emphasized the need for a remedy consistent with the sheriff’s duty under the replevin and the law’s hold on the property.

    The court emphasized that the creditor, in the present case, must pursue a remedy consistent with the sheriff’s duty under the replevin, and with the hold which the law has upon the property. The issue of his execution gave him a general lien against the property of his debtor. He meets with an obstruction to his levy. The court sees no reason why he may not proceed in equity, making all the rival claimants parties, preventing if need be a transfer of the property by the plaintiff in replevin, avoiding a multiplicity of suits, and so determining in one action the whole controversy.