New York Law Review

Tag: removal from office

  • Matter of Simon, 40 N.Y.3d 36 (2023): Grounds for Removal of a Judge for Misconduct

    Matter of Simon, 40 N.Y.3d 36 (2023)

    A judge can be removed from office for egregious misconduct that demonstrates a pattern of injudicious behavior and damages public confidence in the integrity of the court, even if the judge acknowledges their actions were wrong.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals upheld the State Commission on Judicial Conduct’s recommendation to remove Judge Alan M. Simon from his judicial positions. Simon conceded to multiple charges of misconduct, including violating rules regarding judicial integrity, impartiality, and appropriate conduct. The court found that Simon’s actions, which included using his position to bully, intimidate, and engage in political activity, constituted “truly egregious circumstances” that warranted removal. The court emphasized that even though Simon admitted his misconduct, his pattern of behavior, lack of remorse, and attempts to minimize his actions undermined public trust and demonstrated unfitness for judicial office.

    Facts

    Alan M. Simon served as a Justice in Spring Valley Village Court, Ramapo Town Court, and Acting Justice in Hillburn Village Court. The State Commission on Judicial Conduct brought six charges of misconduct against him. Simon conceded to the charges, which included violating various rules of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, such as upholding the integrity and independence of the judiciary, acting impartially, refraining from lending the prestige of the office to advance private interests, maintaining professional competence, and avoiding political activity. Specifically, Simon used sanctions improperly, bullied and intimidated various individuals, engaged in ethnic smearing and name-calling, threatened officials, and injected himself into the political process of an election other than his own.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated Simon’s conduct and sustained six charges against him, recommending his removal from office. Simon sought review of the Commission’s determination from the New York Court of Appeals. Simon conceded his misconduct but argued for a lesser sanction than removal, such as censure. The Court of Appeals reviewed the record and the Commission’s findings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Court of Appeals should accept the recommendation of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct and remove Judge Simon from his judicial offices.

    Holding

    Yes, because Simon’s misconduct met the standard of “truly egregious circumstances” justifying removal from office, due to the pattern of misconduct, lack of remorse, and damage to public confidence in the judiciary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court cited its broad authority to determine appropriate sanctions in judicial misconduct cases, emphasizing that the goal is to safeguard the bench from unfit incumbents. The court differentiated between a judge’s poor judgment and misconduct that qualifies as “truly egregious circumstances” and thus justifies removal. The court found that the actions demonstrated a pattern of injudicious behavior, as well as an abuse of power that had damaged public confidence in the court. The court highlighted Simon’s use of sanctions inappropriately, his bullying and intimidating behavior, and his involvement in political activity, which all demonstrated a pattern of misconduct. The court noted the lack of remorse and evasiveness by Simon as additional justification for removal.

    The court quoted prior precedent, stating that the ultimate sanction of removal is “reserved for ‘truly egregious circumstances’ that extend beyond the limits of ‘even extremely poor judgment’”, and that removal is warranted when a judge exhibits “a pattern of injudicious behavior…which cannot be viewed as acceptable conduct by one holding judicial office.”

    Practical Implications

    This case serves as a clear warning to judges about the standard of conduct expected of them. It underscores that judges must not only act within the bounds of the law but also uphold the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The case is a reminder that the courts take seriously any actions that undermine public trust. The practical implication for attorneys and judges is that even if a judge believes their motives are pure, actions perceived as bullying, intimidation, or the abuse of power can lead to severe disciplinary action, including removal from office. Future judicial conduct cases will likely refer to Simon’s actions as examples of the types of misconduct that justify the ultimate sanction of removal.

  • In re Tamsen, 99 N.Y.2d 20 (2002): Judicial Removal for Misconduct Unrelated to Judicial Duties

    In re Tamsen, 99 N.Y.2d 20 (2002)

    A judge may be removed from office for misconduct, even if that misconduct is unrelated to the judge’s official duties and occurred before the judge assumed office, if the misconduct demonstrates a lack of integrity that undermines public confidence in the judiciary.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals upheld the removal of a Town Court Justice, Tamsen, from his judicial office due to misconduct that occurred prior to his judgeship. Tamsen had misappropriated funds from his law firm, leading to his disbarment. The Court found that this conduct, although unrelated to his judicial duties, demonstrated a lack of integrity rendering him unfit for judicial office. The court emphasized that judges must be held to a higher standard of conduct to maintain public confidence in the judiciary, and Tamsen’s actions warranted removal regardless of when they occurred or whether they directly impacted his judicial performance. The Court granted the motion for summary determination because there was no issue of fact to be raised.

    Facts

    Timothy Tamsen, while working as an attorney, misappropriated $2,500 in legal fees from his law firm employer on six occasions in 1995 and 1996.
    Tamsen altered a receipt book in an attempt to conceal one instance of theft.
    As a result of these actions, Tamsen was disbarred from practicing law by the Appellate Division, Second Department.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct initiated a proceeding against Tamsen, who was then a Town Court Justice, based on the misappropriation and disbarment.
    The Administrator of the Commission moved for summary determination, which was granted by the Commission despite Tamsen’s opposition.
    The Commission sustained one charge of misconduct and determined that Tamsen should be removed from office.
    Tamsen sought review of the Commission’s determination by the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State Commission on Judicial Conduct erred in granting summary determination and precluding consideration of Tamsen’s fitness to perform his judicial duties.
    Whether Tamsen’s misconduct, which occurred prior to his judicial service and was unrelated to his judicial duties, warrants his removal from judicial office.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statutory requirement authorizing the Commission to make a determination after a hearing does not require a formal hearing where no issue of fact is raised.
    2. Yes, because Tamsen’s misappropriation of funds and related subterfuge resulting in his disbarment as an attorney while sitting as Judge warrants removal under the applicable standards even though the wrongdoings related to conduct outside his judicial office.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that summary determination was appropriate because Tamsen was given ample opportunity to be heard on issues of law, namely, whether his conduct violated the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and what the appropriate sanction should be. He was not entitled to relitigate the underlying facts of his disbarment.
    Regarding the sanction, the Court emphasized that judges must be held to a higher standard of conduct than the general public to maintain public confidence in the judiciary. Even relatively minor improprieties can subject the judiciary to public criticism. The Court quoted Matter of Aldrich v State Commn. on Jud. Conduct, 58 NY2d 279, 283 (1983): “relatively slight improprieties subject the judiciary as a whole to public criticism and rebuke”.
    The Court found that Tamsen’s misappropriation of funds and subsequent disbarment, even though predating his judicial service, demonstrated a lack of integrity that undermined public confidence. The Court explicitly stated, “notwithstanding that all of the wrongdoings related to conduct outside his judicial office” such actions still warrant removal. Citing Matter of Boulanger, 61 NY2d 89, 92 (1984). The Court stated that the expiration of Tamsen’s term of judicial office did not moot the proceeding.

  • In re Going, 99 N.Y.2d 121 (2002): Judicial Misconduct and the Standard for Removal

    In re Going, 99 N.Y.2d 121 (2002)

    Judges are held to higher standards of conduct than the public, and removal from office is warranted when a judge’s actions constitute truly egregious misconduct that undermines public confidence in the judiciary.

    Summary

    This case involves a Family Court Judge, Robert N. Going, who was removed from office by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct. The charges stemmed from creating a hostile work environment, engaging in erratic behavior, and issuing an improper ex parte order. The Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s decision, finding ample evidence of misconduct that detracted from the dignity of the office and disrupted court operations. The court emphasized that judges are held to a higher standard and that the judge’s actions, coupled with a lack of contrition, warranted removal to maintain public confidence in the judiciary.

    Facts

    Judge Going engaged in a romantic relationship with a court attorney and argued with her in open court. He created a hostile work environment for his law clerk, including interfering with her boyfriend’s employment. After the relationship ended, his behavior became erratic, including panic attacks that disrupted court operations. He also took hostile actions against the Chief Clerk. Judge Going also issued an ex parte order reinstating a friend’s driver’s license that had been suspended for failure to pay child support, despite knowing the individual was in arrears.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated Judge Going based on a complaint from the Deputy Chief Administrative Judge. The Commission filed a Formal Written Complaint containing two charges. After an evidentiary hearing, the Referee filed a report, and the Commission sustained both charges, directing removal from office. Judge Going sought review of the Commission’s determination in the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Commission lacked jurisdiction to investigate the ex parte order charge (Charge II) due to the absence of a separate written complaint regarding that specific instance of misconduct.

    2. Whether the Commission’s determination to remove Judge Going from office was supported by the record and the law.

    Holding

    1. No, because Judge Going waived any objection to the scope of the inquiry by failing to object to it during his appearance before the commission and because the principal purposes of a complaint were satisfied.

    2. No, because the record contained ample evidence of misconduct that detracted from the dignity of his office, disrupted the operations of the court, and constituted an abuse of his judicial and administrative power.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that Judge Going waived any objection to the Commission’s jurisdiction regarding Charge II by failing to object to the inquiry during his appearance. The court emphasized that the purposes of a complaint were satisfied because Judge Going was notified and had the opportunity to prepare. On the merits, the court found substantial evidence of misconduct, including creating a hostile work environment, erratic behavior, and the improper ex parte order. The court emphasized that judges are held to a higher standard of conduct than the general public. The court quoted Matter of Aldrich v State Commn. on Judicial Conduct, 58 NY2d 279, 283 stating “members of the judiciary are held to higher standards of conduct than members of the public at large and that relatively slight improprieties subject the judiciary as a whole to public criticism and rebuke”. The court found that Judge Going’s actions constituted “truly egregious” misconduct, warranting removal to maintain public confidence in the judiciary. The court also noted Judge Going’s lack of contrition and additional improprieties during the investigation exacerbated his misconduct.

  • Matter of Mazzei, 81 N.Y.2d 26 (1993): Judicial Conduct and Sanctions for Ethical Violations

    Matter of Mazzei, 81 N.Y.2d 26 (1993)

    Judges must be held to a higher standard of conduct than the public at large, and removal from office is an appropriate sanction for egregious ethical violations, particularly when they involve willful disregard of ethical responsibilities and undermine the integrity of the judiciary.

    Summary

    This case concerns a Town Justice, Mazzei, who faced multiple charges of misconduct, including allowing an attorney with whom he shared office space to appear before him without disclosure, neglecting his judicial duties, making inappropriate remarks about a fellow judge, permitting a private individual to make ex parte sentencing recommendations, and representing his former court clerk in a suit against the Town. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the State Commission on Judicial Conduct’s determination that Mazzei should be removed from office, finding that his conduct was egregious and demonstrated a willful disregard for his ethical obligations.

    Facts

    The Justice shared office space with an attorney who appeared before him in court without disclosing their relationship. He neglected over 100 cases for eight months. The Justice made obscene and sexist remarks about a fellow Town Justice. He allowed a private individual to sit at the bench and make ex parte sentencing recommendations, even after being cautioned against this practice. Finally, he represented his former court clerk in an action against the Town where he served as a Justice.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated the Justice’s conduct, held an evidentiary hearing, and sustained five charges of misconduct. The Commission determined that the Justice should be removed from judicial office. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Commission’s determination, finding it supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and accepted the determined sanction of removal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Commission’s determinations of judicial misconduct were supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
    2. Whether the sanction of removal from judicial office was appropriate given the Justice’s conduct.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Commission’s determinations were supported by a preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing.
    2. Yes, because the Justice’s conduct was “truly egregious,” demonstrating a willful disregard for his ethical responsibilities and undermining the integrity of the judiciary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that judges must be held to a higher standard of conduct than the public at large. The court noted that the Justice’s repeated disparagement of his judicial colleague undermined the dignity of the court and the judicial system. His neglect of cases, continued use of a private individual for sentencing recommendations after being cautioned against it, and representation of his former clerk in a suit against the Town, all demonstrated a deliberate evasion and violation of his ethical responsibilities. The court stated that the “ ‘truly egregious’ standard is measured with due regard to the fact that Judges must be held to a higher standard of conduct than the public at large.” Because of the multiple instances of misconduct, the Court found removal from office to be the appropriate sanction. The court found the Justice’s actions were “not merely the result of negligent oversight or lack of awareness of appropriate norms of judicial behavior. Rather, he deliberately evaded and violated his ethical responsibilities as a Judge.”

  • In re Roberts, 91 N.Y.2d 94 (1997): Judicial Misconduct and Removal from Office

    In re Roberts, 91 N.Y.2d 94 (1997)

    A judge’s actions demonstrating a demonstrable lack of fitness for judicial office, including abusing judicial authority, displaying gross insensitivity in domestic abuse matters, and failing to disclose potential conflicts of interest, warrant removal from judicial office.

    Summary

    The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct determined that Justice Donald R. Roberts should be removed from his position as Justice of the Malone Village Court. The charges stemmed from various instances of misconduct in 1994. The Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s determination, finding that the sustained charges, in the aggregate, demonstrated a lack of fitness for judicial office, justifying removal and a ban from future judicial service. The Court emphasized the egregious nature of the Justice’s actions, including abuse of authority and insensitivity in domestic abuse cases.

    Facts

    Justice Roberts directed the arrest and sentencing of an individual to 89 days in jail for failing to pay the full amount of a court-ordered surcharge related to a theft of services charge (a $1.50 cab fare), without affording the individual basic constitutional and procedural safeguards. The individual had already paid the restitution for the original charge, but was unable to pay the full $90 surcharge immediately. Justice Roberts made callous comments regarding domestic abuse, suggesting that orders of protection are worthless and failing to issue an appropriate protective order in a relevant case. He also failed to inform a litigant of a potential basis for recusal, creating an appearance of impropriety.

    Procedural History

    The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated Justice Roberts and preferred five specifications of judicial misconduct. The Hearing Officer and the Commission sustained four of the charges. Justice Roberts sought review of the Commission’s determination in the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals conducted a plenary review of the record and upheld the Commission’s decision to remove Justice Roberts from office.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Justice Roberts’ actions, including the unlawful jailing of a defendant for failure to pay a surcharge, his callous comments and actions regarding domestic abuse matters, and his failure to disclose a potential conflict of interest, constitute judicial misconduct.

    2. Whether the sustained charges of judicial misconduct warrant the sanction of removal from judicial office.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Justice Roberts’ actions demonstrated a gross abuse of judicial authority, insensitivity to domestic abuse issues, and a disregard for proper judicial conduct, all of which constitute judicial misconduct.

    2. Yes, because the aggregate of the sustained charges reveals a demonstrable lack of fitness for judicial office, justifying the ultimate discipline of removal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that Justice Roberts committed a “most serious abuse of judicial authority” by ordering the arrest and sentencing of an individual without due process for failing to pay a surcharge. The Court noted that the Justice treated the matter as a personal affront and disregarded the judicial function. The Court also found that Justice Roberts demonstrated gross insensitivity in domestic abuse matters, citing his callous comments and failure to issue a protective order. The Court emphasized the importance of judicial demeanor and temperament, noting Justice Roberts’ failure to inform a litigant of a potential basis for recusal, which created an impermissible appearance of impropriety. The Court stated, “Together with charges one and four, these additional charges paint a picture of an individual who is unable to appreciate the unique judicial role, does not measure or control his conduct, and dispositionally or predispositionally disregards protocols and procedures.” The Court concluded that Justice Roberts’ actions demonstrated an inability to appreciate the judicial role and a disregard for proper procedures, warranting removal from office.

  • Matter of Robert, 89 N.Y.2d 745 (1997): Judicial Misconduct and Impropriety

    Matter of Robert, 89 N.Y.2d 745 (1997)

    A judge must avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, and removal from office is warranted when a judge presides over cases involving close friends and confronts critics in an unprofessional manner, even after being cautioned about such behavior.

    Summary

    This case concerns a Justice of the Chester Town Court who was charged with judicial misconduct for presiding over cases involving his friends and for confronting a woman who had criticized him in a newspaper letter. The Commission on Judicial Conduct found him guilty of misconduct, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that his actions warranted removal from office because they demonstrated a lack of understanding of the serious nature of his conduct and a disregard for the rules of judicial conduct, even after being cautioned by the Commission.

    Facts

    The petitioner, a Justice of the Chester Town Court, was charged with violating the Rules of Judicial Conduct. The charges included presiding over cases involving his friends, despite prior cautions from the Commission on Judicial Conduct against such behavior. He was also charged with confronting a woman in the presence of her employer after she wrote a letter to the editor critical of him.

    Procedural History

    The Commission on Judicial Conduct designated a Referee who held a hearing. The Referee found the factual allegations of the charges were sustained. The Commission confirmed the Referee’s findings and determined the petitioner engaged in misconduct warranting removal from office. Three members of the Commission dissented with respect to the sanction, voting for censure instead. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the actions of the Justice of the Chester Town Court, specifically presiding over cases involving friends and confronting a critic, constitute judicial misconduct warranting removal from office.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Justice’s conduct demonstrated a failure to comprehend the serious nature of his actions and a disregard for the rules of judicial conduct, even after being cautioned by the Commission, thus making him unfit for judicial office.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that each of the charges against the Justice was established. The court cited Matter of Murphy, 82 NY2d 491, 495 and Matter of Fabrizio, 65 NY2d 275 to support the impropriety of presiding over cases involving close friends. The court emphasized that the Justice failed to understand the seriousness of his conduct. He even testified that he intended to continue presiding over matters involving his friends. The Court noted, “The fact that the misconduct continued even after petitioner was on notice that the Commission considered his actions improper demonstrates that he is not fit for judicial office (see, Rules of Judicial Conduct [22 NYCRR] § 100.2 [a]; Matter of Hamel, 88 NY2d 317, 320) and that the sanction of removal is appropriate (Matter of Sims, 61 NY2d 349, 356).” This continuation of misconduct, even after being cautioned, was a key factor in the Court’s decision to uphold the sanction of removal.

  • In the Matter of Josephine D. Tyler, 75 N.Y.2d 525 (1990): Judicial Misconduct and Sanctions for Impartiality Violations

    In the Matter of Josephine D. Tyler, 75 N.Y.2d 525 (1990)

    A judge’s actions demonstrating partiality, abuse of power, and failure to uphold the integrity of the judiciary warrant severe sanctions, including removal from office.

    Summary

    This case involves a review of a determination by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct to remove Justice Josephine Tyler from her position as a Town Court Justice. The Commission found her guilty of multiple acts of misconduct, including presiding over a case involving her husband, improperly ordering child support, using court stationery for personal matters, and striking a defendant. The New York Court of Appeals upheld most of the Commission’s findings and agreed that removal was the appropriate sanction, emphasizing the importance of impartiality and fairness in the judicial system.

    Facts

    Josephine Tyler, a Justice of the Caneadea Town Court, engaged in the following actions:

    1. Issued an arrest warrant for a defendant who gave her husband a dishonored check and then presided over the arraignment, setting bail at $5,000 and failing to appoint counsel, despite being advised to disqualify herself.
    2. Improperly ordered a defendant charged with harassment to pay child support.
    3. Sent a letter on court stationery to a contractor regarding a dispute over the installation of a septic tank at her father’s property.
    4. Requested a young man she had sentenced to return to court and struck him with a telephone directory after accusing him of vandalism.
    5. Sent a personal letter in a Town Court envelope to tenants of an apartment building owned by her father regarding water usage and also sent a letter to an attorney concerning the water quality.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated Justice Tyler and sustained five of seven charges of misconduct. The Commission determined that removal from office was the appropriate sanction. Justice Tyler then sought review of the Commission’s determination in the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence substantiates the Commission’s findings of judicial misconduct.
    2. Whether the sanction of removal from office is an appropriate punishment for the sustained charges of misconduct.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the evidence supports the Commission’s findings regarding charges I, V, VI, and supplemental charge I. Charge III was not supported by sufficient evidence.
    2. Yes, because Justice Tyler’s actions demonstrated a lack of fairness, impartiality, and self-restraint, posing a threat to the proper administration of justice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals conducted an independent review of the record, giving due deference to the Commission’s determination. It found sufficient evidence to support most of the charges. The Court emphasized that Justice Tyler’s actions, particularly her handling of the dishonored check case involving her husband, displayed a clear lack of impartiality. The court cited Matter of VonderHeide, 72 NY2d 658, 661, noting that the judge’s continuance in office would pose a threat to the proper administration of justice.

    Regarding the child support order (charge III), the Court agreed with Justice Tyler that it was an error of law rather than intentional misconduct. However, the Court found that the other actions sufficiently demonstrated a pattern of abuse of power and disregard for judicial ethics. The Court highlighted her failure to heed the advice of the District Attorney and a County Court Judge to disqualify herself. The Court concluded that “her conduct displayed a lack of the basic qualities of fairness, impartiality and self-restraint which are essential for judicial office.” This behavior violated multiple sections of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Therefore, the Court accepted the Commission’s determined sanction of removal from office, without costs.

  • In re Intemann, 73 N.Y.2d 580 (1989): Judicial Conduct and the Sanction of Removal

    In re Intemann, 73 N.Y.2d 580 (1989)

    A judge’s participation in business activities, practicing law while in office, failure to disqualify himself in cases involving close associates, and lack of candor during investigations warrant removal from judicial office.

    Summary

    Judge Intemann was charged with violating the Rules of Judicial Conduct for engaging in business activities, practicing law while serving as a judge, and failing to recuse himself in cases involving a close friend and business associate. The Commission on Judicial Conduct sustained the charges and recommended removal, finding that the judge also lacked candor during the investigation. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s determination and imposed the sanction of removal, emphasizing the serious nature of the misconduct and the judge’s dishonesty.

    Facts

    William H. Intemann, Jr., was elected as a Judge in Hamilton County in November 1983, taking office on January 1, 1984. From January 1984 to January 1986, Intemann actively participated in managing three businesses organized for profit, including retaining counsel and executing contracts. After assuming his judicial role, Intemann continued to practice law, specifically attempting to finalize three estate matters without informing the clients or transferring the files to the attorney who took over his practice. He also instructed a client to sign an undated estate tax form, which he later signed and backdated to appear as if he completed it before taking office. Furthermore, he intercepted mail addressed to the attorney who took over his practice to handle estate matters himself. During his first two years in office, Judge Intemann presided over 21 cases brought by an attorney who was a close friend, business associate, and his personal attorney.

    Procedural History

    The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated Judge Intemann’s conduct and sustained charges of violating the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct. The Commission recommended removal from office. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Commission’s determination.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Judge Intemann’s participation in business activities after assuming judicial office violated section 100.5(c)(2) of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct?

    2. Whether Judge Intemann’s actions in continuing to practice law, deceiving clients, and falsifying documents constituted judicial misconduct?

    3. Whether Judge Intemann’s failure to disqualify himself from cases involving a close friend and business associate created an appearance of impropriety and conflict of interest?

    4. Whether the sanction of removal from office was appropriate given the nature and extent of Judge Intemann’s misconduct and lack of candor during the investigation?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the unrebutted evidence showed Judge Intemann actively participated in the management of three businesses organized for profit after taking judicial office, violating section 100.5(c)(2) of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct.

    2. Yes, because Judge Intemann continued to practice law after becoming a judge, deceived his clients, and falsified documents related to estate matters, all of which constituted judicial misconduct.

    3. Yes, because the close relationship between Judge Intemann and the attorney appearing before him in 21 cases created an appearance of impropriety and a potential conflict of interest, requiring disqualification.

    4. Yes, because the serious nature of Judge Intemann’s improper acts, including deception practiced on clients and his lack of candor during the investigation and hearing, warranted removal from office.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Commission’s findings that Judge Intemann violated the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct. The court emphasized that Judge Intemann’s active participation in business activities, continuing to practice law while in office, and failure to recuse himself created an appearance of impropriety. The court found his attempts to conceal his continued legal practice, including intercepting mail and falsifying documents, particularly egregious. The court noted, “In evaluating the sanction imposed, we find significant not only the serious nature of petitioner’s improper acts, including the deception practiced on several of his clients, but also petitioner’s lack of candor during the investigation and hearing. Such conduct cannot be condoned in a Judge and petitioner should be removed from office.” The court concluded that because of the serious misconduct and lack of candor displayed by the judge, removal from office was the appropriate sanction. The court cited Matter of Conti, 70 NY2d 416, 419 for the principle that judges must avoid even the appearance of impropriety.

  • Matter of Myers, 67 N.Y.2d 11 (1986): Judicial Misconduct and Removal from Office

    Matter of Myers, 67 N.Y.2d 11 (1986)

    A pattern of judicial misconduct, including deliberate falsification of court records, failure to advise litigants of their rights, and disregard of statutory procedures, warrants removal from judicial office to safeguard the integrity of the bench.

    Summary

    This case involves a Judge of the Rensselaer County Family Court, who was found by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct to have engaged in a course of conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The charges included falsifying court reports, failing to advise litigants of their rights, disregarding statutory procedures, and engaging in improper ex parte communication. The Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s determination that the judge’s misconduct warranted removal from office, emphasizing the need to safeguard the bench from unfit incumbents.

    Facts

    The Judge was elected to the Rensselaer County Family Court in 1977. In 1982, the Commission on Judicial Conduct filed a complaint alleging 20 counts of misconduct. These counts included directing a court clerk to falsify court reports to the Office of Court Administration (OCA) regarding pending cases, failing to advise litigants of their right to counsel and a hearing, failing to require sworn financial disclosure statements, entering dispositional orders without jurisdiction, initiating improper ex parte communication, refusing to allow an attorney to appear, and refusing to work due to staffing issues.

    Procedural History

    A referee initially found that none of the counts were sustained, attributing the judge’s actions to good faith mistakes, misapprehension of legal issues, poor judgment, or lack of experience. The Commission on Judicial Conduct moved to disaffirm the referee’s findings. The Commission found the judge guilty of 9 of the 20 counts. Subsequently, the Commission determined that the misconduct warranted removal from office, a decision which was then reviewed by the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence supports the Commission’s finding that the judge deliberately falsified reports to the Office of Court Administration.
    2. Whether the judge’s repeated failure to advise litigants of their constitutional and statutory rights constitutes judicial misconduct warranting disciplinary action.
    3. Whether the judge’s disregard of important statutory procedures, such as failing to require sworn financial disclosure statements and entering dispositional orders without jurisdiction, constitutes judicial misconduct.
    4. Whether the sanction of removal is excessive, given the judge’s alleged inexperience, court congestion, and personal conflicts with court staff.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the testimony of the deputy clerk, corroborated by the chief clerk, established that the judge directed the falsification of court records to conceal the number of cases exceeding OCA deadlines.
    2. Yes, because a repeated pattern of failing to advise litigants of their constitutional and statutory rights is a serious violation that undermines the fairness of the judicial process.
    3. Yes, because the judge’s consistent disregard of statutory procedures, coupled with an unwillingness to recognize the impropriety, indicates a threat to the proper administration of justice.
    4. No, because the judge’s actions, including the deliberate falsification of court records and the disregard of litigants’ rights, are inconsistent with the fair and proper administration of justice, rendering him unfit to remain in office.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that the judge directed a deputy clerk to falsify reports to the OCA, which demonstrated a deliberate attempt to deceive the court administration. The court emphasized the deputy clerk’s credible testimony, which was partially corroborated by another court employee. The court stated, “Having examined the relevant testimony on this point, we conclude that the Commission’s finding of deliberate falsification was correct”.

    The court noted the judge’s repeated failure to advise litigants of their rights to counsel and to remain silent, especially in cases involving child custody and paternity. The court distinguished this case from situations involving mere errors of law, stating, “A repeated pattern of failing to advise litigants of their constitutional and statutory rights, however, is serious misconduct”. The court found that these omissions caused serious damage, even if the judge was not abusive to the litigants.

    The court highlighted the judge’s disregard of statutory procedures, such as failing to require sworn financial disclosure statements and entering orders without jurisdiction. These errors, the court stated, were fundamental and, when coupled with the judge’s unwillingness to acknowledge their impropriety, indicated a threat to the administration of justice. The court cited Matter of Aldrich v State Comm. on Judicial Conduct, 58 NY2d 279 and Matter of Shilling, 51 NY2d 397 in support of this conclusion.

    Addressing the sanction of removal, the court stated that the purpose of judicial disciplinary proceedings is “not punishment but the imposition of sanctions where necessary to safeguard the Bench from unfit incumbents”. The court rejected the judge’s argument that his misconduct was due to inexperience, court congestion, or personal feuds. The court found that these factors did not excuse the deliberate falsification of records and the disregard for litigants’ rights. The court concluded that the judge’s conduct was inconsistent with the fair administration of justice and rendered him unfit to remain in office.