New York Law Review

Tag: remarriage

  • Gaden v. Gaden, 29 N.Y.2d 80 (1971): Recovery of Gift Made in Contemplation of Remarriage

    Gaden v. Gaden, 29 N.Y.2d 80 (1971)

    A transfer of property between former spouses, even after a divorce, can be considered a gift made in contemplation of marriage (remarriage) and thus recoverable under Civil Rights Law § 80-b if the remarriage does not occur.

    Summary

    Following a divorce, a husband transferred a half-interest in the family home to his former wife. The parties intended to remarry, but the remarriage never occurred. The husband then sought to recover the transferred interest under Civil Rights Law § 80-b, arguing it was a gift made in contemplation of marriage. The trial court granted the husband’s claim, but the Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the transfer was indeed a gift made in contemplation of marriage and was therefore recoverable because the contemplated marriage did not occur, regardless of fault.

    Facts

    The Gadens were married, divorced, and then resumed cohabitation. During the period of cohabitation after their divorce, the husband conveyed a one-half interest in their home to the wife. Both parties contemplated remarriage. However, the couple never remarried and ultimately separated. The husband claimed he transferred the property solely in contemplation of remarriage.

    Procedural History

    The husband sued to recover the one-half interest in the home, asserting it was a gift made in contemplation of marriage under Civil Rights Law § 80-b. The trial court ruled in favor of the husband. The Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating the trial court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the transfer of a property interest from a former spouse to another, during a period of cohabitation following a divorce, can be considered a “gift made in contemplation of marriage” under Civil Rights Law § 80-b, and thus recoverable when the contemplated marriage does not occur.

    Holding

    Yes, because the transfer of a half-interest in the family dwelling was considered a gift in sole consideration of a ceremonial remarriage, even after a decade of marriage, separation, and divorce. The gift is recoverable under Civil Rights Law § 80-b because the contemplated marriage did not take place.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals interpreted Civil Rights Law § 80-b to allow recovery of gifts made in contemplation of marriage when the marriage does not occur, regardless of which party is at fault for the failure to marry. The court reasoned that the statute’s purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment when a marriage fails after a gift has been given in anticipation of it. The court stated, “[t]he issue of fault, relevant at common law, has been eliminated by the statute.” The court found that the husband’s transfer of the property interest to the wife was indeed a gift made in contemplation of marriage, based on the circumstances and the husband’s stated intent. The dissent argued that applying the statute to a couple with a long history, including marriage, divorce, and cohabitation, distorts the legislative intent behind the statute. The dissent further contended that the transfer was more akin to a resumption of marital relations than a gift in contemplation of marriage, noting the husband’s testimony that he wanted the home in both their names to demonstrate his good faith in rebuilding their marriage. Judge Breitel in dissent stated that the words of the statute “may fit, but the picture portrayed does not.” He further argued that “the statutory language referring to ‘sole consideration’ for the ‘gift’ is distorted to elide so substantial a legal and economic consideration as an equally shared obligation on the purchase-money obligation and mortgage.”

  • Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218 (1954): Effect of a Void Remarriage on Alimony Obligations

    Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218 (1954)

    A former husband’s obligation to pay alimony to his former wife, which terminated upon her remarriage, is not revived even if the remarriage is later declared void, provided the wife has a statutory right to seek support from her second, albeit invalid, marriage partner.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a husband’s alimony obligations to his ex-wife are reinstated after her subsequent marriage is declared void. The separation agreement stipulated alimony would cease upon the wife’s remarriage. When the wife’s second marriage was annulled, she sought to revive her ex-husband’s alimony payments. The court held that because New York law (Domestic Relations Law § 236) allows a court in an annulment action to order the second husband to support the wife, the first husband’s obligation remains terminated. The rationale hinges on the policy consideration that the wife has an avenue for support from her second “husband,” thus negating the need to revive the first husband’s duty.

    Facts

    Mr. Gaines and Ms. Jacobsen entered into a separation agreement where Mr. Gaines agreed to pay alimony until Ms. Jacobsen remarried. Ms. Jacobsen subsequently remarried, and Mr. Gaines ceased alimony payments. The second marriage was later annulled because Ms. Jacobsen’s second husband had a living wife at the time of the marriage. Ms. Jacobsen then sought to reinstate alimony payments from Mr. Gaines.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled in favor of Ms. Jacobsen, reinstating Mr. Gaines’ alimony obligation. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the annulment of the second marriage did not revive Mr. Gaines’ alimony obligation. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a former husband’s obligation to pay alimony to his former wife, which terminated upon her remarriage, is revived when the remarriage is subsequently annulled.

    Holding

    No, because New York Domestic Relations Law § 236 allows a court, in an annulment action, to direct the husband to provide support for the wife, eliminating the need to revive the prior husband’s obligation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from its prior decision in Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 366 (1929), where alimony was reinstated after the annulment of a subsequent marriage. The critical difference was the enactment of Civil Practice Act § 1140-a (now Domestic Relations Law § 236) between the two decisions. This statute empowers courts to order support for a wife in an annulment action. The court reasoned that because the wife now has a legal avenue to seek support from her second husband (even if the marriage was void), the need to revive the first husband’s obligation is eliminated. The court stated, “Today, through the operation of section 1140-a, the wife can receive support from the husband of the annulled marriage, where ‘justice requires,’ and there is no more reason to revive the obligation of the first husband—a stranger to the annulment—than there would be if the marriage were terminated by divorce.” The court emphasized the policy consideration that the law should avoid imposing a double burden on the first husband when the wife has recourse for support from her second marriage. This decision effectively limits Sleicher to situations where the wife has no statutory right to support from the annulled marriage partner. The dissenting opinion argued that because in this specific case the second husband had died after commencement of the litigation, section 1140-a would be of no avail to the wife, and therefore the holding in Sleicher should control.