New York Law Review

Tag: religious discrimination

  • Scheiber v. St. John’s University, 84 N.Y.2d 120 (1994): Religious Institution Exemption from Anti-Discrimination Laws

    Scheiber v. St. John’s University, 84 N.Y.2d 120 (1994)

    A religious institution’s exemption from anti-discrimination laws, under New York Executive Law § 296(11), permits preferential hiring of individuals sharing the same faith to promote its religious principles, but does not allow for wholesale discrimination based on religion unrelated to those principles.

    Summary

    Donald Scheiber, a Jewish former Vice-President of Student Life at St. John’s University (SJU), sued after being fired, alleging religious discrimination. SJU claimed the firing was due to poor performance and asserted an affirmative defense under Executive Law § 296(11), allowing religious institutions to prefer employees of the same religion. The New York Court of Appeals held that while SJU qualifies as a religious institution under the statute, summary judgment was inappropriate because there were disputed issues of fact as to whether SJU was actually exercising its statutory preference or engaging in unlawful discrimination.

    Facts

    Donald Scheiber, a Jewish man, worked at St. John’s University (SJU) for 20 years, eventually becoming Vice-President of Student Life. After a new University President was appointed, Scheiber was fired. SJU is operated in connection with the Vincentian order, a Roman Catholic religious organization. Scheiber claimed that the new administration, particularly the President’s preference for Vincentians, was a pretext for religious discrimination, violating state and federal laws, and that he was singled out for increased scrutiny as the only Jewish Vice-President. SJU maintained Scheiber was terminated due to poor job performance and invoked its right to prefer Roman Catholics in certain positions.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted SJU’s motion for summary judgment under Executive Law § 296(11), finding that SJU could prefer a Roman Catholic for the Vice President of Student Life position. The Appellate Division affirmed. Scheiber appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether St. John’s University, as an institution operated in connection with a religious order, is entitled to claim the religious exemption under Executive Law § 296(11)?

    Whether, even if SJU is a religious institution, the exemption under Executive Law § 296(11) automatically entitles it to summary judgment against a claim of religious discrimination?

    Holding

    Yes, SJU is a religious institution entitled to claim the exemption because it is an educational organization operated in connection with the Vincentian order.

    No, because disputed issues of fact existed as to whether the University was exercising the preference allowed by statute or engaging in unlawful discrimination, therefore, SJU did not establish a basis for summary judgment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that SJU qualified as a religious institution under Executive Law § 296(11) because it is an educational organization connected with the Vincentian order. However, the court emphasized that the religious exemption is not a license for wholesale discrimination. Citing Matter of Klein (Hartnett), 78 NY2d 662, 667, the court stated that the Human Rights Law should be read to accomplish its anti-discriminatory purpose, and the exemption is narrow, intended to allow preference in hiring to promote religious principles. The court found that the exemption operates to exclude from the definition of “discrimination” exercise of a preference in hiring for persons of the same faith where that action is calculated by the institution to effectuate its religious mission. A religious employer may not discriminate against an individual for reasons having nothing to do with the free exercise of religion and then invoke the exemption as a shield against its unlawful conduct. The court noted SJU’s denial of preferential hiring and its advertisement as an equal opportunity employer contradicted its defense. Because SJU did not conclusively demonstrate that it fired Scheiber to promote its religious principles by hiring a Catholic replacement, a genuine issue of material fact remained, precluding summary judgment. The court emphasized the absence of an undisputed factual predicate to delve into complex constitutional issues of Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.

  • Imperial Diner, Inc. v. State Human Rights Appeal Board, 52 N.Y.2d 72 (1980): Single Incident of Ethnic Slurs Creates Hostile Work Environment

    52 N.Y.2d 72 (1980)

    A single incident of sufficiently humiliating ethnic or religious slurs can constitute discrimination creating a hostile work environment, violating laws against discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a single incident where an employer made an egregious antisemitic remark to a waitress was sufficient to establish a discriminatory practice violating the state’s human rights law. The waitress quit after the incident. The Court emphasized that the statute should be liberally construed to combat discrimination, and that an employer’s discriminatory intent is often subtle. The Court found that the employer’s crude and open contempt created a hostile work environment, and that his subsequent refusal to apologize justified the finding of a constructive discharge. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating the Human Rights Division’s order.

    Facts

    Eleanor Rose, a waitress at Imperial Diner, was assigned to a less desirable counter station. After being reassigned to a table station by the head waitress, Rose thanked the diner’s president, believing he was responsible for the change. In response, the president made an obscene antisemitic remark, stating she thought she was special because she was Jewish, like other Jewish women working there. When Rose expressed shock, the president repeated the remark and refused to apologize. Rose left the diner. She informed another owner, who suggested she return and ignore the incident, but Rose insisted on a public apology. When she went to collect her paycheck days later, the president again refused to apologize.

    Procedural History

    The State Division of Human Rights found Imperial Diner and its president guilty of discrimination, ordering a written apology, reinstatement with back pay, and $500 in damages. The Human Rights Appeal Board affirmed this determination. Imperial Diner then sought to annul the determination in the Appellate Division, which granted the petition, finding a lack of evidence of a systematic pattern of discrimination. The State Division of Human Rights appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a single incident of egregious ethnic slurs by an employer is sufficient to constitute discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment, violating Executive Law § 296(1)(a)?

    Whether the employee’s decision to quit constituted a constructive discharge?

    Holding

    Yes, because the statute prohibits discrimination, and not just repeated discriminatory acts. The employer’s contempt created a hostile work environment directly related to her working conditions.

    Yes, because the commissioner could reasonably conclude that the employer’s refusal to apologize, coupled with the offensive remarks, created an intolerable atmosphere that compelled the employee to resign.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that the Human Rights Law must be liberally construed to achieve its purposes. Discriminatory intent is rarely announced openly, but often pursued through subtle means. Here, the employer’s contempt was blatant, creating a humiliating environment for the complainant. The Court stated, “This type of vilification is humiliating, not only when it is done wholesale, but also, and perhaps especially, when it is directed at a lone individual in an isolated incident.” A single, sufficiently egregious incident is enough to constitute discrimination; a pattern of repeated acts is not required.

    The Court also addressed the issue of constructive discharge, noting that an employer may create conditions so intolerable that an employee is compelled to quit. While the employer offered the waitress her job back, his persistent refusal to apologize for the offensive remarks allowed the commissioner to find that she was compelled to resign. The Court deferred to the commissioner’s broad discretion in fashioning a remedy, finding that the ordered relief, including back pay and a written apology, was reasonably related to the discriminatory conduct. The court stated, “That is not to say that this was the only conclusion that the commissioner could have drawn from the facts. However, it was a reasonable one and thus may not be set aside by the courts although a contrary decision may “have been reasonable and also sustainable”

    In dissent, Judge Meyer argued that requiring a written apology violated the employer’s First Amendment rights. He also argued that back pay should not be awarded for periods when the complainant was otherwise employed.

  • Eastern Greyhound Lines v. New York State Division of Human Rights, 27 N.Y.2d 279 (1970): Employer Duty to Accommodate Religious Practices

    27 N.Y.2d 279 (1970)

    An employer’s uniformly applied grooming policy does not constitute religious discrimination unless it is demonstrated that the policy was motivated by discriminatory intent towards a specific religious creed.

    Summary

    Abdullahi Ibrahim, an Orthodox Muslim, was denied a baggage clerk position at Eastern Greyhound Lines because his religious beliefs required him to wear a beard, conflicting with the company’s clean-shaven policy for employees dealing with the public. He filed a complaint alleging religious discrimination. The New York State Division of Human Rights found Greyhound’s policy discriminatory, but the Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal, holding that a uniformly applied grooming policy, absent discriminatory intent, does not violate the Human Rights Law, and that employers are not required to accommodate every individual religious practice.

    Facts

    Abdullahi Ibrahim, an Orthodox Muslim, applied for a baggage clerk position at Eastern Greyhound Lines. He was informed by a company representative, McCarter, that the position required employees to be clean-shaven. Ibrahim explained that his religious beliefs mandated he wear a beard. Greyhound’s policy required employees dealing with the public to be “freshly shaven”. The company employed other Muslims.

    Procedural History

    Ibrahim filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights, alleging an unlawful discriminatory employment practice. A hearing commissioner ruled in favor of Ibrahim. The State Human Rights Appeal Board confirmed the commissioner’s decision. The Appellate Division reversed and annulled the Appeal Board’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an employer’s uniformly applied clean-shaven policy, with no demonstrated discriminatory intent, constitutes unlawful religious discrimination under Section 296 of the Human Rights Law when it conflicts with an employee’s religious practices?

    Holding

    No, because the employer’s general policy, uniformly applied, does not constitute an unlawful discriminatory practice in the absence of actual discrimination based on creed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the company’s policy, requiring employees to be clean-shaven, was based on a desire to promote a positive business image and attract public support. The court emphasized that there was no evidence suggesting that the policy was motivated by discriminatory intent against Ibrahim’s religious creed. The court stated, “Policy resting on a desire to promote business by greater public support could justify the exclusion by an employer of beards and have no possible religious connotation.”

    The court distinguished this case from Sherbert v. Verner, noting that Sherbert dealt with state action and the denial of a public benefit based on religious grounds. The court highlighted that the failure to accommodate every individual religious requirement does not, in itself, constitute a violation of the Human Rights Law, absent actual discrimination based on creed. The court further cited Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., emphasizing the difference between religious discrimination and the failure to accommodate religious beliefs. The court concluded that requiring employers to accommodate the “special requirements of each individual’s religion” would create an unworkable standard. The court found no violation of the Human Rights Law because Greyhound’s policy was uniformly applied and not motivated by religious discrimination. The court stated, “The failure to make this kind of accommodation to particularization, which could assume many variations in appearance and in time schedules, is not in- itself or in the absence of actual discrimination based on creed, a violation of section 295 of the Human Bights Law.”

  • Lombardo v. Board of Higher Education, 13 N.Y.2d 1097 (1963): Pleading Requirements for Religious Bias Claims

    13 N.Y.2d 1097 (1963)

    A party alleging religious bias in promotion decisions must present specific instances and factual allegations sufficient to warrant a factual inquiry, though a showing of systematic exclusion is not the only method of proving unlawful discrimination.

    Summary

    Lombardo, et al., brought an Article 78 proceeding alleging religious bias in promotion decisions at a tax-supported college. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, finding that the petitioners’ allegations were insufficient to warrant a jury trial. While evidence of systematic exclusion or a generalized pattern can demonstrate unlawful discrimination, it’s not the exclusive method. The dissent argued that specific allegations of bias, coupled with findings from the State Commission for Human Rights, warranted a trial to resolve the factual issues.

    Facts

    The petitioners, Lombardo et al., claimed religious bias and prejudice influenced promotion decisions at a City University of New York (CUNY) college. The State Commission for Human Rights (formerly S.C.A.D.) had previously made findings suggesting that key personnel at Queens College resisted employing and promoting Catholic teachers. The petitioners cited specific instances to support their claim of bias.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in Special Term, which ruled in favor of the petitioners. The Appellate Division reversed Special Term’s order. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, upholding the dismissal of the petitioners’ claim, with a dissenting opinion arguing for reversal and reinstatement of the Special Term’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the petitioners presented sufficient evidence of religious bias in promotion decisions to warrant a jury trial.

    Holding

    No, because the petitioners did not present sufficient specific instances and factual allegations to necessitate a jury trial. The court found that the allegations, even when considered with the State Commission for Human Rights findings, did not establish a triable issue of fact requiring a trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority, in a brief per curiam decision, affirmed the Appellate Division’s order without providing detailed reasoning. The dissent, however, articulated a differing view. Judge Scileppi, in dissent, emphasized that bias and prejudice are often concealed and manifested through conduct. While systematic exclusion can demonstrate discrimination, it is not the only permissible method of proof. The dissent highlighted the specific instances alleged by the petitioners and the findings of the State Commission for Human Rights, which suggested resistance to the employment and promotion of Catholic teachers at Queens College. The dissent argued that these factors, taken together, demonstrated a triable issue of fact entitling the petitioners to their day in court. The dissent explicitly referenced precedent, stating, “I am not suggesting that every bare charge of discrimination should be tested by a trial; however, in this case we are confronted by allegations of specific instances tending to show the existence of bias and prejudice.”