Lublin v. Central Islip Psychiatric Center, 43 N.Y.2d 336 (1977)

An individual, validly committed after being acquitted of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect, bears the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that they can be released without posing a danger to themselves or others.

Summary

Lublin, acquitted of murdering his wife by reason of insanity and committed to a psychiatric center, petitioned for release, arguing he was no longer a danger. The trial court denied his petition, placing the burden of proof on Lublin. The Appellate Division reversed, asserting the burden should be on the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the individual seeking release from commitment after an insanity acquittal must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence that they are no longer dangerous. The Court reasoned that the state’s interest in protecting the public and providing for the mentally incompetent outweighs the individual’s liberty interest in this specific context.

Facts

Lublin killed his wife by stabbing her multiple times and then attempted suicide. He was found not guilty of murder by reason of mental disease or defect and committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene. Lublin was institutionalized for almost two years. The Commissioner repeatedly decided not to seek Lublin’s conditional release or discharge. Lublin initiated a proceeding seeking release, claiming he was no longer a danger to himself or others.

Procedural History

The Suffolk County Court denied Lublin’s petition for release, finding he failed to prove he could be released without danger. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the burden of proof should have been on the Commissioner and remanded for a new hearing. The New York Court of Appeals granted review.

Issue(s)

Whether an individual, validly committed after being acquitted of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect, who subsequently seeks release, must prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that they can be released without posing a danger to themselves or others?

Holding

Yes, because given the clear evidence of a dangerous mental condition, as evidenced by the commission of a violent act, it is appropriate that the condition be presumed to continue until the contrary is proven by the individual seeking release.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the traditional rule places the burden of proof on the party seeking affirmative relief. The Court emphasized that the question of burden of proof becomes significant when evidence is delicately balanced. Weighing Lublin’s liberty interest against the State’s parens patriae interest in the mentally incompetent and its police power to protect citizens, the Court found the State’s interest outweighs the individual’s. As Justice Titone stated, “where the underlying act was one of extreme violence, reasonable medical doubts and judicial doubts should be resolved in favor of the public * * * and, a fortiori, the burden of proof should devolve upon the detainee to show that he no longer constitutes a danger to himself or others.” The court clarified that the applicable standard of proof is a “fair preponderance of the credible evidence.” The court explicitly limited its holding to situations where the individual is seeking initial release, not revocation of conditional release.